1. Exaggeration as amplification

Aristotle defines exaggeration as the use of “indignant language […] painting a highly colored picture of the situation” (Rhet, II, 24, 1401b1-10, RR, p. 383), and notes its spectacular and curious effect in a judicial situation: “if the defendant does so, he produces an impression of his innocence; and if the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an impression of the defendant’s guilt” (ibid).

2. Exaggeration to absurdity

Exaggeration to absurdity is a technique of refutation known under the name of adynaton: “the arguer uses both hyperbole and apodioxis to establish a position by the exaggeration of the absurd of the opposite position” (Molinié 1992, Adynaton; for apodioxis, S. Dismissal)

This is a variant on refutation from the absurd, taken to the ridiculous:

To prevent accidents, leave your car at home!
To avoid recidivism, let us execute all offenders!

The mechanisms of argumentation are the same as those of the slippery slope argument, an invitation: “don’t stop now, the path is so good”, S. Slippery Slope; Laughter.

You want to be vegetarian, no problem, eat salad, go and graze on the lawn.

In the following passage the position “criminally insane people must be judged as everyone else” is rejected by showing that if intentionality is not taken into account, the very idea of criminal behavior becomes meaningless:

Let us judge all criminal acts. Whatever the level of consciousness of their perpetrators. And why not a dog? The news provides a tragic opportunity to further advance justice. […] And why does the cyclone that recently ravaged the West Indies, causing several victims and immense material damage, escape the wrath of justice?
M. Horeau, [Obvious Delirium]. Le Canard Enchaîné, 2007[1]

3. Minimization, or euphemization

Minimization strategies are used to deflect an accusation, when bad behavior is acknowledged as such, and its material significance is reduced to nothing. If I’m accused of having stolen a bicycle, for example, I might defend my actions thus: “Oh yes, but it’s just an old broken worthless bike.”

The associated feeling is indifference, and the accuser is encouraged to cool down, S. Calm. Anything can be euphemized, even torture:

30-7-84 Christian Von Wernich (chaplain [capellán] of the Police of Buenos Aires, currently priest in Bragado) (statement to the magazine Siete Días):
Tell me that Camps has tortured a poor guy whom nobody knows, good, okay then. But how could he have tortured Jacobo Timermann, a journalist about whom there was constant and decisive global pressure, if only for that!
Carlos Santibáñez & Mónica Acosta, [The Two Churches], [1996].[2]

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[1] L. M. Horeau, “Flagrants délires”. Le Canard Enchaîné, (a satirical newspaper) August 29, 2007. P. 1
[2] Carlos Santibáñez & Mónica Acosta, Las dos Iglesias. Report commemorating the 20th anniversary of the assassination of Bishop Angelelli.
www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/investig/dosigles/02.htm (11-08-2017).

Lat. ex datis, datum, “gift, present”.

The label “ad auditorem argument”, lat. auditor “listener” is used by Schopenhauer ([1864], p. 43).

The ex datis argumentation is not based on facts or experience, but on what has been admitted, “given”, or conceded by the interlocutor, the audience or the adversary. The arguer reasons, “from what has been granted” (Chenique 1975, p. 322). The ex datis argumentation is sometimes called ex concessis^@ (ibid.).

Like the ad hominem^@ argument, the ex datis argument is based on the beliefs of the audience. While the ad hominem argument exploits these beliefs to rebut the whole system, the ex datis argument exploits them for confirmation purposes only. Good knowledge of the audience’s character is important to argumentative rhetoric, because it provides the orator with a great reserve of such ex datis premises, S. Ethos.

If the interactional framework does not allow the revision of beliefs, this data cannot be questioned, and the conclusions based upon it are irrefutable in this context. From this data, the arguer concludes positively, “besides, you yourself sayit!”. Consider the issue, “Should we take military action in Syldavia?”:

You admit that the Syldavian troops are poorly trained and that the situation will soon be out of control;
and that the unrest in Syldavia may extend to the region;
we agree that this extension would threaten our security;
and no one denies that we must intervene if our security is threatened.
So, you should join us, the camp of the people who are in favor of a military intervention in Syldavia.

This strategy of argumentation has something to do with religious confession and philosophical maieutic. The listener is invited to assume the truth of his or her beliefs, that is the conclusion that he or she does not dare to draw, or is unable to express because of some intellectual or moral inhibition.

The ex datis argument scheme calls for a foundational and an ethical criticism. According to the foundational principles, to be valid, an inference must be based on true universal premises, whereas any ex datis argumentation is misleading because its premises are based upon local beliefs only. As the ex datis argument is the typical form of rhetorical argumentation, all such rhetorical arguments must be condemned.

From an ethical point of view, and unlike the logician arguing for what is, or what he truly believes to be true, the party putting forward an ex datis argument does not necessarily endorse and support the premises and rules borrowed from the audience. This is why the ex concessis argument may end up as a trap. People are generally expected to take responsibility for what they say, so the audience in good faith will normally allocate to the arguer the beliefs he or she argues from, even if the speaker only advances them ex concessis. Yet, if this arguer is better informed than the audience and knows that P is true (or false), whereas the listeners believe that P is false (or true); or if he or she has reliable information unknown from the audience, and takes into account only what the audience believes and knows, then, to say that the argument is ex datis, ex concessis, ad auditorem… is simply to say that the orator lies and manipulates the audience. S. Refutation; Manipulation.

 

In philosophy, Kant draws a distinction between ex datis knowledge based on experience, and ex principiis knowledge deduced from the first principles. History is the prototype of knowledge ex datis, philosophy and mathematics prototypes of knowledge ex principiis. Mere ex datis knowledge would be only a compilation of data. Extending the Kantian meaning, one might think that the ex datis argumentation is based on experience, “on the substance, on things themselves”. This interpretation would make ex datis an equivalent of the ad rem, to the matter^@ argument, and this does not seem to be the case. The use of the expression ex datis in argumentation is distinct from its use in philosophy.

Lat. ex concesso, pl. ex concessis; concessus, “concession, consent”.
Lat. ex concessu gentium: gentium, from gens “race, nation, people” translated as “argument from the consensus of nations”.

The Latin label ex concessis refers to two kinds of argumentation.

— Argumentation based upon the (alleged) universal consensus (ex concessu gentium), that is to say, from general agreement, S. Consensus; Authority.

— Argumentation based upon a local consensus, limited to the beliefs of the audience. The orator may or may not share these beliefs. With this meaning, the argument ex concessis is also called ex datis.

Some argument schemes are designated by Latin labels, S. Ab —; Ad —; Ex —. This entry lists the labels using the Latin preposition ex (rarely e, and never e before a vowel).

E/ex means “taken from”; in the construction “arguments e/ex N” the Latin noun N refers to the substance, from which the argument is drawn.

A list of “ex + N” Arguments

Latin name of the argument	• Meaning of the Latin word(s)Latin • (When necessary a word-for-word translation) • English equivalent(s) • Reference to the corresponding entry/ies
ex concessis (sg. ex concesso) e concessu gentium	Lat. concedere, “admit; agree with sb” — arg. from the consensus of nations ; from traditional wisdom; from what is admitted by the audience or the opponent — S. Consensus; Authority; Ex concessis; Ex datis; Beliefs of the Audience; Concession; Ad hominem.
e contrario [generally a contrario]	Lat. contrarius, “contrary; opposite” — S. Opposites
ex datis	Lat. datum, “gift” — arg. from the facts as such; from what is accepted by the audience — S. Ex datis
ex notatione	Lat. notatio, from notare “stamp with a mark” — arg. from “what the word (truly) says”; argument from the meaning or of a word. S. True Meaning of the Word; Derived Words
ex silentio	Lat. silentium, “silence” — S. Silence

As the ab and ad arguments, the ex arguments do not refer to a unified category of arguments, or to a common semantic family, nor to a formal type.

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Evidentiality is a set of grammatical or linguistic phenomena indicating how the information conveyed in a statement has been obtained by the speaker. Evidential systems commonly signal that the information 1) comes from sensory experience (auditory, visual); 2) that is has been inferred from something else; 3) that it reproduces a hearsay. Other evidential systems are much more complex. In evidential languages, the speaker must explicitly mention the basis on which he or she says what he or she says, that is, the kind of argument supporting the utterance.

In some languages, evidentiality is grammaticalized, that is, it corresponds to a specific grammatical category. In English, for example, the reported event is necessarily referred to by its temporal-aspectual coordinates. In evidential languages, the speaker is obliged to stipulate how the information he relays has been obtained (via the senses, hearsay, inference, etc.). The sub-system of the grammatical marks of evidentiality is distinct from the modal system as well as from the temporal-aspectual system.

Evidentiality can be considered as a linguistically embedded argumentation, as an “argumentation within grammar”. It leads to the conception of the argumentation as a continuum, sometimes related to the grammar and semantics of the language and at other times, to the grammar and semantics of discourse.

In English, where evidentiality is not grammaticalized, evidential markers or phrases remain optional. The evidential sources can be discursively expressed as coordinated sentences or as the head of the sentence:

Peter is at home;

one can hear him             I hear that Peter is at home
one can see him               I see that —
they told me                   They told me that —
I read it                          I read that —
I guess                          I guess that —

Evidentiality may be expressed by modals. So, for example, in the statement “Peter is at home”, the information about that Peter’s whereabouts is given in the categorical mode, and is endorsed by the highest degree of speaker certainty on an epistemic scale ranging from doubt to certitude. From an evidential perspective, the statement implies that the speaker has some direct evidence to back the speech, for example “I just left him”, etc.

“Peter should be at home now”: this sentence communicates the same information on a lower position on the epistemic scale. From an evidential perspective, the statement implies, for example, “I have no direct and categorical evidence of what I say, but on the basis of Peter’s usual habits, I infer that he is at home”.

The following example is taken from Ducrot (1975). In “Pierre doit avoir reçu ma lettre” (“Peter must/should have received my letter”), , the information is backed only by common knowledge of the usual delivery deadlines. The following case is different:

Eh bien, je crois que Pierre a reçu ma lettre!
Well, I believe that Peter has received my letter!

There is now an implication that the same information has been inferred from a quite different source, that is, some natural sign taken in Peter’s behavior which can be explained only by referring to the letter’s content; for example, the letter informed Peter of a disciplinary warning, and Peter clearly changed his behavior.

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In general, to evaluate an argumentative discourse is to pass upon this discourse a justified positive or negative “value judgment”, S. Value. The assessment activity is one argumentative activity among others, which may be misleading or well founded, regardless of the quality of the discourse it approves or condemns. In order to avoid arbitrariness, the evaluation must specify its method, criteria and reference assessment scale, and remain open to criticism — as is the case for any other argumentation.

1. Dimensions of evaluation

1.1 Assessment scales

Arguments may be evaluated on the basis of different kinds of scales, such as:

An efficiency scale — The best argument is the one that best orients its target towards the thesis it defends, or the action it advocates.

A scale of logical-scientific validity — Good arguments are valid deductions, starting from true premises and conveying their truth to their conclusion according to valid rules and methods.

Invalid arguments are misleading, and effective argumentation may be so; in fact, effective arguments are systematically suspected of being misleading. Conversely, a valid argument may be totally ineffective: for example, “P, so P” is a valid deductive inference but it has no persuasive power. It could be argued that ordinary arguments often simply just camouflage this kind of truism by using two distinct formulations of the same proposition P “P, therefore (paraphrase of P)”. Since trains never leave before the scheduled time, the following account is not a real justification:

Due to the delay, the train will not start on time.

1.2 Binary and gradual evaluation

— Binary evaluation classifies arguments as valid (good, accepted) and invalid (bad, rejected). This evaluation follows the rules and criteria of formal logic. It requires the translation of the argumentation produced in ordinary language into a logical language. The evaluation bears on this logical characterization, taken as expressing the essence of the argumentation, and this logical evaluation is then transferred to the original discourse, S. Connectives.

— Gradual evaluation positions the argument on a gradual scale, as more or less good or bad. In practice, the evaluation criteria depend on the argument scheme considered, and on the availability of a relevant set of critical questions, which can be rather heterogeneous. The argument under consideration is then checked for each condition, and its global evaluation may be only a precarious synthesis of the results of these different operations.

2. The diagnosis of fallacy

The imputation of fallacy is an adversarial procedure condemning, rejecting, or disqualifying a discourse. The accused arguer has the right to defend his or her argument, in view of the principle of “no execution without representation”. Discussions about the fallacious nature of argumentation are, in principle, open-ended and their conclusions are defeasible and adjustable. They are arguments like any others, possibly themselves fallacious. At any rate, meta-argumentative disputes about argument evaluation provide interesting data for argumentative analysis.

Evaluators

Hamblin gives a clear answer to this question: the logician is not the arbiter of the argument or dispute (Hamblin 1970, p. 244-245):

Consider, now, the position of the onlooker and, particularly, that of the logician, who is interested in analyzing and, perhaps, passing judgment on what transpires. If he says “Smith’s premises are true” or “Jones argument is invalid”, he is taking part in the dialogue exactly as if he were a participant in it ; but, unless he is in fact engaged in a second-order dialogue with other onlookers, his formulation says no more than the formulation “I accept Smith’s premises” or “I disapprove of Jones’s argument”. Logicians are, of course, allowed to express their sentiments but there is something repugnant about the idea that Logic is a vehicle for the expression of the logician’s own judgments of acceptance and rejection of statements and arguments. The logician does not stand above and outside practical argumentation or, necessarily, pass judgment on it. He is not a judge or a court of appeal, and there is no such judge or court: he is, at best, a trained advocate. It follows that it is not the logician’s particular job to declare the truth of any statement or the validity of any argument.
While we are using a legal metaphor it might be worthwhile to draw an analogy from legal precedent. If a complaint is made by a member of some civil association such as a club or a public company, that the officials or management have failed to observe some of the association’s rules or some part of its constitution, the courts will, in general, refuse to handle it. In effect the plaintiff will be told: “Take your complaint back to the association itself. You have all the powers you need to call public meetings, move rescission motions, vote the managers out of office. We shall intervene on your behalf only if there is an offence such as a fraud.” The logician’s attitude to actual argument should be something like this.

The diagnosis of fallacious speech operates on a meta-argumentative level, but this second level does not transcend the dialogue under scrutiny, it remains an integral part of the argumentative game. In other words, the judgment “this argument is fallacious” works in the same way as any other ordinary refutation, whether carried by a participant (ordinary use of the word fallacy) or by an analyst, who then behaves as a participant. One must then speak of an ad fallaciam argument.

In a letter to Scherer, the economist Leon Walras refers to a controversy between Scherer himself and Guéroult:

I take […] your [= Scherer’s] study of December 30 to the point where you […] clearly and plainly address the more general considerations about the divergence between his [Guéroult’s] opinions and yours.

“Perfectibility, you say is a modern idea, one of those that best indicate the distance between the old world and the new world. It bears within itself its own self-evidence, so that its adversaries are only a few sophists or some misanthropes. It has passed into the common law of intelligence. Yet, as M. Guéroult seems sometimes to do, perfectibility should not be confused with the possibility of perfection. This confusion is not merely a matter of words; for those who understand the scope of the questions, it marks the dividing point between two systems, liberalism and socialism. Socialism, reduced to its principle, is nothing other than the belief in the possible perfection of society and the effort to realize this state.”

This is clear and precise. M. Guéroult and you agree up to a point: for both of you, humanity advances and does not retreat; the law of the development and organization of society is a law of progress and not of decadence. Beyond these limits, you separate, you think that society is only perfectible, while M. Guéroult, on his part, thinks that society, sooner or later, will be perfect; you are a liberal, M. Guéroult is a socialist. Perfectibility or perfection, liberalism or socialism, such is the alternative and the question that is raised. (Léon Walras, [“Socialism and liberalism”], [1863][1])

Schérer argues that Guéroult concludes from the possibility of the perfectible (point upon which they agree) the possibility of the perfect (point upon which they disagree). This is a typical argument built upon derived words. Schérer does not consider this inference to be a sophism (he does not attribute to Guéroult the intention to mislead his readers) not even to be a mistake, a fallacy of “confusion”, simply a criticism. The analysis is not made from an external logical point of view; it comes from a political opponent, making this point as a sub-issue of a greater debate “Liberalism or Socialism?”.

3. For a laissez-faire in argumentation

Ordinary argumentation is carried out in specific fields by speech communities corresponding to what Hamblin calls “civil association[s]”, having their, interests, programs, ways of thinking and rules for deliberation and action. In these fields, the logician does not, as such, have the substantial specialist skills required. This remark is at the heart of “critical liberalism”, advocating a laissez-faire attitude with argumentation.

From such a viewpoint, what becomes of evaluation? Hamblin’s objection is taken into account, and the evaluation of the arguments is entrusted to the “civil association” with which the arguing party, interested in the outcome of the issue, is affiliated. The data to be considered for the evaluation is not limited to the one isolated argument under scrutiny, but consists in a well-defined selection of contradictory discourses developed around the same issue.

As a result, the evaluation process may be empirically documented and criticized on three levels:

— Non-thematized criticism: description of the practices of evaluation in action, such as concessions, objections, refutations and counter-discourses in general.
— Emergence of a specific ordinary critical metalanguage: charges of fallacy, misplaced authority, irrelevance, emotionality, amalgam and impugned motives, etc. (Doury 2000).
— Evaluations carried out by the specialists of the field. This level, which includes scientific expertise, is the ultimate level of evaluation. Scientists routinely evaluate the discourses and fallacies of their colleagues; historians and social scientists evaluate the fallacies of historians (Fisher 1970), and the teachers and pupils evaluate the pupils’ and teachers’ arguments.

All these activities are “[meta-argumentative]”, as opposed to “ground level argumentations” (Finocchiaro, 2013, p. 1). Provided that the intervention is useful and desired, the specialist in argument analysis can intervene at all levels. As Hamblin has explained, his or her function and deontological position are those of a “well-trained advocate”. As such, the specialist can evaluate all the arguments of the world, the posture being that of the participant analyst and evaluator, working under a double constraint of externality / internality well known in ethnomethodology. He or she may meaningfully intervene in court as a jurilogician or a jurilinguist, that is as a counsel, not a substitute for the judge.

Argumentative discourse is in itself evaluative and critical; scholarly evaluation is a process of argumentative expansion and deepening of the issue itself. There is no super-evaluator capable of putting an end to the critical process by providing a final, conclusive evaluation to silence all other participants.

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[1] Quoted after Léon Walras L. (1896). “Socialisme et libéralisme”. In Études d’économie sociale – Théorie de la répartition de la richesse sociale Lausanne: Rouge & Paris: Pichon. P. 4.

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1. The word ethos

The word ethos is borrowed from the ancient Greek word ἦθος (ēthos), having two meanings:

I. In pl. Usual stay, familiar places, dwelling. Speaking of animals: cowshed, stable, den, nest. […]
II. Usual character, hence custom, usage; the manner of being or habit of a person, his character; […] by extension, mores. (Bailly, [ethos])

In rhetoric, ethos refers to “the moral impression (produced by an orator)” (ibid.).

In Latin rhetoric, ethos is translated as mores, “manners”, or sensus “common sense”. Quintilian considers that ethos “manners” and pathos “passions” are subcategories of feeling [adfectus]:

Of feelings [adfectus] as we are taught by the old writers, there are two kinds, the first of which the Greeks included under the term πάθος (pathos), which we translate rightly and literally by the word “passion” [adfectus]. The other, to which they give the appellation ἦθος (ēthos), for which, as I consider, the Roman language has no equivalent term, is rendered however, by mores, “manners”; whence that part of philosophy, which the Greeks call ἠθική (ēthikē), is called moralis. (IO, VI, 2, 8)

The same opposition ethos / pathos can also be translated in Latin as sensus / dolor:

Sensus is one of those vague terms by which Latin tries to express what Greek rhetoric designates by [ethos]. […] It is distinct from dolor, which responds to [pathos] (Cicero, De Or. III, 25, 96). (Courbaud, note 2 to Cicero, De Or., II, XLIII, 184; p. 80)

The noun sensus basically refers to physical perception, also to “an intellectual way of seeing things”, and a moral perception of the situation in terms of right and wrong, a “moral sense” (after Gaffiot, Sensus). To display sensus is therefore to jointly display good perceptual, analytic and moral skills.

Sensus also points toward sensus communis, “common sense”, as a synthesis capacity in agreement with what people consider to be “[soundness and prudence]” (MW, Common sense). The good orator is a man of common sense with the ability to achieve synthesis.

The English nouns ethos, ethics, ethopoeia, ethology are borrowed and adapted from the Greek.

— The noun ethos is used in rhetoric, up to the present time. Mores is borrowed from the Latin mores, which itself translates the Greek ethos.
— Ethology is the science of the behavior of animal species in their natural environment, cf. supra, meaning (I).
— The noun ethopoeia is used in rhetoric, and literary theory, referring to a “moral and psychological portrait”.
— Ethics is the part of philosophy dealing with morality and values.

The rhetorical notion of ethos refers to the fact that the speaker is projected into discourse and holds part control over this projection. The ethics of discourse refers to an inner moral authority controlling discourse. The ethotic dimension of rhetorical discourse can be seen as a discursive projection of ego ideals, whereas its ethical dimension would be a discursive projection of the superego imperatives.

Such moral control is central to the rhetorical definition of an orator as a vir bonus dicendi peritus “a good man having public speaking skills”. In contemporary argumentative theory, the criticism of discourse is referred to a rational control, whereas classical rhetoric refers discourse to moral control as well.

2. The arguer’s ethos

Ethotic strategies deal with the social “presentation of self” (Goffman [1956]). The ethos of the orator is a professional ethos. All professions have their ethos, for example, beyond its strictly professional capacities, the traditional waiter embodies a set of peripheral professional virtues: may be finding the cocktail best adapted to the customer’s mood, having the art to deftly drop into and out of the conversation, etc.

Aristotle deals with ethos in two passages of Rhetoric. It describes on the one hand ethos proper, the auto-fiction that constitutes the construction of the face that the orator intends to present to the public; and, on the other, the ethos of the audience, the synthesis of information which enables him or her to adequately orient his or her argument.

2.1 Aristotle: The combined effect of discourse and reputation

In the Aristotelian system, ethos is one of the main leverages for persuasion, the other two being logos and pathos. The Rhetoric poses the primacy of ethos over logo-ic proofs, “[the speaker’s] character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion” (Rhet., I, 2, 1356a10; RR, p. 106). The concept of ethos is introduced as follows:

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him to be credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speakers contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356a1-15; RR, p. 107)

The speaker’s ethos is the product of a discursive strategy that builds a complex authority based on three components:

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character — the three namely, that induce us to believe a thing, apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. (Rhet., II, 1, 1378a; RR, p. 245).

Good sense is phronesis, that is to say, “prudence”; good moral character, arete, “virtue”; and good will is eunoia, or “goodwill”. The arguer has persuasive authority because he or she is (or appears to be) clever, honest, and on our side. To no lesser extent than pathos, ethos has a pathemic structure; ethotic authority combines expertise, morality and benevolence into a unique feeling of trust, the perfect persuasive cocktail:

These qualities are all that is necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers. (Rhet., II, 1, 1378a15; Freese, p. 171)

The verb to appear (and not to be), will seem suspicious. Rhetoric is always suspected to give to the incompetents, vicious and crooks, the means to deceive their partners. As Groucho Marx says or repeats, “sincerity — If you can fake that, you’ve got it made”. But the ablest and truest arguer remains subject to the “paradox of the actor”, that is to say, he or she can be suspected of feigning the skills, virtues, and intentions he claims and shows, and therefore must not only be but appear sincere and true. The arts of appearance are no less necessary to honest people than to scoundrels.

Under this definition, the Aristotelian ethos attracts identification on the basis of a shared community feeling. Disruptive rhetoric implements another ethotic positioning, as an influential minority group: “we are different from all of you … I bring a new world … yes your wise men call it madness.”

The text of the Rhetoric is somewhat puzzling. On the one side, ethotic persuasion “should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his or her character before he or she begins to speak”. In line with the classical doctrine of technical and non-technical proofs, this amounts to an outright rejection of non-technical ethos (not the speaker’s character before the speech) in favor of technical ethos (what the speaker says). Nonetheless, the following sentence seems to prioritize the former over the latter, probably because both play their part in actual discourse, as suggested in Ruelle’s translation: “It is necessary, moreover, that this result should be obtained by the force of discourse and not merely by a preference favorable to the speaker.” (Aristotle, Rhet. Ruelle, emphasis added).

2.2 Challenging the ethos

Ethos can be seen as a public exhibition of one’s best possible self, in view of influencing the recipient. Critical theories of argumentation focus on the subject matter of the debate, protect the participants by keeping at least some part of their personalities distanced from the dispute, when they have nothing to do with it. They make a crucial distinction between the charisma of the speaker, which is rejected by principle as exerting an irrational influence, and the exercise of the authority legitimately attached to his or her specific competences.

Ethos and personal attacks on the opponent are the obverse and reverse of the same discursive coin, as theoretically shown by politeness theory. Exhibiting ethos, the speaker exploits his own person as a resource to accredit his point of view, whilst when attacking personally the opponent, the speaker exploits the person of the opponent to refute or discredit his point of view. In both cases, the discourse eludes the substance of the issue and turns to a discussion about the participants, either to discredit or to accredit their positions.

From a critical perspective which postulates that only explicit arguments about the matter itself are relevant, and potentially valid, there cannot be something like an ethotic argument simply because the propositional requirement is not met. Due to its implicit and global positioning, ethotic authority cannot be challenged by any refutation on the matter; accordingly, the opponent will be tempted by an ad personam counter-attack.

In a face-to-face situation, the ethotic grip seeks to establish an asymmetrical relationship framing the interactional relation on a high / low opposition, humbling the opponent into the low position, in order to inhibit free criticism. S. Modesty. So, from a critical point of view, the ethotic yoke must be shaken off, as a preliminary of any constructive discussion. The charismatic facets of ethos are first rejected outright, as irrelevant and fallacious. Second, an explicit component is extracted from a synthetic form of ethos, the argument from authority, which satisfies the propositionality condition and is accessible to criticism. This authority is integrated as peripheral evidence, to be dealt with within the appropriate critical framework.

3. Ethos and discursive identities

Contemporary and ancient discussions about ethos deal with a broadly recognized fact, language splits the speaker into several discursive roles. Ethos is a hub concept, connecting argumentation studies with linguistic studies on subjectivity in language (Benveniste 1958) and with literary studies in narratology, confronting author and narrator, real and implicit readers.

Argumentative discourse, as any discourse, articulates three identity-building elements, ethos strictly speaking, reputation, self-portraying. The ethotic impact of discourse is the result of these three forces:

Ethos Itself — Ducrot integrates the notion of ethos into the general theory of polyphonic discourse: “Ethos is attached to the speaker as such: the character attributed to him or her as the source of the utterance, make this utterance acceptable or not” (Ducrot 1984, p. 200). In Goffman’s terminology, ethos is attributed to the Figure, S. Roles.

Explicit Self-Portrayal — Ducrot introduces as a second, intra-discursive element “what the orator could explicitly say about himself” (1984, p. 201). The arguer can be the author of her own portrait: “I raised my three children myself” but these self-accounts are quite distinct from what can be indirectly revealed through the discourse. Having an accent is not the same thing as saying “Yes, I have an accent and I am proud of it”. In an argumentative situation, participants systematically value their persons and actions in order to legitimize themselves. The requirements of this situation prevail over the principles of linguistic politeness.

Fame, Reputation — Some social actors are well-known people, that is, they have a reputation, prestige, and perhaps even charisma, positive or negative. This established image is called the “prior”, or the “preliminary” ethos by Amossy:

We shall therefore call preliminary ethos or preliminary image, the image that the audience can have of the speaker before the speech, as opposed to ethos (or oratory ethos, which is fully discursive). […] Preliminary ethos is developed on the basis of the role played by the speaker in society (its institutional functions, status and power) but also on the basis of the collective representation or stereotype of this person […]. Indeed, the image projected by the speaker integrates prior social and individual data, which necessarily plays a role in interaction and contributes significantly to the power of his speech. (Amossy 1999b, p. 70; Maingueneau 1999)

“Pre-discursive” does not mean “language-free”. Reputations are based on discourse as well as upon actions. Ethos can be said to be pre-discursive only in the sense of “preceding a particular speech act”.

Public relations agencies can construct, manage and repair the image of human beings and commercial products (Benoit 1995, etc.).

The operating and control systems of these different identity layers are very different, and each layer can conflict with the two others.
Reputation is a socio-historical construct, which can be socially managed and controlled. Reputation can be inconsistent; the self-representation that the arguer has of his reputation can be different from the representation his audience has of him.

Self-portrayal is an explicit, declarative, controlled activity, an “argumentation of the self” as it is properly termed.

Ethos building is an on-going speech activity. All speech, spontaneous or elaborated, contains subjective features. This fact is transparent for the participants. The speaker knows that his or her conversation partners know (that he or she knows, etc.) that at least some of these subjective features will be elaborated and interpreted as clues to the speaker’s identity, through standard argumentations from natural signs. The arguer might therefore intentionally arrange these subjective features in order to channel these interpretations according to his or her intended aims and perspectives.

The concept of ethos can be used as a descriptive category, relevant to the analysis of any form of ordinary discourse (Kallmeyer 1996). This trend towards generalization, coming with the naturalization of ethos, is typical of modern theories of argumentation such as that of Argumentation within Language or Natural Logic. Argumentative ethos is specifically a category of rhetorical action, a strategic resource available to the arguer, a functional element, intentionally elaborated or distorted.

Generally speaking, inferences to the speaker’s (deep) identity(ies) are based on inferences from linguistic and encyclopedic clues. Like all interpretation processes, such inferences are open-ended, the only restrictions are those of the imagination of the interpreting party: the identity of the speaker is in the eye and ear of the receiver. When it comes to the specificity of ethos, argumentative analysis focuses on the strategic dimension of the presentation of self in argumentation. Its reconstruction program, distinct from the psychoanalytic approach, dovetails with the semiotic and stylistics program.

4. Ethos as a stylistic category

“Style is the man”, and ethos is the style. When looking for a systematic method to study ethos, we come across the stylistic tradition. For example, Quintilian thus emphasizes the effectiveness of a style linked to the choice of vocabulary having a “majestic” ethotic effect:

Words derived from antiquity have not only illustrious patrons, but also confer on style a certain majesty [not without charm], for they have the authority of age and, as they have been disused for a time, bring with them a charm similar to that of novelty. (Quintilian, IO, I, 6, 39, slightly modified)

The authority of the uttered word is constitutive of the ethos of the speaker. The ethos is constructed from features belonging to any linguistic level, beginning with the voice — a powerful vector of attraction or repulsion — the art of hesitating, repeating, faltering, and so on. Ethotic inferences can be drawn from any feature of the argument. He or she who:

— makes concessions is moderate / weak.
— does not make concessions is straight / sectarian.
— appeals to the authorities is conservative / dogmatic.
— uses pragmatic arguments upon causes and consequences is sensible and realistic, pragmatic / opportunist.
— refers his arguments to the nature of things and their definition is a man of conviction / conservative.

Other argumentation lines (by absurdity, by analogy…) do not have such clearly associated ethos.

The link of ethos with style is explicitly made in the Rhetorical Art of Hermogenes of Tarsus (160-ca. 225 CE). Hermogenes considers that discourse can be evaluated along seven stylistic categories:

Clarity, grandeur, beauty, vivacity, ethos, sincerity and skill (Hermogene, AR, 217, 20 – 218, 05; Patillon, 1988, p. 213).

Ethos is one of these categories of discourse; in any given speech, there may be a little or a lot of ethos.
Ethos has four components, simplicity; moderation; sincerity; severity. These qualities compare with the qualities of wisdom, expertise and benevolence that make up Aristotelian ethos. Each of these components is characterized by specific thoughts, methods, words, figures of speech, and rhythms.

As strange as this might sound, sincerity, the key ethotic element is a style. Sincerity is a linguistic condition attached to:

— Emotions, and particularly a feeling, indignation.
— Severity in the accusation of others or oneself is shown by using harsh and vehement words.
— A method of discourse management, in particular the balance achieved between what is openly discussed and what is left suggested.
— The use of derogatory demonstrative pronouns; of figures: apostrophe, and particularly figures of embarrassment (reticence, doubt, hesitation, corrections, interrogations).
— Personal comments suspending the speech (after Patillon 1988, pp. 259; p. 261 et seq.)

Thus, a sincere character is not an extra-linguistic supplement that would be introduced into the discourse from outside, by a moral exhortation. It is the product of a discursive strategy. Any ethics of discourse should take this into account. In particular, figures of speech serve the construction of ethos, and they therefore are instrumental in argumentation in general. We are very far from post-Ramusian rhetoric where invention is divorced from elocution.

5. Character of the audience

After having defined the ethos of the orator in a brief passage of the Rhetoric, Aristotle takes a very different perspective to deal with the characters of the audiences:

Let us now consider the various types of human character, in relation to the emotions and moral qualities, showing how they correspond to our various age and fortune. (Rhet, II, 12, 1388b31, RR p. 311).

This section describes a set of “ideal-types”, that is, human characters classified and characterized according to their social condition, wealth and power (noble, rich, powerful, and lucky) and age (youthful, mature, old). These “elements of sociology for the rhetoricians” conclude with a practical remark:

Such are the characters of Young men and Elderly Men. People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character: and we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to our audience. (RT, II, 13, 1390a20-29, RR p. 319)

Such a passage clearly shows that the adaptation-identification to the audience is the key to persuasion. It will be regarded as fallacious by the normative theories of argumentation requiring that one speaks the truth, not upon the basis of the specific beliefs of a particular audience (ex datis).

Compared to the three statuses distinguished for the ethos of the speaker (ethos strictly speaking, self-portraying, reputation), we see that the character of the audience is entirely of the latter kind, that is reputation, not that of a person but of a group: “young people are like that”. Strictly speaking, however, any audience is able to express its rhetorical ethos by means of its spontaneous reactions to speech.

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An epitrope is defined as, “a figure of rhetoric, consisting in granting something that one can dispute, in order to give more authority to what one wants to persuade” (Littré, Epitrope), S. Concession.

Under ordinary conditions, as described by Grice’s principles, the arguer refutes everything possible, and concedes anything else. So, “Peter concedes P” pragmatically implies that Peter is not able to refute P. If the arguer concedes a doubtful proposition, he or she will be considered a bad arguer; if he or she concedes something that could obviously be refuted, the speech will be interpreted as being ironic:

P is obviously wrong:
L: — P, okay, but / yet Q

Embedding P in a concessive structure, assigns P to the opponent, whether or not he or she wishes to endorse it:

About a writer whose qualities of style have just been discussed in a rather negative way:
I am ready to consider him a good stylist, but he doesn’t know what a plot is.

Irony may also arise from the exaggeration given to the granted position:

I may have visions, but I also have some hard evidence.

S. Irony; Exaggeration.

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The word epicheirema comes from the Greek “epicheirein, to endeavor, attempt to prove” (Webster, epicheirema). It translates into Latin as ratiocinatio (Cicero), “reasoning”, or as argumentatio (Ad. Her.)

The term epicheirema is used in ancient argumentation theory with three distinct definitions.

1. Epicheirema as dialectical reasoning

The Aristotelian theory of syllogistic reasoning opposes philosopheme to epicheirema. Philosopheme is another name for the analytical or scientific syllogism, where the premises are true and the rule of deduction is valid (Top., VIII, 11; p. 156). In contrast “epicheirema is a dialectical inference” (ibid.), that is, a syllogism founded on premises taken from the doxa, hence only probable; this inference concludes to a probability.

2. Epicheirema as an argumentation
whose premises are themselves argued

In rhetorical argumentation, the word epicheirema is a synonym of probable (rhetorical) syllogism, enthymeme and argumentation. A well-built, convincing, rhetorical proof is defined as an argumentation (ratiocinatio) whose premises are only probable, and, consequently, should be explicitly backed by their proofs (Cicero, Inv. I, 34; Hubbell, p. 98-99). In short, a probable premise accompanied by its proof becomes certain. Cicero discusses the following rhetorical syllogism (id., 101-103)

— Premise 1 + Proof of Premise 1:

Premise 1: “Things that are governed by design are managed better than those that are governed without design”
Proof of Premise 1: “The house that is managed in accordance with a reasoned plan is better managed that those that are governed without design. The army […] The ship […]”

— Premise 2 + Proof of Premise 2:

Premise 2: “Of all things, nothing is better governed than the universe”
Proof of Premise 2 (our numbering and presentation)
(a) “the rising and the setting of the constellations keep a fixed order”
(b) “and the changes of the seasons not only (b1) proceed in the same way by a fixed law but (b2) are also adapted to the advantage of all nature,
(c) “and the alternation of night and day has never through any variation done any harm.”

— Conclusion: “Therefore, the universe is governed by design.”

Premise 1 is the conclusion of an induction, that is an enumeration of examples, sharing the same structure and orientation. In premise 2, case (b), the element (b2) argues not only for a design but also for a benevolent design, as does case (c).

Structure of an epicheirema

The question as to whether an epicheirema includes five or three components is disputed (Solmsen 1941, p. 170). On the surface level, an epicheirema is indeed a sequence consisting of five components:

Premise 1 + Proof of Premise 1 + Premise 2 + Proof of Premise 2 + Conclusion

This corresponds to a three-element deep structure:

(Premise 1 and its Proof) — (Premise 2 and its Proof) — Conclusion

This is Quintilian’s position: “To me, as well as to the greater number of authors, there appears to be not more than three [parts]” (IO, V, 14, 6).

The epicheirema corresponds to a linked argumentation, represented as follows:

3. Epicheirema, as a communicated argument

The Rhetoric to Herennius defines “the most complete and perfect argument [argumentatio]” as “that which consists of five parts: the Proposition, the Reason, the Proof of the Reason, the Embellishment and the Résumé” (Ad Her., II, 28).

This perfect rhetorical argument is described as a sequence consisting of five components, like a logical epicheirema, but with a quite different organization. The first three elements correspond to the logical component, establishing the Proposition:

Reason 1 + Proof of the Reason + Proposition

The proof of the Reason, “corroborates by means of additional arguments, the briefly presented Reason” (Id., p. 107). The argumentation must now be seen as serial:

[Argument₁   =>       {(Conclusion] = Argument₂)    =>  Conclusion}
Proof of the Reason                    Reason                                Claim

The Embellishment is a reformulation that “adorn[s] and enrich[s] the argument (argumentatio)”. The Résumé is not the conclusion; its “[brevity]” contrasts with the preceding amplification episode, creating a kind of hot / cold contrast. This second component of the argumentation articulates two elements that clearly have a communicative function.

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1. The Greek word

The Greek word corresponding to the English word enthymeme (adjective enthymematic) means (after Bailly, [enthymema]):

1. 1. Thought, reflection.
   2. Invention, particularly war stratagem.
   3. Reasoning, counseling, warning.
   4. A reason, a motive.

The general meaning of “thought, reflection” is present in all ancient rhetoric: “Any expression of thought is properly called an [enthymema]. (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55; p. 423). Quintilian also alludes the meaning “everything that is conceived in the mind”, to put it aside (IO, V, 10, 1).

2. An instance of an argument scheme

In rhetorical argumentation, an enthymeme is essentially an instance of a topic^, an argument scheme^@. An argument scheme is a general formula having an inferential (associative) form; an enthymeme is the application of such a formula to a specific case. This general definition combines with the following orientations.

(i) In relation to logic, the enthymeme is:

— A form of syllogism:

• • • • • • A syllogism based on plausibility or on sign
          • A truncated syllogism.

— The counterpart of the syllogism.

(iii) Functionally, the enthymeme is seen as a manifestation of cooperation with the audience.

(iv) Marginally, the enthymeme has also been defined as a concluding formula.

3. A special kind of syllogism

3.1 The enthymeme, a syllogism based on “a probability” or “a sign”

In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle defines the enthymeme as “a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs.” (P. A., II, 27)

An enthymeme is a probable reasoning such as:

Peter is tired, he must have worked hard.

The arguer can be charged with mistaking necessary and sufficient conditions, or trusted as knowing for sure that Peter did not spend the whole night celebrating, according to the context span taken into consideration by the analyst.

A natural sign is a proposition expressing a natural connection between two states of things. The connection can be probable (to be red is a sign or a symptom of fever) or necessary (as smoke to fire).

A probability is a proposition expressing either a probable natural relation or a social agreement:

A probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a probability, e.g. “the envious hate”, “the beloved show affection”. (Aristotle, PA, II, 27)

These are excellent examples of associative semantic inferences (+ envious, + hate); (+ love, + show love), S. Orientation; Topos in Semantic. Such substantial probabilities are based on common sense views of basic human tendencies. The corresponding topics underlie the current production of arguments; S. Common place.

The big strong man will prevail over the small weak one, and mothers love their children. Sometimes, however, this is not the case. A characteristic of reasoning from social probabilities is that it can be reversed, as expressed in the key Aristotelian topic n°21, “incredible things do happen” (Rhet, n°22, 1400a5; RR p. 373).

Consistency is generally a source of probabilities. Humans are rational and intentional beings; they make plans and are expected to act according to these plans, to remain true to their words and intentions. Their behavior is assumed to be probably consistent. Inconsistency is the sign of a defective personality, or of a basic mistake, S. Consistency; Ad hominem. Showing that the opponent is incoherent is a key tool for claims or narratives to be rejected. But consistency is only a probability, as noted in topic n°21, and probabilities cannot hold against hard evidence; they are default qualifications. Other topics are based on inconsistent behavior, people change their minds and criminal actions might be badly planned, S. Motives.

3.2 The enthymeme as a truncated syllogism

The enthymeme is also defined as a categorical syllogism where a premise is omitted:

Men are fallible, you are fallible.
You are a man, you are fallible.

Or the conclusion:

Human are fallible, after all you are a human!

The Logic of Port-Royal defines the enthymeme as:

A syllogism perfect in the mind, but imperfect in the expression, since one of the propositions is suppressed as too clear and too well known, and as being easily supplied by the mind of those to whom we speak. (Arnauld, Nicole, [1662], p. 224)

No enthymeme is conclusive, save in virtue of a proposition understood, which, consequently, has to be in the mind though it be not expressed. (Id., p. 207)

The example in the preceding paragraph can therefore be called an enthymeme for two reasons: on the one hand because it is based on probable indices and on the other hand because it is an incomplete syllogism. The definition of an enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is often not considered to be Aristotelian: “It is not of the essence of the enthymeme to be incomplete” (Tricot’s Note to Aristotle, PA, II, 27, 10, p. 323). Moreover, according to Conley, this conception of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is not widely used in ancient rhetoric. He finds it only in a passage by Quintilian (Conley 1984, p.174). However, the First Analytics does consider the case of the truncated syllogism, “Men do not say the latter [Pittacus is wise] because they know it” (PA, II, 27, 10). On the other hand, we read in the Rhetoric that:

If any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the price is a crown, it is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games’, without adding ‘And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown’, a fact which everybody knows. (Rhet., I, 2, 1357a15; RR, p. 113).

Under this definition, the enthymeme can be considered as a figure of speech by ellipsis, precisely a figure of thought.

4. The rhetorical counterpart of the syllogism

In the Aristotelian systematic, the proof is obtained by inference, whether scientific (logical), dialectical, or rhetorical. Aristotle considers that there are two kinds of scientific inferences, syllogistic deduction and induction. In rhetoric, scientific inference is replaced by “rhetorical inference” or enthymeme, the requirements of rhetorical discourse not being compatible with the exercise of scientific inference:

I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example the rhetorical induction. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b5, RR, p. 109)

The syllogism (scientific inference) and the enthymeme (rhetorical inference) are defined in a strictly parallel way:

When it is shown that certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b15; RR, p. 109)

But, unlike the syllogism, derived from true propositions, the enthymeme is drawn from “probabilities and signs” (Rhet., I, 2, 1357a30; RR, p. 113), see supra § 3.1.

The enthymeme is “the substance of persuasion”, “a sort of demonstration” (Rhet., I, 1, 1354a10, RR p. 95; 1355a5, RR p. 99). It deals centrally with the issue, the substance of the debate, “the fact” (Rhet, I, 1, 1354a25, RR p. 97. As such, the enthymeme is opposed to the reckless use of ethos and pathos, S. Emotion; Pathos; Ethos.

The enthymeme is also called a rhetorical syllogism, considered as an imperfect syllogism. These labels refer rhetoric to syllogistic. However, the scientific / dialectical / rhetorical parallelism, however attractive it may be, is problematic. If one accepts this opposition, one enters a very uncomfortable and empirically inadequate notional grid. On the one hand, the distinction between the three types of reasoning creates a divide between categorical scientific syllogism and probable dialectic syllogism, versus persuasive rhetorical enthymeme, the socially relevant discourse being posited as inherently unable to deal with well-grounded truth. On the other hand, argumentative rhetoric is straightjacketed in the opposition between technical^@ evidence, rhetorical evidence proper, and non-technical proof, which obviously do not fit into the previous notional framework. Common judicial discourse routinely combines the two types of proof, in perfectly syllogistic forms of reasoning, S. Layout; Demonstration.

The reasons given for binding the enthymeme to syllogistic discourse are somewhat paradoxical. The enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is supposed to suit rhetoric because it would be less pedantic than the complete syllogism; this assumes that the missing premise is easy to retrieve. Another reason put forward is that one would use an enthymeme because the ordinary audience is composed of people of a mediocre intelligence, unable to follow a rigorous syllogistic chain. This second justification supposes that the missing premise is too difficult to recover: these two justifications are not immediately compatible.

5. Enthymeme and interpretative cooperation

From the point of view of argumentative communication, the enthymeme exploits what is implicit to achieve persuasion:

Everyone who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymeme or examples; there is no other way. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b5, RR p. 109)

As Bitzer notes (1959, p. 408), the enthymematic form is a way of connecting speaker and audience in a process of co-construction of the meaning of discourse, “the enthymeme is satisfied if merely what is stated in it be understood”, (Quintilian, IO, V, 14, 24). Building a common speech space, implicitness produces intersubjectivity. The orator frames the audience as good listeners, and thus creates a “good intelligence” and an atmosphere of complicity. Communicative fusion thus contributes to the formation of an ethos: “you understand me; you can read my mind, I am like you, we are together”.

In Jakobson’s words, the enthymematic formulation of reasoning has a phatic function, that is to say, it keeps the communicative channel open. The effect of surprise associated with the ellipsis is supposed to wake up somnolent audiences: “Something missing!” (see supra § 3.2).

6. The enthymeme as a conclusive formula

The ancient rhetorical practice accorded a superior efficiency to the enthymeme founded on opposites. As the paragon, this specific enthymeme has appropriated the name of the class:

Although every expression of thought may be called enthymeme, the one which is based on contraries has, for it seems the most pointed form of argument, appropriated the common name for its sole possession. (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55; 423)
What you know is of no use; is what you do not know hindrance? (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55: 425).

The second sentence can be understood as a rhetorical question “so, what you do not know should be useful”.

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