EPITROPE

An epitrope is defined as, “a figure of rhetoric that consists in conceding something that can be disputed, in order to give more authority to what one wants to persuade” (Littré, Epitrope), see Concession.

Under ordinary conditions, as described by Grice’s principles, the arguer refutes everything possible, and concedes everything else. So, “Peter concedes P” pragmatically implies that Peter is unable to refute P. If the arguer concedes a doubtful proposition, he is considered a bad arguer; if he or she concedes something that is obviously refutable the speech is interpreted as ironic:

P is obviously wrong:
L: — P, okay, but / nevertheless Q

The embedding of P in a concessive structure, assigns P to the opponent, whether he  wants to endorse it or not:

About a writer whose stylistic qualities have just been discussed in a rather negative way:
I’m prepared to consider him a good stylist, but he doesn’t know what a plot is.

Irony can also arise from the exaggeration of the position granted:

I may have visions, but I also have some hard evidence.

S. Autophagy – Retribution; Irony; Exaggeration.

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EPICHEIREMA

The word epicheirema comes from the Greek “epicheirein, to endeavor, attempt to prove” (Webster, epicheirema). It  is translated into Latin as ratiocinatio (Cicero), “reasoning”, or as argumentatio (Ad. Her.).

The term epicheirema is used in ancient argumentation theory with three different definitions.

1. Epicheirema as dialectical reasoning

The Aristotelian theory of syllogistic reasoning contrasts philosopheme with epicheirema. Philosopheme is another name for the analytical or scientific syllogism, in which the premises are true and the rule of deduction is valid (Top., VIII, 11; p. 156). In contrast “epicheirema is a dialectical inference” (ibid.), that is, a syllogism based on premises taken from the doxa, and, therefore only probable; this inference leads to a probability.

2. Epicheirema as an argumentation whose premises are themselves argued

In rhetorical argumentation, the word epicheirema is a synonym for probable (rhetorical) syllogism, enthymeme and argumentation. A well-constructed, persuasive, rhetorical proof is defined as an argument (ratiocinatio) whose premises are only probable, and, therefore, should be explicitly supported by their proofs (Cicero, Inv. I, 34; Hubbell, p. 98-99). In short, a probable premise becomes certain whenit is  accompanied by its proof. Cicero discusses the following rhetorical syllogism (id., 101-103)

— Premise 1 + Proof of Premise 1:

Premise 1: “Things that are governed by design are managed better than those that are governed without design”
Proof of Premise 1: “The house that is managed in accordance with a reasoned plan is better managed that those that are governed without design. The army […] The ship […]”

— Premise 2 + Proof of Premise 2:

Premise 2: “Of all things, nothing is better governed than the universe”
Proof of Premise 2 (our numbering and presentation)
(a) “the rising and the setting of the constellations follow a fixed order”
(b) “and the changes of the seasons not only (b1) proceed in the same way by a fixed law but (b2) are also adapted to the advantage of all nature,
(c) “and the alternation of night and day has never through any variation done any harm.”

— Conclusion: “Therefore, the universe is governed by design.”

Premise 1 is the conclusion of an induction, that is an enumeration of examples, that have the same structure and orientation. In premise 2, case (b), the element (b2) argues not only for a design but also for a benevolent design, as does case (c).

2.1 Structure of an epicheirema

The question as to whether an epicheirema consists of five or three components is controversial (Solmsen 1941, p. 170). On the surface level, an epicheirema is indeed a sequence consisting of five components:

Premise 1 + Proof of Premise 1 + Premise 2 + Proof of Premise 2 + Conclusion

This corresponds to a three-element deep structure:

(Premise 1 and its proof) — (Premise 2 and its proof) — Conclusion

This is Quintilian’s position: “To me, as well as to the greater number of authors, there appear to be not more than three [parts]” (IO, V, 14, 6).

The epicheirema corresponds to a linked argument, presented as follows:

3. Epicheirema, as a communicated argument

The Rhetoric to Herennius defines

The most complete and perfect argument [argumentatio]” as “that which consists of five parts: the Proposition, the Reason, the Proof of the Reason, the Embellishment and the Résumé. (Ad Her., II, 28)

This perfect rhetorical argument is described as a sequence consisting of five components, like a logical epicheirema, but with a completely different organization. The first three elements correspond to the linear development of the logical component that establishes the proposition:

Reason 1 + Proof of the Reason + Proposition

The proof of the reason, “corroborates by means of additional arguments, the briefly presented Reason” (Id., p. 107). The global argument must now be seen as serial:

[Argument₁   =>       {(Conclusion] = Argument₂)    =>  Conclusion}
Proof of the Reason                    Reason                                Claim

The embellishment is a reformulation that “adorn[s] and enrich[s] the argument (argumentatio)”. The Résumé is not the conclusion; its “[brevity]” contrasts with the preceding episode of amplification episode, creating a kind of hot / cold contrast. This second component of the argumentation articulates two elements that clearly have a communicative function.

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ENTHYMEME

1. The Greek word

The Greek word corresponding to the English word enthymeme (adjective enthymematic) means (Bailly, [enthymema]):

1. 1. Thought, reflection.
   2. Invention, especially war stratagem.
   3. Reasoning, advice, warning.
   4. A reason, a motive.

The general meaning of “thought, reflection” is present in all ancient rhetoric: “Every expression of thought is properly called an [enthymema]. (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55; p. 423). Quintilian also alludes to the meaning “everything that is conceived in the mind”, to set it aside (IO, V, 10, 1).

2. An instance of a topos (argument scheme)

In rhetorical argumentation, an enthymeme is essentially an instance of a topos,. An argument scheme is a general formula having an inferential (associative) form; an enthymeme is the application of such a formula to a specific case. This general definition is combined with the following orientations.

(i) In relation to logic, the enthymeme is:

— A form of syllogism:

• • • • • • A syllogism based on plausibility or on sign
          • A truncated syllogism.

— The counterpart of the syllogism.

(iii) Functionally, the enthymeme is seen as a manifestation of cooperation with the audience.

(iv) Marginally, the enthymeme has also been defined as a concluding formula.

3. A special kind of syllogism

3.1 The enthymeme, a syllogism based on “a probability” or “a sign”

In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle defines the enthymeme as “a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs.” (P. A., II, 27)

A natural sign is a proposition expressing a natural connection between two states of things. The connection can be probable (to be red is a sign or a symptom of fever) or necessary (as smoke to fire).

An enthymeme is a probable reasoning such as:

Peter is tired, he must have worked hard.

The arguer can be charged with mistaking necessary and sufficient conditions, or he may be trusted to know for certain that Peter did not spend the whole night partying, according to the range of context considered by the analyst.

A probability is a proposition expressing either a probable natural relation or a social agreement:

A probability is a generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a probability, e.g. “the envious hate”, “the beloved show affection”. (Aristotle, PA, II, 27)

These are excellent examples of associative semantic inferences (+ envious, + hate); (+ love, + show love), see Orientation; Topos in Semantic. Such substantial probabilities are based on common sense views of basic human tendencies. The corresponding topics underlie the current production of arguments; see Common place.

The big strong man will prevail over the small weak one, and mothers love their children. Sometimes, however, this is not the case. A characteristic of reasoning from social probabilities is that it can be reversed, as expressed in the key Aristotelian topic #21, “incredible things do happen” (Rhet, n°22, 1400a5; RR p. 373).

Consistency is generally a source of probabilities. People are rational and intentional beings; they make plans and are expected to act according to those plans, to remain true to their words and intentions. Their behavior is presumed to be probably consistent. Inconsistency is the sign of a defective personality, or of a basic mistake, see Consistency; Ad hominem. Showing that the opponent is incoherent is a key tool for rejecting claims or narratives to be rejected. But consistency is only a probability, as noted in topos #21, and probabilities cannot hold against hard evidence; they are standard everyday qualifications. Other topics are based on inconsistent behavior, people change their minds and criminal actions may be poorly planned, see Motives.

3.2 The enthymeme as a truncated syllogism

The enthymeme is also defined as a categorical syllogism in which a premise is omitted:

Men are fallible, you are fallible.
You are a man, you are fallible.

Or the conclusion:

Human are fallible, after all you are a human!

The Logic of Port-Royal defines the enthymeme as:

A syllogism which is perfect in the mind, but imperfect in the expression, because one of the propositions is suppressed as too clear and too well known, and as being easily supplied by the mind of those to whom we speak. (Arnauld, Nicole, [1662], p. 224)

No enthymeme is conclusive, except in virtue of a proposition understood, which, consequently, has to be in the mind though it be not expressed. (Id., p. 207)

The example in the preceding paragraph can therefore be called an enthymeme for two reasons: first because it is based on probable indices and second because it is an incomplete syllogism.

The definition of an enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is often not considered to be Aristotelian: “It is not of the essence of the enthymeme to be incomplete” (Tricot’s Note to Aristotle, PA, II, 27, 10, p. 323).
Moreover, according to Conley, this conception of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is not widely used in ancient rhetoric. He finds it only in one passage in Quintilian (Conley 1984, p.174).
However, the First Analytics does consider the case of the truncated syllogism, “Men do not say the latter [Pittacus is wise] because they know it” (PA, II, 27, 10). On the other hand, we read in the Rhetoric that:

If any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the price is a crown, it is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games’, without adding ‘And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown’, a fact which everybody knows. (Rhet., I, 2, 1357a15; RR, p. 113).

According to this definition, the enthymeme can be considered as a figure of speech by ellipsis, precisely a figure of thought.

4. The rhetorical counterpart of the syllogism

In the Aristotelian system, the proof is obtained by inference, whether scientific (logical), dialectical, or rhetorical. For Aristotle, there are two types of scientific inference, syllogistic deduction and induction. In rhetoric, scientific inference is replaced by “rhetorical inference” or enthymeme, since the requirements of rhetorical discourse are incompatible with the exercise of scientific inference:

I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example the rhetorical induction. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b5, RR, p. 109)

The syllogism (scientific inference) and the enthymeme (rhetorical inference) are defined in a strictly parallel way:

When it is shown that certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b15; RR, p. 109)

But, unlike the syllogism, derived from true propositions, the enthymeme is drawn from “probabilities and signs” (Rhet., I, 2, 1357a30; RR, p. 113), see supra § 3.1.

The enthymeme is “the substance of persuasion”, “a sort of demonstration” (Rhet., I, 1, 1354a10, RR p. 95; 1355a5, RR p. 99). It deals centrally with the issue, the substance of the debate, “the fact” (Rhet, I, 1, 1354a25, RR p. 97. As such, the enthymeme is opposed to the reckless use of ethos and pathos, S. Emotion; Pathos; Ethos.

The enthymeme is also called a rhetorical syllogism, considered as an imperfect syllogism. These labels refer to rhetoric as syllogistic. However, the scientific / dialectical / rhetorical parallelism, however attractive it may be, is problematic.To accept this opposition, is to enter a very uncomfortable and empirically inadequate conceptual grid.
— On the one hand, the distinction between the three types of reasoning creates a divide between categorical scientific syllogism and probable dialectic syllogism, versus persuasive rhetorical enthymeme. This distinction posits socially relevant discourse as inherently incapable of dealing with well-founded truth.
— On the other hand, argumentative rhetoric is straitjacketed in the opposition between technical evidence, rhetorical evidence proper, and non-technical proof, which do not fit into the previous notional framework. Common legal discourse routinely combines the two types of proof, in perfectly syllogistic forms of reasoning, see Layout; Demonstration.

The reasons given for tying the enthymeme to syllogistic discourse are somewhat paradoxical. The enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is said to suit rhetoric because it would be less pedantic than the complete syllogism; this assumes that the missing premise is easy to retrieve. Another reason given is that one would use an enthymeme because the ordinary audience is composed of people of a mediocre intelligence, who are unable to follow a rigorous syllogistic chain. This second reason assumes that the missing premise is too difficult to recover: these two justifications are not immediately compatible.

5. Enthymeme and interpretative cooperation

From the point of view of argumentative communication, the enthymeme exploits the implicit to achieve persuasion:

Everyone who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymeme or examples; there is no other way. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356b5, RR p. 109)

As Bitzer notes (1959, p. 408), the enthymematic form is a way of connecting speaker and audience in a process of co-construction of the meaning of the discourse, “the enthymeme is satisfied if merely what is stated in it be understood”, (Quintilian, IO, V, 14, 24). By constructing a common speech space, implicitness produces intersubjectivity. The speaker frames the audience as good listeners, and thus creating a “good intelligence” and an atmosphere of complicity. Communicative fusion thus contributes to the formation of an ethos: “you understand me; you can read my mind, I am like you, we are together”.

In Jakobson’s terms, the enthymematic formulation of reasoning has a phatic function, that is to say, it keeps the communicative channel open. The surprise effect associated with the ellipsis is intended to awaken a sleepy audiences: “Something is missing!” (see supra § 3.2).

6. The enthymeme as a closing formula

The ancient rhetorical practice accorded a superior efficiency to the enthymeme founded on opposites. As the paragon, this specific enthymeme has appropriated the name of the class:

Although every expression of thought may be called enthymeme, the one which is based on contraries has, for it seems the most pointed form of argument, appropriated the common name for its sole possession. (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55; 423)
What you know is of no use; is what you do not know hindrance? (Cicero, Top., XIII, 55: 425).

The second sentence could be understood as a rhetorical question “so, what you do not know should be useful”.

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ANNEXE

commenter la dernier exemple, et revenir à l’autre.

EMOTION

1. Emotion

1.1 Psychology

From a psychological point of view, emotion is a syndrome, a temporary synthesis of different states:

— A psychic state of consciousness.
— A neurophysiological state, perceptible or not to the subject, such as the goosebumps associated with emotions such as fear or pleasure; or the adrenaline rush associated  with anger.
— An altered self-presentation: changes in facial expression; of body posture; specific attitudes and emergence of actions, such as the flight reaction, characteristic of fear.
— A cognitive state, including a structured representation of reality.

The direction of causality between these components is discussed: common sense considers that the psychic state determines the neurophysiological and attitudinal changes, “he cries because he is sad”, but it can be shown that, if you put a subject in the physical state corresponding to a particular emotion, he will experience that emotion, so, literally, “he is sad because he cries” (James, 1884).

1.2 Basic emotions

The emotions listed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and taken up by the Latin rhetoricians can be considered as the very first set of basic social emotions in the Western world, see. Pathos.

Modern philosophers propose their own lists of emotions; for example, Descartes claims that there are only six “simple and primitive” passions, “wonder, love, hate, desire, joy, and sadness. […] all the others are composed of some of these six or are species of them » ([1649], §69).

Psychologists define basic emotions as universal, independent of languages ​​and cultures. The lists are variable and more or less developed; they generally include fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy, surprise. Ekman (1999) enumerates the following ones: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness – distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame.

In theology, the major sins, pride, envy, anger, sadness (acedia: sloth, depression), avarice, gluttony, lust, can be seen as emotional leaks, considered as sins insofar as they are left uncontrolled.

1.2 Emotions and mood: Phasic and thymic

Moods are defined as stable or thymic affective states, whereas emotions are phasic, i.e; they develop in an event structure, according to a bell-shaped curve pattern, S. Calm.

1.3 Emotion and situation

An emotion is related to a situation. Causal theories of emotion analyze the situation as a stimulus that mechanically produces a response, which is the corresponding emotion. However, this view does not explain the possibility of emotional injunctions and disagreements about emotions (see below). In fact, emotion is not related to some kind of objective situation, but to a subjective perception of the situation; the stimulus is a situation under a certain description. In other words, the situation perceived as emotional is part of the emotion.

A distinction can be made between emotion as it is experienced and emotion as it is framed in the discourse of the experiencer, The relationship between experienced emotion and spoken emotion is analogous to that between time as an extra-linguistic reality, and tense, the form language gives to time. The object of rhetorical-argumentative treatment of emotion is emotion-tense, whereas psychology is interested in emotion-time.

2. Argumentative emotions

Serious argumentative situations are inherently emotional. Contradiction, conflictive or not, disrupts routine beliefs and plans of action. For example, having to decide what to do creates tension at the social, cognitive, and emotional levels. The arguer must confront an uncomfortable situation; relationships with the other, and social statuses are potentially threatened; representations of the everyday world are destabilized, as are personal identities based on these representations.

2.1 Emotions as issues in argumentative discourse

The situation associated with emotion is not a causal source of emotion; when it rains there is no argument as to whether or not one can get wet or not This negotiability of emotions is evidenced by the existence of emotional injunctions, such as,

“Time for Outrage!”(Stéphane Hessel)
“A Call for indignation” (Ignacio Ramonet)
“Indignant? We should be” (Simon Kuper).[1]

In one given situation, there can be huge discrepancies between the emotional states of the participants:

S1 — Let us weep, the father of the nation is dead!
S2 — Let’s rejoice, the tyrant is dead!

S1 -— I’m not afraid!
S2 — You should be.

An emotion is a point of view. In the second example, by refusing to agree with S1, S2 opens a debate, and must explain why he does not agree. S2 must reveal his or her reasons for being afraid, i.e. argue his feelings. Conversely, S1 is now at risk of being refuted by S2, and left with an inappropriate emotion.

As with argumentation in general, we can distinguish between cases in which emotion are argued explicitly, and those in which the argument is left implicit, and where we are left with an orientation toward a particular, unnamed, emotion. In both cases, the starting point  of the emotion is in the participants’ perception of the situation. Ultimately, the formatted situation and the experienced em explicitlyotion form a compact whole. Therefore, in order to justify an emotion, one must give a detailed account of the situation including objective specifications of what happened and subjective emotional evaluations of the latter.
This formatting follows a relatively simple system of “emotional parameters”, that determine the nature and intensity of the emotion, depending on the more or less predictable and pleasant character of the situation, its origin, its distance, control, norms and values ​​of the experiencer, etc. (Scherer [1984a], p. 107; 1984b).

2.2 The Rhetoric: How emotion are « done » and « undone »

Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides an excellent description of the thematic structure of speeches that construct or deconstruct specific emotions.  The book is not about the psychology of emotions but rather a treatise on what discourse can do with emotions and how an emotional social thrust can be controlled, reconstructed or refuted. The question is not what anger or calm are, but how discourses that are likely to provoke or tranquilize anger are constructed. This is why, from an argumentative perspective, action predicates should be preferred to substantives to refer to emotions, for example:

— To anger vs. to cool down the anger;
— To inspire friendship vs. to break with friends,
— To frighten vs. to encourage;
— To shame vs. to despise other’s opinion and behave shamelessly 
— To be grateful vs. to feel no obligation;
— To pity vs. to be indifferent;
— To incite rivalry, jealousy, envy vs. to incite a spirit of open competition.

Emotions belong in the realm of discursive action. In the Rhetoric, they are defined on the basis of typical scenarios, activated and developed by the speaker. This description of discursive strategies which generate emotions is one of the major achievements of rhetorical argumentation theory.
Anti-oriented discourses construct and refute anti-oriented emotions. Speech alters representations, thus arousing or appeasing, counterbalancing emotions, just as any point of view can be fought, turned back, or circumvented.

The examples of pity and anger can give an idea of these basic argumentative techniques.

2.2 Pitiful vs merciless

Moving to pity 

A pities B when he considers that B is the victim of an undeserved evil; and when A is well aware that he may one day suffer from the same evil (id., 1385b10-15, RR, p. 291).

For A to feel compassion for B, the distance between A and B must be properly calibrated; one feels pity towards people who are similar and close to us.Generally speaking, the dimension of distance plays an essential role in the construction of emotion, not as an objective metric, but as a cultural, language-built notion.

It follows from this description that pity should not be considered an automatic feeling. In particular, according to the Rhetoric, those who have nothing to fear for themselves would be insensitive to pity. According to the theory of the moral character (mores) of the audience, the locally relevant construction of an emotion depends on a good analysis of the audience, see Ethos.

In oher words, to directly induce pity, B must show that he or she is suffering, and that he or she does not deserve to be, that the same thing could happen to you, etc., and then, of course, reinforce these substantial commonplaces. If pity is constructed according to such parameters, it is justified and judged to be decent and reasonable.

Rejecting misplaced pity — Walton has shown the lines along which the target can resist pity, in other words, he has shown how to construct a discourse against pity, which allows the target to remain calm, insensitive, and not yield to a movement of undue pity. This discourse is first constructed along a specific “information line”, about the situation. It is then subjected to a condition of relevance, pity can only be appealed to if the domain allows for personal involvement. For example, scientific discourse, which excludes ordinary subjectivity, does not allow appeals to pity, which are then considered “irrelevant” (Walton 1992, p. 27)

When relevant, the appeal to pity routinely functions in the general conflict of pro and contra arguments, concerning personal involvement. In the case of dismissed workers, for example, the appeal to compassion (ad misericordiam) is pitted against the need to preserve the interests of shareholders (ad pecuniam vs. ad misericordiam), to place the company in a good position in the market (ad rivalitatem vs. ad misericordiam), or to preserve the jobs of other workers in the company (ad misericordiam vs. ad misericordiam).

2.3 Anger: Getting angry and calming down

Argumentation theory has glorified the appeal to pity with a Latin name, ad misericordiam. Actually, from an argumentative point of view, there is no reason to distinguish pity from other emotions. All should be given the same lexical consideration, particularly the appeal to anger, ad iram, a highly arguable and argumentative emotion.

Make angry — Anger is a basic rhetorical emotion. If the speaker is willing to cause the public anger, he speaker will let free course to his feigned o real righteous indignation or holy anger, and will adopt a virtuous ethos. From the same virtuous attitude, the opponent will denounce rage, fury and hatred, S. Pathos.

Discursive representations play an essential role in these oppositions. In order to make A angry with B, the speaker has to show to his or her interlocutor A that:

— B despises, offends, mocks A; B is an obstacle to A‘s plans, wishes, and takes pleasure in it.
— A suffers and seeks revenge by harming B.
— A fantasizes about his future revenge, and enjoys it.

These are the basic lines of inflammatory speech. It should be noted that anger is not an atomic emotion, a crude response to the bite of a stimulus, but the complex result of an aggregate of emotions such as humiliation, contempt and even pleasure. The rationality or morality of anger depends on the proper construction of this sense of injustice. Anger can be fully virtuous, rational and emotional, if these distinctions have any meaning here.

Anger triggers the mechanisms of revenge. In a typical serial episode, the anger constructed and justified in the first sequence, is transformed, into an argument for subsequent action.

Anger is not hatred; anger can be rationally justified, hatred cannot; there is no acceptable reason for hatred. From a religious point of view, hate speech is a sin “Love, at least bear with one another patiently!”. The status of hate speech serves as an example of how social evaluation is achieved. Any citizen can legitimately comment on and take stock of anger speech, outrage speech and hate speech. Politicians and judges have the authority to make judgments about such matters. They can of course also seek the assistance of other parties they deem helpful, anthropologists, moralists, and, of course, linguists and logicians.

From anger back to calm — In order to calm an angry A, B‘s advocate will develop a calming discourse that concludes that A‘s expression of anger is poorly worded and badly constructed, and that this anger is unreasonable. He will argue that B’s behavior was not contemptuous, mocking, insulting, or outrageous. Rather it is the case the case that B was misunderstood; he or she was joking; the intention was not hostile; B behaves like this with people that he loves; B is sorry, and offers apologies and compensations; B has already been punished, etc. — and the reassuring discourse will conclude that all this happened a long time ago, and that the situation has changed, see Kettle

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[1] Stéphane Hessel (2011). Time for Outrage! London: Charles Glass Books.
Ignacio Ramonet (2011).  http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/02/a-call-to-outrage/(11-08-2017)
Simon Kuper (2011). Quoted after https://www.ft.com/content/280c9816-192c-11e0-9311-00144feab49a?mhq5j=e1 (11-08-2017)

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DIALECTICS

Dialectic and dialogue have the same Greek etymology dia- + legein, dia- “through”, legein “to say”. The prefix dia- is different from the prefix di– which means “two”. Etymologically, a dialogue is not a two-person conversation (which could be called a dilogue). The condition is not on the number of participants, but on discourse circulation. However, the historical notion of dialectic does refer to a two-partner dialogue.

1. The ancient dialectical method

Aristotelian dialectic is a dialogical method used to resolve problems of the form « P or not P? », such as « is it good to be rich or not? », by eliminating one of the options, in a standardized question-answer interaction using dialectical syllogisms.

Dialectic is a philosophical tool used in the a priori search for the definition of fundamental concepts. In this function of clarifying first principles, it has been replaced by axiomatization.

1.1 Dialectical reasoning

As « mathematical science » and « rhetorical argument », « dialectical reasoning » proceeds by syllogism and induction (Aristotle, Post. An., I, 1). While scientific syllogistic deduction proceeds from « true and primary » premises, dialectic uses generally accepted premises (Top. I, 1), or simple “opinions”, endoxon:

Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall
 be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about
every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. (Ibid.)

The word endoxa translates as “probable premises” or as “accepted ideas”. The strict deduction rules of the syllogism are replaced by argument schemes.

D’après les Seconds analytiques, le raisonnement dialectique « [prend] les prémisses comme comprises par l’adversaire » (Aristote, S. A., i, 1, 5 ; p. 2). Le jeu se déroule entièrement dans le système de croyance du Répondant, il a pour fonction de tester la cohérence de ce système, V. Ad hominem.

1.2 Dialectical game

The dialectical game is played by two partners, the Respondent and the Questioner (Brunschwig 1967, p. 29). It is a limited interaction governed by strict rules, which proceeds by questions and answers, with a winner and a loser.

— The Respondent first chooses to assert P or not P.
— The Questioner must refute the proposition that the Respondent has chosen to support, by means of total questions (yes or no questions).

Based on these answers, the Questioner attempts to make the Respondent to admit a statement which contradicts his original assertion. If the Questioner succeeds, then he wins the dialectical game; if he or she fails, the Respondent will win.

Dialectical refutation by contradictory consequences has the following form:

Peter asserts “S is P”.
On the one hand, S possesses the Q attribute, the doxa says so and the adversary admits it.
On the other hand, P possesses non-Q attributes.
If S were P, it would have to possess the non-Q attribute.
So Peter is saying incompatible things about S.

Peter holds that power is a good.
But everyone agrees that power corrupts.
Corruption is evil.
Good is incompatible with evil.
To be good, power would have to exclude corruption.

Or again: you say that so-and-so is a super champion; you admit, like everyone else, that a super champion doesn’t dope; but so-and-so does dope, so he’s not a super champion.

You contradicts what you say with the consequences of what you say: You assert opposites about the same being (he does drugs and he’s a super champion): This form of refutation, used in philosophical dialectical exchange, is at the root of ordinary refutation.

From a linguistic point of view, the art lies in the construction of non-P. In fact, what is said by the proposer is something like S is X ; his opponent constructs X as non-P, through a series of argumentative paraphrases, V. Contraries; Absurd.

1.3 Dialectical discussion and social authority

To be worthy of a dialectical debate, the proposition discussed in a dialectical debate is an endoxon, that is to say, it must be endorsed by some social or intellectual authority; in other words, it must be an endoxon

Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by philosophers, i.e., either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these. (Top., 10)

This authority of opinion is not an all-or-nothing question. It is derived from the authority of different social groups, according to a gradation that goes from the quantitative to the qualitative, from the opinion of humankind (universal consensus) to the authority of “enlightened opinion” to that of an illustrious person, see Doxa.
The Aristotelian continuum values different orders of endoxa. We are far from the vision of the doxa as cliché or stereotype as “ready to think”, or, just as mechanically, “ready to denounce”. Endoxa are opinions worth of discussing ; they enter in the definition of what a thesis is:  A thesis is « a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion ».

The philosopher must be eminent, “for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly” (Aristotle, Top., I, 11). In other words, “if it were the first comer who emitted paradoxes, it would be absurd to pay attention to it” (Aristotle, Top., Brunschwig, I, 1, 100b20, p.17). The authority that frames the debate is clearly socially referenced as such.

It is noteworthy that it is the plurality and competition between authorities — and not the appeal to authority — that is placed at the center of intellectual debate. Authority is invoked not to close the discussion but rather to open it. To say that a proposal is supported by an authority is not to say that it is true, but to say that it deserves discussion.

2. The scholastic dispute

The scholastic dispute (disputatio) corresponds to the medieval practice of a dialectical game. It is an instrument of research and teaching, based on a specific substantive question, as proposed by a master. At the end of the discussion, the master proposes a solution and refutes the arguments against it (Weijers 1999).

3. The revival of dialectic

The ancient dialectical method, which had been in decline since the Renaissance (Ong 1958), was reconstructed in the second half of the twentieth century within the framework of logical dialog games. It has been brought to the forefront of argumentation studies by the Pragma-Dialectic and by the Informal Logic programs. The Pragma-Dialectic program of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1996, etc.) is a “New Dialectic”, a counterpart of Perelman’s “New Rhetoric” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 1996 “La Nouvelle Dialectique” [“The New Dialectic”]). In the Informal Logic framework, the study of “logical dialogue games” has been developed by Douglas Walton (Walton 1984; Walton 1998, The New Dialectic).

The terms Proponent and Opponent used to refer to the central partners in an argumentative situation, are borrowed from this dialectical theory. Unlike the Proponent of a substantial proposition in an argumentative situation, the Respondent in the dialectical game does not have to provide a positive proof of his claim, but simply has to avoid being led into a self-contradiction.

Continuing of a general definition of dialectic as, “the practice of reasoned dialogue, [the art] of argument by questions and answers” (Brunschwig 1967, p. 10), one can consider that the conversational process is “dialectical” insofar as 1) it relates to a specific and mutually agreed problem; 2) it is played out between equal partners, 3) it is driven by the search for the truth,  justice or the common good; 4) the speech circulates freely between the partners, yet  5) it respects explicitly established rules.

4. Aristotelian dialectic and Hegelian dialectic

Unlike Aristotelian dialectic, Hegelian dialectic does not proceed by eliminating the false, but by synthesizing of the antagonistic positions. The original opposition is not resolved but abolished and transcended. Aristotelian dialectic is based on the principle of non-contradiction, whereas Hegelian dialectic tends toward something “beyond” contradiction.

However, going beyond contradiction should not mean that a speaker can engage in an inconsistent discourse:

[HL] claims that “since the world is torn by contradictions, only dialectic (which admits the contradiction) makes it possible to consider it as a whole and to find out its meaning and direction”. In other words, since the world is contradiction, the idea of ​​the world must be contradictory. The idea of ​​a thing must be of the same nature as this thing: The idea of ​​blue must be blue.
Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, [1927][1]

5. Rhetoric and ancient dialectic

The use of syllogistic deduction is the hallmark of science ; dialectics is legislative, serving to discuss a priori foundations that will serve as premises for scientific deduction; rhetoric has an executive function : it deals with current, public affairs, involving law, politics and, with the development of Christianity, religious belief.

– According to their ancient definitions, dialectic and rhetoric are the two arts of discourse. Argumentative rhetoric is “the counterpart of dialectic” (Aristotle, Rhet, I).

– Dialectic is a technique of discussion between two partners, based on (short) questions and answers. The object of rhetoric is long and continuous monological speech addressed to an audience.

–Dialectic deals with philosophical theses . Rhetoric is concerned with specific social or political issues.

– Rhetoric and dialectic use the same foundations of inference,topoi, applied to plausible statements, endoxa, components of a doxa,

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[1] Quoted after Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs. Excerpt from the Preface to the 1946 edition. Paris: Grasset, 1975. P. 63.y

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DOXA

The word doxa is modeled on an ancient Greek word, meaning “opinion, reputation, what is said of things or people”. The doxa corresponds to a set of socially predominant, fuzzy, sometimes contradictory, representations, considered in their current linguistic formulation. The word shares the deprecating meaning of cliché or commonplace; it may be given the meaning of “ideology” or “dogma”, particularly when it is called into question (Amossy 1991, Nicolas 2007). Its derived adjective is doxic (or doxical).

Aristotle defines the endoxa (sg. endoxon) as the common opinions of a community, used in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning:

Those opinions are ‘generally accepted’ which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, i.e., by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. (Aristotle, Top., I, 1)

An endoxic idea is therefore an idea based on a form of social authority, ranging from the authority of common people as a group, to that of the wise (S. Dialectic), according to a gradation ranging from the purely quantitative to the qualitative, from the opinion of the human (the universal consensus) to the authority of the enlightened opinion.

Thus, endoxic is an antonym of paradoxic, paradoxical. Latin translates the adjective derived endoxos “endoxic” by probabilis, “probable”.

The endoxa is the target of philosophical criticism addressed to common sense and common opinion. This criticism extends to conclusions based on the endoxon – inferential topic system, used in dialectic and rhetoric. Yet, to say of a proposition that it is endoxic, is not pejorative:

It is well known that Aristotle confides, under conditions of scrutiny, in the collective representations and the natural vocation of mankind toward truth. (Brunschwig, Preface to Aristotle, Top., p. xxv)

Rhetoric and dialectic are based on endoxa: dialectical arguments test the endoxa, and rhetorical argument exploits them, pro and contra, in the context of a particular conflict.

In a judicial situation, the salient doxic elements, without being taken as true, may determine who bears the burden of proof, in other words, it determines who is at first sight, the object of suspicion, who is accused by the rumor, S. Common place.

Argument schemes relying on the authority of the doxa:

— Appeal to common belief, S. Authority.
— Appeal to the feeling of the crowd, S. Ad populum.

DOUBT

Doubt is a mental state and a behavior typically associated with an argumentative situation.

— As a psychological state, doubt implies discomfort and apprehension, see Emotion. Argumentation is a costly and time-consuming activity, from the cognitively, emotionally and interactionally. Non-argumentative individuals are reluctant to engage in an argumentative situation, where they will have to face the resistance of the other party.

— At the cognitive level, to doubt is to be in a state of suspended assent to a proposition, or a state of indecision about what to do.

— From a linguistic point of view, doubtful propositions are formulated by the speaker, without being affirmed or denied. In Goffman’s terms, the speaker is, at most, the « Author » of the proposition, not its ‘Principal’; he or she is not committed to the statement, S. Roles.

— From an interactional point of view, a turn of speech is doubted if it is not ratified or openly rejected by the interlocutor, see Disagreement; Question. Such rejection cannot remain unfounded and reservations must be justified, by adding arguments in support of another point of view, or by refuting the reasons given in support of the original proposal.

— In a full-blown argumentative situation, one party or the other does not necessarily assume doubt. One party may be absolutely certain of the truth and validity of his argument, and argue in perfectly good faith that P is the case or the right thing to do, while the other party will have no doubt that it is not the case. The doubt is systematically taken over by the third party.

Dialogue outsources these different operations by giving them specific linguistic forms and micro-social configurations.

Argumentative doubt, Cartesian doubt, skeptical doubt

Argumentative doubt is opposed to Cartesian doubt. Descartes rejects “all such merely probable knowledge and makes it a rule to trust only what is fully known and incapable of being doubted » ([1628], Rule II; Geach). He reconstructs a system of certain beliefs on the basis of the only absolute certainty, that of the cogito: “I think, therefore I am”. This type of doubt is opposed to skeptical doubt:

Cartesian doubt does not consist in floating, uncertainly, between affirmation and negation. On the contrary, it clearly shows that what is in doubt is false, or insufficiently self-evident, and so cannot be asserted to be true. Skeptical doubt regards uncertainty as the normal state of thought, whereas Descartes regards it as a disease he seeks to cure. Even when he takes up the arguments of the skeptics , it is in a spirit quite opposite to theirs. (Gilson, Note 1, p. 85. to Descartes [1637])

Argumentative doubt differs from skeptical doubt in that it does not privilege the indefinite suspension of assent over the resolution of disputes.

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DISSOCIATION

1. Dissociation as a fundamental argumentative technique

The concept of dissociation was introduced by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca. According to them, there are two types of argumentation techniques: “association and dissociation” ([1958], p. 190).

The former of these concerns two or more propositions, that make up an argument, while the latter operates on a single concept.
The technique of dissociation is thus placed on a par with the large and varied set of association techniques, i.e., argument schemes. This shows the importance that Perelman attaches to the concept.

2.Dissociation as a conceptual reorganization

Perelman defines dissociation as the splitting of the meaning of a word or concept, in order to avoid a contradiction.
The meaning of the problematic term T is reformulated as containing an internal contradiction, “an incompatibility”, “an antinomy”, and dissociation is the mechanism by which it can be resolved ([1958], 550-609).
T is split into a term T₁ and a term T₂, this operation involves a negative evaluation of T₁ and a positive evaluation of T₂.

Dissociation appears as a kind of “semantic cleansing”, by which an unwanted content or connotation, T₁, can be disposed of. The concept of reality can thus be divided, « dissociated », into the pair T₁ = appearance vs. T₂ = reality, the latter being “the true reality”.

While the primitive status of what is given as the starting point of dissociation is undecided and indeterminate, the dissociation in Terms 1 and 2 will value the aspects corresponding to term 2 and will devalue the aspects that oppose it. Term I, the appearance, in the narrow sense of this word, is only illusion and error.
(Perelman 1977, p. 141)

Dissociation is the key operation for extracting a concept from the ordinary meaning of a word, not for analyzing a concept as a synthesis of two distinct but equally important concepts, see distinguo.

3. Linguistic aspects of dissociation

Reasoning by dissociation is characterized first of all by the opposition between appearance and reality. This can be applied to any notion, by using adjectives such as apparent, illusory on the one hand, real, true on the other. To use an expression such as apparent peace or genuine democracy is to indicate the absence of genuine peace, or the presence of an apparent democracy: one of these adjectives refers to the other. (Id., p. 147)

The linguistic markers of dissociations are very diverse:

A prefix such as pseudo- (pseudo-atheist), quasi– not– the adjective alleged, the use of quotes indicate that we are dealing with the term I, while the capital letter (Being), the definite article (the solution), the adjective unique or true denote a term II. (Id., p. 148)

Other dissociations are stabilized as pairs of antithetical terms or “philosophical pairs” such as “opinion / science; sense knowledge / rational knowledge; body / soul; just / legal, etc.” (Perelman [1958], 563). Some of these dissociated pairs are traditional and constitute the oppositions that generate foundational ideological discourses.

As with all antonymic pairs, one term is linguistically preferred to the other, and this preference can be reversed. The T₁ vs. T₂ opposition “superficial vs. deep” can be reversed by praising the superficial — “the skin is the deepest thing there is” (Paul Valéry). The pair, “rhetoric, argumentation” can be seen as an « antagonist pair », engaged in permanent revolving evaluations.

4. Dissociation as shielding

Dissociation is a dialogue strategy:

X: — Well old boy, that’s democracy!
Y: — There is democracy and there is democracy.

X seems to have the upper hand in the discussion. Y resists with a typical dissociation that allows him to get rid of the embarrassing democracy proposed by X as a pseudo-democracy. The reply introduces a stasis of definition

Dissociation has a concessive facet. For example, one might assume that some intellectuals would make good businessmen, while conceding that they are only a tiny minority. Dissociation does the same thing, but by completely excluding of the subcategory « intellectual businessmen » from the general category, “intellectuals”:

(1)    S1    — When it comes to business, intellectuals are hopeless
         S2    — Or they are not really intellectuals.

(2)    S1_1     — Germans drink beer.
        S2         — Not Hans!
        S1_2     — Normal, Hans is not a real German.

In (2) S2 refutes S1₁ by producing of an opposite case. S1₂ recognizes that Hans is German and does not drink beer, and maintains his original claim by splitting the category “German” into « true Germans vs. not true Germans ». The modification of the argument may or may not be justified; S1 may have responded:

S1_3      — But Hans is not a real German, he grew up in the United States

– Suppose that Americans drink less beer than Germans. S1_3 introduces a line of justification showing that Hans deviates from the stereotype of the true German.
This new category created by S1_3 is based upon an explicit criterion, that is independent of the current discussion. In the previous dialogue, the only contextually available criterion is « beer drinking ». The word Germans in S1 refers to all Germans; if Germans are redefined as true Germans on the basis of the criterion, “Germans who drink beer”, then the statement S1₁ is indeed compelling, since “Germans who drink beer” do drink beer.

Category rectification serves to exclude individuals from the category being reanalyzed. In politics, this strategy opposes the, “true Syldavian” as good citizens in order to exclude other citizens as, “bad citizens”. In practice, dissociation transforms a previously necessary and sufficient condition (to be a Syldavian one must be a Syldavian citizen) into a necessary one, « to be a true Syldavian, one must have Syldavian nationality and share our ideology ».

In the following case, “La Réunion” [1], that is “the people living in La Réunion”, is opposed to “the true Réunion”, an ad hoc subcategory of this group.

Roland Sicard (RS) is the host of the television program. Marine Le Pen is the candidate for the National Front (“Front National”, a far-right party) in the 2012 French presidential elections. Gilbert Collard (GC) is a lawyer, president of her support committee.
RS   — good morning Gilbert Collard […] er- a word about Marine Le Pen’s trip to La Réunion\ she was heckled, one feels that the National Front candidates are still in a lot of trouble abroad/?
GC   — Listen I know La Réunion very well because I was there very often as a lawyer and then in particularly sensitive cases and— there are: uh, two Réunions uh there’s a Réunion which is instrumentalized that organizes the usual reception committee for Marine Le Pen they’re quite insignificant eh\ well and then ther’s the real Réunion made up of men with divergent views of – women with opi – but that’s no more difficult in the overseas departments than in metropolitan France anyway\ no I don’t think what makes it difficult is the instrumentalization of the media hmm […]
TV program [Home Truths] France 2, 08 Feb., 2012.[2]

S. Opposite words; Categorization; Orientation

5. Distinguo and dissociation

According to Perelman, the dissociation technique is, “hardly mentioned by traditional rhetoric, for it is especially important for the analysis of systematic philosophical thought” (1977, p. 139). An example is taken from Kant, for whom natural sciences postulate a universal determinism while morality postulates the freedom of the individual; hence the necessity of dissociating the concept reality, a confused notion, into a phenomenal reality, in which determinism reigns, and a noumenal reality in which the individual can freely choose and act on his decision.
These sub-concepts are in a complementary oppositional relationship, as contradictories. The goal is not to nullify one of these dimensions, as in the case of dissociation.

Ancient rhetoric has the concept of distinguo. The distinguo is an operation of clarification performed on a concept that is considered possibly « confusing ». In order to clarify the concept, the distinguo performs a kind of content analysis, and rearranges the semantic and cognitive content of the word in different subdomains, for example to clearly define the position of the subject of an investigation, as in example (1) (§1)
Such an operation is the basic task of the lexicographer when she decides whether the signifier to be defined has only one meaning, or several related meanings (polysemy), or several unrelated meanings (homonymy). At this point, the operation does not involve any special treatment or evaluation of the relatively independent semantic or cognitive subdomains.

Dissociation goes one step further by deciding that one of these components is to be evaluated positively, the other negatively and considered negligible for the discussion.

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[1] The Réunion Island is an overseas French department, East of Madagascar.
[2] TV program Les Quatre Vérités France 2. Feb. 8, 2012.

DISMISSAL

When applied to discourse, dismissal is a method of processing out an opponent’s discourse, on the brink of refutation and destruction.

1. Dismissal as the final stage of refutation

An argument can be dismissed after due consideration. In this case, dismissal is the final step of a conclusive refutation.
The standard forms of refutation are based on a substantial examination of the content of the rejected speech, or on more or less relevant considerations about the person holding it. Even in the latter case, the refutation, however poorly argued, is at least backed by some justificatory discourse.

2. Rejecting the argument without considering it (ad lapidem)

The opponent can reject a discourse simply by declaring that the bad quality of the proposed argument is self-evident and self-denouncing:

No comment.
Your arguments are shabby, inadequate, miserable, distressing
I will not give your statement the honor of a rebuttal.
What you say is not even wrong.

Uncle Toby’s reaction, “whistling half a dozen bars of Lillabullero” “when any thing, which he deem’d very absurd, was offerd”  is an example of such reaction ,  S. Ab –, ad –, ex –.

In ancient rhetoric, this move which declares the argument “childish” or “obviously absurd or practically null », is called apodioxis, (Dupriez 1984, Apodioxis; Molinié 1992, Apodioxis), S. Pathetic argument.

The opponent may, in good faith, dismiss an argument as self-refuting, which leads to paradoxical situations. If Big Jones’ discourse is truly self-refuting, then:

The more he talks, the more foolish he appears, the fewer votes he will get.

But this is a dangerous strategy, inspired more by the self-confidence of the arguer’s confidence in his party’s arguments than by any self-refuting evidence about Big Jones’ discourse.

Finally, the opponent may adopt a strategy of irony, and contribute to the spread of his opponent’s speech. This is the extraordinary case reported by Wayne Booth about events taking at his university, in s which students were clashed with their university administration:

At one point, things got so bad that each side found itself reduplicating broadsides produced by the other side, and distributing them, in thousands of copies, without comment; to each side it seemed as if the other side’s rhetoric was self-damning, so absurd had it become. (Booth 1974, p. 8-9)

See also Dismissal (Companion

The other side cannot even hear such a dismissal, which is obviously directed at third parties. Used in particularly contentious argumentative situations, such a maneuver makes any deal between the discussants impossible, see Conditions of discussion.

From an ethotic perspective, such a (non-) arguer displays a kind of moral indignation, while the opponent may accuse her of arrogance and contempt.

Ad lapidem argument (Lat. lapis, “stone”)

The name of this argument is derived from a famous incident in which Dr. Samuel Johnson claimed to disprove Bishop Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy (that there are no material objects, only minds and the ideas in those minds) by kicking a large stone and saying ‘I refute it thus’ (Wikipedia, Ad lapidem).

This clear disdain for verbal argument is akin to « the proof of the pudding is in the eating », a popular practical proof by facts and actions.

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DISAGREEMENT

1. Preference for agreement

Argumentation is a means of deriving a new consensus from an existing one, see Agreement; Persuasion. Such a construction can be seen as the “macro” expression of a tendency that can be observed at the “micro” level of the interactional sequence, the preference for agreement. This concept is fundamental to the organization of speech turns in interaction.

In an adjacency pair, the first turn “prefers”, i.e., is oriented toward a certain type of second turn. The preferred response to an invitation is acceptance, rather than refusal; proposals are made to be accepted rather than rejected; affirmations are put forward to be ratified, not to be rejected, and so on.
The preferred sequence is unmarked; the second speaker follows the first; agreement is the  default. A minimal linguistic mark may suffice: (yes, OK, let’s go…), or a quasi-verbal ratification (mm hm) or a minimal physical action (nod).
The preference for agreement is also reflected in practices such as the avoidance of frontal opposition, the absence of ratification of emerging disagreements and the preference for micro-adjustments to reach an agreement without explicitly bringing up the disagreement for open discussion.

The dispreferred sequence is marked, i.e. it contains specific features such as hesitation, the presence of pre-turns (underlined in S2_2) and justifications (bolded in S2_2):

S1_1 — What are you doing this evening?
S2_1 — Well I don’t know …
S1_2 — Come for a drink!
S2_2 — (silence) hmm, well, you know, I’d rather not, I have got a little work to do.

Giving reasons for accepting an invitation is almost an insult:

S1 — Come to dinner tomorrow night!
S2 — With pleasure, it means that I won’t have to cook, and I will take out the garbage on the way down when I leave home.

This preference for agreement is not a psychological fact, but an observed conversational regularity. It can be compared to Grice’s principle of cooperation, or with Ducrot’s observations on the polemical effect of second turns that do not respect the presuppositions of the first turn, see Presupposition.

2. Conversational disagreements and open arguments

Face-to-face face disagreement is expressed by a series of specific coordinated behaviors, either verbal “I don’t agree”, or paraverbal: struggles for the floor; interruptions; non-collaborative overlaps; accelerated speech flows; raised voices; negative regulators, head shaking, sighs, excitement, loud ironic excesses of signs of agreement, or unaddressed partner behavior, etc.

Sequences of conversational divergence occur randomly; they follow unpredictable patterns; they have a potentially negative impact on the goals of the overall interaction; they introduce a delicate balance between somehow sacrificing a particular view of things in order to maintain good relations with the other party; or taking the risk of damaging the relationship in order to maintain and sharpen extreme disagreements. Most of the time, conversational disagreements are resolved immediately, through incremental micro-adjustments and negotiations, and forgotten

At other times, conversational divergences serve to deepen differences. When conversational divergences are explained and disagreements are ratified, with each position supported by arguments and counterarguments, the interaction becomes highly argumentative. Such interactions can be consequential, remembered, pondered and elaborated upon. They can generate new interactions, that refer back to the original disagreement, where the parties will develop planned interventions. The handling of what has become an issue is now the rationale for these interactions.

3. Enantiosis: Emergent argumentation

The argumentative role of an opponent can develop from his interactional role as a listener, ratifying the existence of an argumentative situation, in which two discourses concerning the same topic are in explicit competition.

During a friendly conversation at a party, between people who hardly know each other:
S1 — if we are going to watch the candidates’ TV debate together tonight, maybe we should know something about each other, personally I vote for candidate Smith.
S2 — oh, well, for me it’s not quite so…

Before this exchange, S2 is simply S1‘s interlocutor. During the exchange, a political divergence emerges, that initiates a restructuring of the interaction, that may lead to a reframing of the interlocutors as political antagonists. From this point, a full-blown argumentative situation can develop, depending on whether or not subsequent moves will thematize the emerging opposition.

The figure of rhetoric called enantiosis seems particularly well suited to designate this transitional moment, in which opposition is looms large without yet being ratified by the participants. The Greek adjective [enantios] can mean:

1. 1. Being in front of, as in opposite shores facing each other; things offered to one’s gaze.
      
   2. With an orientation towards ​​hostility: which stands in front of: “those in front of us”, that is the enemy; in general, the opposing party, the adversary.
   3. Opposed, contrary to: the opposite party, the opponent (after Bailly, [enantios]).

According to this development of meaning, in a dialogue, the adjective enantios first refers to the person standing here, in front of you, for example, in the position of the interlocutor. In a second instance, the idea of ​​hostility appears, and then the interlocutor becomes the opponent (the “adversarius” in a rhetorical encounter, Lausberg [1960], §274).

The word enantiosis is also used as a synonym for « antithesis », and can refer to oppositions such as “good vs. bad; even vs. odd”; one vs. multiple” (Dupriez 1984, Énantiose). This kind of binary opposition is characteristic of the sometimes Manichaean diptych corresponding to antagonistic argumentation. The semantic palette of enantiosis covers the dynamics of this emergence and the initial stabilization of the argumentative situation:

The person facing you >

> with hostility: the opponent  >

> the argumentative antithesis, discourse vs. counter-discourse.

4. “Deep disagreement”

See Dissensus.

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