In the field of argumentation studies, the word value can refer to:

1. 1. The truth-value of a proposition, S. Proposition.
   2. The value of an argumentation, S. Evaluation; Force.

The question of values ​​and value judgments: this entry.

1. Values as a unified field

The philosophical tradition considers that questions about

the good, the ends, the right, obligation, virtue, moral judgment, aesthetic judgment, the beautiful, truth, and validity (Frankena 1967, p. 229)

belong to separate domains: morality, law, aesthetics, logic, economics, politics, epistemology.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, these questions have been taken up globally, within the framework of a general theory of values, of distant Platonic ancestry. This “wide-ranging discussion in terms of ‘value’, ‘values’, and ‘valuation’ [then] spread to psychology, the social sciences, the humanities and even to ordinary speech” (ibid.).

2. The New Rhetoric on values

The concept of value was introduced into the field of argumentation by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric [1958], in the philosophical filiation of Dupréel (1939) (Dominicy n. d.).
It constitutes its permanent foundation, as shown by the introductory chapter of Perelman “Juridical Logic” [Logique juridique] (1979) entitled « The New Rhetoric and Values ».

The status of value and the role of values in argument is extensively discussed and exemplified in Guerrini 2019 Les Valeurs dans l’argumentation [Values in Argumentation]

2.1 Perelman’s research program on the logic of values

Perelman presents his discovery of the theory of argumentation as a step beyond a research program on the “logic of value judgments” (Perelman 1979, §50, p. 101; 1980, p. 457). This latter research led him to the following results:

— « There is no logic of value judgments » (ibid.) that would allow their rational organization. This conclusion that is said to be « unexpected » (ibid.).

— Contrary to the project of classical philosophy, it is impossible to build an ontology that would allow a “calculus of values” regulating their hierarchy.

— The treatment of values by logical positivism leads to a dead end. It maintains a gap between the values and the facts from which they cannot be derived. The consequence of this disconnection is that any recourse to values is rejected as irrational.
Perelman argues that considering that value-based actions are irrational is self-defeating, since it implies that practical reasoning and the whole field of law, both based on values, should be regarded as irrational, which is absurd because unacceptable.

Perelman’s conclusion is that, since science and logic deal with truth judgments, they cannot provide the rules of practical reason, which deals with value judgments. Such is the basic of the Perelmanian claim, that re-asserts the gap between the rational and the reasonable, between “the two cultures”, science and humanities, S. Demonstration; Proof.
Furthering his research program on values, in search of other methods capable of accounting for the rational aspect of the use of values, Perelman sought other perspectives better suited to this specific object. He found them in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Topics, which provide techniques for an empirical study on how individuals justify their reasonable choices. Perelman was then able to redefine his theoretical objective no longer as a logic, but as a (New) Rhetoric (ibid.). The argumentative-rhetorical method ​​appears to be the solution to the failure of the logical and philosophical treatments of values. Perelman consistently opposes the project of classical philosophy to develop a calculus of values, since it is not possible to derive a hierarchy of values ​​from an ontology of values. More specifically, Perelman opposes Bentham on the possibility of a calculus of pleasures and pains.

2.2 The opposition fact / value, value judgement / reality judgement

The New Rhetoric is thus structured around two issues concerning values.  The first one has a logical origin. It concerns value judgments, made about a being or a concrete situation. second has a philosophical origin. It concerns substantial values such as the true, the beautiful and the good, which are the most general of all values.
In the TA, values are defined by the following distinctions and operations, which actually retain much of its positivist origin.

— Facts are necessary and compel the mind, whereas values ​​call for an adherence of the mind, S. Argumentation (I).

— But in practice, value judgments and reality judgments are difficult to distinguish. Contextual considerations may be necessary to characterize a judgment as a value judgment: “this is a car” can be a judgment of fact or a value judgment; “this is a real car” is only a judgment of value (see Dominicy, n. d., p. 14-17).

— In science, if two truth-judgments about a reality are contradictory, one of them is necessarily false (principle of the excluded middle), while two contradictory value judgments, “this is beautiful! vs. this is ugly!”, may both be justified by value-based arguments, developed independently from any appeal to reality.

— Values and facts live in separate worlds. Value judgments cannot be derived from nor opposed to reality judgments. Group values ​​are acquired through education and language. and they are specifically reinforced through the epidictic genre.

— Values currently conflict. Legitimate contradictions between value judgments cannot be resolved by eliminating one of the conflicting values, as one eliminates a false proposition. One can only rank the values (ibid., p. 107).

 

The specific treatment of values in the TA is based upon two assumptions
—A distinction is made between two kinds of substantial values, “abstract values ​​such as justice or truth, and concrete values ​​such as France or the Church” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 77).

— It follows that substantial values and value judgments are “objects of agreement that cannot make a claim to the adherence of the universal audience” (id., p. 76), but only to the adherence of particular audiences, S. To Persuade – To convince.

The so-called universal values, ​​“such things as the True, the Good, the Beautiful, and the Absolute” might be regarded “as valid for the universal audience only on condition that their content not be specified” (ibid.). They are the “empty frame[s]” suited to all audiences, and are as such pure instruments of persuasion (ibid.). Natural law theorists would object to this conclusion.

— The TA reasserts the link between values and emotions, of positivist origin.

— The Treatise, maintains the opposition between value judgments and judgments of fact only as the result of “precarious agreements” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 513) and for special debates.

—  The fact/value dichotomy is at the foundation of the Perelmanian argumentative construction. It absolutizes the gap between the two kinds of rationality, the reasonable [raisonnable] of current practices and law, and the rational [rationnel] of logic and sciences. This decision widens the gap between « the two cultures », the culture of facts (sciences) and the culture of values (humanities), V. Demonstration; Proof.

2.3 Discussions:  The opposition facts / values and agreement

 For Perelman, the functioning as an argument of value claims as well as of reality and truth claims presupposes the agreement of the participants. The whole of these « preliminary agreements » to the argumentation itself creates an atmosphere of « communion » (p. 74) allowing the harmonious development of the argumentative-rhetorical situation itself.
Still according to the Treatise, argumentation can be based on two classes of objects, an object being defined as anything on which one can agree or disagree:

We will ask ourselves which objects of agreement play a different role in the argumentative process. We think it will be useful, from this point of view, to group these objects into two categories, one relative to the real, which would include facts, truths and presumptions, the other relative to the preferable, which would contain values, hierarchies and places of the preferable (Id., p. 88; emphasis in the text).

The Treatise further states that

The notion of « fact » is characterized only by the idea that one has of a certain kind of agreement about certain data, those which refer to an objective reality. (Id. p. 89)

In other words, with the agreement of the participants, statements about values and reality can be used as arguments. In rhetorical argumentation, the speaker proceeds on the basis of values shared with the audience, or presented as such, S. Ex datis. In an adversarial debate, the speech of the proponent and the opponent may be based on radically incompatible values. In such cases, the role of third parties (judges, voters, members of a jury…) becomes essential to settle the conflict of values, rather than to solve it definitely.

Discussion: Agreement erases the difference between fact and values

The facts would be defined by an agreement on the objective data, and the values would be defined by an agreement on something which does not belong to the objective reality.

In practice, this definition erases the hard-won distinction between facts compelling the mind and values calling for an adherence of the mind (cf. supra) and replaces it with the notion of agreement.

For the purposes of argumentation and communication, agreement can be reached on both facts and values, which allows them to be used as arguments. At that point, the deal is done, whatever the ontological differences between facts and values.

Discussion: Is agreement a prerequisite for argumentation?

Argumentation works as well in a regime of disagreement as in a regime of agreement.
Participants can disagree on facts as well as on values. Like values, facts are not imposed on the minds, but must be agreed upon.
In a concrete argumentative situation, the agreement of the participants upon facts as well as upon values cannot be taken for granted, and the absence of agreement does not prevent their use as argument.

A fortiori, in an argumentative situation where a profound disagreement is developing, the discourses of both parties are based on radically incompatible values and facts contested by the other party. Facts and values must then be negotiated by the parties and composed by the mediator. It is in these adjustment processes that the argumentation takes on its full meaning.
The role of third parties (judge, voter, mediator) then becomes essential to settle conflicts of values and reality, always with reference to a particular case.

2.4 Discussion:
Has the epidictic genre a special status in relation to values?

According to the TA, values and truth are acquired via different processes, group values ​​are acquired through education and language. In this per, the epidictic genre specifically deals with values; it does not admit contradiction. Its specific social function is to strengthen the adherence of the group to its common founding values, “without which the discourses aimed at action could not find leverage to move and rouse their listeners” (1977, p. 33)
Perpetually reconstructed in epidictic encounters, where they are subject to a quasi-axiomatic treatment, values find their application in the two argumentative genres properly called, the deliberative and the judicial.
The deliberative and judicial genres are argumentative genres, aimed at collective decision making in situations of conflicting positions. According to Perelman, the epidictic genre has a very different status, it does not admit contradiction; its object is the reinforcement of adherence to group values in order to trigger action, V. Emotion:

Without [values] discourses aimed at action could not find leverage to move and stir their listeners (1977, p. 33).

Discussion:  The epidictic discourse on values is not unanimous

While insisting on the irreducible contradictions that prevail in the field of values, Perelman thus removes values from actual social contradiction by making the epidictic genre inherently unanimous.
The epidictic genre can be let exclude blame and restrict itself to praise, through literary and social conventions aligning the homage to living and dead men and women with the hagiography of saints. These conventions are not different from those that want a group to erect statues to its heroes and saints and not to its scoundrels and demons.
It is the social framework of the discourses of homage and veneration that, if anything, precludes counter discourse in the case of epidictic, not the nature of eulogy with has a perfect counterpart, blame. The devil’s advocate always has a role to play, even in canonization cases. If the eulogy of the deceased is unanimous, it is not because there are no opponents or because the opponents have nothing to say, but because, by convention of mourning, they keep silent; the new generation can be trusted to turn into villain the great men and values of older generations.
Epidictic praise of virtue ceases to be unanimous as soon as it is given a precise content

Exception being made of the specific conventional practice of mourning, the epidictic genre is defined by the two antagonistic acts of language, praise and blame. These acts define not so much a genre as a position (footing) that can be taken in both political and judicial discourse.

2.5 Discussion: Does Argument Schemes applies specifically to facts and Topics to values?

According to the Treatise, the opposition of values and facts corresponds to the opposition of the argumentative principles that govern them. Values are governed by topics (loci, topoi, places):

When it’s a question of founding values or hierarchies or reinforcing the intensity of the adhesion they arouse, we can link them to other values or other hierarchies to consolidate them, but we can also have recourse to premises of a very general order, which we’ll call loci, the [tópoi] from which the Topics, or treatises devoted to dialectical reasoning, derive (p. 112)

The Treatise is formal on this point:

We will call places [lieux] only premises of a general order allowing to found values and hierarchies, and which Aristotle studies among the places of the accident (p. 113)

Discussion:  An unnecessary distinction

Given the preceding definition, of the word “place”, we understand that the principles which found, i.e. which justify, the factual conclusions will not be called places (loci, tópoi).
This is what we actually see in the 3rd part of the Treatise. This part, which forms the main part of the work, is entitled « Argumentative techniques », techniques which are also called « argumentative schemes » (p. 251).

But we obviously notice that the schemes, the techniques of association correspond closely to what the tradition calls « argumentative commonplaces », which the Treatise ratifies incidentally:

these schemes [can also be considered] as places of argumentation (p. 255).

2.6 The so-called “loci of value”

Following the preceding decision, we therefore give up reserving the name of “place” to the rules of values only. It remains to be seen what the consequences of this terminological realignment are for the conceptual opposition fact/value. Just as agreement can be reached on facts and values, the same kind of argumentative rules apply to fact and value.

This is confirmed by the fact that the so-called “loci of value” does not specifically apply to values. The following are considered the « most common » loci (id., p. 95/):

— Quantity: “one thing is better than another for quantitative reasons” (id., 85/115): “the more, the better”.
— Quality is used to challenge Quantity, that is “the strength of numbers” (id., p. 89/119): “the rarer it is, the more precious it is”.
— Order: “the loci of order affirm the superiority of that which is earlier over that which is later” (id., p. 93/125).
— Existence: “the loci relating to the existent affirm the superiority of that which exists, of the real, over the possible, the contingent, or the impossible” (id., p. 94/126).
— Essence: “according a higher value to individuals to the extent that they embody [the] essence” (id., p. 95/126), which materializes as the topos “the closer to the origin, to life, to the prototype, the better it is.”

These so-called loci of values correspond to the topoi of the accident in Aristotle’s Topics (id., p. 113), V. Topics of the Preferable.  The accident is a kind of predication about an object. Such gradual links can be represented on correlated argumentative scales, S. Scale; Topos in semantics.

Discussion: The so-called “loci of value” are not specific to values

The places of the accident are, by definition, operative on the field of objects as well as on the field of values. So, in keeping with tradition, topic (locus, place) and (argument) scheme can be safely interchanged.

2.7 Discussion: Value and Emotions

The following passage on emotions is perhaps key to understanding the role of values in Perelman’s philosophy. By a clever dissociation, the New Rhetoric puts « passions » out of the picture in favor of values:

Note that passions, as obstacles, are not to be confused with passions that serve as support for positive argumentation, and which will usually be qualified with a less pejorative term, such as value, for example. (Ibid., p. 630; emphasis added)

See also the quotation above (§2.4): the role of values is « [t]o move » the audience. But, on the other hand, if values are opposed to facts (§2.2), and emotions being facts, values should be opposed to.  emotions

The notion of value refers to issues of subjectivity, emotion, and, semantically, the orientation and biases constitutive of ordinary speech. The words expressing values are words carrying argumentative orientations, constituted in antonymic couples. This lexicon organized by antonymy can be considered as a gigantic reservoir of « antagonistic couples », generators of argumentative situations:

« pleasure / displeasure », « knowledge / ignorance », « beauty / ugliness », « truth / lie »; « virtue / vice; « harmony / chaos, discord »; « love / hate; « justice / injustice », « freedom / oppression »…

Antonymy is also expressed by more or less fixed phrases (« self-expression / repression », « life in the open air / life in the offices »). Finally, the discourse can build long anti-oriented sequences, under the figure of the antithesis.

The relation of valorization/de-valorization can be reversed: aesthetics of the ugliness / (beauty), classical praise of the coherence and the constancy, baroque praise of the inconstancy, etc.

3. Values in argument

3.1 Value words

Basic values: The apple and the three libidos

The multiplication of values ​​does not call into question the fact that rhetorical discourse relies on substantial values, perhaps more prosaic than “the True, the Good, the Beautiful, the Absolute”, but nonetheless firmly attached to the human condition, and having highly mundane contents, namely honos, uoluptas, pecunia. That is, glory as the desire for social recognition; pleasure in all its forms; money and possessions. There is no place for knowledge in this trinity of materialistic values. By contrast, knowledge is one of the three criteria used by Eve to evaluate the fruit that put an end to the state of innocence:

So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, and he ate.
Genesis, 3, 6[1]

“Good for food”: the good, pleasure of the mouth; “a delight to the eye”: the beautiful, pleasure of the eyes; “to be desired to make one wise”: the true, pleasure of the mind, which was not included in the previous trinity of values.

Taken together, these three pleasures define the divine: “when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” (id. 3:5).
These three values can most probably be attached to the human condition; that is, they are widely available for immediate valorization in pragmatic argument, the argument used by the Devil.

Multiplication of value

All choices involve values and preferences. At the limit, the same valued word can be split in two anti-oriented value-words by a dissociation process, creating two anti-oriented homonyms.

Value words as oriented words

The concept of value refers to issues of subjectivity (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980) of affectivity and, to the inherent orientation of ordinary statements, S. Emotion; Orientation. Words which express values are basically antonymic pairs coupling words which have opposing argumentative orientations.

The whole lexicon can be seen as an enormous reservoir of such pairs:

pleasure vs. displeasure
knowledge vs. ignorance
beauty vs. ugliness;
truth vs. lies
virtue vs. vice
harmony vs. chaos
love vs. hate
 justice vs. injustice
 freedom vs. oppression”

Antonymic values are also expressed by more or less fixed phrases (“free expression of self vs. repression of aggressive instincts”, “life in the open air vs. life in offices”).

The ratio “valorization vs. devaluation” can be reversed:

aesthetics of ugliness vs. beauty), baroque esthetic of inconsistency (vs. consistency).

Value terms are at the root of “biased” language. Unbiased talk would amount to an elimination of value statements (i.e. of subjective, emotional, oriented statements), in favor of judgments based on facts. This requirement can only be satisfied by rejecting natural language in favor of a formal, scientific or technical language, or an alexithymical expression, S. Pathos.

3.2 Founding and exploiting value judgements

In argument, value words, emotion words function like “facts words”, that is, as word in general. Judgements of value as evaluation attach a value to a specific being, event, or state of things. They can be argued, used as argument or questioned as any other kind of judgement.

Arguments positioning an object in relation to a reference value

The word « valorization » has a positive orientation; the word implies the contribution of an additional value: or passing to a more noble use or place

We will nonetheless speak of evaluation (positive or negative) to designate the argumentative operation that situates a fact, a proposal for action, in relation to a value.

The process of valorization can be argued in a wide variety of ways:

X is (+) because:

— there are many / few
— it is round, it is heavy/light, it is mustard-colored, it has no shape
— I like it
— It is rare, it has just been published
— it is available right now

The story goes that a wealthy old dowager was once asked to sell one of her mansions that had been uninhabited and abandoned for many years. The discussion was long and arduous, and, when the buyer ran out of arguments, he pointed out that unless urgent repairs were made, the manor would fall into ruin. To which the dowager would have answered soberly: « I like ruins ».

The justification is satisfactory as soon as the interlocutor is satisfied or renounces.

From an argumentative point of view, the justification structure is not different from:

It’s flammable, it’s very dry, and they put products in it.

A value judgement about a being, an event, a situation… β is a judgement situating β on the specific valuation scale attached to the value / anti-value system Vⁱ

In other words, oppression is a negative value and freedom is positive one.

Restricting circulation rights is oriented towards oppression
Extending circulation rights is oriented towards freedom

The preference corresponds to the same structures in the comparative, which can be represented on a scale:

β can be characterized as ranking high or low in the value Vⁱ

Y is (+) than X because (even- more (+) (modern, etc.)

          The operation of dissociation is a valuation / depreciation operation, which splits the meaning of a word into two sub-meanings (a single notion into two notions), one of which will have a positive value (orientation), and the other, a negative value (orientation).

The predication of a value upon an object follows standard argumentative procedures. For example, in France, National sovereignty as a political value of reference, is consecrated as such in the Article 3 of the 1789 “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen”:

The principle of all Sovereignty lies essentially in the Nation. Nobody, no individual can exercise any authority that does not expressly emanate from it.[2]

An evaluation question can arise, asking for example, that an international treaty be assessed in relation to that value. For this purpose, reference can be made to the preceding axiomatic definition, as enshrined in its legal implementation and by experience drawn from analogous situations in the past. The evaluation follows the general definition based categorization procedure, S. Categorization; Definition.

— National sovereignty is defined by the conditions Ci, Cj, Ck … –
— Treaty T respects / does not respect these conditions.
— We can / cannot sign this treaty without renouncing our national sovereignty.

The evaluation has to take into account that, as in any broad axiomatic definition, national sovereignty has many corollaries and ramifications, financial or military, sovereignty for example.

Arguments using an evaluation

The pragmatic argument and the argument by the absurd routinely implies a valorization operation:

Question: Should we do F?
Argumentation: F will result in C1;
Positive/negative evaluation of C1: C1 is Vi(+) (positive from the point of view of value Vi);
Therefore: Let’s do F.

The rebuttal can take two paths, for example:

(i) A counter evaluation of C1:

C1 is actually Vⁱ (–) (negative from the very point of view of Vⁱ),

— perhaps at the cost of a dissociation opposing to V_i “the true V_i”.
This rejoinder opens an evaluation stasis, an issue about the positioning of C in relation with value Vi. 

(ii) Introduction of another consequence C₂, considered to be negative from the point of view of the value V_m.

F will result in C²
C² is V_m (-)

In this case, the stasis is about the relative weights of C1 being V_i(+) vs. C2 being V_m(-).
Vm can be identical to Vi, which gives the rebuttal an ad hominem tinge:

Legalizing cannabis will certainly reduce the activity of small-scale dealers, but it will increase the activity of large-scale dealers.

In both cases, the conclusion is the same: “don’t do F!”.

This rejoinder opens a stasis about the relative weights of C¹ being Vⁱ (+) vs. C² being V^m(—).
The deadlock can be broken by a prioritization adapted to the circumstances of the moment: « But here Vⁱ is less important than V^m« .

In times of pandemic, public health imperatives allow us to restrict freedom
The Republican motto mentions freedom, not public health.

A value can also be invalidated as such by its practical consequences; this pattern of rebuttal seems to be available for all kinds of value:

In the name of freedom, anything can be said and done.
Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!
(Manon Roland, an historical Girondine, guillotined during the French Revolution).

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[1] Quoted after www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+3&version=RSVCE

[2] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789 (09-20-2017).

Guerrini Jean-Claude, 2019, Les Valeurs dans l’argumentation [Values in argumentation]. Paris, Classiques Garnier.

Argument ad vertiginem; Lat. vertigo “movement of rotation, vertigo”.

The argument of vertigo is defined by Leibniz in his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding [1795], as a follow-up to his discussion of Locke’s four kinds of argument, S. Collections (3: Modernity and tradition.

We might bring yet other arguments which are used, for example the one we might call ad vertiginem, when we reason thus: if this proof is not received we have no means of attaining certainty on the point in question, which we take as an absurdity.

This argument is valid in certain cases, as if any one wished to deny primitive and immediate truths, for example, that nothing can be and not be at the same time, or that we ourselves exist, for if he were right there would be no means of knowing anything whatever. But when certain principles are produced and we wish to maintain them because otherwise the entire system of some received doctrine would fall, the argument is not decisive; for we must distinguish between what is necessary to maintain our knowledge and what serves as a foundation for our received doctrines or practices.

Use was sometimes made among jurisconsults of probable reasoning in order to justify the condemnation or torture of pretended sorcerers upon the deposition of others accused of the same crime, for it was said: if this argument falls, how shall we convict them? And sometimes in a criminal case certain authors maintain that in the facts where conviction is more difficult, more slender proofs may pass as sufficient. But this is not a reason. It proves only that we must employ more care, and not that we must believe more thoughtlessly, except in the case of extremely dangerous crimes, as, for example, in the matter of high treason, where this consideration has weight, not to condemn a man, but to prevent him from doing harm; so that there may be a mean, not between guilty and not guilty, but between condemnation and banishment in judgment, where law and custom allow it.
Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding [1765]. P. 437.

In substance, the argument from vertigo urges us to accept certain kinds of proof for if we don’t, we are left powerless. This is a subspecies of arguments by unacceptable consequences, S. Pragmatic argument; Absurd; Pathetic; Ignorance.

These consequences are “absurd” and dramatic, when dealing with the first principles of knowledge, such as the principle of non-contradiction, which every person must admit on pain of being unable to say anything scientific. Unlike the argument from ignorance, the argument ad vertiginem would therefore be valid insofar as the impossibility on which it is based is not a subjective impossibility, related with such and such a person or group, but an objective, rational impossibility concerning humanity as such.

However, Leibniz operates a distinguo between epistemic situations where our power to know is at stake, “what is necessary to maintain our knowledge”, and social situations dealing with human affairs and ideology, that “[serve] as a foundation for our received doctrines or practices”.
Since demonstrative reasoning cannot apply in the latter case, “probable reasoning” must be rehabilitated in this domain, for lack of a better proof. But having to make do with weaker proof in the criminal domain implies that a person can be condemned on the basis of insufficient proofs, which Leibniz finds undesirable. So, in an interesting maneuver, he proposes to re-equilibrate the weakness of the proofs motivating the condemnation by softening the condemnation itself.

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Lat. a rubrica argument; the Lat. name rubrica belongs to the semantic family of rubor “red”, and means “red earth; heading”. In the collections of laws “the headings of chapters were written in red color” (Gaffiot [1934], Rubrica).

The interpretive argument based on the title of the relevant section of the code or argument of the title (a rubrica) is a matter of legal logic, S. Juridical arguments.

Codes and administrative regulations are divided into sections and subsections with titles and subtitles. These headings carry no legal weight, but they are relevant to the interpretation of the law, insofar as they define the scope of the following articles. The argument  on the title legitimates or suspends the application of an article depending on whether or not the case considered falls within this scope.

 

If the College regulation contains a section entitled “Rules of conduct in classrooms”, Article 1 providing that:

The use of mobile phones is forbidden,

this article cannot be invoked in order to ban mobile phones in the playground. If the prohibition is made under the heading “General provisions”, it applies to the conduct during classes, etc. The highest disposition in the hierarchy prevails.

Lat. pro subjecta materia argument, Lat. subjectus, “adjacent, near”, materia “topic”.

The interpretative argument from the subject matter of the law requires that the text of a law or of a regulation be interpreted not absolutely but depending on the matters concerned, that is to say, the specific material topic and purpose of the law,S. Juridical arguments.

In the following case, the interpretation derived from the object of the law leads to the redefinition of the expression territory entirely covered by snow as meaning “places where the snow layer is sufficient for tracking game”, since the purpose of the law is the protection of game. The same expression would be defined in a very different way if its purpose were, for example, the regulation of off-piste skiing.

What is meant by, “territory entirely covered with snow”? If this condition were interpreted literally, the prohibition of hunting in snow would hardly ever produce any result. […] The purpose of the law is to prevent the destruction of game, but this destruction is not prevented if I hunt, out of the woods, on land where I can follow the track of the game, although the neighboring grounds are stripped of snow.
It is therefore of little consequence that the snow should be melted over an area of ​​one hundred acres of rocks or marshy land, if I go hunting on the nearby land which remains covered with snow. Is it true that, in our hypothesis, the object of the prohibition would be evaded, if we admitted a contrary interpretation? — Quite obviously yes. It is therefore necessary to agree with our opinion, since the word “entirely” used here is impossible to apply literally. It is therefore necessary to attribute to it only the meaning and the scope that it contains pro subjecta materia.
Thus I think that there is an offense whenever one is found hunting, outside the woods, on snow-covered ground, as long as one can track the game.
Renaissance Joseph Bonjean, [Code of Hunting], 1816.[1]

The subject matter corresponds to the intention of the law, itself determined with reference to the intention of the legislator, here to protect game. If the subject is indicated by a title, the argument of the subject matter of the law and the argument of the title of the law (a rubrica) converge to the same conclusion.

The argument of the subject matter of the law is quite different from the argument to the to the matter. The former refers to the content of a specific law, the later to the matter at issue in an argumentative situation.

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[1] Renaissance Joseph Bonjean, Code de la chasse, vol. 1, Liège: Félix Oudard, 1816, p. 68-69.

The expression argumentative structure is used in three different ways:

— The theoretical structure of an argumentation corresponds to its internal organization, that is to say to the specific form of the “argument(s) – conclusion” relation in a given text or interaction, S. Layout; Convergent, Linked, Serial.

— The empirical structure of an argumentative question materializes in an argument map, which features the second- or third-level sub questions derived from the main issue, as expressed by the root question, S. Script.

— The structure of an argumentative text corresponds to what classical rhetoric calls its disposition, the step-by-step organization of co-oriented and anti-oriented information and argumentations, S. Rhetoric. The structure of an argumentative institutionalized interaction fundamentally consists in the institutional arrangement of successive sequences dealing with the questions and sub-questions. Ordinary interactions include repetitions with variations of what was previously discussed. Argumentative texts and interactions routinely include non-argumentative sub-sequences.

These different structures can be depicted by diagrams, S. Scheme.

Lat. a ratione legis stricta, or stricta lege, Lat. ratio, “reason”; lex, “law”; strictus, “tight, narrow”.
Lat. stricto sensu: Lat. sensus, “thought, idea, meaning”
Lat. ad litteram, littera “letter”

The argument based on the strict meaning of a normative text, or principle of strict application of the law, prohibits restricting or extending the provisions of the law or regulation beyond what it clearly states. This can be considered to be a particular case of the principle “one does not interpret what is clear”.  S. Juridical arguments.
Regulatory provisions must be taken  to the letter (ad litteram), in their strict sense (stricto sensu)

If the legal voting age is 18 years, then one cannot forbid young people to vote on the day of their birthday because they are “barely” 18 years old, nor allow them to vote the day before their birthday because they are “almost” 18 years old. But from a linguistic point of view,

“he’s almost 18 years old” is co-oriented with “he’s 18 years old”,
“he is barely 18 years old” is co-oriented with “he is not 18 years old”.

The principle of interpretation stricto sensu cancels these co-orientations. The law establishes thresholds, and admits threshold effects whereas almost and barely blur the borders. S. Orientation; Orienting words.

The argument of the generality of the law posits that the law must be applied to all the concrete cases it covers. The principle of strict meaning posits that it must be applied according to its literal meaning to all these cases.

The strict meaning principle applies regularly when the law is clear. When it seems clear to one judge but not so clear to her colleague, a stasis emerges on the necessity of interpretation (distinct from a stasis of interpretation, where two interpretation clash).

The letter vs the spirit of an intervention

In a juridical context, the ad litteram label refers to an argumentation that complies strictly “to the letter” of the law, as opposed to its spirit. Interpretations appealing “to the spirit” of the law may invoke the intention of the legislator.
In an argumentative context, an ad litteram reply addresses the strict letter of the opponent’s discourse, as opposed to its meaning as intended by the opponent. Ad litteram is then equivalent of ad orationem, S. Matter.

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The label straw man fallacy refers to a special case of a general phenomenon, discourse and meaning resumption and representation.

The argumentative space is an interactional and textual space organized by a question^@, where co-oriented, anti-oriented and third parties’ discourses articulate and overlap. S. Orientation; Roles. In such a space, argumentative interventions constantly refer to and influence each other, under quite different modes, ranging from explicit quotation, to more or less distorted repetition and reformulation, to the most allusive expression.

1. Resumption of speech

1.1 Direct, explicit quotation

An explicit quotation is expressed in a passage between quotation marks, accompanied by its space-time coordinates, so as to construct an unequivocal object: what was said, by whom, when, where.

Explicit quotations can be rejected by showing that they are incomplete, unduly de-contextualized, or misunderstood, S. Authority; Circumstances. Accordingly, an interpretative stasis^@ can emerge about what the text really means and what the author has really said. It may be argued that a direct quotation is already an interpretation, and an indirect one certainly is. S. Interpretation.

In the case of direct quotation, the source text does exist; in the following ones, the very existence of such a text is problematic.

1.2 Indirect quotation

Indirect quotation of a position is presented by the speaker as a reformulation which paraphrases the original saying, or rephrases it in order to clarify its meaning and intention. The indirect quotation can be dismissed as tendentious or ludicrous, that is to say, presenting an unfair reinterpretation of the original position, implying something that was never said, S. Orientation; Epitrope; Prolepsis

1.3 Allusion

Allusion to another discourse is no more than a trace that makes it possible to broadly locate the source discourse, without the possibility of designating any individual author or work. Its vague character is its best guarantee against contradiction, and a veil of mystery suits some kinds of authorities well.

2. Anticipating oppositions

The discourse can also be attributed to a voice staged in a polyphonic space, as in the case of anticipated objections, S. Interaction; Prolepsis.

3. Straw man

The discrepancy between what the quoted party said or might have said and what the quotation makes him say is the basis for the fallacy known as the straw man or scarecrow fallacy.

Undisputable refutation must be about what the other really claimed, S. Relevance. This requirement has a clear meaning in the case of written and referenced statements. In ordinary discourse, no segment is totally context-free, and its meaning is always an interpretation, so it is often not clear if someone has fully said something or not. In an argumentative situation, what the other has actually said is not a prerequisite but an issue in the argument.

The straw man fallacy is an accusation of mischievous representation of the diverging discourse. The expression is a metaphor on the substantive straw man, which literally refers to:

a mass of straw formed to resemble a man. (Thes., Straw man).

As a metaphor, a straw man is:

1. a weak or imaginary opposition (such as an argument or adversary) set up only to be easily refuted.
2. a person set up to serve as a cover for a usually questionable transaction (MW, Straw man)

Given meaning (1), the straw man or scarecrow strategy corresponds to a tendentious, repulsive, even self-refuting, reformulation, of the discourse of something previously said.

Given meaning (2), the straw man strategy corresponds to a position which masks the real position of the arguing party. This position is advanced in order to set the public, or the speaker’s opponents on a false track, S. Red Herring.

A strategy is a complex set of coordinated actions, planned by an actor in order to achieve a specific goal. Strategies can be antagonistic or cooperative. Antagonistic strategies develop in non-cooperative fields of action, such as war, game of chess, or commercial competition. Such strategies serve to secure a decisive advantage over an opponent pursuing an antagonistic goal. Antagonistic strategies are covert, and discovered by the adversary as they are implemented, S. Manipulation. Co-operative strategies are developed by partners working together to achieve a common goal, from which both will benefit. The strategic intentions are transparent to all partners. A research strategy for example is an action plan to solve a problem; and teachers and students will collaborate to implement a pedagogical strategy.

In the military field, the strategy is set up before combat operations and tactics during the fight; tactics refers to the local implementation of a global strategy.

1. Argumentative strategies

An argumentative strategy is a set of speech choices planned and coordinated to support a point of view. Argumentative strategies are a subspecies of language and communicative strategies, speech and text construction strategies, interactional strategies.

An argumentative strategy is antagonistic if it is devised in order that the speaker may take the upper hand over the opponent.

There are two cases in which argumentative strategies may be cooperative:
— Firstly, if the speakers have the same argumentative role, share a common point of view and collaborate to support it.
— Secondly, they may have different roles, and without identifying themselves with these roles, they might collaborate in the construction of a shared solution.

The phrase argumentative tactics is not used, but could be useful to refer to local argumentative phenomena as part of the global argumentative action. The choice to use such argument schemes can be seen as a tactical move, an implementation of a general policy. This does not suffice, however to define an argumentative strategy which requires the application of different kinds of instruments, at all discourse levels, for example coordinating the choice of words, the choice of arguments and self-presentation (as open/closed to objections for example). An argument scheme can be identified on the basis of a brief passage, while the study of a strategy requires an extended corpus which fully represents a position.

2. Some argumentative strategies

The first strategic level is that of the choice of answer to be given to the question, S. Stasis.

— A defensive strategy merely refutes the opponent’s proposals.

— A counter-proposal strategy ignores the opponent’s proposition P and argues a proposition Q which is incompatible with P. In such a context, argumentation may take an explanatory turn, S. Explanation.

— An objectivizing strategy focuses on objects without questioning people.

— Ruining the discussion is a way to ruin the opponent’s arguments,, S. Destruction of speech.

— Bentham has identified types of arguments whose coordinated use defines a stalling strategy, a conservative strategy, aiming to postpone the debate n the hope that it will never take place: “the conditions are not yet fulfilled for you to join the European Union.”

— Conciliation vs. breakthrough strategies are characterized by the acceptance vs. refusal of concessions, the flexibility vs. radicalization of the proposals presented as compatible / incompatible. Conciliatory strategies use information accepted by the audience, present the conclusions and its recommendations as a continuation of previous beliefs and actions. Rupture strategies defy the audience, reject all its representations in order to replace them with new ones. The first strategy is reformist, the second is revolutionary.

 

These two last strategies are used by Paul, the Apostle of Christianity. In the following passages, in order to get the ear of the Athenians that he addresses for the first time, he uses a typical rhetorical captatio benevolentiae strategy, and begins his discourse with a reference to their own creeds, S. Rhetoric; Beliefs of the Audience:

21 The one amusement the Athenians and the foreigners living there seem to have is to discuss and listen to the latest ideas. 22 So Paul stood before the whole council of the Areopagus and made this speech: “Men of Athens, I have seen for myself how extremely scrupulous you are in all religious matters,
23 because, as I strolled round looking at your sacred monuments, I noticed among other things an altar inscribed: To an Unknown God. In fact, the unknown God you revere is the one I proclaim to you.
Acts of the Apostles, 17, 21-23[1]

Nonetheless, the message was met by skepticism on the part of the Athenians. In particular, they questioned the message about the resurrection of the dead. Later, in quite different circumstances, Paul claims a rupture between his message and “the wisdom of the wise”:

17 For Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the gospel, not in cleverness of speech, so that the cross of Christ would not be made void. 18 For the word of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. 19 “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the cleverness of the clever I will set aside.” 20 Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? 21 For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not come to know God, God was well pleased through the foolishness of the message preached to save those who believe. 22 For indeed Jews ask for signs and Greeks search for wisdom; 23 but we preach Christ crucified, to Jews a stumbling block and to Gentiles foolishness.
First Letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 17-23.[2]

3. “Strategic Maneuvering”

Pragma-dialectics has introduced the concept of strategic maneuvering to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical demands. The rhetorical requirement is defined as a search for efficiency: each party wishes its point of view to triumph. The dialectical requirement is a quest for rationality. During an encounter, each party simultaneously pursues these two objectives. In practice, the dialectical dimension is appraised according to the pragma-dialectical rules for the rational resolution of a difference of opinion. The rhetorical dimension is essentially communicational and presentational. It updates the classical demand that the issue and position must be presented in the correct language or format for the target audience (van Eemeren, Houtlosser 2006).

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[1] Quoted after www.catholic.org/bible/book.php?id=51&bible_chapter=17 (05-05-2017)

[2] Quoted after www.biblescripture.net/1Corinthians.html (05-05-2017)

The word stasis is borrowed from the Greek; it translates in Latin as quaestio, and, “in modern parlance”, as issue (Nadeau 1964, p. 366).
In medicine, a stasis is defined as “a slowing or stoppage of the normal flow of a bodily fluid or semifluid” (MW, Stasis); a stasis results in congestion, that is, in “an excessive accumulation especially of blood or mucus in an organ” (MW, Congest).

As used in rhetorical argumentation, the word stasis is a medical metaphor; medicine is a valuable source of examples and an important analogical resource domain for argumentative theory S. Natural Sign. In medicine, a state of stasis occurs when the bodily humors are blocked, and medical arts have to be applied to restore the correct flow of the fluids. Similarly, in the field of human action and interaction, a situation of stasis occurs when the consensual circulation of discourse is blocked by a contradiction or a doubt, and the argumentative arts must be implemented to restore the normal, cooperative flow of dialogue. Nadeau defines the situation of stasis as “a position of balance or rest” established between two opposite discourses (id., p. 369).
In a state of stasis, the equilibrium is that of an aporia: “the Greek verb aporein describes the situation of the person who, finding himself in front of an obstacle, finds no passage”; the associated psychic state is embarrassment (Pellegrin 1997, art Aporia). In philosophical usage, an aporia is an insoluble contradiction.

2. The classical stasis theory

The first systematic formulation of a theory of stasis is found in Hermagoras of Temnos (late 2nd century BC; Benett 2005). The technique of stasis is used by rhetoricians before Hermagoras, but he was the first to formally identify and name the concept along with four basic kinds of stasis (Nadeau 1964, p. 370). This theory is best known via the treatise On Stasis of Hermogene of Tarsus, a Greek rhetorician of the 2nd half of the second century (Hermogene, AR; Patillon 1988). Hermogene distinguishes between:

(i) On the one hand, misconceived questions, upon which an argumentative debate cannot be built, either because their answer is obvious, or because they are undecidable; these questions are “incapable of stasis” (id., p. 385); in other words they cannot be rationally discussed.
(ii) On the other hand, we have well-conceived questions, which can be rationally discussed.

Hermogene organizes the different kinds of general, well-conceived questions as follows (after Patillon, p. 57 sq.).

— Stasis of conjecture: Is the fact established?
— Stasis on the definition, upon “the name of an act” (Nadeau, p. 393): Someone robs a private person in a temple; is he a temple plunderer?
— The next step is the qualification of the act; it can be rational (discussed on the basis of good reason) or judicial (discussed on the basis of an existing law).

Judicial qualification is discussed under the following lines (after Patillon, p. 59).

The defendant does not admit to the mischievousness of the fact: antilepsis (“contradiction, objection”, Bailly, [Antilepsis])

The defendant admits to the mischievousness of the fact: opposition

• He assumes responsibility: compensation
• He rejects responsibility:

— and blames the victim: counter-accusation
— and blames somebody or something else:

≠ who or which can be guilty: report of accusation
≠ who or which cannot be guilty: excuse

3. The authentic “rhetorical question”

A stasis is a question, the node of a conflict articulating a judicial action in order to solve it. The Rhetoric at Herennius defines the first stage of a judicial encounter as the determination of the issue constituting the cause (Ad Her., I, 18, 17):

The issue [constitutio] is determined by the joining of the primary plea of the defense with the charge of the plaintiff (Ad Her., I, 18, 11)

Quintilian explains that the first thing he does to disentangle an argumentative situation is to find the quæstio, the question, or the issue. The question “arises” when a statement made by a party is contradicted by the other party (note that the following text presupposes that adultery was a crime; that it was legal to kill an adulterer; and, apparently, that the executor was prosecuted for killing the man, while he also killed the woman):

5. First, then, (what is not difficult to be ascertained, but is above all to be regarded) I settled what each party wished to establish, and then by what means, in the following way. I considered what the prosecutor would state first: either an admitted or contested point. If it were admitted, the question could not lie in it. 6. I passed therefore to the answer of the defendant and considered it in the same way. Sometimes, too, what was elicited there was admitted. But as soon as there began to be any disagreement, the question arose. The process was of this nature: ‘You killed a man’ —‘I did kill him”. The fact is admitted, so I pass on. 7. The defendant ought to give a reason why he killed him. ‘It is lawful’, he may say, ‘to kill an adulterer with an adulteress’. It is admitted that there is such a law. We may then proceed to a third point, about which there may be a dispute. ‘They were not guilty of adultery’ — ‘they were’. Hence arises the question.
(IO, VII, 1, 5-7; my emphasis).

The question, that is to say, the point to be judged, is deduced from the nature of the reply given by the accused to the accuser. When the parties agree, the facts are considered to be established or “peaceful”; they are disputed when disagreement arises.

At the beginning of On Invention Cicero criticizes Hermagoras for having too general a view of argumentative questions, including philosophical as well as scientific questions, “Can the senses be trusted? What is the shape of the world? How large is the sun?” (On Inv., I, 8, VI). Cicero limits the theory of questions to those belonging to the proper domain of the orator, the epidictic, deliberative and judicial genres. Nonetheless, the concept of question has no such pre-set limit.

The concept of stasis as a question is the counterpart in the rhetorical domain of the Aristotelian concept of problem in the dialectical domain (Aristotle, Top., I, 11, 104b-105a10, pp. 25-28); a question is a rhetorical problem. The theory of stasis is the theory of “rhetorical questions” in the proper sense:

The constitutio of the auctor ad Herennium, then, is the functionally dual stasis of Greek rhetoric […] the psychical counterpart of which is the articulate question, or, as Sextus Empiricus (Against the Geometricians, III, 4) styled it, the “rhetorical question” (Dieter 1950, p. 360).

This meaning of the expression rhetorical question is quite distinct from the current meaning, which designates a question to which the speaker knows the answer, whilst also knowing that his interlocutors also knows the answer, and whose value is that of a challenge to potential opponents. To avoid confusion, we’ll use the expression argumentative question, S. Argumentative Question.

4. Example

Facing the accusation, “You have stolen my moped!”, the defendant may adopt different strategies which will determine the type of debate to follow.

(1) Denying having committed the act; the fact is not ascertained (“conjectural stasis”)

I did not even touch your moped!

(2) Recognize there has been a theft, and accuse somebody else:

It’s not me, it’s him!

Idem, accusing the author of the accusation:

It’s not me, it’s you, who accuse me, yet who destroyed your own moped to get the insurance premium.

This strategy, like the strategy of reorientation of the fact, manifests the tendency to radical refutation, by symmetrical reversal, S. Reciprocity; Causality.

 (3) Recognize the fact, deny it was a theft, and re-categorize the action under a more honorable label, S. Categorization. This can be achieved via a number of different strategies:

But this is my moped; you stole it from me last year!
But this moped belongs to me, you pretended to buy it, but have never paid me.
I didn’t steal it, I just borrowed it. I asked you for permission.

(4) Idem, but invoking various kinds of extenuating circumstances:

The gang leader forced me.
I was just taking my grandmother to the hospital

(5) Idem, and apologize:

I made a mistake, Mr. President.

(6) Recusing the judges (stasis on the procedure); disqualifying the accuser:

It is not for the victor to judge the vanquished.
But who are you to judge me?
Suits you (= the accuser) well, you the gang leader, to complain of a theft! This should be solved by a good fistfight, as usual.

 (7) Recognize the fact and claim to be proud of it:

You were drunk, I saved your life by taking your moped, and you should thank me!

Maybe because of its spectacular character, the last case is known in the rhetoric of figures as an antiparastasis, S. Orientation.
All these strategies are equally interesting, and all might deserve to be known by a specific name.

Some of these strategies are mutually exclusive, S. Kettle argumentation.

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The words sophism, sophist refer to very distinct realities in philosophy and in ordinary language.

1. The historical sophists

In Ancient Greece, the sophists were the first to implement a philosophy of language in their interactions with their fellow citizens. By means of calculated discursive interventions called “sophisms”, the sophists destabilize the peaceful current representations of the world as seen through language. They emphasize the “arbitrariness” of language (within the Saussurian meaning of “arbitrary”), and so provoke naive speakers who consider language to be transparent and unproblematic. These discourses are not intended to deceive their audience, but to highlight to them the paradoxes of their current talk.

In the Euthydemus, Plato stages Socrates deconstructing sophistical arguments, such as the following one. Dionysodorus is a sophist, Ctesippus his naive interlocutor:

[Dionysodorus:] — […] And your father turns out to be […] a dog.
— And so does yours, said Ctesippus.
— You will admit all this in a moment, Ctesippus, if you answer my questions, said Dionysodorus. Tell me, have you got a dog?
— Yes, and a brute of a one too, said Ctesippus.
— And has he got puppies?
— Yes indeed, and they are just like him.
— And so, the dog is their father?
— Yes, I saw him mounting the bitch myself, he said.
— Well then: isn’t the dog yours?
— Certainly, he said.
— Then since he is a father and is yours, the dog turns out to be your father, and you are the brother of the puppies, aren’t you?
Plato, Euthydemus, 298d-e. CW, p. 737

This argument is not intended to convince Ctesippus that he is son and brother of a dog. The sophist does not deceive his listeners, he leaves them confused and infuriated.

The sophists have devised thought-provoking paradoxes such as the following one:

Antiphon the Sophist claimed that the law, by obliging man to testify the truth before the courts, often compels us to do wrong to one who has done us no harm, that is, to contradict the first precept of justice.
Émile Bréhier, [History of Philosophy], 1928.[1]

The Sophists represent, with the Skeptics, an essential intellectual movement within argumentation theory. The Sophists established the principle of debate and irreducibly contradictory discourses, as the foundational cases presented in Antiphon’s second Tetralogy, about a prosecution for accidental homicide; the case is discussed as follows:

First Speech for the Prosecution
Reply to the Same Charge
Second Speech for the Prosecution
Second Speech for the Defense[2]

The intellectual and social contributions of the historical sophists have been stigmatized by Platonic idealism that imposed on them deformations which were suffered until Hegel in philosophy and are surviving in common language. Ancient Sophists were no more sophists in the contemporary sense of the word than Duns Scott was a dunce.

2. Contemporary usage:
the sophism, an intentional paralogism

In contemporary language, a sophism is an eristic, that is, a misleading discourse. From an interactional point of view, it is an embarrassing, false, manipulative and dangerous discourse, received as evidently false but the refutation of which is difficult. As any kind of discourse can be denounced by calling it a “sophism”, the concept is essential for the analysis of the polemical reception of argumentative discourse.

A sophism is a paralogism enveloped in malicious speech, produced to pull the rug from under the opponent’s feet. The distinction between sophism and paralogism is based on a charge of shameful intent, which may or may not be properly laid out. Paralogism is on the side of error and stupidity; sophism is a paralogism serving the interests or passions of its author. Under the principle of “who benefits from the crime?”, such an “error” is charged with malicious intent by the recipient and the potential victim. One moves from description to the accusation embedded in the negative contemporary use of sophist, sophistry, S. Fallacies: Aristotle foundational list, Paralogism.

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[1] Émile Bréhier, Histoire de la Philosophie, Vol. 1, Antiquité et Moyen Âge [Antiquity and Middle Ages] Paris: PUF, 1981, p. 74.

[2] Antiphon, Second Tetralogy. KJ. Maidment, ed. Quoted after www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0020%3Aspeech%3D3