TERM to TERM REASONING

Two types of term to term reasoning have been observed in very different contexts, transductive reasoning in psychology and two-term reasoning in Arabic culture.

Both are described as immediate projections, directly from one term to another, corresponding to a kind of conditioned « associative reflex ». Such reasoning looks like an automatic association between the form and content of two terms, as such, dispensing with predication, judgment, and any law-like connection (« backing« ).

1. Transductive Reasoning

The concept of transductive reasoning was developed by Piaget ([1924], 185) to analyze the development of children’s intelligence. Transductive reasoning is characterized as the pre-logical and intuitive way of thinking of the young child, which goes directly from one individual or a particular fact to another individual or particular fact, without the mediation of a general law. According to Grize,

The young child who says, ‘It’s not afternoon because there was no nap’ is based on the daily experience of napping as an ingredient of the afternoon [transductive reasoning].(1996, p. 107).

Transductive reasoning appears to be the product of a conditioned association “nap = afternoon”, that results from the application of the scheme of opposites to “no siesta = no afternoon”. From this perspective, napping is a decisive defining characteristic of the afternoon.

Grize notes that adults also use this kind of reasoning:

When we say that we stopped at the traffic light because it was red, […] our thinking does not go through a general law of the kind: “any red traffic light implies stopping” (ibid.).

In the latter case, the statement takes the form of a “semantic block” (Carel 2011), « answer because stimulus ». However, the adult does not use the negation in the same way as the child to say “it is not a red light because I did not stop” would be considered as a denial of reality.

However, it is said that a motorist deeply imbued with respect for the Highway Code refused to believe that he had collided head-on with another vehicle because he (the victim) was driving down a one-way street. According to this belief, the legal prohibition of a fact implies its material impossibility.

2. Two-Term Reasoning

In a very different context, Gardet and Anawati speak of, “two-term reasoning” which is characteristic of “a specific rhythm of thought which the Arab mind knew how to use with a rare happiness of expression” (Gardet and Anawati [1967], p. 89). This type of reasoning seems to be similar in nature to transductive reasoning.

The ‘dialectical’ logic associated with the Arab genius, is organized according to modes of reasoning with two terms that proceed from the singular to the singular, by affirmation or negation, without a universal middle term. Should we say, as has sometimes been said before, that [this universal middle term], not explicitly understood, is nevertheless explicit in the thinking mind? We don’t think so. Undoubtedly, a two-term argument can be ‘translated’ into a three-term syllogism […]. But in the logical mechanism of thought, it is actually the confrontation, the contrast, the similarity or the inclusion, of the two terms of the argument that gives the ‘proof’ its persuasiveness. The universal middle term is not present in the mind, even in an implicit form. It is not a matter of establishing a discursive proof, but of promoting a self-evident certainty. (Bouamrane & Gardet 1984, p. 75; my emphasis)

The Arab logician and theologian al-Sumnani has distinguished five rational processes, i.e. five schemes of argument, that are characteristic of two-term reasoning. These five processes,

are based on observations, and then, on a movement of the mind which operates either by elimination or by analogy from the same to the opposite, or from the same to the same. It is always a matter of moving from the present, actual fact, the “witness” (shâhid), to the absent, (gha’ib). There is no abstract search for a universal principle. (Gardet and Anawati [1948], pp. 365-367; my emphasis).

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SCHEME – SCHEMATIZATION

1. Scheme (schema)

In general language, as a scheme, a schema is « a graphic sketch or outline » (MW);
a « diagrammatic representation » (after MW). In argumentation:

• The words scheme, schema are used with this general meaning to refer to any kind of diagram used to represent and clarify the structure of an argumentative phenomenon, see convergent argumentation scheme/schema, etc.
  Toulmin’s “layout of argument” is also known as “Toulmin’s scheme/schema” or “Toulmin argument pattern” (TAP).
• An argument scheme (pattern) is an abstract or generic representation of a set of concrete argumentations (enthymemes) that share the same structure (scheme).
  The term is an unambiguous equivalent of the shorter classical term, topos (pl. topoi).

2. Schematization

In this sense, schematization is similar to elocutio in classical argumentative rhetoric (§3.3).

RULES

Arguments can be approached on the basis of very different systems of rules.

— Rules that express observational regularities.
— Rules expressing norms, imperatives, which are instrumental in evaluating arguments.
— Rules as advice on how to do things well, how to convince a person to believe or to do something.

1. General Rules of Interaction

1.1 Rules of interaction

Argumentative interactions in natural language follow the various systems of rules proposed for interaction in general, so for example, the rule of justification of non-preferred sequences is applied:

A dispreferred second part is a second part of an adjacency pair that consists of a response to the first part that is generally to be avoided, and which is likely to be marked by such features as delays, prefaces and accounts. (SIL, Dispreferred second part)

1.2 Principle of Cooperation

The principle of cooperation expresses not only what the participants actually do (observational regularity), but also what is reasonable for them to do (rational regularity).

1.3 Principle of Civility

The rules of linguistic politeness regulate conversation based on the concepts of face and territory. In ordinary conversation, these rules can inhibit the development of arguments. The overriding concern for maintaining relationships can make it difficult for disagreements to be expressed and developed.

1.4 Sins of Language

The Christian theological tradition has developed a set of rules for controlling the discourse. Violation of any of these rules is stigmatized as a « sin of the tongue » (Casagrande & Vecchio 1991).

2. Rules Specific to Argumentative Speech

2.1 Rules of place

Specific rules are attached to specific argumentative venues. For example, parliamentary rules apply in parliament; tribunal proceedings, or classroom interactions develop according to their own specific codes and regulatory conventions, see forum. These rules are established according to a sui generis procedure and are applied by the competent authorities having authority in the particular place. These rules frame the kind of local rationality that characterizes the “genius loci”, the spirit of the place.

In such places, the rules determine the subjects to be discussed, the procedures that will lead to a legitimate decision and conclusion, and the persons qualified to speak; they regulate the right to speak, the amount of speech, and the order of speaking. These rules may, for example prohibit overlapping and interruptions.

2.2 “The Rules of Honorable Controversy”

Levi Hedge presents the following seven “Rules for Honorable Controversy” in his Elements of Logick (1838):

Rule 1. The terms, in which the question in debate is expressed, and the precise point at issue, should be so clearly defined, that there could be no misunderstanding respecting them.

Rule 2. The parties should mutually consider each other, as standing on a footing of equality in respect to the subject in debate. Each should regard the other as possessing equal talents, knowledge, and desire for truth, with himself; and that it is possible therefore that he may be in the wrong and his adversary in the right.

Rule 3. All expressions which are unmeaning or without effect in regard to the subject in debate should be strictly avoided.

Rule 4. Personal reflections on an adversary should in no instance be indulged.

Rule 5. No one has a right to accuse his adversary of indirect motives.

Rule 6. The consequences of any doctrine are not to be charged on him who maintains it, unless he expressly avows them.

Rule 7. As truth, and not victory, is the professed object of controversy, whatever proofs may be advanced, on either side, should be examined with fairness and candor; and any attempt to ensnare an adversary by the arts of sophistry, or to lessen the force of his reasoning, by wit, caviling, or ridicule, is a violation of the rules of honorable controversy.
(Hedge, 1838, pp. 159-162)

– Rule 5 corresponds to the accusation of having a hidden motive: “You agree to this proposal not because you approve of it but to please the director.
– Rule 6 is original, and refers to the problem of the hidden agendas, or even of conspiracies, see pragmatic argument.

Disputes can be said to be “honorable” in both the intellectual and social sense. This system reintroduces what is socially acceptable into a situation where the participants do not spontaneously apply the usual rules of cooperation and courtesy. Such considerations join the rhetorical problems of appropriateness (prepon) and propriety (aptum) (Lausberg [1960], § 1055-1062).

In Hedges’ system, social control is the root of the imposition of cooperation. The rules for avoiding the sins of language come from religion. In the pragma-dialectical framework, the system of rules makes use of communicative rationality, in the spirit of Grice, see cooperative principle.

3. Pragma-Dialectic Rules and the Reconceptualization of Fallacies

These rules define “A Code of Conduct for Reasonable Discussants” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst 2004, p. 190), for partners willing to resolve their disagreement rationally. A fallacy is defined as a violation of one of these “Ten Commandments for Reasonable Discussants” (id., 190-196), see fallacies-1:

Commandment 1, Freedom rule: Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or calling standpoints into question

Commandment 2, Obligation to defend rule: Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so.

Commandment 3, Standpoint rule: Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party.

Commandment 4, Relevance rule: Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint.

Commandment 5, Unexpressed-premise rule: Discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises.

Commandment 6, Starting-point rule: Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point.

Commandment 7, Validity rule: Reasoning that in an argumentation is presented as formally conclusive may not be invalid in a logical sense.

Commandment 8, Argument scheme rule: Standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively defended by argumentation that is not presented as based on formally conclusive reasoning if the defense does not take place by means of appropriate argument schemes that are applied correctly.

Commandment 9, Concluding rule: Inconclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining these standpoints, and conclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints.

Commandment 10, Language use rule: Discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other party’s formulations.

This system is inspired by the proposals of the Erlangen School for the definition of a rational “ortholanguage”, see logics for dialogue. In the spirit of Grice, these rules introduce or impose cooperation where it would not be spontaneously practiced by the participants. The game is based on the notion of standpoint. It corresponds to a dialectical treatment of the difference of standpoints, in which a proponent affirms his standpoint and responds to the attacks of an opponent who questions it. Rule 9 recalls the goal of the game, which is to resolve the disagreement of opinion either by eliminating the untenable opinion or by eliminating the doubt about a well-reasoned opinion.

Such a system of rules considers the validity judgments of the speakers (van Eemeren, Garssen, Meuffels 2009). It is also possible to identify the implicit rules on which speakers base their judgments by observing their practices (Doury 2003, 2006).

4. More About Rules

Argumentation-2: Key features and issues
Dialectic
Paradoxes of argumentation

Fallacies-1, Contemporary approaches
Fallacies-2, Aristotle’s foundational list
Fallacies-3, From logic and dialectic to science
Fallacies-4, A moral and anthropological perspective

SCHEME of argument, or TOPOS

1. Argument scheme

An argumentat scheme (argumentation scheme, topos) is a discursive formula, a generic statement that functions as an argument rule, an inferring license.
Concrete argumentations, or enthymemes correspond to its actualization in specific passages. They stand in an occurrence/type relation with the corresponding topos.

The concept of an argumentation scheme (argument scheme) captures the specificity of the minimal concatenation of two statements (S1, S2) that make up an argumentation (Arg, Concl). An argumentation scheme is essentially a specific kind of sentence connection, a special case of textual coherence and cohesion; that is to say, a general discursive inferential scheme that links an argument to a conclusion.

In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the topoi (place; pl. topoi), i.e., argumentation schemes, are expressed as such general statements, which can sometimes be formulated as proverbs or maxims. The saying, “if you can do the hard things, you can do the easy things as well” corresponds to the “from the greatest to the least” (a maiori ad minus) branch of the a fortiori scheme.
Typical formulas, such as those proposed by Bentham’s “let us wait a little, the moment is not favorable” are also complete and perfectly adequate expressions of an argumentation scheme. see legal arguments: three collections. This scheme can be specified in a discursive domain, see a fortiori.

The characteristic indefinite components (subject, predicate) of the scheme, can also be expressed as variables. For example, the schema a fortiori  can be written as (according to Ryan 1984):

If <P is O> is more likely (more probable, recommendable…) than <E is O>,
and <P is O> is false (not plausible, not recommendable)
then <E is O> is false (not plausible, not recommendable).

The scheme is embodied in the following argumentation:

If teachers do not know everything, students know even less

In the same style, the schema of the opposites is written as follows:

If <A is B>, then <not-A is not-B>.

Derived argumentation:

If I was of no use to you in my life, at least my death will be of use to you.

Such formulations should not be taken as some kind of “logical or semantic deep structure” of the schema. Their undoubted benefit is to clarify the reference of general terms.

2. Example: The Argument scheme on waste

Identifying a scheme in a text is a key moment in argument analysis. But this identification is not easy, because the main semantic components of the scheme can be distributed in the text. Experts will say that they know a scheme when they see one; but, in any case, a check is necessary.

The reconstruction can proceed along the following basic lines:

— First, an explicit definition of the topic is needed.
— Second, the passage must be clearly delimited.
— And finally, one must show how the scheme can be projected onto the passage; that is, one must establish a point-to-point correspondence between the scheme and the passage under analysis. Essentially, these connections consist of the linguistic operations of equivalence and close reformulation and synonymy.

This method can be illustrated by the case of the argument from waste, as defined and illustrated in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca.

— The schema:

The argument from waste consists in saying that, as one has already begun a task and made sacrifices, which would be wasted if the enterprise were given up, one should continue in the same direction. ([1958], p. 279)

— First derived concrete argumentation:

this is the justification given by the banker who continues to lend to his insolvent debtor in the hope of getting him back on his feet again in the long run. (Id., p. 279)

— Linguistic operation associating the argument with the scheme

1st column, italics: the actual argumentation itself
3rd column, bold the topos
2nd column, the correspondence between argumentation and topos

(*) Interpretation by the topos of the opposites

The second enthymeme is more complicated:

This is one of the reasons which, according to Saint Theresa, prompt a person to pray, even in a period of ‘dryness’. [1] One would give up, she says, if it were not “that one remembers that it gives delight and pleasure to the Lord of the garden, that one is careful not to throw away all the service rendered, and that one remembers the benefit one hopes to derive from the great effort of dipping the pail often into the well and drawing it up empty”. (Id., p. 279)

— Linguistic operations associating the argument to the scheme (same conventions):

 (¹) Traditional mystical metaphor for “no increase in faith” = no spiritual benefit.

3. Naming argument schemes

Argument schemes are named according to their form or their content.

3.1 By their specific domain and semantic content

Some famous arguments are named according to their precise content.

— The third man argument is an objection made by Aristotle to the Platonic theory of intelligible forms, as opposed to individuals. According to this objection, the Platonic theory implies an infinite regression. It can be seen as an argument from vertigo.

— The argument against miracles: The probability that the dead person was resurrected is less than the probability that the witness is mistaken; so we may reasonably doubt that the dead person was resurrected (Hume, 1748, §86 “Of Miracles”). This formally refers to a hierarchy of probabilities, and can be represented on an argumentative scale.

— The ontological argument infers the existence of God from the a priori notion of a perfect being, see a priori; definition.

3.2 According to their form and content

See Collections (2): From Aristotle to Boethius
Collections (3): Modernity and tradition
Collections (4): Contemporaty innovations and structurations

On the use of Latin words and expressions, see ab arguments, a/ad — e/ ex — 

3.3 Oriented labels

Usually, the label that designates an argument specifies a form and/or content: the argument refers to the consequences (ad consequentiam), to authority (ab auctoritate), to the consistency of human beliefs (ad hominem), to emotion (ad passionem) or to some particular emotion (ad odium). The speaker can admit, without inconsistency, losing face and invalidating the argument he has just used, that he is arguing by the consequences, ad hominem, ex datis, from a religious belief (ad fidem), or possibly from the number, ad numerum. These arguments can be evaluated in a second, normative, stage.

Some other arguments involving the arguer are denoted by oriented labels. An argument cannot be labeled an appeal to stupidity, to superstition or fancy without invalidating it; given the current view of emotion as antagonistic to reason, to label  a passage as containing an appeal to emotion, from ad passiones to ad odium, amounts to a rejection of the argument. Such labels contain a built-in evaluation; there is some confusion between the levels of description and evaluation.
An appeal to faith is judged to be fallacious or not, depending on whether one shares the speaker’s faith or not. In such cases, the theoretical language is biased, and normative action becomes ideological.

4. Typologies of Argumentation Schemes

A general typology of argumentation schemes is an organized collection of argumentation schemes. Collections of argumentation schemes are locally constituted as:

— The set of arguments used locally by a particular speaker, in a particular discussion, see collections, 1 to 4.
— The set of arguments attached to a question, see  script.

5. Argument schemes in discourse

The concept of the argument schema anchors the study of argumentation in the material reality of speech and discourse. The ability to identify an argument from authority, a pragmatic argument, etc. is an essential skill for the production, interpretation and criticism of argumentative discourse, see tagging.

Some works, such as the Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica or texts such as Montesquieu’s “On the Enslavement of the Negroes” can be described as dense and dry sequences of arguments. Other texts are more fluid, and hardly seem reducible to circumscribed segments that could plausibly be described as the occurrence of an argumentation scheme.

Schemes are underdetermined by linguistic expression; there may be several plausible analyses of the same segment of text, some of which invalidate the argument, some of which do not. This uncertainty should not be automatically be taken as an indicator of the poor quality of argument or  analysis. Contextual considerations and the nature of the particular editing of the passage play a crucial role in this regard.

An argumentative text or interaction can be compared to a natural meadow, where the most beautiful flowers correspond to canonical argument schemes. But it is also necessary to ask what the dense plant tissue around these flowers is made of. For this purpose, interaction analysis, discourse analysis and textual linguistics serve as crucial analytical tools, that must be adapted to the specifics of argumentation analysis. The “schema approach” is part of a broader perspective that begins with the attitude towards the other’s discourses, the kind of argumentative situation they frame, the determination of general argumentative strategies, considering a whole range of semiotic phenomena. At the micro level, it is necessary not only to focus on their coordination but also to consider the operations that produce the statements: a good grammar book and a good dictionary are essential if one want to construct a good argumentative analysis, see argumentative question; indicator.

SCHEMATIZATION

The study of schematizations is the defining goal of the natural logic developed by Jean-Blaise Grize, a student and later collaborator of Jean Piaget at the Research Center on Genetic Epistemology in Geneva.
This logic is called “natural” in contrast to formal logic: on the one hand, it is a “logic of objects” (1996: 82) and a “logic of subjects” (Grize 1996: 96); on the other hand, it involves thinking processes that leave “traces” in natural discourse.

In Grize’s view, an argument is not necessarily a set of statements organized according to the layout proposed by Toulmin. The impact of an argument and its rationality are not tied to a particular way of speaking or to the use of such and such specific « discursive techniques », as suggested by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca. Any utterance, any coherent sequence of utterances, whether it is considered descriptive, narrative, or argumentative, is indeed argumentative.
According to Grize, discourse is essentially argumentative, which means that all utterances frame the situation according to the point of view of the arguer, in order to produce  a significant, synthetic signification of the situation, a « schematization, » i.e., an argument. .

“Scheme” here has a completely different meaning from “argument scheme”, which, in Grize’s vocabulary, would be called “reasoned organization”, corresponding to the second-level phenomenon of sentence combination, whereas schematization is a first-level phenomenon, that of sentence production.

According to Grize’s favorite metaphor, to argue is to « let the audience see » a situation as « spotlighted » by the speaker. Since all speech casts some subjective light on the world, argumentation is inherent in speech.

In Perelman’s terms, this operation consists in giving “presence” to an object (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 116). This presentification of an object, in both Grize and Perelman, corresponds to what classical rhetoric calls ekphrasis, energeia, hypothyposis. Such figures have the hypnotic power to make the audience hallucinate a rhetorical reality in place of reality. If argumentation is the expression of a point of view, schematization is its counterpart, the cognitive vision attached to that point of view.

Grize defines his natural logic in relation to formal logic:

in addition to  a logic of form, a formal logic, it is possible to imagine a “logic of content”, that is, a logic that takes into account the processes of thinking, the development and interconnection of these contents.
Formal logic based on propositions considers the relations between concepts, while natural logic proposes the construction and interconnection of concepts. (Grize 1996, p. 80)

This “logic of content” may remind us of Toulmin’s “substantial logic”, see layout of argument. But, unlike Toulmin, who characterizes argumentation as an arrangement of statements without discussing their internal structure, Grize believes that argumentation begins with the basic operations that produce the statement itself.

This concept fits with a vision of argumentation as representation and storytelling, as a coherent and detailed account of the world. This may be of some comfort to all students who are discouraged by the difficulty of making dense account of extended texts or interactions in terms of argument schemes, even when these are supplemented by an extensive repertoire of figures of speech.

If persuasion is defined as shifting the partner’s representations, and, accordingly, his or her behavior, then any informative statement, such as “It is 8 a.m.” is argumentative. If the addressee has to catch the 7:55 train and is enjoying a last cup of coffee, thinking it is a quarter to 8, then, the information will dramatically change his vision of the immediate future. Natural logic is also a theory of generalized persuasion, in that it simply “ »illuminates »  the relevant aspects of reality”.

1. Schematization, a Step-by-step Process of Meaning Construction

Argumentation is traditionally defined as a combination of utterances. Natural Logic studies argumentation as a cognitive process evidenced in natural discourse, and manifested at every stage of discourse production, from the first elaboration of an idea to the combination of utterances, which is only the final stage of the argumentative process. Schematization corresponds to a representation embodied in a complex discursive unit,

Influencing the interlocutor is to try to modify his or her representations, by emphasizing some aspects of things, concealing others, proposing new ones, and all this by using appropriate schematization. (Grize 1990, p. 40)

Argumentation does not appear to be a chain of statements in a discourse. It emerges progressively at every stage of the production of the utterance, from the first operation of apprehension of content to the construction of a meaningful and therefore “reasoned” discourse. Any statement, any coherent succession of statements, whether or not it is traditionaly considered to be argumentative, narrative, or descriptive … , is indeed argumentative to the extent that it constructs a unique point of view, that is a “schematization”. This conception leads to reconsider all information as argumentation, tending to liken discursive meaning to argumentation, S. Argumentation (I); Argumentation (II).

Grize defines Natural Logic as “the study of logical-discursive operations that make it possible to construct and reconstruct a schematization” (1990, p. 65); “Its task is to account for the operations of thought allowing a speaker to construct objects and to predicate upon them at will” (1982, p. 222).
The concept of schematization defined as a “[discursive representation], oriented towards an addressee, of what the author conceives or imagines of a certain reality” (1996, p. 50), “of what it is all about” (1990, p. 29). A schematization is a discourse that focuses the listener’s attention upon a “micro-universe” given as “an accurate reflection of reality” (id., p. 36), which constructs or “structures” (id., p. 35) a synthetic, coherent, stable meaning. The purpose of schematization is “to show something to someone” (Grize 1996, p. 50; my emphasis); “to schematize […] is a semiotic act: it is to give to see” (id., p. 37; my emphasis). The object of Natural Logic is the study of the operations constructing such images.
The functioning of schematization is particularly clear in classical argumentative situations, when a discourse directly confronts a counter-discourse; the same reality is given two antagonistic descriptions:

S1 — These replacement workers, you will pay them with the strikers’ money!
S2 — Not the strikers’ money, the taxpayers’ money.

2. Operations constructing a schematization

Natural Logic postulates the existence of “primitive notions”, of a pre-linguistic nature (Grize 1996, p. 82), linked with the culture and the activities of the speakers. These pre-notions are the place of “cultural pre-constructions”, i.e., received ideas and current, accepted ways of doing things. The language “semantizes” these primitive notions turning them into “objects of thought” associated with words (Grize 1996, 83).
Schematization operations are anchored in these “primitive notions” (id., p. 67) and are constructed by a series of operations; “primitive notions” are actually noted by words between brackets. The following sequence is formed of the primitive image and fuzzy notions /fuzzy/ and /image/:

It’s unfortunate that the edge of the image is blurry, and it needs to be corrected. (Ibid.)

This construction follows these steps:

(a) The process of discourse construction begins with the selection of relevant primitive notions, to produce the objects of discourse; here “image, edge of the image” as well as the predicative pair “to be blurred, not to be blurred”. The objects thus schematized will evolve with the development of the discourse, S. Object of discourse.
(b) Then, the operation of characterization produces “contents of judgments” that is predications, and these are accompanied by modalizations, carried out on the objects of discourse. Here, the content of judgment is, “that the edge of the image be quite blurry”.
(c) A subject then asserts (positively or negatively) the preddication, and produces a statement, “it is unfortunate that the edge of the image is quite blurry”.
(d) Operations of configuration then connect several utterances and so build a discursive chain, “a reasoned organization”. The preceding statement for example, is connected to another statement, “this must be corrected”, which is produced according to the same mechanism:
It’s unfortunate that the edge of the image is blurry, and it needs to be corrected.

These different linguistic-cognitive operations can be likened to the vision of language and mind developed by the philosophy of traditional logic, S. Logic.

(a) Apprehension of content by the mind;
(b) Predication, constituting unasserted propositions;
(c) Judgment, expressed in an assertion, which can be true or false;
(d) Concatenation of judgments, i.e. discourse construction.

The aim of this approach is to emphasize that all operations relevant to the genesis of the utterance have an argumentative import. Argumentation is as much a sentence construction process as a sentence connection process.

3. Shoring

The concept of shoring developed in Natural Logic is defined as,

a discursive function consisting, for a given segment of speech (whose dimension can vary from a simple statement to a group of statements having a certain functional homogeneity), to accredit, to make more likely, to reinforce, etc. the content asserted in another segment of the same discourse. (Apothéloz & Miéville 1989, p. 70)

This concept corresponds to the classical problematic of argumentation as a composition of statements, a statement-argument supporting a statement-conclusion. To refer to the same phenomenon, Natural Logic also uses the expression “reasoned organizations”:

Many statements are made merely to support, to shore up the information given. This is part of the general process of argumentation, and allows us to envisage more or less extensive blocks of discursive sequences as reasoned organizations. (Grize 1990, p. 120)

The study of reasoned organizations is an instrument for the study of representations, defined as “a network of articulated contents” (id. p. 119-120). It should be emphasized that, for Natural Logic, the reasoning process is not limited to the combination of utterances but includes the whole dynamic process of structuring the utterance, whether it will function as argument or conclusion in a reasoned organization.

4. Schematization and communication

Schematizations refer to a particular communication situation. They are the product of “the activity of speech [which] is used to construct objects of thought” (1990, p. 22); these objects being part of a dialogue where they are used “as shared references for interlocutors” (ibid.). The communication situation envisioned is intended to be “essentially dialogical in nature” (1990, p. 21), but it is actually analogous to that of rhetorical address. It never considers the possible interactions between the respective schematizations of the participants.

By [dialogal] I don’t mean the interweaving of two discourses, but the production of a speech between two parties, a speaker [orator] … addressing a listener. Admittedly, in most texts, the listener remains virtual. This, however, does not alter the basic problem: the speaker constructs the speech according to his or her representations of the listener, simply, if the listener is present, he or she can actually say, “I do not agree” or, “I do not understand”. But if the listener is absent, the speaker must indeed anticipate his or her refusals and misunderstandings. (1982, p. 30)

Persuasion is given up, “the speaker can only propose a schematization to his or her audience, without actually ‘transmitting’ it” (ibid.).

5. “Logic of Contents” (Grize) and “Substantial Logic” (Toulmin)

Grize defines his Natural Logic in relation to formal logic:

Alongside a logic of form, a formal logic, it is possible to envision a “logic of contents”, that is, a logic that takes into account the processes of thought, the development and interconnection of these contents.
Formal logic based on propositions takes into account the relations between concepts, while natural logic proposes to  the construction and interconnection of notions. (Grize 1996, p. 80)

This “logic of contents” may remind us of Toulmin’s “substantial logic”, see layout of argument. But, unlike Toulmin, who characterizes argumentation as an arrangement of statements without discussing their internal structure, Grize considers that argumentation begins with the basic operation that produce the statement itself.

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Argument SCALE – LAWS OF DISCOURSE

The correlative concepts of argument scale and laws of discourse are developed in Ducrot (1973).
An argument scale (French “échelle argumentative”), more precisely “argument₁ scale”, deals strictly with argument₁ “good reason” or premise for a conclusion, not with argument₂, “dispute”, see to argue.

1.Argument Class, Argument Scale

An argument class is defined as follows:

A speaker places two statements p and p’ in the argument class determined by an utterance r if he regards p and p’ as arguments for r. (Ducrot [1973], p. 17)

S: — Your great-grandmother spent time in The Two Maggots, she dressed in black, she read Simone de Beauvoir, she was a real existentialist!

S presents three arguments leading to the conclusion “she was a real existentialist” (a popular philosophy of the mid-twentieth century). These arguments correspond to characteristics borrowed from the stereotype of what existentialists are and do, see categorization.
The term argument class refers to an unordered and non-hierarchical set of elements. The speaker may present his arguments in whatever order he deems most appropriate. There is no reason to think that “spending time at The Two Maggots” (an existentialist café in Paris) is considered by S to be a stronger or weaker argument than “reading Simone de Beauvoir”.

Two utterances p and q belong to the same argument scale (for a given speaker in a given situation)

“if the speaker considers
1) that p and q belong to the argument class of r; that is, that they are both arguments for the same conclusion r;
2) that one of these arguments is stronger than the other” (Ducrot, [1973], p. 18).

The following scale represents a situation in which q is stronger than p for the conclusion r:

The situation in which the speaker believes that “reading Simone de Beauvoir” is a stronger argument than “spending time in The Two Maggots” for the conclusion “to be a true existentialist” is represented by the following scale:

Relative scale, absolute scale
Scales in which the strength  of the arguments p and q is determined solely by the speaker, are called relative scales.
Scales in which the gradation is objectively determined are called absolute scales, for example the scale of cold:

2. Laws of discourse

Argument scales are governed by four laws: The law of lowering [French Loi d’abaissement],  the law of negation, the law of inversion, and the law of weakness.

2.1 Lowering law 

The lowering law is a semantic law about negation. According to this law:

In many cases, (descriptive) negation is equivalent to less than (Id, p.31).

Negation is asymmetrical; it excludes not just one point on the argument scale, but the whole zone including the denied argument and all potentially stronger arguments. The denial of an argument which is positioned at a higher point on a given scale implies the affirmation of the lower argument, left untouched by the negation.
Let’s consider the  argumentative question “Should we invite him to our poker game?” under the assumption that “we ourselves are a group of decent poker players.
In such a context, “he is not a good poker player” means, “he is a poor poker player”, not “he is a first-class poker player”.

This is true for descriptive negation.The statement “he is not a good poker player, he is a first class poker player” (emphasis on good and first class) involves a very special form of negation, « metalinguistic negation » in which a previous statement is denied, see denying. The stronger argument is necessarily expressed, while the weaker argument remains implicit in the unmarked use of negation.

2.2 The law of weakness

According to this law, « if a proposition p is fundamentally an argument for r, and if, on the other hand, under certain conditions (especially contextual conditions) are met, it appears to be a weak argument (for r), then it becomes an argument for not-r » (Anscombre and Ducrot 1983, p. 66):

He’s a good hunter: he killed two pigeons last year

In particular, the weak argument must be presented in isolation, and not in conjunction with conclusive arguments. Grice’s principle of exhaustiveness can also account for this fact: an isolated weak argument will be interpreted not only as weak weak (inferred from the contextual knowledge), but also as the best possible (pragmatic inference from the assertion), which leads to the rejection of the attached conclusion, and consequently, in a binary situation, as a good reason to go for the opposite conclusion, see cooperation.

From an interactional point of view, presenting a weak argument can also serve a positive purpose, by opening up a discussion and clarifying the participants positions.

2.3 Law of negation (or topos of the opposites)

The law of negation states that,

if p is an argument for r, then not-p is an argument for not-r (Ducrot 1973, p. 27).

If “the weather is nice” is an argument for “let’s go for a walk”, then “the weather is not nice” is an argument for “let’s stay home”.

This law corresponds to the argument by the opposite (corresponding to the paralogism of the negation of the antecedent).

The following example combines the law of weakness with the law of negation; a weak argument for a conclusion is reversed as a strong argument for the opposite conclusion:

Following the Second Iraq War, which began in 2003, Saddam Hussein, former President of the Republic of Iraq, was tried and executed in 2006. Some commentators felt that the trial had not been conducted fairly, and considered that the trial was not fair, and that it was so rigged that even Human Rights Watch, the largest arm of the US human rights industry, had to condemn it as a total masquerade.
Tariq Ali, [A Well-Orchestrated Lynching], 2007[1].

According to the author, the Association Human Rights Watch generally approves decisions in the interests of the United States. Thus, the fact that they approve the verdict is a weak argument for the conclusionconcluding that “the verdict is fair”. In this case, the fact that even the organization has condemned the decision (as have individuals or organizations more inclined to criticize the United States) is a strong argument for the conclusion that the verdict is unfair.

Conversely, a weak refutation of r strengthens r. This strategy falls within the general framework of the paradoxes of argumentation.

2.4 Law of inversion

According to this law,

If p’ is stronger than p with respect to r, then not-p is stronger than not-p’ with respect to not-r. (Ducrot 1973, p. 239; 1980, p. 27)

— “Leo has a bachelor’s degree” and “Leo has a master’s degree” are two arguments for “Leo is a qualified person, he can teach mathematics”.
— “Leo has a master’s degree” is a stronger argument for this conclusion than “Leo has a bachelor’s degree” for this same degree.

Under normal circumstances, we might say:

Leo has the bachelor’s degree and even a master’s degree, he is fully qualified to teach mathematics.

The indicator even 1) indicates that the passage to which it belongs is argumentative;
2) marks that the statement it modifies is stronger than the other argument(s) contextually available for the conclusion defended in that passage.

You can say, “He has a thesis, and even a bachelor’s degree”, but with some irony about the value of diplomas. If you want to argue against Leo, to show that he is not sufficiently qualified, you will say:

Leo has no master’s degree, not even a bachelor’s degree, he is not qualified to teach mathematics.

The negation turns the weakest argument for qualification into the strongest argument for the lack of qualification.

Argument scales can express the argument a fortiori:

He doesn’t have a bachelor’s degree, a fortiori he doesn’t have a master’s degree.

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[1] Tariq Ali, Un Lynchage bien orchestré [A well-orchestrated lynching]. Afrique-Asie, February 2007.

QUESTION

1. Question as Interrogation

A question can be a sentence that  “attempts to get the addressee to supply information” (SIL, Question), using the specific morphemes and syntactic transformations attached to the interrogative form.

– The fallacy of many questions (loaded question, biased question) is one of the six Aristotelian linguistic  fallacies. A loaded question is a question about a statement that contains several implicit statements. The loaded question assumes the truth of these underlying statements, which may be disputed by the recipient of the question.

– Rhetoric uses a number of commonplace ontological questions to gather information.

— A rhetorical question, in the traditional sense of the term, re-frames the argumentative question as a question that admits a self-evident answer, see argumentative question, §4

2. Question as Problem

A question can be the subject of a discussion, an “issue; broadly: a problem” (MW, Question). It doesn’t necessarily have an interrogative form.

An argumentative question represents the discursive confrontation that generates an argumentative situation. Such a question does not refer to a search for information, but to a problem admitting of two meaningful, equally reasonable but incompatible answers.

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RICH and POOR

Arguments from wealth and arguments from poverty are two types of arguments from authority. The words of the rich are valued – because they are rich – and the words of the poor are valued – because they are poor. The rich and the poor are then taken at their word, and their words are used as arguments from authority. A speaker can validates a position by putting it in the mouth of a rich or poor person, see authority; commonplace.
Both arguments are common and equally powerful.

The Wealth Argument, or “Top People” Argument

The argument from wealth is the basis of a family of discourses that elaborate on the key issue.

She is rich, so what she says is true. I consider her advice authoritative. She made the best financial decision. She has an exceptional artistic taste, as evidenced by the value of her collections. I vote for her!

This argument easily extends from the wealthy to the upper class, ruling class, and the most glamorous and lucrative professions. It could be called “the top people” argument.

The Poverty Argument: Appeal to the “People Down Below”

The poverty argument is similar to the wealth argument. It validates a language of authority derived from poverty: “The poor are right”:

The poor are good, because they have no money, and those who have no money have no vice; they are not corrupt; their words are is authentic; they are the repositories of common sense; their opinions are fundamentally sound.

Like the wealth argument, the argument of poverty extends beyond the poor to all “the people down there”, that is the exploited proletariat, the dominated, and the lower 10%, as well as to the country people, who live close to nature (naturalistic argument), or to tramps as as wise philosophers … The truth comes out of their mouths, as it does out of the mouths of  children.

The saying vox populi vox dei, “the voice of the people is the voice of God”, which underlies the ad populum argument, is based on the poverty and number argument

These arguments differ from the appeal to money, or the wallet argument, which is related to the punishment and reward argument, see threat and promise.

Argumentative ROLES
PROPONENT, OPPONENT, THIRD PARTY

In an argumentative exchange, the participants are part of a complex system of roles and characters, according to which they speak and act. Some of these roles are general; others are specific to the argumentative situation.

1. General interactional roles (not specific to argumentation)

1.1 Roles attached to the “participation framework” (Goffman)

The concept of a participation framework details and clarifies the traditional concept of a verbal exchange between a speaker and one or more listeners. The participation framework is defined as a relationship between two complex speech structures, the production format and the reception format (Goffman, 1981). These concepts are instrumental to analyzing all argumentative interactions, from rhetorical addresses to everyday argumentative interactions. They are relevant to analyzing of the ethos, and polyphonicrespp structure of the argumentative texts.

• Reception format (id., pp. 141-142)

The people who can actually hear a speaker’s words occupy various statuses in relation to these words.

— The addressed participants are the people to whom the words are openly directed, and the pronoun you refers to the addressed participant(s). Everyday group conversations demonstrate that successfully addressing a specific person may require complex maneuvers.

— The ratified participants are the members of the group formed around the ongoing speech event. They may or may not be addressed. In order to get the floor in a discussion, one must be a ratified participant. Ratified, non-addressed participants may be addressed during  the speech event’s development.

In a current argumentative exchange, the referee of the debate, if there is one, is a ratified participant, who will be addressed only as a resource if a crisis looms, or during a planned slot in order to move the debate forward, to evaluate and conclude the session. If the debate is open to a broader audience, audience members are ratified participants but not addressed participants.

In a codified dialectical exchange, the questioner and the respondent are the only ratified and addressed participants. Both participants alternately hold the floor.

In a classical rhetorical address, the audience is ratified and addressed. The difference from the dialectical situation is that the audience does not have an official right to the floor. Nonetheless, the audience may express its reactions with applause or boos (Goffman 1981).

— Overhearers and eavesdroppers. People passing within earshot are non-ratified participants. Overhearers accidentally hear the sounds and words of the conversation, possibly without even listening. Eavesdroppers intentionally spy on the conversation.

• Production Format

Speech is produced by the speaker. Goffman (1981) and Ducrot (1980) have independently shown that the speaker should not be considered to be a unified entity but rather a complex articulation of different discursive personae. In Goffman’s words the Animator, the Author, the Figure and the Principal (id., p. 144; p. 167).

— The Animator (Goffman) is the talking machine, that physically produces the discourse. Similarly, Ducrot redefines the Speaker as “the empirical being” to which all external speech determinants can be attributed, “the psychological or even physiological processes that originate the utterance, the actual intentions and cognitive processes that render the statement possible” (Ducrot 1980, p. 34).

The counterpart of this talking machine in the reception format is the hearing machine: the listeners, and the entire range of ratified and non ratified participants who physically hear the speech and choose listen to it or not (Ducrot 1980, p. 35).

— The Author selects the thoughts to express and the words to express them. A speaker reading a book or quoting another person is the Animator of the words borrowed without being their Author (Schiffrin 1990, p. 242). The pronoun I refers to the Author of the speech (except in quoted speech).

— The Figure corresponds to the discursive self-image of the Author, that is, the ethos.

— The Principal is

(in the legalistic sense) someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who is committed to what the words say … a person acting under a certain identity, in a certain social role” (Goffman 1987, p. 144). 

“The same individual can very quickly alter the social role in which he is active, even though his capacity as animator and author remains constant” (id., p. 145). 

The same Author can address a student as a teacher, an adult, a citizen, a New Yorker, etc. and so on.
Defined as “someone who believes personally in what is being said and takes the position that is implied in the remarks” (id., p. 167), the Principal plays a key role in the polyphonic space, as the person who takes the responsibility of what is said (Ducrot’s énonciateur, 1980, p. 38), see interaction, dialogue, polyphony.

For example, consider the following statement:

The weather is nice (V1), but I must work (V2)

the Author stages two voices:

— In V1, the voice of someone arguing that a nice weather is a good reason to go for a walk.
— In V2, the voice is that of a another person arguing that having to work is a good reason to stay home.

The decisive point is that, the Principal identifies to voice V2, dropping the argument E1, and validating the argument E2.

There is no intrinsic superiority of argument E2 over E1. The speaker authors both arguments, and, as a Principal, acts upon E2, not E1.

In summary, “the Animator produces talk, the Author creates talk, the Figure is portrayed through talk, and the Principal is responsible for talk” (Schiffrin 1990, p. 241).

1.2 Roles Attached to Different Types and Genres of Speech

To account for the variety of discursive genres, one must introduce new types of roles, such as the narrator and the narratee for storytelling; the expert and the layperson for explanation; and the proponent, the opponent and the third party for argumentation.

Interactional genres bring their own share of professional or occupational roles: seller and customer for shop interactions; teacher and students in classroom interactions; physician and patient for therapeutic interactions.

1.3 Socio-Interactional Roles

Linguistic roles combine with a set of social roles, in which we distinguish (after Rocheblave-Spenlé [1962]):

— Global social roles: gentleman, cool guy, cheerleader, troublemaker, etc.
— Biosocial roles: young/old, male/female/transgender, etc.
— Social class roles: bourgeois, aristocrat, white or blue collar worker, etc.
— Professional roles: farmer, trader, truck driver, etc.
— Community roles: religious believer, member of a trade union, a political party, a sport team, etc.
— Family roles: husband, wife, child, father, uncle, etc.

2. Argument-acting roles: Proponent, Opponent, Third party

The argumentative situation is defined as a three-pole situation, that is to say a three-role situation: Proponent, Opponent and Third Party. Each of these roles corresponds to a specific discursive modality, a discourse of proposition, supported by the proponent, a discourse of opposition, supported by the opponent, and a discourse of doubt or questioning, that defines the Third Party position.

2.1 Proponent and Opponent

In dialectical theory, the terms proponent and opponent are defined, as partners in an argumentative game see dialectic. From an interactive perspective, an argument becomes dialectical when the third party is eliminated and each actor is assigned a role (“you will be the proponent, and I will be the opponent”) that they must assumed for the entire “dialectic round” (Brunschwig 1967). Eliminating the third party goes hand in hand with expelling rhetoric and the establishing a system of objective-rational norms. In a figurative sense, one could say that the third party is then replaced by Reason or Nature—that is, by the rules of truth.

From a rhetorical perspective, the argumentative game is initially defined first as an interaction between a proponent, the speaker, and a third party, the silent audience to be persuaded. The opponent and counter-discourse are not absent, but consigned to the background.

By engaging into a discussion, participants acknowledge the fact that none of them has sufficient power or authority to decide the matter at hand, and that they are engaged in a problematic situation.

2.2 Third Party

Considering that the argumentative question is a full systemic component of argumentative interaction highlights the role of the third party. This figure materializes what is publicly at stake and the contact between the contradictory discourses.

In its prototypical form, an argumentative situation is an interaction between the proponent’speech , the opponent’s counter-discourse, and a third, mediating, interrogative discourse. The third party stabilizes or manages the question, and decides upon the external relevance of the participants’ interventions. Therefore, the argumentative situation, as exemplified in public adversarial exchanges, is a three-role situation. Basic argumentative situations such as political debates and court cases, are tripolar. Argumentative speech is systematically multi-addressed, the addressee is not only, or necessarily, the adversary-interlocutor, but also, in one case the public about to cast their vote, and in the other, the judge about to pronounce a verdict.

Unlike the categorical assertions and denials of the proponent and the opponent, the third party may appear softer and undecided. In reality, the third party refuses to accept either of the opposing proposals or points of view. They ask for more arguments, remaining doubtful and leaving the question open, in the name of making an informed decision. According to the most classical concept of argumentation, the judge is the prototypical figure of the third party. All ratified participants of an argumentative situation who consider that the argumentative forces balanced, or, more subtly, that even if one seems to prevail, the other cannot be considered to be null, are de facto in the third party position. In philosophy, the radicalization and reification of this position is elaborated as methodological skepticism.

Once the third party and the argumentative question are accepted as key elements of the argumentative exchange, the proponent and opponent are granted full responsibility for their arguments. One may answer, “No!” and the other “Yes, of course!” without either of them being systematically accused of manipulation, bad faith or other of fallacious speech.

Institutions may stabilize the argumentative roles and their attribution to individuals. In an ordinary interaction, the argumentative roles do not correspond to permanent roles but rather to footings, (Goffman (987, chapter 3), particularly in that they are labile. Within the same speech turn, the same person can take the role of both the Third party and the Proponent with regard to an issue (affirming a position while expressing a certain degree of doubt about it), or act as the Proponent on one issue and the Opponent on another.

3. Argument-actors [Fr. actants] and Actors [Fr. actors]

The individuals engaged in the argument are the physical participants, or actors of the argumentative situation. When clarification is needed, the term argument-actor (Fr. actant, borrowed from semiotic theory), may be used to refer to the three basic argumentative roles, Proponent, Opponent, Third Party.

Any actor can successively occupy each of the three argument-acting roles (Fr. rôle actantiel), according to all the possible paths. For instance, an actor may abandon his or her discourse of opposition in order to develop a discourse of doubt, switching from the argument-acting role of opponent to that of third party. An argumentative issue remains unsolved as long as the contradiction survives, even if some actors change their point of view. If two actors swap their argument-acting roles–that is, if they convince each other, the issue remains open.

In the case of an argumentative alliance, or co-argumentation, several actors can occupy the same argument-acting position simultaneously; that is, several individuals can produce co-oriented interventions. The study of argumentation should focus both on co-oriented interventions and anti-oriented interventions.

4. Argument is demilitarization

The distinction between argument-actors / actors makes it possible to reconsider the famous and strangely prized slogan “argument is war”, along with its related bellicose metaphors (Lakoff, Johnson 1980). Argument_2 may be a kind of war, albeit with fewer casualties, but argument_1, that is argumentation, is not. The opposition between discourses, that is between argument-actors [Fr. actants], is not necessarily confused with possible collaborations or oppositions between people, that is, between actors [Fr. acteurs]. Argumentative situations are confrontational only when the actors identify themselves with their argumentative roles. In the most obvious case, that of internal deliberation, the same actor can peacefully progress through all the argument-acting positions (argumentative roles). If a group deliberates on a question of common interest, it fortunately happens that the associated members will together examine the various facets of the problem together, that is, the different possible answers to the question and the arguments that support them. During this process, they systematically occupy the different argument-acting positions, without clearly identifying with one of these positions, and without necessarily transforming this process into a war between the actors. An argumentative situation is not inherently polemical; but it can certainly become so when features that define the participants’ identity are involved and put at risk in the discussion.

Classical RHETORICAL ARGUMENTATION

Classical argumentative rhetoric is based on the natural ability to speak. This capacity is developed through conceptualization and practical exercises on general or social issues. This type of rhetoric combines linguistic, interactional and civic skills.

1. The Rhetorical Address

The rhetorical address corresponds to the traditional definition of discourse, that is, “that which, in public, treats a subject with a certain method, and a certain length” (Littré, [Discourse]). A discourse is a “formal, ordered and usually extended expression of thought on a subject.” (W., Discourse).
This concept of discourse differs from the concepts of discourse as defined by Foucault (1969, 1971) or Pêcheux (Maldidier, 1990). This meaning of discourse is not included among the six definitions considered by Maingueneau in his foundational presentation of “French discourse analysis” (1976, pp. 11-12).

A rhetorical address is a speech delivered by a speaker or orator to an audience.

– The orator addresses a pressing issue of general concern, typically seeking to influence an ongoing decision-making process that is developing under certain time constraints.
Classical rhetoric focuses on an orator, addressing an audience. In reality, a full rhetorical situation involves choice, and includes as many orators or voices as there are possible choices.

— The speech is a relatively long, planned monologue composed of a series of speech acts that construct a unified representation of the disputed subject, and are intended to lead to action.

— It is produced in the context of a discursive competition that takes place between different speeches of mutual opponents, with incompatible proposals. The rhetorical address occurs in a space of contradictory discourse, where all interventions are positioned in relation to  each other. Even if the speaker tries to erase all traces of the surrounding counter-discourses, the speech is still structured by such competing discourses.

— The speech is delivered to an audience, composed of everyone who will play a role in the decision-making process concerning the issue in hand. The audience is divided on what the right decision would be, and includes staunch supporters and opponents of each proposal, as well as undecided individuals, see roles. The traditional emphasis on persuasion suggests that the orator focuses more on the doubters and questioners, than on radical opponents. His task is to remove doubt, create and guide opinion, see logos, ethos, pathos.

The rhetorical audience is both diminished and enlarged. It is diminished, because it is defined by its lack of knowledge and its indecision. However, at least within the framework of the New Rhetoric  the audience is also elevated as a critical instance, somewhere on the path to achieving a universal, deeply rooted and justified consensus.

Argumentative rhetoric has theorized, codified, evaluated and stimulated this type of public communication, the only type of public address possible before the advent of radio, cinema, television and the internet. Its theoretical object remains well defined, the circulation of contradictory speeches within a decision-making group, see argumentation-2; persuasion.

2. The Rhetorical Catechism

At least until the modern times, rhetorical argumentation was the backbone of teaching and education in the Western world. In the Middle Ages, it served as one of the three arts of discourse that made up the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric), and was preparatory to the quadrivium (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music).

For such pedagogical purposes, rhetoric has constructed a standard self-representation of the speech production process and the resulting speech delivered to an audience:

– A five-step production process, invention, disposition, speech, memory, pronunciation.

– Three genres of discourse, deliberative, judicial, and epideictic.

– Three rhetorical roles: the rhetorical interaction is functionally tripolar, “the speaker who wants to persuade, the interlocutor whom he must convince, and the opponent whom he must refute” (Fumaroli 1980, p. 3).

– Three discursive means of pressure focus on transforming the audience’s representations and desire for action. The speaker must:

– Inform and teach, through his logos, that is, through the cogency of his arguments and the plausibility of the facts as he reports them.
– Please and attract through his style, and his ethos, the self-image he projects in his speech.
– Move the audience to action, through pathos.

– According to the tradition, the actions aimed at producing these effects are concentrated in the strategic moments of the discourse:

The introduction is the ethotic moment.
The narrative and the arguments are dominated by logos.
The conclusion is the emotional, pathemic, moment, through which the speaker hopes to wrest the final decision.

3. Organization of the Process

The process of constructing an argumentative rhetorical discourse is traditionally described as involving five stages. The corresponding Latin words for these stages are provided in order to avoid confusion with the English terms, which are false cognates.

(i) Inventio: Finding the arguments

“Invention [inuentio] is the invention of things, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing” (Ad Her., i, 3). Inventio is the cognitive step corresponding to the methodical search for arguments, guided by the technique of “topical questions”, see common places.
The Latin word inventio does not mean “invention” in the sense of creating something that did not exist before. Here, « to invent » means “to find or discover something” (Gaffiot [1934], Inventio).
Psycholinguistic research on the production of written and oral discourse has expanded upon the reflection on inventio techniques.

Rhetorical arguments are « found » based on an exploration of reality, guided by a natural, substantial ontology.
Religious arguments have introduced a fundamental change to this vision. Instead of being plausible statements, good reasons are sacred statements drawn from foundational sacred texts and, to a lesser extent, from the texts of the relevant religious tradition.

(ii) Dispositio: Planning the sequence of arguments

“Arrangement [dispositio] is the ordering and distribution of the matter” (ibid.), that is, the planning of speech, particularly the organization of arguments. Inventio and dispositio are the two cognitive stages of this process.

(iii) Elocutio: Expressing the argumentation

“Style [elocutio] is the adaptation of appropriate words and phrases to the matter under consideration” (ibid.).
Although the word style used in the Ad Herennium translation may suggest a superficial arrangement of expression, elocutio is more than that. It corresponds to the “putting into language” of the arguments, their semantization, and the entire linguistic expression.

The elocutio is characterized by four qualities, the grammatical correctness (latinitas), the clarity of the message (perspicuitas), the adaptation of the message to suit the audience (aptum) and the density and richness of its expression (ornatus). A discourse may be rejected as defective on any one of these levels, see destruction.

Currently, the English word elocution refers to “the skill of clear and expressive speech, especially of distinct pronunciation and articulation” (W., Elocution). With this meaning, elocution clearly belongs first to pronuntiatio, and only peripherally to elocutio, as expression and style.

(iv) Memoria: Memorization of speech

Speeches must be memorized because they are intended to be delivered orally, without the use of paper or autocue. Like the « invention » process, memorization involves cognitive factors. The cultural importance of this memorization work, which may seem anecdotal, has been demonstrated by Yates (1966).

(v) Pronuntiatio: Delivering the speech

“Delivery [pronuntiatio] is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture” (ibid.).
The Latin word pronuntiatio refers not only to the physical process of speech production and modulation, but also to the idea of ​​assertive speech. A pronuntiatio is a “declaration, announcement, or proposal” (Gaffiot [1934], Pronuntiativus). A judge does not say or read his judgment; he pronounces it.
The rhetorical tradition views delivery as the moment of performance, and dramatization of the discourse, that requires a special training of the body, gestures and the voice. Orators, preachers, and actors are subject to the same constraints of public performance, though their techniques, social statuses and messages differ greatly.

In short, the rhetorical prescriptions for finding, ordering, and expressing arguments in writing are particularly well-suited to general academic essays. These prescriptions seem clear, and easy enough to teach ­— but, unfortunately, they are not so easy to put into practice.

In Divisions of Oratory Art, Cicero frames the concepts of ancient rhetoric as a series of questions and answers, “very much like  a catechism”, as Bornecque notes ([1924], p. VII). Rhetoric may have suffered from such an ostensibly pedagogical presentation, where everything must be done and said by the book.

4. Textual Organization of the Speech

This process leads to the final product, the speech delivered in a specific situation. It is articulated in parts, traditionally called:

– Introduction (exordium)
– Narration
– Argumentation (a confirmation of one’s position followed by a rebuttal of the opponent’s positions)
– Conclusion.

Argumentation is the central part of the speech. Contrary to a simplistic view of discourse, there is no opposition between argumentation, narration and description. Like literary narratives or descriptions, argumentative narratives or descriptions, are made from a particular point of view.

5. Extensions and Restrictions of Rhetoric

Ancient argumentative rhetoric has been redefined on various dimensions.

– Limitation to its expressive dimension. Argumentative rhetoric can be oriented towards persuasive communication or the quality of expression.

– Generalization to its persuasive dimension. Nietzsche assimilates the rhetorical function to the persuasive function of language, see persuasion.

– Restriction to the linguistic dimension and liquidation of the cognitive dimensions. The apparent logic of the five components of rhetorical production was profoundly challenged in the Renaissance (Ong 1958). The three components related to thought (invention, disposition, and memory) were separated from the two components related to language (expression and delivery). Inventio, the foundation of argumentation, was removed from rhetoric. Rhetoric redefined its subject matter, shifting its focus from social discourse to literature and belles-lettres, and developing a passion for the autonomous study of the discourse variations and stylistic figures.
A language deprived of thought and a thought deprived of language: this orphaned rhetoric would become the target of violent attacks from Locke, see ornamental fallacies.
In nineteenth-century France, Fontanier ([1827], [1831]) was the emblematic figure associated with this “restricted rhetoric” (Genette, 1970), as opposed to the so-called “general” rhetoric, which was revived by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). The question of reviving an integral concept of rhetoric remains a topos of rhetorical studies.

– Generalization along its linguistic dimension. A rhetoric limited to figures of speech can itself be called “general”: this paradoxical term corresponds to the “Group μ” approach in their General Rhetoric (1970). Figures are examined within a structuralist framework, and figures are reconsidered under the two basic dimensions of language, the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axes. Issues of argumentation, public speaking, interaction, and communication, are not considered, nor is the aesthetics of figures. During the 1970s, this General Rhetoric was practically the only concept of rhetoric to be considered in the French literature , and Perelman’s New Rhetoric occupied only a marginal position. Wenzel devoted an avenging paragraph to this “alarming” view of rhetoric (1987, p. 103; see Klinkenberg, 1990, 2001). The contrast with the status of rhetoric in speech and communication departments in the United States could not be greater.

– Extension to ordinary speech. The rhetorical approach can be extended to everyday  speech, insofar as it involves managing one’s face (ethos), processing data oriented toward a practical end (logos), and correlating affects (pathos) (Kallmeyer, 1996). Thus, the rhetorical trilogy can thus be seen as the precursor of the various theories of the language functions (Bühler 1933, Jakobson [1960]), in a different theoretical atmosphere. This extension also preserves a fundamental characteristic of rhetorical speech: altering reality by participating in ongoing action. This view may resonate with Bitzer’s evocation of the dialogue between fishermen at work in the Trobriand Islands, and his definition of the “rhetorical situation” as involving a degree of “urgency”:

Rhetorical situations may be defined as complexes of persons, events, objects and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence, which can be partially or completely removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence (Bitzer [1968], p. 5).

– Extension to any semiotic domain. Rhetoric naturally extends to the co-verbal and paraverbal signifiers. Furthermore, the strategic implementation of any semiotic system can be legitimately be considered rhetorical practice: rhetoric of painting, of music, of architecture for example.

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