Argument from OPPOSITES

We follow Freese and Rhys Roberts who use the term “(topos) from / of the opposite” in their translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Ryan uses the equivalent term contrary in his discussion of the topos (Ryan 1984). Contrary is also used in logic in the pair contrary / contradictory proposition.
Since the topos plays with two pairs of opposites, the plural « topos of opposites » also seems appropriate.

In a broader sense, the terms opposition and opposite can cover a number of specific argumentative phenomena, see opposition; contradiction; contrary and contradictory.

1. Topos of opposites

Cicero recognized the enthymeme based on opposites as the archetypal enthymeme.
The topos of the opposites is the first on Aristotle’s list of rhetorical topoi:

One line of positive proof is based upon consideration of the opposite of the thing in question. Observe whether that opposite has the opposite quality. If it has not, you refute the original position. If it has, you establish it. (Rhet., II, 23; RR, p. 355)

If courage is a virtue, then cowardice is a vice.

Ryan restates the Aristotelian topos as follows

If A is the contrary of B, and C is the contrary of D,
1A — then, if C is not predicated of A, then D is not predicated of B.
1B — then if C is predicated of A, then D is predicated of B (1984, p. 97)

2. A dialectical resource

The topos of opposites is a dialectical resource,  used to evaluate claims such as « A is B », “courage is a virtue.” If the proponent holds that « A is B« , then the opponent can examine the opposites of A and B.
In a dialogical format:

Confirmation – The test using the method of opposites is as follows

Question: Is courage a virtue?
Topos of the opposites:

Opposite of courage: cowardice.
Opposite of virtue: vice.

Let’s a apply the opposite of virtue to the opposite of courage:
“Cowardice is a vice.”
This proposition seems indisputable. Therefore, we can conclude that courage is indeed a virtue.

Argumentation: “Courage is (indeed) a virtue, since cowardice is certainly a vice.”

Refutation – Let’s apply the same test to the statement “Pleasant things are (intrinsically) good. »

Question: “Are pleasant things good?”

Topos of the opposite:
Opposite of pleasant: unpleasant.
Opposite of  good: bad.
Derived statement: “Unpleasant things are bad.”

New question: “Are unpleasant things always bad?”
The answer is no, because cod liver oil is quite unpleasant to drink (in its natural state), yet it is good for your health.

Conclusion: unpleasant things are not always bad.
Some unpleasant things are good.

Argumentation: “Pleasant things are not intrinsically good, since unpleasant things can also be good.”

The topos of opposites can also be used to suggest practical actions:

Inhaling black coal dust made the miners sick, they will recover if they drink white milk

If the cold rain has given him a cold, a hot tea will do him good.

2.1 Linguistic and logical forms of the topos of opposites

Aristotle expresses the topos of opposites in a language that is ordinary in its construction but technical in its use of a specialized vocabulary: rhetorical terms such as topos or enthymeme, or grammatical ontological terms such as subject or predicate. These terms are indeterminate, meaning they are taken in their broadest sense: « a subject (a being), a property (a predicate) ». This is a a generic formulation of the topos.

The topos expresses a structure common to a set of enthymemes. Unlike other topoi, the logical form of the topos of opposites is very simple.
According to Ryan’s formulation (1984, p. 97, cf. above), this basic form is as follows:
          1A – If A is the opposite of B, and C the opposite of D,
          then, if C is not predicated of A, then D is not predicated of B.

          1B – If A is the opposite of B, and C is the opposite of D,
          then, if C is predicated of A, then D is predicated of B.

The clause “— is not predicated” can be read as “is not true, acceptable, possible, etc.”.

According to etWalton & al. (2008, p 107), the argument « from opposites » has two forms:

Positive form:
The opposite of the subject S has the property P.
Therefore, S has the property non-P (the opposite of the property P).

Negative form:
The opposite of the subject S has the property non P
Therefore, S has the property P (the opposite of the property non P)

In practice, the « logical form » is obtained by replacing the indefinite terms (the variables), with letters. The original proposition is written in the standard form of the analyzed propositions, « A is C » (Ryan), or « S is P » (Walton). This shorthand is, very useful because it avoids the complicated formulations that are sometimes necessary to correctly express coreference.
A « logical form », in the strong sense, would be a form that could be used in a logical calculation. But the only operation here is the actualization of the generic form (topos) into a specified form (enthymeme).

2.2 Is the topos of opposites fallacious in itself?

The topos of opposites is logically fallacious

The phrase « is not predicated” can be read as “is not true, acceptable, possible etc. »
Applied to the logical implication, « A implies B« , the topos validates the conclusion « not P implies not Q« . A sufficient condition is mistakenly considered to be necessary and sufficient. So, the conclusion is not « quasi-logical », but simply false, as a case of a negation of the antecedent (modus tollens), see Deduction.

The topos of opposites is conditionally valid

Consider an opaque box: 1) It contains two kinds of objects, cubes and spheres. 2) These objects are either red or green (or exclusive). 3) objects of the same shape have the same color.
An observer pulls an object out of the box: it is a ball, and it is green.
In this case, a ball is a non-cube, and a non-green object is red. We can safely conclude that the balls are green; and that the non balls (cubes) are non green (i.e., red).

2.3 The topos of the opposites in literature

The topos of the opposites can be found in literary passages, where it serves as poetic oratorical amplification without losing its argumentative value of confirmation.

In Milton’s Paradise Lost, [1667], Satan leads the war against the angels, and has just suffered a cruel defeat. He calls “his potentates to council”, and explains to their assembly how a new weapon of his invention — gunpowder and cannons — will enable them to take their revenge.

He ended, and his words their drooping cheer
Enlighten’d, and their languish’d hope reviv’d
Th’invention all admir’d, and each how he
To be th’inventor mifs’d; so easy’ it feemed
Once found, which yet unfound moft would have thought
Impossible.
Milton, Paradise Lost, [1667], Book VI, 498-501; (My italics) [1].

The same conclusion applies to Columbus’ egg: « what seemed impossible before seems easy after. »

2. How does the topos apply?

In the preceding cases, the topos is quite easy to apply, because it operates on the basic linguistic structure “A is B” (as in the previous cases), which can be easily transformed into “Non A is non B”.

The topos is also easy to identify, when the final formulation of the argumentation “A is B, therefore not-A is not-B”, makes the relationship between the opposites transparent.

In other cases, the topos is more deeply embedded in the discourse, and its perception and reconstruction are more complex. In all cases, simple or complex, an argument is needed to show that a given passage corresponds to such and such a specific type of argument, see waste; argument scheme. For example, how can we decide whether the following passage is structured by the topos of opposites (i.e., corresponds to an occurrence of the topos of opposites)?

It took billions of years and ideal conditions before humans appeared on the planet, maybe one global warming will be enough to make it disappear. (Original formulation)

This is clearly an inferential structure, moving from a categorical statement about the past to a restricted statement about the future:

E1, maybe E2

The corresponding Toulminian structure is « Data, SO, Modal, Claim. » The two related statements have the same structure, and express consecutions. This parallelism bodes well for the occurrence of the topos of the opposites.
The structure to be considered for the operation is not the simple grammatical structure « S is P », but rather the consecutive structure:

« Conditions, Result« , « C resulted in R« , or « C (resultative) R. »

Do these C and R contain opposite predications about opposite subjects?

“It took billions of years and ideal conditions before humans appeared on the planet.”
It took B before A = B was necessary for A.
Billions of years and ideal conditions ==> (resulted in) humans appearing on the planet.
CONDITION C1  ==>   RESULT R1

“Maybe one global warming will be enough to make it disappear”.
Maybe W will be enough for D
One global warming ==> will make humans disappear from the planet.
CONDITION C2]    ==> RESULT R2

The opposites are not to be sought in a simple predicative structure, but rather in the two parallel structures, “C [results in] R”. The results R1 and R2 are clearly opposites:

Humans appeared on the planet.
to make [humanity] disappear.

Are their respective conditions in the same relationship? Condition C2, “one global warming” cannot be self-evidently opposed to condition C1, “it took billions of years and ideal conditions.” Nevertheless, their argumentative orientations are clearly opposed:

(i) C1, it took billions of years and ideal conditions before …

— Billions of years leads to conclusions like “that’s a long time”
— ideal conditions leads to conclusions like “it’s rare, difficult to obtain”
— The construction “it takes X(time) to do Y” is oriented toward “it’s a lot (of time)”.

These three orientations converge to give rise to the global conclusion, “This is a very complex process.”

(ii) Conversely, C2 is oriented toward a class of conclusions of the type: “this is a very simple process”:

— The determiner “one” is oriented towards uniqueness, “just one”, and simplicity.
— Will be enough is oriented toward limitation, such as “not more than”, or “less than expected”, for a given performance.

If this reconstruction is acceptable, then the following argumentative structure is attributed to the discourse:

It was really complicated to produce R,
so, maybe, it will be very easy for R to disappear.

These examples also suggest that the classical Aristotelian formulation of the topos may be oversimplified.

3. Trivial and non-trivial conclusions provided by the topos

The use of the topos of opposites is a semantic reflex. Reasoning from opposites is a basic way of thinking, much like causal reasoning, or reasoning by analogy or by definition. Reasoning from opposites may seem to produce commonplace conclusions, empty because analytical reformulations of the original proposition, when both terms are equally obvious.

Nevertheless, even in this case the topos helps to clarify the meaning of the words, which is no less necessary in philosophy than in general disputes:

Temperance is beneficial; for licentiousness is hurtful. (Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23; RR, p. 355)

There are, however, cases in which the “opposite reflex” may, or must, be inhibited: If a prayer says “Peace to those who love you”, should we apply the topos and conclude something like “War to those who don’t”?

Let us consider the following arguments based on the opposites:

If war is the cause of our present problems, then peace is what we need to set things right. (Ibid.)
Those who plunged the country into crisis may not be the best people to lead us out of it.
We cannot trust the same failed market mechanisms to successfully steer the country out of this crisis (after Linguee, 25-10-2015).

These conclusions are countered with the argument that « we failed because of a lack of determination and radicalism »:

If we are in trouble, it is because we just have only fought a limited war; this limited war is the cause of our current difficulties, an all-out war is what we need to put things right again; only an all-out victory will bring us peace.

Our policy has not failed, you have prevented us from actually implementing it

The conclusion of the following example is not trivial:

For even not evil-doers should / Anger us if they meant not what they did / Then can we owe no gratitude to such / As were constrained to do the good they did us. (Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23; RR, p. 355)

The following one is also quite suggestive:

Since in this world liars may win belief, / Be sure of the opposite likewise – that this world / Hears many a true word and believes it not (id., p. 357).

The opposites reflex is a typical example of how argumentation leads us to see things from a different perspective, under a different formulation; or, as Grize would say, in a different light, see Schematization.

4. A transcultural topos

As a semantic reflex, the topos of opposites combines well with analogical reasoning. Like the topos a fortiori, the topos of opposites has cross-cultural validity. The following two examples come from the Chinese tradition.

Wang Chung, Four Things to be Avoided. [2]

There are four things which, according to public opinion, must be avoided by all means. The first is to build an annex to a building on the west side, for such an annex is held to be inauspicious, and being so, is followed by a case of death. Owing to this apprehension, nobody in the world would dare to build facing the west. This prohibition dates from days of yore.  […]
On all the four sides of a house there is earth; how is it that three sides are not looked upon as of ill omen, and only an annex in the west is said to be unpropitious? How could such an annex be injurious to the body of earth. or hurtful to the spirit of the house? In case an annex in the west be unpropitious, would a demolition there be a good augury? Or, if an annex in the west be inauspicious, would it be a lucky omen in the east? For if there be something inauspicious, there must also be something auspicious, as bad luck has good luck as its correlate. […]

Han Fei Tzu. “Precautions within the palace”. [3]

Moreover, whether one is ruler of a state of ten thousand chariots or of a thousand only, it is quite likely that his consort, his concubines, or the son he has designated as heir to his throne will wish for his early death. How do I know this is so? A wife is not bound to her husband by any ties of blood. If he loves her, she remains close to him; if not she becomes estranged. The saying goes, “if the mother is favored, the son will be embraced”. But if this is so, then the opposite must be, “if the mother is despised, the son will be cast away.”

5. A contrario

Latin contrarius, “contrary”. Two constructions can be used to refer to the argument, with the same meaning:
— the Latin preposition a: argument a contrario sensu, “by the opposite meaning”
— or, less commonly, the Latin preposition ex: “complecti ex contrario” “conclude on the basis of the opposite meaning” (Cicero, quoted in Dicolat, art. Complector).
S. Latin labels

The label “argument a contrario” can be used with the meaning of “inversion”, to refer to the various kinds of argumentations based on contradiction, S. Contradiction.

Argumentation from the opposites, as defined in law, corresponds to one kind of argumentation a contrario:

A discursive process according to which given a legal proposition asserting an obligation (or other normative qualification) of a subject (or a class of subjects), in the absence of any other express provision, we must exclude the validity of another legal proposition asserting the same obligation (or other normative qualification) with respect to any other subject (or class of subjects)” (Tarello 1972, p. 104).
Thus, if a provision requires all young men, who have reached the age of 20, to perform their military service, it will be concluded, a contrario, that young girls are not subject to the same obligation. (Perelman 1979, p. 55)

When a rule explicitly refers to a category of things, then it does not apply to the things that do not belong to that category. The rule applies only in the defined domain, to all the specified things, and only to them.
This is an application of Grice’s rule of quantity, which states that the speaker must provide just the necessary amount of information, no more and no less, see Cooperative principle.

This rule assumes that the legal system of law is well designed and stable, see systemic principle. In a period of social change and revision of the law, the argumentation a pari will be opposed to argumentation on the opposites. Women fighting for gender equality will refuse to contrast their status with that of men, and will demand that laws be applied a pari, be they beneficial (voting rights) or quite possibly less attractive (military service).

There is no paradox in the fact that a pari / a contrario argumentation can be applied to the same material situation. Legal issues are not unanimous, and cannot be resolved by the automatic application of an algorithm; their discussion involves historical considerations, values and affects.

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[1] Edinburgh: Donaldson.
[2] Wang Chung, Four Things to be Avoided. In Lun-hêng, “Balanced Discussions”, Book XXIII, Ch. III, 68. Translation and notes by Alfred Forke, Leipzig, 1906. Reprinted by Paragon Book Gallery, New York, 1962. (p. 793-794)
Quoted from http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/wang_chung/lunheng/wangchung_lunheng.pdf
[3] Han Fei Tzu. Basic Writings. Section 17, “Precautions within the Palace”. Translated by Burton Watson. New York, London, Columbia University Press, 1964. P. 84-85.

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OPPOSITION

The relationship of opposition between (opposite) words is roughly equivalent to the lexical relationship of antonymy. These terms cover a number of classical lexical oppositions such as:

Male / female: terms in a two-dimensional opposition (classical gender regime).
Obligatory / permissible / forbidden: terms in a multidimensional opposition.
Sight / blindness: terms in a possession / deprivation relation.
Mother / son: correlative terms.

These relations of opposition are exploited in various argumentative maneuvers, involving negation,and/or terms and propositions containing opposite terms:

– Negation, see denying.
– Rhetorical figures of opposition, see opposition (in French).
– Opposition between terms, see correlative terms.
– Opposition between propositions: see contradiction; contrary and contradictory
– The argument scheme of the opposites predicates a contrary predicate upon a contrary subject, see argumentative scale.
— The refutation by the observation of the opposite rejects the predication “A is P” based on the constatation that the opposite predicate, Q, is actually true of A, see refutation.

Refutation and destruction by an opposite

A statement of fact admitting an opposite can be refuted by establishing that its opposite is true, see opposite, opposition.

A statement can be invalidated by the use of a misleading opposite.
It only makes sense to attribute a quality to an entity if it also makes sense to attribute  the opposite quality to the same entity.

If entity A cannot receive the predicate O1, then it cannot receive its opposite O2, Friendly and unfriendly are opposites.
L1: – Peter acted in a friendly way (so you should be grateful to him.
L2: – To say he acted in a friendly way, he must have had  the possibility of acting in an unfriendly way.

It is ironic to praise poor people for their sobriety because to be praised for sobriety, they must first have enough to eat.
Who can say that he’s brave if he’s never had the chance to prove it?
He can’t say otherwise, so what he says isn’t relevant.

This can be generalized. For a statement to provide meaningful information in a given situation, the opposite statement must also be meaningful.

In today’s Le Figaro , the CEO of EDF claims that the French nuclear power plants are in very good condition. It’s hard to imagine him saying  he could have said the opposite. (France Culture Radio News, 04/18/2011; the CEO of EDF is in charge of the French nuclear park).

This is a very powerful tool for destroying discourse. An entire argument can be dismissed on this basis. He cannot speak otherwise because of his position: “As a teacher, you have to speak in this way.”

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OBJECTION

Like refutations, objections are reactive, non-preferred second-turn interventions, that oppose the conclusions of the first turn, the target discourse.

In terms of content, objections can be considered politely toned down refutations, that may still have the full force of a refutation. Presenting a refutation as an objection is a small price for logic to pay in the name of civility.

However, objections can also be seen as weak, indecisive refutations, that are easily dismissed. To refute is to shoot down, while to object is merely an attempt to stop,  or at best to weaken, the position under scrutiny.

Whether a rebuttal is considered an objection or a refutation depends on the kind of dialogue that develops between the participants. In a logical language game, one cannot claim that all swans are white and simultaneously concede that this particular swan is black. Conclusive counterarguments count as refutations. In ordinary language, however I might argue that in general, swans are white, while conceding the existence of black swans as exotic exceptions.

The same kind of argument can be treated as either a refutation or a concession. For example, as a refutation,  an objection might emphasize a negative consequence of the interlocutor’s proposal:

— But if you build the new school here, the students’ commute will take half an hour longer.

This counter-argument can be contextually constructed as a refutation:

— and this is clearly unacceptable, classes start at 7.30 a.m., and some commuting students  already spend more than an hour commuting. The new school cannot be built here!

or as an objection:

— We’ll have to create a new bus route for commuter students, but this is still the best place to build the new school!

Objection and refutation have essentially different interactional statuses; objections are cooperative, while refutations are antagonistic. The objecting party is a dialectical figure, essential in cooperative everyday argumentative dialogue.

While refutations seek to close the debate, without listening to the answers, objections keep the dialogue open. They correspond to the problematic of the discourse under discussion, which is accepted as a working hypothesis. Objections are framed as a search for better answers. They seek explanations, precisions and modalizations. They accept being only partially answered or integrated as the case may be.

The ethos and emotional states expressed by refutation and objection differ greatly. Refutation wants the last word and is associated with aggression. Objection evokes a spirit of moderation, collaboration and openness.

In a proleptic discourse, referring to possible negative observations, the speaker mentions “objections”, not “refutations”, followed by a but structure:

It could be objected that P [prolepsis], but R [answer to the objection, proposal reinforced]

See refutation; concession; prolepsis.

OBJECT OF DISCOURSE 

Jean-Blaise Grize introduced the concept of a discourse object (« discursive object »; French objet de discours) in connection with the schematization process. An object of discourse is an entity or situation that is the focus of a given discourse and is constantly redesigned throughout the discourse or interaction.

1. Cluster of a word

At the linguistic level, the cluster of an object [“faisceau d’objet”] is studied based on the term that designates this object. It is defined as:

The set of aspects normally associated with the object. Its elements are of three kinds: properties, relations, and patterns of action. Thus, the cluster of « rose » includes properties such as « to be red, » relationships such as « to be more beautiful than, » and action patterns such as « to fade » (Grize 1990, p. 78-79). (Grize, 1990, pp. 78–79).

The cluster attracted by an object is defined at the notional level. It does not coincide either with linguistic categories such as those used in semantic analysis (id., p. 79), with lexicographical elements used in dictionaries, with elements associated with the object psychologically, or with ontological features claiming to grasp the being of the object, see categorization. A word’s cluster results from an aggregation of discourses using that word (id., p. 78), see orientation; words as arguments; inference; polyphony. This concept can be compared to the stereotypes associated with a word, or, better, to the set of its preferred linguistic collocations, as established in corpus linguistics.

2. The cluster of a discourse object

At the discourse level, the elements that make up the cluster attached to a specific object of discourse are not known a priori, but are constructed empirically, on the basis of the study of the actual discourse, or corpus, being analyzed. A specific object of discourse develops through the progressive aggregation of contextual properties attributed to it in that discourse, the entities associated with it, the events it participates in.

The study of discourse objects focuses on their plasticity, as they are progressively produced and transformed in discourse, including their mode of introduction, and the evolution of the contexts to which they are attached. This study overlaps with the grammatical study of designation paradigms (Mortureux 1993). A designation paradigm is the set of words and expressions forming the anaphoric chain associated with an evolving discourse object. This study is part of the analysis of textual cohesion and coherence, and overlaps with basic rhetorical observations about shifts in meaning.

Discourse objects can be contrasted with “logical objects.” Classical logic refers to stable objects. According to the principle of identity every occurrence of the sign (signifier) “a” is strictly equivalent to another. Consequently, any variation in the scope of the reference of “a” introduced in the development of discourse are considered fallacious, see fallacy; ambiguity.

 3. Objects of discourse in argumentative situations

A discourse may concern a large number of objects, and studying the development of each one may be impractical; therefore, limits must be set. As far as argumentation studies are concerned, they must focus on the most relevant objects, that is, on conflicting  central and peripheral objects, and primarily on those mentioned in the formulation of the argumentative question. Just as peaceful, uncontroversial, assertions are taken to be true, uncontroversial objects are taken to be real and stable in their reference.
Controversial objects are associated with controversial claims. Observing their discursive development, and correlatively establishing their contrastive characterization is a simple and practical method for revealing their precise argumentative relevance.

Workers or undocumented immigrants?

The following data, taken from a discussion between students, concern the conditions that a person must fulfill in order to obtain French citizenship. The key question “Who? Who can obtain French citizenship?” immediately structures the debate, see invention. The two antagonistic positions taken by the participants are clearly reflected in the two systems, of designations they use to answer the question “who?”

— All the students agree that there is an unproblematic group, that should have an automatic right to French citizenship, namely, “the persecuted”.

— One group of students supports the claim that “the process of acquiring citizenship should be facilitated”. Immigrants are constructed as people who have a right to French citizenship. These individuals are referred to as:

Workers; people who came to work during prosperous times.
People we asked to come.
People we welcomed.
People who have been here for a long time;
Their relatives;
Their children – born in France – born in another country

— Another group of students supports the claim that “the process of obtaining citizenship should be tightened.” In this set of aligned (cooriented) discourses, immigrants are portrayed as people who do not have the right to French citizenship. These individuals are referred to as:

Undocumented immigrants
People with problems; having or creating problems
Illegal immigrants;
Immigrants by “practicality” (i.e., economic migrants)
« Everyone”, (i.e., indiscriminate foreigners, people asking for citizenship).

In reality, among those who apply for French citizenship, there are certainly both undocumented immigrants and people who came to France many years ago to work. Nevertheless, each group of students schematizes immigrants (as a group) as either one (undocumented) or the other (workers).

For another example of divergent constructions of causality as an object of discourse, see cause – effect.

This method can be used to show how a particular « light » is cast on an object of discourse, how it is “spotlighted” (Grize), or given a discursive “presence” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s [1958], 115-120).

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NON-CONTRADICTION PRINCIPLE

1. In logic

In logic, the principle of non-contradiction prohibits the affirmation of contradictory propositions. In other words:

— The conjunction “P and not-P” is a contradiction, and, as such, is a self-destructive proposition, that is necessarily false.
— The disjunction “P or not-P” is necessarily true.

One of the two propositions P or not-P must be true, both cannot be true at the same time. The same thing cannot both be and not be. This principle is considered  as a law of thought in classical logic and an axiom in contemporary logic. A logical system that respects the principle of non-contradiction contains no antinomies and  is said to be consistent.

Negation — Using the truth table method, the negation operator is defined as follows:

P	¬ P
T	F
F	T

This table expresses the principle of the excluded middle. It reads:

Line 1: ‘if P is true, then not-P is false’.
Line 2: ‘if P is false, then not-P is true’.

2. In natural language

The application of the non-contradiction principle to everyday language is complex, because:
— It presupposes that P is either unambiguously true or false, not far from true or practically false, true or not according to the circumstances.
— There are natural language utterances that cannot be said to be either true or false, such as « Come back tomorrow! » or « I promise to come back tomorrow. »

Many forms of argument appeal to the principle of non-contradiction , albeit under different names. See ad hominem; dialectic; contradiction; consistency.

The principle of non-contradiction applies not only to logical and argumentative discourse, but to any kind of discourse. Inconsistent narratives or descriptions for example, are rejected as such.

According to the basic rule of Aristotelian dialectic, any discourse that leads to a contradiction is irrational and must be abandoned. Hegelian dialectics sees the motor of history in the ongoing treatment of contradictions. Cynical politicians can invoke Hegel to hide their opportunism:

Stalin’s speech on the Five-Year Plan serves as a passionate apology for contradiction as a “vital value” and an “instrument of struggle”. One of Lenin’s great strengths was his ability never to feel imprisonned by what he had preached as true the day before. Mussolini’s famous words “Let us beware of the deadly trap of coherence” could be endorsed by anyone intending to work within unpredictable currents they cannot.
Julien Benda, [The Betrayal of the Intellectuals], [1927][1]

Affirming of a paradox as an oxymoron enables one to endure the contradiction: “O wound without scar!”. Rather than being deemed absurd or fallacious and dismissed, such a paradoxical assertion triggers a search for the deeper, symbolic meaning of the words wound and scar used in this context.
This interpretive approach goes a step further than hastily dismissing it as a  “fallacy”.

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[1] Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs, [1927]. Excerpt from the preface to the 1946 edition. Paris: Grasset, 1975, pp. 78-79.

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Argument from NATURAL SIGN

A natural sign is a perceptual datum, an actual material fact or object,  that is materially connected, either necessarily or ambiguously, to another fact or object or state of things that is not perceptually accessible.

Natural signs are typically undeniable facts, “as certainties, we have, in the first place, what is perceived by the senses, such as what we see, what we hear, as signs [signa] or indications” (Quintilian, V, 10, 12).

Natural signs are quite different from linguistic signs, in which the link between signifier and signified is social and arbitrary, nor are they global analogues of what they “represent”, as in the case of analogical thought. Nor are they a symbolic representation of the associated phenomenon.
The natural sign is merely a part of the phenomenon through which the observer can access the whole phenomenon as a whole. The connection between the present natural sign and its absent counterpart may be:

The very first manifestation of a phenomenon: a red setting sun / rainy weather tomorrow.
A remnant of something that has disappeared: the leftovers / the meal.
A part of a whole: a strand of hair / a person.
An effect of a cause: being tired / having worked.

1. Natural signs, clues and traces

Clue is an accurate synonym for material sign, since looking for clues involves an “intricate procedure or maze of difficulties”, or be trying “to find something, understand something, or solve a mystery or puzzle” (MW, Clue). These descriptions fit well with exploratory argumentative situations. Generally speaking, an argument is a clue to a conclusion.
Etymologically, a clue is ‘a ball of thread’; hence, one used to guide a person out of a labyrinth” (OD, Clue). Clues are typically sought “in the detection of a crime”: “police officers are still searching for clues” (ibid.). However, clue is also used to refer to a “piece of information” given to someone, which is not a natural sign in the sense discussed in this entry.

Traces, such as fingerprints (necessary signs), or tire marks (probable sign), are a special kind of natural sign. However, insofar as traces are remnants, “a mark […] left by something that has passed”, not all material signs are traces; smoke is a correlate of actual fire, not a trace of fire — but but ashes are.

Index, indication and indicator can also be used in the sense of “natural sign”.

2. Reasoning on probable and necessary signs

The relationship between a natural sign and its counterpart is inferential in nature:

Anything that [when it is, another thing is, or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after], is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being.
(Aristotle, P. A., II, 27; my italics for the sign and underlining for the counterpart).

A tentative reformulation: α is a sign of another thing A, if when  α is the case, then A is the case; or when α occurs, then A is about to occur or has just occurred

In the Aristotelian system, enthymemes are developed from natural signs and probabilities (P. A., II, 27); see enthymeme; probable.

These inferences are used in concrete arguments, such as:

I can see smoke, the house must be on fire.
Peter’s face is flushed, he must have a fever.

The quality of the argument depends on the nature of the link used. If the sign is necessary, the argumentat is conclusive. If it is probable, the possible claim is somewhat more probable than it would be without the argument. Probable signs reduce uncertainty, see abduction.

Probable signs are distinct from human and social probabilities.

— A necessary sign (tekmerion) is associated with a material entity or state of affairs. It corresponds to material, empirical necessity (not logical necessity):

A scar / an old wound.
Calloused hands / being a workman.
Smoke / fire.
Footprints in the sand / people on the island.

Such signs thus have the force of proof, the associated syllogism is valid, as in the following propter quid argument, see. a priori

Law (major): A woman who has milk has given birth (if M, then B)
Sign (minor): This woman has milk.
Conclusion: This woman has given birth.

— Probable (contingent) signs (semeion) can correspond to several related independent realities. Contingent signs are ambiguous, whereas necessary signs are unambiguous

Being tired is a possible sign of having worked.
Being flushed is a possible sign of having a fever.

Typically, peripheral indicators are not necessary signs: “He has a guilty look so he must be feeling guilty, so he is guilty”, see circumstances. The corresponding syllogism is not valid:

Law:                Women who have given birth are pale.
Sign:               This woman is pale.
Conclusion:    This woman has given birth.

A necessary condition is considered sufficient: one may simply have a naturally pale complexion, or one may be pale because one is ill. The probable sign is only a fragment of evidence (judicial); it can support a suspicion, but it is not a proof.

The human body is an inexhaustible source of natural signs. White hair and flexible skin are natural signs that indicate the person’s age and general physical condition. In medicine, co-occurring unnecessary signs are grouped into a syndrome, which is defined as “a group of signs and symptoms that occur together and characterise a particular abnormality or condition” (MW, Syndrome). For example, Samter’s syndrome

Samter’s Triad also known as aspirin-sensitive asthma, is a chronic disorder consisting in asthma, recurrent sinus disease with nasal polyps, and a sensitivity to aspirin and other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs).[1]

The presence of these three conditions together provides a basis for a conclusive medical reasoning: if a patient has asthma and is sensitive to aspirin, it is highly likely that they will also have nasal polyps. They should be evaluated for this third condition.
Individually these signs may be inconclusive, but taken together, they can form a body of conclusive evidence. For example, an area of ​​the body may be red, because it has been rubbed; hot, because it is starting to burn; painful or swollen because of an accidental blow. But if it is red, painful, hot and swollen at the same time, then we can say that it is inflamed, see convergent argumentation.

In the following passage, to guess the enemy’s intentions, the soldier observes their actions and movements, deducing a conclusion from a cluster of converging signs.

The writer Roland Dorgelès had “the singular privilege of baptising a war”, as “the Phony War” [la drôle de guerre], referring to the strangely calm situation on the front between September 3rd 1939, the date of the declaration of war, and May 10th 1940, the date of Nazi’s Germany’s invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France. His book, The Phony War, is a series of reports from the front during this period. In April 1940 he was stationed at an observation post in Alsace.

Looking down on the enemy lines from above was like looking down on the enemy lines from a balcony. The sergeant who never lost sight of the ennemy, now knows their habits, where they came from, and where they went.
‘There, he points out, they are digging a sap. Look at the disturbed earth… That gray house has certainly been reinforced… Look at the embrasures… And what about those tiles over there? Most of the workers are there right now. I counted sixty of them, coming back from the site with lamps this morning: so they must be digging underground.

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MOTIVE – REASON

An individual’s will, intentions, desires, motives, reasons… can be interpreted as the causes of their actions, which are then considered to be the effects or consequences of this “inner” causation. Conversely, actions are evaluated and interpreted according to their motives and reasons which are seen as their causes. The consistency requirement imposes this causal structure on human motivation.

1. Argumentation from the existence of reasons for action

Two basic Aristotelian topoi (argument schemes, sg. topos) implement the law of causality in human action by substituting reasons and motives for causes. If the cause exists, then the effect follows. In other words, if a person has a motive or a reason to do something, they will do it as soon as the opportunity  arises.As of the topos # 20 of the Rhetoric states:

Consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding the action in question. (Rhet., II, 23, 20; RR, p. 373)

The basic topos is:

You wanted it, so you sought it!
He who wants the end wants the means.

This topos is also used in the pathetic argument. Here, it supports an accusation:

You had a motive, you talked about it, the opportunity arose, and you did it!

Or a defence:

L1:     — You did it!
L2:      — I had no reason to do it, in fact, I had reasons not to do it.

Similarly, in topos #24, cause means “reason to do”:

Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist. […] For example, Leodamas […] (id., II, 23, 24; F. p. 319).

2. Arguments about the “real reasons”

The following argument schemes substitute a hidden motivation for a publicly claimed good reason, just as a true cause can be substituted for a false one, see interpretation:

— Topos # 15 substitutes a hidden, self-serving motive for a publicly claimed noble reason. It is used to accuse or refute an opponent.

— Topos # 23 rejects a malicious interpretation given to an action by providing an acceptable and respectable explanation for the alleged guilty motive. It is used to clear someone from a charge.

— Topos # 19, on the other hand, changes the benevolent interpretation of an action into a malevolent one.

2.1 Publicly displayed good reasons and real private ugly intentions

According to topos #15 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

The things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly, their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness, but in their heart they prefer their own advantage. […] This is the most effective of the forms of argument that contradict common opinion. (Rhet. II, 23, 15; RR, p. 369)

The argument highlights a (possible) private, hidden, bad motive, in order to refute the public, honourable, good reason given to justify an action.

S1:   — In supporting this charity, I am fighting for a noble cause!
S2:    — You are mainly fighting for your own publicity.

S1:    — We are fighting a war to restore democracy and human rights in Syldavia
S2:    — You are fighting a war to get their oil.

In the second dialogue, S1 justifies the war, S2 does not oppose the war, he simply presents a realpolitik argument presented as the true reason for war.

2.2 A laudable motive substituted for a blameworthy one

This argument corresponds to topos # 23, “useful for men who have been really or seemingly slandered”:

To show why the facts are not as supposed; pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given. (Rhet., II, 23, 23; RR p. 375)

Embodied in the enthymeme:

She embraces him because he is her son, not because he is her lover.

Topos # 23 is the opposite of topos # 19. It helps to exculpate by substituting an honourable motive for the offensive one:

I hit him to save him from drowning, not to hurt him!

The is reinterpreted action is reevaluated: “You must congratulate me and not blame me!” see stasis; interpretation; orientation.

2.3 The poisoned chalice

The wording of topos # 19,–“some possible motive for an event or state of things is the real one”–may seem puzzling. It fits the enthymemes:

A gift was given in order to cause pain through its subsequent withdrawal.

Gods give to many great prosperity, / Not out of good will towards them, but to make / Their ruin more conspicuous. (Rhet., II, 23, 19; XX p. 371)

The topos involves a dramatic negative reinterpretation of an act that was previously viewed positively.

He seduced her not out of love but out of hate to make her suffer by leaving her.

This is the principle behind the “dinner game”, « They invited me not as a friend, but to make fun of me.” This technique is particularly effective for destroying a sense of gratitude, see emotion.

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Appeal to MODESTY:
AD VERECUNDIAM 

1. The argument ad verecundiam

« Verecundia » means « modesty » or « humility. » The Latin term « argumentum ad verecundiam, » translates as « argument from, or appeal to modesty« .
This argument is used by someone who bows before the speech and the good reasons offered by a person whom they consider superior. It typically ratifies an act of submission to the ethos.
The ad verecundiam argument is the interactional correlate of an appeal to authority, not an appeal to authority. Note that, in the following key passage, Locke refers to ad verecundiam as arising from a fear of violating “modesty”.

The first [fallacious argument] is to allege the opinion of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority.
When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it.
This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam. (Locke [1690], p. 410).

This argument is fallacious:

It argues not another man’s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. [Locke, 1690], p. 411).

Similarly, topic #11 of the Rhetoric argues “from a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter”. Such a precedent-setting judgment must have been made by an authority, one of “those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict” (Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23, 12; F. 309), that is to say, “it would be disgraceful to contradict him” (ibid.; my italics), be he a father, a god, a teacher or a wise man. Courtesy is argumentatively oriented in favor of the submission to the status quo.

2. Authority or Pusillanimity? Ad Verecundiam, or Misplaced Modesty

Locke describes an interaction, in which one partner “alleges” an authoritative opinion. The qualities that give an opinion authority have either a social source (“parts, learning, eminency, power,dignity”) or an intellectual source (“learning, approved author, learned doctor approved writer”), see ethos. Such sources do have a legitimizing power, see dialectic. Note that religious authorities are not mentionned.

It must be emphasized that Locke is not censoring the expression of, or the reference to authoritative opinions in the first round of speech; rather the critizing the unquestioning acceptance of such an authority. The problem does not lie in the appeal to authority in the first round, but rather in the fear of an aggressive third round that prohibits criticism of this authority.
The condemnation ad verecundiam protests the censorship of this second round by an internal impulse of modesty, and the feeling of one’s own inadequacy (however legitimate iy may be!). This censorship is a preventive reaction to a potential threat from a third round that aims to silence objectiond addressed to the authority. The third round itself does not address the substance of the objection to the second round (through an argument ad judicium, see matter.) It merely substitutes a negative evaluation of the person who holds it–an personal attack ;that wouls invoke “a breach of modesty, too much pride, insolence, impudence”, i.e., a maneuver of intimidation, see  respect. The problem then is not in the authoritative first round, but in the inhibiting foreboding of an aggressive third round. As the label “argument ad verecundiam” indicates, the fallacy is committed by the interlocutor, the overly modest person who does not object for fear of making a scene. This is a fallacy of cowardice or spinelessness; not primarily a fallacy of authority. Verecundia is the (misplaced sense of) shame that prevents one from saying out loud what one is thinking. It is a betrayal of our duty to truth.

4. Justified modesty

When it comes to authority itself, the problem is twofold. In the first round, participant S1_1 has “alleged” an authoritative opinion, which may be a perfecty reasonable move. Suppose that in a second round, S2 can overcome his ad verecundiam inhibition and express his dissenting opinion quite freely. If, in a third round, S1_2 silences S2_1′s remarks in the name of authority, while at the same time criticizing his opponent for his boldness and pride then S1 is arguing from authority, which is certainly a fallacious move.
Some situations, however,are embarrassing. If S1 quotes Einstein in his (Einstein’s) area of expertise, and S1 has a good background in physics and S2 has none, then a humble lay speaker S2 would be wise to ask for more explanation before voicing his doubts. If not, S1_2 could legitimately give in to an , authoritative exasperation.

3. A fallacy in dialogue

The problem of authority is thus recast as one of authoritarian interaction, i.e.,  a dialogue in which a claim of authority is expressed in the first speech turn, and exploited in the third turn to silence the objections, considering that the quoted authority gives the caster the power to end the discussion. This use of authority is in a direct contrast to the use of authority in a dialectical game. The problem does not lie so much in the quoting of authority as in the possibility of contradicting authority. Modesty, respect, concern not to cause the other to lose face, rules of politeness, preference for agreement are all intellectual inhibitors. All these constraints define a typically anti-dialectical situation, see Dialectic.

Authority is accepted as a fact, the problem lies in the possibility of questioning that authority . Authority is deceptive only when it claims to escape from dialogue, to silence its opponent, and not to answer his counter-discourse. The conclusion is that what is deceptive or not, is a dialogue move. It is impossible to say whether a statement like “The Master said it!” is fallacious or not; it all depends on the position of the statement in the dialogue. If it is an opening statement, it is not misleading. If it is a closing statement, intended to silence the critic, it is.

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[1] Latin “argumentum ad verecundiam” lat. verecundia “modesty, humility”.

APPEAL TO MODERATION
Ad Temperentiam [1]

1. Appeal to Moderation vs. Appeal to Radicalism

In politics, moderation is opposed to radicalism or extremism, just as reformism is opposed to revolution. Arguments from moderation emphasize stickin to the practical, compromising, taking inclusive positions, and changing things little by little.
The appeal to radicalism emphasizes the urgency of decisions, the need for new beginnings, avoiding dead ends in discussions. It also emphasizes the will to remain faithful to principles that can be framed as antinomies, “freedom or death”.

gTwo opposing ethos and emotional states are associated with moderation and radicalism: respectively conservative vs. progressive; open to dialogue and compromise vs. uncompromising; realist vs. idealist; serenity vs. exaltation; etc.

2. The Middle Ground Argument

The middle-ground argument justifies an action by showing that it does not satisfy any of the opposing parties. The speaker takes the position of the responsible third party, see roles.

Stay away from extremes.

The fact that both the far right and the far left are attacking my policy clearly shows that it is a good policy.

Christianity has restored true proportions in architecture, as in other arts . Our temples, larger than those of Athens, and smaller than those of Memphis–the right balance, where beauty and taste par excellence prevail.
Chateaubriand, [The Genius of Christianity], 1802[1]

The intermediate position is valued. Reason and virtue “stand in the middle” (Lat. in medio stat virtus):

Neither rash nor cowardly, but courageous.

However, an arguer who chooses the middle ground risks being stigmatized as indecisive, or unwilling to examine the arguments of the parties in detail: “let’s stop the discussion, meet in the middle and split the difference”.
The case of Solomon’s judgment shows that some issues that cannot be so easily divided.

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[1] Latin. argument ad temperentiam, lat. temperentia, “moderation, measure, restraint”
[2] Quoted from François René de Châteaubriand, Le Génie du christianisme. Part 3, Book 1, Chapter 6. Tours: Mame, 1877, p. 194-195.

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METONYMY – SYNECDOCHE

Traditionally, the field of rhetoric has been divided into two main areas, one dealing with tropes and figures, and the other deals with argumentation schemes. Semantic and ornamental rhetoric is opposed to cognitive and functional rhetoric. However, this distinction can be misleading.

1. Tropes

A trope is defined as an operation “by which a word is given a meaning that is not exactly its proper meaning” (Dumarsais [1730], p. 69). This definition can be paralleled by that of an argument, which is defined as an operation “by which a proposition (the conclusion) is given a belief value that is not exactly the proper belief value of that proposition.”

The linguistic mechanisms involved in trope referential shifts bear a significant resemblance to those involved in arguments. In both cases, the problem is one of transmission. In the case of a trope, the meaning of one word is transferred to another. In argument, the belief value of one proposition is transferred to another. The rules of transfer are similar in both cases.

Metaphor, irony, metonymy and synecdoche considered the four “master tropes” (Burke, 1945), are all relevant to the study of argumentation, albeit in quite different ways.

2. Metonymy

2.1 Metonymy as a Trope

Consider the classic example of metonymy, “The pen is mightier than the sword. » A pen is “an instrument for writing or drawing with ink…” (MW, Pen), and a sword is “a weapon with a long metal blade and a handle with a hand guard…” (OD, Sword). » In the quoted proverb, the words pen and sword are used metonymically for “words, thoughts and discourse, verbal communication…” and “physical violence, military force…” respectively. The overall meaning is that “violence does not prevail over reasoned discourse.”

The semantic scheme of metonymy can be described as follows.

— There is a word {S / C1}, whose signifier is S and whose content is C1, pen/“writing instrument.”
— The signifier S is used metonymically to denote the content C0, pen/“discourse.”
— This transfer of meaning operates under the condition that it has a backing, expressed by a law of transition such as “C0 is in some relation of contiguity with C1.” In this case, “the pen is the instrument with which discourse is produced.”

Subtypes of metonymic schemes are classified according to the nature of the connection between the contents of C0 and C1. For example:

— Effect for cause, “Death is in the meadow.”
— Instrument for agent, “She is the pen of the president.”
— Agent (or “cause”) for the work produced: “A new Shakespeare has just come out.”
— Instrument for object produced: “The pen is mightier…”
— Name of the place where the object is made for the object itself, etc. “I feel like cognac.”
— Relevant current planned action for a participant: “Sir, your rendezvous just left.”

2.2 Metonymic and argumentative transfer

Figures and arguments require similar support. This can be illustrated by the following examples.

The effect for cause metonymy: “Death is in the meadow”[1] means that phytosanitary products (Ph)  (pesticides, also called plant protection products) used in agriculture can cause death (D). The word (signifier) designating the effect (D) now designates (refers to) its cause (Ph).

In the effect-to-cause argument, the truth-value predicated on the effect is transferred back to the cause, or a set of causes:

Metals expand when heated.

The metal expanded (is an established fact), SO it was heated (is an established fact)

The tire exploded, so [either C1, or C2, or…] (id.); see case-by-Case

The effect-to-cause argument transfers the predicate “— is an established fact” from the effect to the cause.

The word death refers to death. In the case of metonymy, its referential domain is extended to include the cause of death, “death refers to phytosanitary products.”
In our standard view of reference, a word refers to an object. In fact, it refers centrally to an object, and to objects that are contextually related to it. In other words, the word (signifier) actually refers to any element belonging to the semantic cluster of these objects.
Ordinary language clearly expresses this fact:

(1) He has a fever, so he has an infection.
(2) Give him an antibiotic, it will reduce the fever.

The antibiotic actually acts on the infection;  so, the fever in (2) is an effect-for-cause metonymic designation of the infection. On the other hand, fever is a natural sign of an infection: “He has a fever, which means he has an infection”: this is exactly what the metonymic analysis says.

Metonymy designating a work by the name of its author corresponds to an argument that transfers a judgment about the author to the work: “The author of this book supported the former dictator.”
Perelman (1952) studied the mechanisms of this metonymic transfer from the person to his or her actions and products from an argumentative point of view.

3. Synecdoche

As the example of the rendezvous above  in §1 shows, metonymic naming can operate on any pair of strongly connected objects, where this connection may be accidental (local), or essential. Synecdoche operates on constituent parts of a whole. The term “metonymy” is sometimes used to refer to both metonymy and synecdoche.

3.1 “Part–Whole” and “Whole–Part” Relations

For instance, a roof is a component of a house. In “looking for a roof”, roof means “house”, houses being considered prototypical shelters.

Part–whole arguments transfer the predicate associated with the part to the whole. These arguments are supported by the same kind of connection, see composition and division.

The roof is in bad condition, so the house must not be well maintained.

3.2 Genus for Species and Species for Genus

In a synecdoche of genus for species, the name of the genus is used to refer to one of its species. The name of the genus replaces the name of the species. For example, “the animal” replaces “the lion.” This use is most common in textual co-reference.

We saw a lion. The poor beast was thin and sick.

Based on the same relationship, the argument by the genus attaches the predicates of the genus to the species, see taxonomy and category; categorization:

This is a lion, therefore it is an animal, and therefore, it is mortal.

4. The tree and its fruits

The following argument was made in defense of Paul Touvier, the leader of the pro-Nazi militia in Lyon, France, during the Nazi occupation. He was sentenced to death after the war, he escaped and remained in hiding for 25 years. The following is an excerpt from a letter written by the Rev. Blaise Arminjon, S.J., to the then president of France on December 5, 1970, in support of Paul Touvier’s petition for clemency:

How can we to believe that he [Touvier] is a “criminal”, or a “bad Frenchman”, when his conduct for twenty-five years, and the education he has given his children, have been so admirable? A tree is known by its fruits.[2]

A Toulminian analysis can be applied to this passage, the warrant for which is provided by the biblical topos, “A tree is known by its fruits.”

For a good tree does not bear bad fruit, nor does a bad tree bear good fruit.
Luke 6:43-45, New King James Version.

This transitional law also permits an interpretation based on a metonymy. Speaking of “the [admirable] conduct of Touvier for twenty-five years” is a metonymic reference to Touvier metonymically. Saying that “the education that Touvier gave his children is admirable” spreads metonymically to the agent, Touvier, who is necessarily equally admirable.

The same phenomenon can be equally expressed through a trope or an argument, both implement the same kind of rationality.

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[1] La Mort est dans le pré, youtube.com/watch?v=nAMARhJoFaQ
[2] Quoted in René Rémond & al,, Paul Touvier et l’Eglise [Paul Touvier and the Church], Paris, Fayard, 1992, p. 164.

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