Aristotle considers composition or “combination of words” and division as verbal fallacies, that is fallacies of words, as opposed to fallacies of things or method, S. Fallacies 2. They are discussed in the Sophistical Refutations (RS 4) and in the Rhetoric (II, 24, 1401a20 – 1402b5; RR p. 128).

The label argumentation by division is sometimes used to refer to case-by-case argumentation, S. Case-by-Case.

1. Grammar of composition and division

Composition and division involve the conjunction and that can coordinate:

— Phrases:

(1) Peter and Paul came.                   (No and N1) + Verb
(2) Peter smoked and prayed.            No + (V1 and V2)

— Statements:

(3) Peter came and Paul came.            (N + V1) and (N1 + V2)
(4) Peter smoked and Peter prayed.     (N + V1) and (N1 + V2)

In Aristotelian logical-grammatical terminology:

(3) and (4) are obtained by division respectively from (1) and (2).
(1) and (2) are obtained by composition respectively from (3) and (4).

The compound and divided statements are sometimes semantically equivalent and sometimes not.

(i) Equivalent — (1) and (3) on the one hand, (2) and (4) on the other hand are roughly equivalent, although it seems that (1), not (3), implies that Peter and Paul came together. In this case, composition and division are possible, and the coordination is used simply to avoid repetition.

(ii) Not equivalent — sometimes phrase coordination (composed statement) is not equivalent to sentence coordination (divided statement). The semantic phenomena involved are of very different types.

Peter got married and Mary got married.
≠ Peter and Mary married.

If Peter and Mary are brother and sister, the custom being what it is, the composition is unambiguous. Without such information, the composition introduces an ambiguity.

The operation of division can produce a meaningless discourse:

The flag is red and black.
* The flag is red and the flag is black.

B is between A and C.
* B is between A and B is between C.

Sometimes a syntactic operation applied to a statement produces a paraphrase of this statement. At other time, the same operation applied to another statement having apparently the same structure as the first one produces a statement that has no meaning, or whose meaning and truth conditions entirely differ from those of the original statement.

2. Aristotelian logic of composition and division

The study of paraphrastic systems is a classical object of syntactic theory. Aristotelian logic considers composition and division as a problem in logic. As Hintikka (1987) has repeatedly pointed out, the Aristotelian notion of fallacy is dialogical, S. Fallacy (I). The fallacious maneuver throws the interlocutor into confusion, and this is precisely what happens with composition and division. The following case is one of the oldest and most famous illustrations of the fallacy of composition:

This dog is your dog (is yours); and this dog is a father (of several puppies).
So this dog is your father and you are the brother of the puppies.

The interlocutor is disoriented, and everyone finds that very funny (Plato, Euth., XXIV, 298a-299d, pp. 141-142). S. Sophism.

Aristotle analyzes this kind of sophistical and sophisticated problem in the Sophistical Refutations and in the Rhetoric under the heading of “paralogism of composition and division”. He shows that the issue extends to a variety of discursive phenomena, under what conditions can judgments made on the basis of isolated statements be “composed” into a discourse of connected statements? The discussion is illustrated by several examples showing the full scope of the interpretation issues that are raised, even if their wording may seem contrived.

(i) Consider the statement: “it is possible to write while not writing” (RS, 4); it can be interpreted in two ways:

— Interpretation 1 composes the meaning: “one can at the same time write and not write” (ibid.), in the sense of: “one can (write and not write)”. The composition is misleading and absurd.
— Interpretation 2 divides the meaning; when one does not write one still retains the capacity to write, meaning: “one can know how to write, while not writing”, which is correct. Under certain circumstances, a person who can write cannot physically do so, for example if one’s hands are tied. The modal power is ambiguous between “having the capacity to” and “having the possibility to exercise that capacity”.

 (ii) The following example also uses the modal can, this time in its relation to time. Consider the statement “if you can carry one thing, you can carry several” (RS, 4, 166a30: 11):

(1) (I can carry the table) and (I can carry the cabinet)

Therefore, by composition of the two statements into one:

(2) I can carry (the table along with the cabinet)

Which is not necessarily the case.

(iii) The fallacy of division is illustrated by the example “five is equal to three and two” (after RS, 4, 166a30, p.12):

— Interpretation (1) divides meaning, that is, it decomposes the utterance into two coordinated propositions, which is both absurd and fallacious:

(Five is equal to three) and (five is equal to two)

— Interpretation (2) composes the meaning, which is correct:

Five is equal to (three and two)

In the Rhetoric, the notion of composition is discussed with several examples that clearly show the relevance of the issue for argumentation. The argument by composition and division “[asserts] of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole” (Rhet, II, 24, 1401a20-30; RR, pp. 381), which makes it possible to present things from quite different angles. This technique of argumentation involves statements constructed around appreciative and modal predicates such as:

— is good; — is just; — is able to —; — can —;
— knows —; — said.

The following example is taken from Sophocles play, Electra. Clytemnestra killed her husband, Agamemnon. Then their son Orestes kills his mother to avenge his father. Was Orestes morally and legally entitled to do this?

“‘T’is right that she who slays her lord should die’; ‘it is right too, that the son should avenge his father’. Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.” Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. (Rhet., II. 24, 1401a35-b5, RR, 383).

Orestes justifies what he did, arguing that his two actions can be composed. His accuser rejects the composition.

This technique of decomposing a doubtful action into a series of commendable, or at least innocent, acts is arguably very productive. Stealing is just taking the bag that is there, taking it somewhere else, and failing to put it back in the same place. The division blocks the overall assessment.

A second example clearly shows that fallacy and argument are two sides of the same coin:

If a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme is refutative; put as follows, demonstrative “for one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things”. The whole line of argument is fallacious. (Rhet., Ii. 24, 1401a30, RR p.381-383)

Abstainers start from an agreement upon the fact that “having a lot of drinks makes you sick”, and divide: “so having a drink makes you sick”. Permissive people follow the other line: “having a drink is good for health”, and proceed by composition. Abstainers argue by division, and this is considered to be fallacious by permissive individuals. Permissive individuals argue by composition, and this is considered to be fallacious by abstainers.

3. Whole and parts argument

The two labels “composition and division” and “part and whole” are in practice considered equivalent (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009).

3.1 Whole to parts and division

The argument based on the whole assigns to each of its parts a property evidenced on the whole:

If the whole is P, then each of its parts must be P.

If the country is rich, each of its regions (inhabitants…) must be rich.
Americans are rich, so he is rich; let’s ransom him!

The problem faced by whole to parts arguments mirrors that of the argument by division: can the property evidenced on the whole be transferred to each of its parts?

3.2 Parts to whole and composition

The argument based on the parts assigns to the whole they make up the properties evidenced on each of its parts:

If every part of a whole is P, then the whole is P.
If every player is good, then the team is good (?).

The problem faced by parts to whole arguments mirrors that of the argument by composition: is the property evidenced by each part also evidenced by the whole?

4. Complex wholes and emerging properties

Accidental or Mechanical wholes are composed of a set of disconnected objects in a relation of neighborhood. Essential or complex wholes are made up of the conjunction of the parts plus some emerging extra properties, which distinguishes them from an inert juxtaposition of components. The degree of complexity of the whole is superior to the simple arithmetical addition of its parts. This process is referred to as a composition effect. The case of the superiority of the group over the individual alleged by Aristotle is an example of such an effect, S. Ad populum.

This issue is also found in rhetoric, where a distinction is made between metonymy and synecdoche, the first focusing upon neighborhood relations and the second on relations between a complex whole and its parts.

Argument a completudine; Lat. completudo, “completeness”.

The evolution of society can be manifested by the emergence of legal cases that do not find clear solutions in the existing system of laws, whether in national, international or human rights legislations (Tarello 1972, quoted in Perelman 1977, p. 55).
Nonetheless, the judge is under an obligation to judge, that is, he or she must pass a sentence upon all the cases before him or her, S.. Silence. That is to say, he or she cannot refuse to make a decision upon a case by arguing that there is no law applicable to that case, or that no interpretation of an existing law can settle it.
In other words, the principle of completeness assumes that the existing system of law, duly interpreted, can qualify all and any human act as permitted, tolerated, or prohibited.

Meta-principles such as the following complement the system of laws:

In civil matters, in the absence of specific law, the judge is obliged to proceed in accordance with equity. To decide according to equity, he must call on natural law and on reason, or on the usages received, when the primitive law is silent.
Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, [Concordance between the Foreign Civil Code and the Napoléon Code], 1856.[1]

The argument of completeness is parallel to the topos of the impotent legislator, the nature of things rendering the application of the law impossible, S. Weight of Circumstances.

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[1] Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, Concordance entre les codes civils étrangers et le Code Napoléon, 2^nd ed. t. II. Paris: Cotillon, 1856. P. 460.

Comparison is the process of establishing whether or not two individuals, two situations, two systems… present or not some similarities or analogies. A process of comparison is involved in many argumentative activities, such that the label argument by comparison (a comparatione) is used with different meanings.
These meanings primarily correspond with the argument a fortiori, the arguments a pari, by analogy, by example or exemplum.

Comparison and categorization — Comparison is the basis for the categorization-nomination process; the individual to categorize is compared either with a known individual belonging to the category, or with the prototypical member defining the category. S. Justice

Intra-categorical comparison — Two beings belonging to the same category are identical from the point of view of this category. Despite this, they can still be compared in terms of:

— their non-categorical properties; S. Intra-categorical analogy.

— their position relative to a prototypical subcategory of this category. A rat and a whale, for example, are identical insofar as both are mammals; considering that the cow is a prototypical mammal, we can say that a rat, being nearer to a cow than to a whale, is “more” a mammal than a whale.

— Hierarchized categories contain by definition built-in comparisons: Bachelor, Master, and Doctorate are three kinds of academic degrees, listed by ascending order. They can enter in an a fortiori argument.

Comparison and structural analogy — A process of comparison is also involved in establishing a structural analogy.

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The expression commonplace corresponds to the Latin locus communis, which translates the Greek topos.

— Often reduced to place (locus, pl. loci), an inferential common place is an inferential topic, or argumentation scheme.

— A substantial common place is an endoxon, a formulary expression of a common thought. Traditional rhetorical invention specialized in the argumentative use of substantial common places.

1. Topical questions: An ontology for doxa-based argumentation

Everyday argumentation is based on an ontology organizing the world of events according to the following broad parameters:

Person, Action, Time, Place, Manner, Cause or Reason.

These dimensions mirror the system of sentence complementation:

Yesterday,     in Philadelphia,      with great difficulty
Time              Place                        Manner

Peter                     met Paul     to settle their business
Focus person      Action        Cause, Reason

The corresponding interrogative words guide the methodical procedure to follow in order to gather and organize information about an event:

Who? What? When? Where? How? Why?

[Interrogative words] have already been recognized in various languages ​​for different purposes: for speculative purposes, in the Latin of the scholastics: cur?, quomodo?, quando? [why? how? when?]; or for military purposes in German, where the tetralogy Wer? Wo? Wann? Wie? is taught to all military recruits as an information framework that any scout on a reconnaissance mission must be capable of providing and reporting back to his superiors. (Tesnière 1959, p. 194)

These common basic dimensions of reality are rubric or “heads of chapters”, generating more or less general ideas and formulas. Their application is extremely general. They might be used to frame a description or narration of any kind, a scout report, a newspaper article, or an event-based essay. Such questions also guide moral evaluation, for example an action such as “having carnal intercourse” will be evaluated as shameful if that if was “with forbidden persons” (With Whom?), or “at wrong times” (When?) or “in wrong place” (When?) (Aristotle, 1383b 15-20; RR p. 279).

When attached to a particular field, these ontological parameters are expressed using words which have a full lexical meaning. For example, the classical guide to political decisions includes questions such as: “Honorable? Will the proposed measure turn out honorable, or embarrassing for us? S. Political Arguments: Two collections

These questions governing the quest for information about a given issue or event, form the very foundation of rhetorical argumentation. They might be answered a posteriori, that is after a full documented inquiry into the specificities of the case. They can also be answered a priori, on the basis of endoxa, that is pre-conceived ideas. The undue prominence given to stereotyped ideas in the construction of arguments, leads to the strong and indignant criticism of rhetoric as a fallacious verbiage, S. Ornamental fallacy?

2. The method: stereotyped portrait-based argumentation

Consider the argumentative question “Has Mr. So and So committed this hideous murder?”

— The question Who? is applied to the defendant: “Who is this Mr. So-and-So?”. The sub-topos Which nation? provides the categorizing information: “Mr. So-and-so is Syldavian”, and likewise for all questions parameterizing the topical person.

— Endoxon on the Syldavians: to the category Syldavian is attached a set of defining endoxical predicates such as “the Syldavians are like that”, each having a specific argumentative orientation:

the Syldavians are peaceful / bloodthirsty people.

These predicates provide an endoxic encyclopedic-semantic definition of the Syldavian.

— The instantiation of the endoxic definition backs the conclusion:

the guilt of Mr. So-and-So is likely / unlikely.

Other topical questions regarding the same Mr. So-and-So will provide other, possibly contradictory, orientations. Such questions thereby play a role in the creation or dismissal of inculpations or exculpations, shifting the burden of proof on the whim of pre-established judgments, regardless of the outcome of any detailed investigation of the matter.

3. Common place based portrayal in literature and argumentation

Each and every one of these questions can itself become the source of sub-questions, and these can be developed considerably, to produce a detailed grid of investigation. The results yielded via this technique depend entirely on the method of investigation used to answer the question; an armchair argument for which the ‘research’ is based on common sense and common places will deliver commonplace conclusions.

The richest set of detailed questions concerns the key element of these rhetorical scenarios, that being the person (Who?). Their application produces a portrait of this person, which can be taken as a literary feat (if successful), and a base for argumentative categorizing inferences.

These commonplaces serve as ready-made arguments, from which the investigating party may select the most appropriate, depending on his or her aims.

Quintilian identified the following doxically relevant facets of a person in order to compound the a priori rhetorical representation of a person, independently of any concrete information about the action under discussion.

— “Birth, for people are mostly thought similar in character to their fathers and forefathers, and sometimes derive from their origin motives for living an honorable or dishonorable life” (IO, V, 10, 24 ).

To answer the sub-question “Birth?” the inquiry about the family collects information such as “he is from a well-known honorable family”, or “his father was sentenced”. The first information provides arguments allowing for example the application of the rule “like father, like son”, “he is a chip of the old block”, which serves inferences like:

He made a mistake, but his family affords all the necessary guarantees; good blood cannot lie, he deserves a second chance.

The second information leads to different conclusions:

The father was sentenced, so the son has a heavy inheritance. Bring me more information about him!

The commonplace “the miser’s son is a spendthrift” opposes the preceding one. If the father has a vice, the doxa now credits the son not of the corresponding virtue, but either of the same vice or an opposite vice.

—  “Nation?” (ibid.) and “Country?” (id., 25). The answers will introduce national stereotypes: “if he is a Spanish, he is proud, if he is British, he is phlegmatic”. These conclusions, “he is proud, he is phlegmatic”, may prove useful for the discussion to come “he is Spanish, so he is proud, so he certainly strongly reacted to this personal attack”.

— “Sex, for you would more readily believe a charge of robbery with regard to a man, and poisoning with regard to a woman” (ibid.) The prejudiced investigator will follow the commonplace suggestion: in case of poisoning, he will tend to look for a woman. A French book, “The Famous Poisoners” [Les Empoisonneuses Célèbres] is exclusively dedicated to famous female poisoners.

—  “Age?”, “Education?”, “Bodily constitution, for beauty is often drawn into an argument for libertinism, and strength for insolence, and the contrary qualities for contrary conduct” (id., 25-26). In other words, “he is handsome, he must be a debauchee” is more probable than “he is handsome, therefore he must live an austere life”. If A is stronger than B, then “A is more aggressive than B” is likely, and therefore, if A and B had a row, “certainly, A attacked B”, in other words, A bears the burden of proof. These inferences can be turned around by application of the paradox of plausibility: “actually, B must have attacked A, because he knew that the appearances were against A”.

— “Fortune, for the same charge is not equally credible in reference to a rich and a poor man, in reference to one who is surrounded with relations, friends and clients, and one who is destitute of all such support” (id., 26). The commonplaces associated with social roles and positions come under this heading. An elderly man from the countryside, sitting on a bench in the setting sun, will certainly deliver some deep and true thought about the current state of affairs, S. Rich and Poor.

— “Natural disposition, for avarice, passionateness, sensibility, cruelty, austerity, and other similar affections of the mind, frequently either cause credit to be given to an accusation or to be withheld from it” (id., 27): “the assassination was committed in a particularly cruel manner, Peter is cruel, therefore he is the murderer’, S. Circumstances.

— “Manner of living, for it is often a matter of inquiry whether a person is luxurious, or parsimonious, or mean” (ibid.).

The following questions refer to arguments based on desires and motives_ (ibid.):

— “What a person affects, whether he would wish to appear rich or eloquent, just or powerful” (id., 28).

— “Previous doings and sayings” (ibid.), used to find motives and precedents.

— “Commotion of the mind, […] a temporary excitement of the feelings, as anger, or fear” (ibid.), S. Emotions.

— “Designs” (id., 29)

This set of commonplaces underlies portraits such as:

A man in his thirties, Canadian, West Coast, sporty, from a well-known and respected family, has never completed his law education, very kind with his neighbors, living a conventional life, works in a pharmacy, with limited prospect for the future…

This portrait can be read as an (unsuccessful) literary attempt, a police form, etc. In all cases, it is a stock of premises. Doxa-based argumentation is based on pieces of information like “the man is X”, draws on the stereotyped categories attached to Xs, “the X are like that”, and concludes that “the man is like that”, S. Categorization; Definition.

4. The literature of characters

This topology has a derived argumentative function and a direct aesthetic-cognitive function. It is linked to the question of the socio-linguistic or doxical beliefs, that is to the prejudiced identity of the person. It is antagonistic with a problematic of identity as deep being, the psychological nucleus of the person. Providing a technique for the construction of the portrait, it thus establishes a bridge between argumentation and literature through the genre of “Characters”, as those of the Greek Theophrastus, and, more generally, the classical literature of portraits and mores.

We are no longer in the realm of ethos as an autofiction, but in the pure world of the ethopoeia, that is to say, of the fictional representation of a “character”, such as “the Miser” or “the Garrulous person” via his or her typical manners, discourse and actions. Such de-contextualized portraits can be used as authorized and respectable sources about the character which they are used to depict, as prolegomena to the exercise of the argumentation in situation, where they will be applied to a particular person.

Historically, this is part of a coherent educative, esthetic and cognitive process of controlled, systematic writing and thinking, the very antithesis of any uncontrolled automatic writing.

5. “This noxious fertility of common thoughts” (Port-Royal)

When based exclusively on common knowledge, that is language associations and doxa-based knowledge, this technique makes it possible to quickly compose fairly convincing, true-to-life pictures of things and events. Critically, these are justifiably very difficult to rebut, as they are the mere expression of shared preconstructed knowledge. The vicious circle between persuader and persuadee is an example of such a situation, S. Persuasion. Such compositions are not scientific characterizations of the individual, as can be developed in psychology or philosophy, but the perfect stronghold for all positive or negative social prejudices. Port-Royal has severely condemned this “noxious fertility of common thoughts”:

Now, so far is it from being useful to obtain this sort of abundance, that there is nothing which more depraves the judgment, nothing which more chokes up good seed, than a crowd of noxious weeds; nothing renders a mind more barren of just and weighty thoughts than this noxious fertility of common thoughts. The mind is accustomed to this facility, and no longer makes any effort to find appropriate, special and natural reasons, which can only be discovered by an attentive consideration of the subject. (Arnauld, Nicole, [1662], III, XVII; p. 235)

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1. Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, A Treatise on Argumentation — The New Rhetoric, 1958

In the New Rhetoric — A Treatise on Argumentation (1958), Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca propose a sophisticated typology of arguments. Some twenty years later, in The Rhetorical Empire [L’Empire Rhétorique, 1977], Perelman takes up the essential elements of the 1958 typology, making some significant simplifications. In Juridical Logic [Logique Juridique, 1979] he presents a specific set of juridical arguments.

1.1 The typology of the Treatise

According to Conley, the Treatise contains “more than eighty different forms of argumentation, and illuminating remarks on more than sixty-five figures” (1984, p. 180-181), and contrasts these achievements with “Toulmin’s renegade logic” (ibid.).

The “forms of argumentation” are described in the third part of the Treatise, entitled “Techniques of argumentation”. They are presented as a set of “association techniques”, (Chap. 1 to 3), along with two other kinds of technique, the “dissociation technique” (Chap. 4), and the “Interaction of arguments” (Chap. 5). This latter Chapter exposes a set of disposition techniques, and discusses the relative persuasive effects of the various arrangements of arguments in a speech, that is, issues in classical “dispositio”.

1.2 The association techniques

The association techniques correspond to the classical argument schemes. They are classified under three categories:

Chap. 1. Quasi-logical arguments
Chap. 2. Arguments based on the structure of reality
Chap. 3. The relations establishing the structure of reality

“Quasi-logical arguments” (§46-59)

This category lists arguments which “lay claim to a certain power of conviction in the degree that they claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics” (p. 192); this definition should be brought closer to the definition of a fallacious argument as “one that seems to be valid but is not so.” (Hamblin 1970, p. 12), S. Fallacies (1). The category covers the following argument schemes:

• • • 46-49 Contradiction and incompatibility
    • 50 Identity and definition
    • 51 Analyticity, analysis and tautology
    • 52 The rule of justice
    • 53 Arguments of reciprocity
    • 54 Arguments by transitivity
    • 55 Inclusions of the part in the whole
    • 56 Division of the whole into its parts
    • 57 Arguments by comparison
    • 58 Argumentation by sacrifice
    • 59 Probabilities

In The Rhetorical Empire, the Chapter on “Quasi-Logical Arguments” essentially recapitulates the class as presented in the Treatise.

“Arguments based on the structure of reality” (§60-77)

From a linguistic point of view, he broad label “argument based on the structure of reality” may be interpreted as referring to arguments which exploit syntagmatic, or metonymic relations. This category in fact lists arguments “alleged to be in agreement with the very nature of things” (p. 191); these arguments “make use of [the structure of reality] to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261). The “causal link” and the “relation of succession” are fundamental to this category.

Arguments within this category include:

• • • 61-63 “Causal link”, “Pragmatic argument”
    • 63-73 discuss arguments where the person is considered to be a causal agent, such as:
      • • 64-68 “Ends and means”, among which:
        • 65 “Argument of waste”
        • 66 “The Argument of direction”
        • 68-73 “The Person and his acts”, among which:
        • 70 “Argument from authority”
        • 73 “The Group and its members”
    • 74-75 extend the notion of “relation of coexistence” to:
    • 74 “Act and essence”
    • 75 “The symbolic relation”
    • 76-77 present “more complex”, second level arguments:
    • 74 “Double hierarchy”
    • 75 “Differences of degree and of order”

The Rhetorical Empire, Chapter VIII, recapitulates the same class of arguments based on the structure of reality under different groupings:

— Relations of succession
— Relations of coexistence
— The Symbolic relation, the double hierarchy argument, argument about the differences of order.

“Relations establishing the structure of reality” §78-88

The inclusive label “Relations establishing the structure of reality” might be interpreted as referring to a set of arguments exploiting paradigmatic or metaphoric relations. This category of relations is defined on the basis of two of its prototypical members, arguments from “the particular case”, and “arguments by analogy”. The following argument schemes come under this category:

• • 78 “Argumentation by example”
  • 79 “Illustration”
  • 80-81 “Model and anti-model”
  • 82-87, On analogy
  • 87-88, On metaphor.

In the Rhetorical Empire, the title “establishing the structure of reality” is not retained; its contents are grouped under two distinct chapters:

Chap. IX, Arguments by example, illustration and model
Chap. X, Analogy and metaphor

This can be construed as a waiver of the distinction between arguments “establishing” the structure of reality, and those “based on” the structure of reality.

It might, however, also be argued that this couple of concepts does not characterize causal arguments in opposition to analogical ones, but indeed applies to both argument schemes. The successful use of an argument “based on” authority, for example, presupposes that the invoked authority has been previously “established”. This distinction is especially helpful in the case of arguments from authority, definition, causality and analogy.

1.3 The dissociation techniques

The basic difference between association and dissociation techniques is that the former operate on judgments; they “establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261); they correspond to argument schemes. In contrast, dissociation techniques operate on “concepts” (p. 411; my emphasis): “[they] are mainly characterized by the modifications which they introduce into notions, since they aim less at using the accepted language than at moving towards a new formulation” (p. 191-192), S. Dissociation, Distinguo; Persuasive Definition.

The two terms of the opposition association / dissociation are thus of a very different nature.

2. Toulmin, Rieke, Janik, An introduction to reasoning (1984)


Toulmin, Rieke, Janik consider nine «forms of reasoning» «most frequently to be met with in practical situations «   (1984, p. 147-155 ; p. 155).

1. analogy 2. generalization 3. sign 4. cause

5. authority 6. dilemma 7 classification 8. opposites 9. degree

In the argument from degree, « the different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155)

Like the following one, this restricted group of argumentative schemes has a family resemblance with the classical lists derived from Cicero, S. Collections 2.

3. Kienpointner, Alltagslogik [Everyday Logic] 1992.

Kienpointner (1992, p. 231-402) synthetizes six contemporary typologies (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] ; Toulmin, Rieke, Janik 1984 ; Govier 1987; Schellens 1987; van Eemeren, Kruiger 1987; Benoit, Lindsey 1987), summarized in the following table (1992, p. 246):

3.1 Rule-using argument schemes

Classificatory Schemes

Definition
Genus – Species
Part – Whole

Comparison Schemes

Equivalence
Resemblance
Difference
A fortiori

Opposition Schemes

Contradictories
Contraries
Relative terms
Incompatibility

Causal Schemes

Cause – Effect
Consequences
Reason
Means – End

3.2 Rule-establishing argument schemes

Argumentation by example
Inductive argumentation

3.3 Other schemes

Argument by example, illustrative argumentation
Arg. by analogy
Arg. by authority

4. Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation schemes, 2008.

Walton, Reed and Macagno present an extensive and exhaustive investigation including “a user’s compendium of argumentation schemes” (2008, p. 308-346).

The schemes are consistently designated as argument schemes, with the exception of (19), (20), (21), referred to as argumentation from values, from sacrifice, from the group and its members.

The following list mentions only the main schemes; they may include subtypes.

(1) Authorities: position, expertise, testimony, number (p. 309-314)

1. 1. 1. Argument from position to know
      2. Arg. from expert opinion
      3. Arg. from witness testimony
      4. Arg. from popular opinion, ad populum
      5. Arg. from popular practice.

Arguments (4) are drawn from what people generally believe, whereas arguments (5) refer to what people generally do.

(2) Example, analogy (p. 315-316)

1. 1. 6. Argument from example
      7. Arg. from analogy
      8. Practical reasoning from analogy

Arguments (7) concern beliefs; arguments (8) concern ways to do things.

(3) Composition and division (p. 316-317)

1. 1. 9. Argument from composition
      10. Arg. from division

(4 )Negation, opposition (p. 317-318)

1. 1. 11. Arg. from opposition (contradictory, contrary, converse, incompatible)
      12. Rhetorical argument from opposition

Negation-based argumentation schemes can be logically valid or not; they are frequently not well defined.

(5) Alternative (p. 318-319)

1. 1. 13. Arg. from alternatives

This scheme concludes with the elimination of a member of an alternative due to the requirement of the other member. It corresponds to a case-by-case argument between two cases.

4.6 Classification (p. 319-320)

1. 1. 14. Arg. from verbal classification

“for all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having property G.”

Set F is included in set G.

1. 1. 15. Arg. from definition to verbal classification

If an individual a is defined (categorized) as a D, and if Ds generally have property P, then a has property P.

1. 1. 16. Arg. from vagueness of a verbal classification
      17. Arg. from arbitrariness of a verbal classification

Schemes 16. and 17. conclude with the rejection of an argument as “too vague” or “too arbitrarily defined” in some aspects. These cases can also be seen as an application of Grice’s Cooperation Principle.

(7) Persons, values, actions and sacrifice (p. 321-327)

1. 1. 18. Argument from interaction of act and person
      19. Arg. from values
      20. Arg. from sacrifice
      21. Arg. from the group and its members

These schemes consider a group whose members are supposed to share quality Q, and attribute this quality to any member of the group. A member of a racist association can legitimately be supposed to be racist.

Not all characteristics of its members can be composed and attributed to the group as such; a large set is not necessarily composed of large elements.

1. 1. 22. Practical reasoning
      23. Two-person practical reasoning

If one pursues an end, then one must accept the means and steps necessary to attain it.

1. 1. 24. Argument from waste
      25. Arg. from sunk costs

Pages 10-11 (id.) consider as synonyms the labels argument from waste, (with reference to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca), and argument from sunk costs. Nonetheless, they are discussed here as two separate entries.

(8) Ignorance (p. 327-328)

1. 1. 26. Arg. from ignorance
      27. Epistemic argument from ignorance

This argument covers the case “if it were true, the newspapers would certainly speak of it” (id., p. 99)

(9) Cause, effect; abduction; consequence (p. 328-333)

1. 1. 28. Argument from cause to effect
      29. Arg. from correlation to cause
      30. Argument from sign
      31. Abductive argumentation scheme
      32. Argument from evidence to a hypothesis
      33. Arg. from consequences
      34. Pragmatic argument from alternatives

Scheme (34) is a special case of (33), the choice is between doing/not doing something and suffering/not suffering negative consequences.

(10) Arguments from threat, fear, danger (p. 333-335)

1. 1. 35. Argument from threat
      36. Arg. from fear appeal
      37. Arg. from danger appeal

Schemes (35), (36), (37) schematize different strategies of fear.

1. 1. 38. Arg. from need for help
      39. Arg. from distress

(11) Commitments, ethos, ad hominem (p. 335-339)

40. Arg. from commitment
41. Ethotic argument
42. Generic ad hominem
43. Pragmatic inconsistency
44. Argument from inconsistent commitment
45. Circumstantial ad hominem

Scheme (44) draws a distinction between committed and not really so.

Schemes (43) and (45) express forms of contradictions between personal commitments and actions.

1. 1. 46. Argument from bias
      47. Bias ad hominem

Schemes (46) and (47) are closely related. According to (46), argument from bias: “L is biased, so the conclusions are suspect”. According to (47), “bias ad hominem”: “L is biased, so I do not trust him”. Biases are relative to a domain, but it is convenient to consider that the whole personality is biased; L has a “false mind”.

(12) Gradualism; slippery slope (p. 339-341)

1. 1. 48. Argument from gradualism

The comments (id. p. 114-115), show that this scheme can be likened to the slippery slope forms, (49) to (53). It expresses the sorite paradox, also mentioned in (52): “If you remove a grain from a pile of grains, you always have a heap; if you remove another grain, you still have a heap … up to what extent?”

1. 1. 49. Slippery slope argument
      50. Precedent slippery slope argument

The slippery slope argument is used to reject an exceptional treatment, on the ground that this exception would open a line of precedents leading to something unacceptable.

1. 1. 51. Sorites slippery slope argument
      52. Verbal slippery slope argument

The slippery slope principle is used to reject the assignment of a property to an object because this property is transmitted by contiguity up to an object that obviously does not or should not possess it. This is a variety of argument to the absurd, based on a demonstration by recurrence.

1. 1. 53. Full slippery slope argument

(13) Rules, exceptions, precedent (p. 342-345)

1. 1. 54. Argument for constitutive-rule claim

Scheme (54) relates to rules of language (synonymy) and to principles of categorization in institutionally codified languages (“D counts as W”).

1. 1. 55. Arg. from rules
      56. Arg. for an exceptional case
      57. Arg. from precedent
      58. Arg. from plea for excuse

Confronted with an exceptional case, one can waive the usual rule (56) or change it (57). Excuses and extenuating circumstances can suspend the rule.

(14) Perception, memory (345-346)

1. 1. 59. Arg. from perception
      60. Arg. from memory

Scheme (59), (60) argue that one can reasonably believe in a given fact on the basis of the perception or memory of this fact.

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1. Scipion Dupleix,
Logic, or the art of speaking and Thinking (1607)
Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Logic for the Dauphin (1677)

These works most probably have no particular historical importance, yet they certainly provide an idea of seventeenth century terminology, clearly akin to the Ciceronian system, S. Collections (2).

As the title suggests, Bossuet’s Logic functions as a pedagogical guide to everyday argumentation: ‘Dauphin’ was the title given to the heir of the French Kingdom.

Table:
— First column, Bossuet, 1677
— Second column, Dupleix, 1607

The order of the lines is that of Bossuet. To facilitate reading, the order of Dupleix was changed, so that the same types of arguments are on the same line; the numbering corresponds to the order in Dupleix’s typology.

Bossuet, 1677	Dupleix, 1607
1. Etymology	3. Etymology
2. Conjugates	4. Conjugata
3. Definition	1. Definition
4. Division
5. Genus	5. Genus and Species
6. Species
7. Property
8. Accident
9. Resemblance 10. Dissemblance	6. Similitude, 7. Dissimilitude
11. Cause	13. Cause
12. Effects	14. Effects
13. What comes before1	10. Antecedents1
14. What accompanies1	9. Adjuncts or conjuncts1
15. What follows1	11. Consequents1
16. Contraries	8. Contraries
17. A repugnantibus3
	12. Repugnants
18. All and parts2	2. Enumeration of the parts2
19. Comparison	15. Comparison with things bigger, equal and smaller
20. Example, or Induction

(¹) S. Circumstances

(²) Bossuet’s topic n°18, “enumeration of the parts” is akin to the topic of definition. For example, what is a “good captain” is defined by enumeration of his relevant qualities: brave, wise, etc. Dupleix’s topic n°2, “all and parts” relates more to composition and division

(³) Dupleix’s topic n°12, from “repugnants” refers to predication: “stone” and “man” are repugnant because “ — be a stone” cannot be said of man — Whereas Bossuet’s topic n°17, “a repugnantibus”, refers to a kind of ad hominem.

Both typologies prioritize arguments exploiting the resources contributing to the definition of a word or a concept, in view of their exploitation in syllogistic reasoning. This enumeration of the core set of arguments is followed by the usual enumeration of arguments schemes drawing on causality, analogy, comparison, peripheral circumstances, opposites and induction. This set will reemerge under a new re-organization in the New Rhetoric.

2. John Locke,
An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)
Wilhelm Leibniz,
New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1765)

In An Essay concerning Human Understanding John Locke briefly mentions “four sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasoning with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition” (IV, 17, “Of Reason”, § 19-22; p. 410). These four arguments are:

— ad verecundiam, S. Ethos; 
Modesty; Authority.
— ad ignorantiam, S. Ignorance.
— ad hominem, S. Ad hominem.
— ad judicium, S. Matter

In his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Leibniz comments on this list, and qualifies Locke’s abrupt and general condemnation by taking into consideration the circumstances; see the above mentioned entries. In addition, Leibniz adds a new kind of argument, the argument ad vertiginem, S. Vertigo.

This brief list has nothing to do with the previous Ciceronian ones; its aim is to oppose the first three fallacious arguments to the last one, the only one to “bring true instruction with it, and advance us in our way to knowledge” (op. cit., p. 411). Reasoning and the methods used in mathematics and experimental sciences are introduced under the heading ad judicium. Contrary to the classical typologies, these arguments are not associated to a logic itself backed by a natural ontology, but rather to the requirements of scientific method, S. Fallacy. We are thus entering a new argumentative world.

3. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of fallacies (1824)

S. Political Arguments.

1. Aristotle, Rhetoric (between 329 & 323 b.c)

1.1 The catalog and its position in the system of Aristotelian proofs

The catalog of the Rhetoric must be viewed within the framework of the Aristotelian typology of the different types of reasoning carried by different types of discourses. In this typology of proofs, rhetorical discourse is opposed to dialectical dialogue and to scientific (syllogistic) discourse. Tricot points out that “syllogism is the genre, scientific (producer of science) [is] the specific difference that separates the scientific demonstration from the dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms” (S. A., I, 2, 15-25; p. 8, note 3). The concept of persuasion in the Rhetoric must be seen in this context: scientific discourse produces apodictic knowledge, dialectical interaction produces probable truth and rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is an element of persuasive discourse. Thus, by its very definition, rhetorical discourse cannot be probative; in short, the phrase “rhetorical evidence persuades” is a pleonasm.

The catalog of arguments is situated as follows in the sub-typology organizing the rhetorical proofs (proof = pistis, “means of pressure”).

 

1.2 Wavering distinctions

Aristotle establishes the following distinctions between the various kinds of rhetorical proof:

	Non-technical
Proof
	Technical	Ethos
		Pathos
		Logos	Enthymeme
			Example
			Sign

 

The proofs attached to the logos are enthymemes, which correspond to deduction; examples^@, which corresponds to induction; and arguments based on natural signs, that are probable or certain. Enthymeme and example are said to be common to the three ancient rhetorical genres (epideictic, deliberative, judicial, S. Rhetoric.) But the articulation of these different kinds of proofs, and the consistency of the text of the Rhetoric such as we read it now, is problematic (McAdon 2003, 2004). The classification of proofs attached to logos has important variants:

(a) “I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes, and nothing else.” (Rhet., I, 2, 8; Fr., p. 19)

(b) “the materials from which the enthymemes are derived […] being probabilities and signs […].” (Ibid I, 2, 14; p. 25)

(c) “Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources — probabilities, examples, necessary signs and signs.” (Ibid II, 15, 8; p. 337)

The example is placed on the same level as the enthymeme in (a), but is considered a form of enthymeme in (c); enthymemes have four sources in (c), and two in (b). Thus, it would be risky to look for a rigorous system in these presentations of rhetorical proof, and the above table must be considered as a simple reminder.

1.3 The topoi of the Rhetoric

The Rhetoric enumerates twenty-eight topoi (topics) or “lines of argument” (Rhet, II, 23), as listed in the following table. An enthymeme is a discursive instance of a topos.

They are designated by their English label, when available, or by a short description, both quoted from Freese (F) or Rhys Roberts (RR).

1. 1. 1. “From opposites” (F). S. Opposites
      2. “From similar inflexions” (F). S. Derived Words
      3. “From relative terms” (F);“upon correlative ideas” (R). S. Correlative Terms
      4. “From the more or less” (F); a fortiori (R). S. A fortiori
      5. “The consideration of time” (F). S. Consistency
      6. “Turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves” (F). S. Ethos; A fortiori.
      7. “From definition” (F). S. Definition
      8. “Topic from the different significations of a word” (F). Aristotle explicitly refers to this topos in his Topics. S. Ambiguity.
      9. “From division” (F). S. Case-by-case
      10. “From induction” (F). S. Induction
      11. “From a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter”, this judgment having been given by one of “those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict” (F). S. Precedent; Ab exemplo; Authority; Modesty; Politeness
      12. “From enumerating the parts” (F). S. Case-by-case
      13. “Since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, […] employing the consequences to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame” (F). S. Pragmatic argument; Dilemma
      14. [id. 13], “but there is this difference that in the former case [i.e., 13] things of any kind whatever, in the latter [i.e., 13] opposites” (F). S. Pragmatic; Dilemma
      15. “Men do not praise the same thing in public and in secret” (F). S. Motives
      16. “From analogy in things” (F). S. Analogy; Opposites.
      17. “Concluding the identity of precedents from the identity of results” Instance: “There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist” (F). S. Consequence; Implication.
      18. “The same men do not always choose the same thing before and after but the contrary” (F).  S. Consistency.
      19. “Maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it” (F). S. Motives
      20. “Examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not” (F). S. Motives
      21. “Things which are thought to happen but are incredible” (F). S. Probable.
      22. “Another line of argument is to refute your opponent’s case by noting any contrast or contradiction of dates, acts or words that it anywhere displays” (RR). S. Contradiction;  Consistency; Ad hominem.
      23. “Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander […] consists in stating the reason for the false opinion” (F). S. Motives; Interpretation
      24. “Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist” (F). S. Motives
      25. “Whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been carried out” (F). S. Consistency; Motives
      26. “Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together” (F). S. Consistency
          
      27. “Another topic consists in making use of errors committed for purposes of accusation or defense” (F). S. Contradiction; Consistency
          
      28. “From the meaning of a name” (F). S. Proper Name

Even if no clear order emerges from this enumeration, it can be noted that an important subset of topics deal basically with the world of human action and its determination, where motives have been substituted for causes, and behavioral stereotypes on human nature and human motivations have replaced strict scientific causality and taxonomies.

 

2. Cicero, Topica, “Topics” (44 b. c.)   

Cicero proposes a typology of arguments in an early work, De Inventione, “On Invention” and in his latest book on argument, Topica, “Topics”. Unlike the Topics of Aristotle, which exposes a method of finding and criticizing arguments in the context of a dialectical philosophical exchange, Cicero’s observations and examples constantly refer to rhetoric as a judicial practice. In this context, Cicero proposes the following distinction:

• Intrinsic arguments, either “inherent in the very nature of the subject which is under discussion” or “closely connected with the subject which is investigated” (, I, 8; p. 387-389).
• Arguments taken “from external circumstances”, or “extrinsic arguments” (, II, 8; p. 388; IV, 24, p. 397), corresponding to the so-called non-technical^@ arguments, mainly testimonies and their conditions of validity, and including authority (Top., IV, 24; p. 397).

Objects and facts are built and discussed on the basis of arguments drawn from five main sources.

 

From definition. Arguments:

— by genus and species of the genus (a genere; a forma generis).
— by enumeration of the parts (partium enumeratio)
— from “etymology” (ex notatione)
— from words of the same family (a conjugata)
— “based on difference” (a differentia).

S. Categorization and Nomination; Definition; Genus; Case-by-case; True meaning of the word; Derived Words

 

From causal relations S. Causality. Arguments: ­

— from efficient causes (ab efficientibus causis)
— from effects (ab effectis).

 

From analogy (a similitudine).

S. A pari; Intra-categorical analogy; Structural analogy

 

From opposites (ex contrario).

S. Opposites

 

From circumstances. Arguments: ­

— from antecedents, ab antecedentibus,
— from consequents, a consequentibus

S. Circumstances

 

This brief and articulated list of arguments is all important in the Western tradition of argumentation studies. They were transmitted in the Middle Ages by Boethius (around 480-524) On Topical Differences (Top., c. 522), and were taken up by medieval logic, dialectic and philosophy. They remained in use until well into the modern era, S. Collections (3).

3. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, “The Orator’s Education” (c. 95)

In Book V, Chap. 10 of the Institutes of Oratory, dealing with arguments, Quintilian summarizes a list of 24 argumentative lines (IO, V, 10, 94). A first series deals with common places.

A second series is a catalog of argument schemes: the French translator, J. Cousin, notes that

“this list-summary, which seems to be a loan, recalls previous classifications, with their elements arranged in a different order: […] Later rhetoricians condense or develop without apparent reason” (1976, p. 240).

The tradition has bequeathed us more or less systematized inventories of argument schemes:

Collections 2: From Aristotle to Boethius
Collections 3: Modernity and Tradition
Collections 4: Contemporary Innovations and Structurations

and a series of questions about them:

— About their nature and number,

— Lists of argument schemes have been compiled, and still are; but what is the unifying factor underlying these lists? Have they a proper systematic organization? Are they amenable to some elementary headings (Blair 2012, Chap. 12 and 13)?

— Where do they come from? Are they recurring remarkable stable structures picked up in (successful) argumentative discourses of all kinds? Or are they construed from the a priori categories of the human mind?

— Are they logical, cultural or anthropological beings? Are they culture-dependent?

— What kind of historical change, if any, can affect the topics? The question arises, when the 19 “forms of reasoning” of Toulmin, Rieke & Janik are compared with the Ciceronian and post-Ciceronian lists of topoi, S.Collections (4) and Collections (2).

1. Categorization of arguments: collections and typologies

A class is a set of beings; basically a typology is a class subdivided into various subtypes; the same class can admit organized different subtypes, S.  Classification. A catalog can be considered as a single-level typology.

A typology of arguments is a set of topics or argument schemes linking the argument to the conclusion. Typologies of arguments include from ten to several dozens of argument schemes.

To categorize a speech segment (an individual, level 0) as a “pragmatic argument” is the process by which the characteristic features that define the pragmatic argument are recognized in this segment. This operation is itself argumentative, and obeys the rules of argumentation by definition. S. Nomination; Definition; Argumentation Scheme.

The idea of argument type, the possibility of drawing up inventories of these types, and giving an internal structure to these inventories, in order to build a “typology of topics”, is the very foundation of the theory of rhetorical argumentation. Walter Ong sees these typologies of arguments as engaged in a perpetual movement of renewal and attempt at redefining:

As the general intellectual tradition changes, the active associative nodes for ideas change, and classification changes too. Revising the tradition has been a common phenomenon in antiquity, when Aristotle differed from the sophists in the list of topics he proposed, Cicero from Aristotle, Quintilian from Cicero, Themistius from all these, and Boethius from all of them again and from Themistius as well. The revision continues in our day with Professor Mortimer Adler’s “Great ideas” (augmented beyond their original hundred), and with such articles as Père Gardeil’s very helpful study of the lieux communs in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, where, after reporting Melchior Cano’s description of the loci (which he notes are taken at times verbatim from Agricola) and Cano’s organization of theological loci, Gardeil proposes, in true topical tradition, a still better classification of his own. (Ong 1958, p. 122)

There are many lessons to be learnt from this passage. First it provides us with a definition of topics as “active associative nodes for ideas”, as theorized since the birth of rhetoric in the context of the theory of argumentation in discourse. Yet the particular interest of this passage lies in the description of the taxonomic trap. To bring the irritating proliferation of typologies to an end, one might be tempted to propose a new and final one, thus bringing everyone into agreement — but, in the end, it appears that an additional typology has been added to an already overloaded list, aggravating the very evil, which it claimed to remedy. This observation can be read as an ironic historical counterpoint to the works that, in that year, 1958, were reviving reflection on topics and arguments.

2. Place of collections in the theories of the argumentation

The question of argument schemes plays a key role in some argumentation theories whilst in other schemes it is either re-defined, or plays only a marginal role.

(i) The question of argument types does not arise in Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of Argumentation within Language. The concept of topos is defined as a semantic link between predicates. It follows that the number of topoi is extremely large, uncountable even, while classical theories enumerate less than one hundred topoi.

(ii) Grize’s “Natural Logic” is based on the concept of schematization^@. The operations of “reasoned organization”, or “shoring” amounts, in substance, to the classical concept of a conclusion supported by an argument. The types of arguments correspond to types of scaffolding. To my knowledge, this line is not further developed. Grize focuses on inference, causality, explanation.

(iii) In Toulmin’s terminology, a type of warrant corresponds to a type of argument, as shown by Ehninger and Brockriede ([1960]). Moreover, Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1984) proposed a brief collection of arguments, S. Collections (4). The example illustrating Toulmin’s “layout of argument” corresponds to a very productive topic, the categorization of an individual.

(iv) The concept is central to the New Rhetoric of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, as well as for Pragma-Dialectic and Informal Logic, S. Collections (4).

3. Dimension of the classification:
number of argument schemes

Classic lists of argument schemes tend to propose a relatively large number or argument schemes. The Rhetoric of Aristotle offers a set of twenty-eight schemes, plus some “lines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes” (Rhet., II, 24; RR, p. 379); plus some rules taken from the Topics. Cicero’s Topica lists a dozen of schemes, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria twenty-five. Boethius passed fifteen forms on to the Middle Ages, S. Collections (2).

The Dupleix’s Logic (1607) and Bossuet’s Logic (1677), can probably be considered as representative, in modern times, of this classic tradition. The former retains fourteen schemes and the latter twenty schemes.

Other modern typologies are quite divergent: Locke [1690] proposes a typology — if it can be considered as such — consisting of four elements to which Leibniz [1765] adds one. Locke’s scientific world is, however, extremely different from, and antagonistic to the rhetorical world of the classics.

Bentham enumerates thirty-one argumentative formulas for the field of political argumentation, S. Political arguments.

In contemporary times, Conley counts “more than eighty different argument types” in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca Treatise (Conley 1984, p. 180-181) S. Collections (4).

4. Forms of the collections

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents a catalogue of twenty-eight topoi randomly listed.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca have constructed a clearly organized four-level typology of the various “techniques of argumentation”

— A speech segment (an individual, level 0) can, for example be categorized as a “pragmatic argument”; that is, this segment presents the essential features that define the pragmatic argument (level 1).

— Level 1 arguments are grouped within a super-category; for example, a “pragmatic argument” is classified as an “argument based on the structure of reality” (level 2).

— Level 2 arguments are grouped in the class of the “techniques of association”, (level 3), one of the two kinds of “techniques of argumentation” (Level 4, top level).

5. Foundations of the collections

The collections of argument schemes can be organized in different ways.

(i) From the perspective of their contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge, inconclusive arguments are opposed to compelling arguments. The latter are, in modern times, generally equated with mathematical demonstration and scientific evidence. In the words of Locke, they “bring true instruction with [them] and advance us on our way to knowledge” (Locke [1690], Chap. 17, § 19-22), S. Collections (3). Person-centered arguments are, from this point of view, irrelevant. The same might be said of those that play only on the guiles of natural language and the nuances of interpersonal relationship.

(ii) From the perspective of their linguistic functioning, metonymic arguments based on a relationship of contiguity, can be distinguished from the metaphoric arguments based on a relationship of similarity. This distinction mirrors the opposition between the arguments “establishing the structure of reality” (analogy type) and those “based on the structure of reality’ (causal type) (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] p. 261; 350). S. Metonymy — Synecdoche; Metaphor; Collections (4).

(iii) From the point of view of their productivity. The productivity of an argument scheme depends on the number of actual arguments (enthymemes) derived therefrom. Intuitively, some topics are very productive. One might think for example of those based on the twin argument schemes by categorization^@ and definition; or arguments based on causal or analogical relations, or from the contraries, etc. Others, including the argument from sacrifice^@ are less productive. Other argument schemes are apparently, no longer in use, such as the argumentative exploitation of syzygies.

(iv) From the point of view of their legitimating power. A good example of organizing topical forms according to their strength is given by the hierarchy of legal and theological arguments in the Arab-Muslim culture and religion, such as proposed by Khallaf ([1942]). He distinguishes between ten sources, ordered according to their degree of legitimacy. The most legitimate forms are those based on the Quran and the Tradition. Those that have the weakest degree of legitimacy are, on the one hand, “the laws of monotheistic peoples”, and, on the other hand, perhaps quite surprisingly given the situation in 2017, “the opinions of the Prophet’s companions”, in that order. In other words, the argument put forward at the time of the origin of Islam is granted the smallest possible weight in the hierarchy of arguments. Such was the situation in 1942; it has undergone significant change with the rise of Salafism.

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Three forms of argumentation use the notion of circumstance:

— The fallacy of omission of the relevant circumstances, a criticism addressed to an argumentation.
— The argumentation by the circumstances.
— In the expression “circumstantial ad hominem”, the circumstances alluded to are the characteristics of the person implicated in an ad hominem argument.

1. Fallacy of omission of relevant circumstances

The fallacy of omission of circumstances is sometimes referred to by the Latin label secundum quid fallacy, which abbreviates the phrase a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, “from a restricted affirmation to an absolute affirmation”.

Aristotle classifies the fallacy of omission of relevant circumstances as a kind of fallacy “independent of language” (Soph. 4; 165b20; S. Fallacy (2), occurring when an expression is used “absolutely or in a certain respect” (Soph. 5; 166b35):

“If < what is not is the object of an opinion >, then < what is not is >” (ibid.; our emphasis and parenthesis).

“What is not is the object of an opinion” is a semantically complete, syntactically integrated utterance, a meaningful unique and complete speech act [1]. All its components are necessary and interdependent; none can be subtracted without altering what the speaker said and meant, and he has only said one thing.
It is not possible to extract from this complete utterance any arbitrarily chosen segment (here, « the object of an opinion”) as long as it makes some sense, and attribute the resulting segment (here, “what is not is”) to the speaker of the former statement.
Such considerations are crucial when it comes to determining what is an elementary well-formed linguistic formula.

Other examples: the specified expression “A is (Place, Time)”, “A is here now” can be reshaped into the corresponding, non-qualified, one “A is (Place)”, “A is here”. Vice versa, the non-specified construction “Peter crossed the street” cannot be specified into “Peter crossed the street yesterday” (which can be non fallaciously reduced to “Peter crossed the street”).
This kind of de-contextualization of a qualified statement may result in irony:

S1:    — The weather is fine! (said in the morning, when the weather is fine).
S2:    — Ah hah! And you said that the weather is fine! (said in the evening, while it is raining).

This fallacy passes over relevant contextual data, treating as an absolute assertion what has been asserted with reservation, in a particular context, with precise reference and intention. This radicalization of assertions and positions makes them very easy to refute.

To be relevant in a methodologically equipped context, the refutation must relate exactly to the expression as used, and take into account all the reservations specifically mentioned. The fallacy is particularly vicious when it pretends that the speaker had fully said and assumed something he or she has only said, in the flux of a dispute, as a concession to the opponent.

Prime Minister: — Our country cannot take in all the misery of the world (S1) but it must take its share (S2).
Opponent : — As Mr. Prime Minister said, we cannot welcome all the misery of the world.

In Goffman’s words, in statement S1 the Prime Minister speaks as an Animator, quoting an unknown Principal, whom he opposes; whereas he speaks as the Principal of S2, taking full responsibility for the content and actions, intentions and consequences of what S2 means, S. Roles.
The opponent forces him to speak as Principal of S1. While the Prime Minister advocates receiving refugees, the opponent, who advocates closing the frontiers, makes an ally of the Prime minister who actually rejected his or her position.

2. Argumentation by the circumstances

Argumentation by the circumstances establishes indirectly the existence of a fact, exploiting peripheral, unnecessary indices of an action that have no real probative value, but nevertheless point to a fact:

Question: — Is he corrupt?
Accuser: — Certainly. He needed money; we have seen him receiving thick envelopes; and yesterday, he bought a brand new car.

In classical terms, the argumentation by circumstances can help to solve a conjectural issue, S. Stasis, such as “did he commit this crime?” (Cicero, Top., XI, 50; p. 82). To answer, one “[looks] for the circumstances that preceded the fact, that accompanied it, that followed it” (Cicero, ibid; XI, 51, p. 83), interpreting “an appointment […] the shadow of a body […] pallor… and other indications of trouble and remorse” (id., XI, 53, p. 83). This is part of the investigatory technique:

“He went out murmuring…: this is to argue from what precedes the action; we saw him stealing behind a bush…: that’s what accompanies it. […] a malicious joy, which he endeavored to keep concealed, appeared on his face, mixed with fright: which is what follows.”
Bossuet [1677], p. 140, S. Collections (III)

These observed circumstances are probable natural signs.
Argumentation by the circumstances is a powerful instrument in the arts of suspicion and construction of a culprit.

3. Terminological delicacies

On §53 of the Topics Cicero deals with arguments drawn from “consequences, antecedents, contradictory things [ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus]” (Top., XI, 53: 83).
This paragraph deals with logical antecedence and consequence, involving semantically “necessary” links (id.), referring to questions of a priori and a posteriori reasoning, definition, rules of implication and to the non-contradiction principle.

Bossuet speaks, in connection with the argument by circumstances, of places “derived from what precedes, from what accompanies and what follows [the action], ab antecedentibus, ab adjunctis, a consequentibus” ([1677], p.140). Here, the links of the preceding and following events with the central event are no longer semantical or logical but purely chronological (the change of preposition – ex antecedentibus for the logical consequence and the necessary link vs. ab antecedentibus for temporal anteriority has nothing to do with this distinction).

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[1] For example, Empedocles argues that « from nothingness nothing can absolutely come into existence and what is cannot perish. »

Cause to effect argumentation is based on the existence of a cause-effect relation. The actual occurrence of the cause is materialized by the necessary occurrence of the effect.

The argumentation is oriented towards the future. Argument:

There is a state of affairs c. This state of affairs c falls into the category of facts C.
Cause- Effect Rule: There is a known causal law linking state of affairs C to state of affairs E.
Conclusion: C will / must have an effect e, of type E.

The causal deduction allows prediction:

This bridge is made of metal.
When heated, this metal expands by a certain coefficient.
In summer the bridge will expand by such and such amount.

This causal argument can be supplemented by a pragmatic argument.

Such dilatation can have dangerous consequences: Expansion can twist metal.

Which must be prevented:

It is therefore necessary to provide sufficient space for the bridge deck to expand.