The tradition has bequeathed us more or less systematized inventories of argument schemes:

Collections 2: From Aristotle to Boethius
Collections 3: Modernity and Tradition
Collections 4: Contemporary Innovations and Structurations

and a series of questions about them:

— About their nature and number,

— Lists of argument schemes have been compiled, and still are; but what is the unifying factor underlying these lists? Have they a proper systematic organization? Are they amenable to some elementary headings (Blair 2012, Chap. 12 and 13)?

— Where do they come from? Are they recurring remarkable stable structures picked up in (successful) argumentative discourses of all kinds? Or are they construed from the a priori categories of the human mind?

— Are they logical, cultural or anthropological beings? Are they culture-dependent?

— What kind of historical change, if any, can affect the topics? The question arises, when the 19 “forms of reasoning” of Toulmin, Rieke & Janik are compared with the Ciceronian and post-Ciceronian lists of topoi, S.Collections (4) and Collections (2).

1. Categorization of arguments: collections and typologies

A class is a set of beings; basically a typology is a class subdivided into various subtypes; the same class can admit organized different subtypes, S.  Classification. A catalog can be considered as a single-level typology.

A typology of arguments is a set of topics or argument schemes linking the argument to the conclusion. Typologies of arguments include from ten to several dozens of argument schemes.

To categorize a speech segment (an individual, level 0) as a “pragmatic argument” is the process by which the characteristic features that define the pragmatic argument are recognized in this segment. This operation is itself argumentative, and obeys the rules of argumentation by definition. S. Nomination; Definition; Argumentation Scheme.

The idea of argument type, the possibility of drawing up inventories of these types, and giving an internal structure to these inventories, in order to build a “typology of topics”, is the very foundation of the theory of rhetorical argumentation. Walter Ong sees these typologies of arguments as engaged in a perpetual movement of renewal and attempt at redefining:

As the general intellectual tradition changes, the active associative nodes for ideas change, and classification changes too. Revising the tradition has been a common phenomenon in antiquity, when Aristotle differed from the sophists in the list of topics he proposed, Cicero from Aristotle, Quintilian from Cicero, Themistius from all these, and Boethius from all of them again and from Themistius as well. The revision continues in our day with Professor Mortimer Adler’s “Great ideas” (augmented beyond their original hundred), and with such articles as Père Gardeil’s very helpful study of the lieux communs in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, where, after reporting Melchior Cano’s description of the loci (which he notes are taken at times verbatim from Agricola) and Cano’s organization of theological loci, Gardeil proposes, in true topical tradition, a still better classification of his own. (Ong 1958, p. 122)

There are many lessons to be learnt from this passage. First it provides us with a definition of topics as “active associative nodes for ideas”, as theorized since the birth of rhetoric in the context of the theory of argumentation in discourse. Yet the particular interest of this passage lies in the description of the taxonomic trap. To bring the irritating proliferation of typologies to an end, one might be tempted to propose a new and final one, thus bringing everyone into agreement — but, in the end, it appears that an additional typology has been added to an already overloaded list, aggravating the very evil, which it claimed to remedy. This observation can be read as an ironic historical counterpoint to the works that, in that year, 1958, were reviving reflection on topics and arguments.

2. Place of collections in the theories of the argumentation

The question of argument schemes plays a key role in some argumentation theories whilst in other schemes it is either re-defined, or plays only a marginal role.

(i) The question of argument types does not arise in Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of Argumentation within Language. The concept of topos is defined as a semantic link between predicates. It follows that the number of topoi is extremely large, uncountable even, while classical theories enumerate less than one hundred topoi.

(ii) Grize’s “Natural Logic” is based on the concept of schematization^@. The operations of “reasoned organization”, or “shoring” amounts, in substance, to the classical concept of a conclusion supported by an argument. The types of arguments correspond to types of scaffolding. To my knowledge, this line is not further developed. Grize focuses on inference, causality, explanation.

(iii) In Toulmin’s terminology, a type of warrant corresponds to a type of argument, as shown by Ehninger and Brockriede ([1960]). Moreover, Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1984) proposed a brief collection of arguments, S. Collections (4). The example illustrating Toulmin’s “layout of argument” corresponds to a very productive topic, the categorization of an individual.

(iv) The concept is central to the New Rhetoric of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, as well as for Pragma-Dialectic and Informal Logic, S. Collections (4).

3. Dimension of the classification:
number of argument schemes

Classic lists of argument schemes tend to propose a relatively large number or argument schemes. The Rhetoric of Aristotle offers a set of twenty-eight schemes, plus some “lines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes” (Rhet., II, 24; RR, p. 379); plus some rules taken from the Topics. Cicero’s Topica lists a dozen of schemes, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria twenty-five. Boethius passed fifteen forms on to the Middle Ages, S. Collections (2).

The Dupleix’s Logic (1607) and Bossuet’s Logic (1677), can probably be considered as representative, in modern times, of this classic tradition. The former retains fourteen schemes and the latter twenty schemes.

Other modern typologies are quite divergent: Locke [1690] proposes a typology — if it can be considered as such — consisting of four elements to which Leibniz [1765] adds one. Locke’s scientific world is, however, extremely different from, and antagonistic to the rhetorical world of the classics.

Bentham enumerates thirty-one argumentative formulas for the field of political argumentation, S. Political arguments.

In contemporary times, Conley counts “more than eighty different argument types” in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca Treatise (Conley 1984, p. 180-181) S. Collections (4).

4. Forms of the collections

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents a catalogue of twenty-eight topoi randomly listed.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca have constructed a clearly organized four-level typology of the various “techniques of argumentation”

— A speech segment (an individual, level 0) can, for example be categorized as a “pragmatic argument”; that is, this segment presents the essential features that define the pragmatic argument (level 1).

— Level 1 arguments are grouped within a super-category; for example, a “pragmatic argument” is classified as an “argument based on the structure of reality” (level 2).

— Level 2 arguments are grouped in the class of the “techniques of association”, (level 3), one of the two kinds of “techniques of argumentation” (Level 4, top level).

5. Foundations of the collections

The collections of argument schemes can be organized in different ways.

(i) From the perspective of their contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge, inconclusive arguments are opposed to compelling arguments. The latter are, in modern times, generally equated with mathematical demonstration and scientific evidence. In the words of Locke, they “bring true instruction with [them] and advance us on our way to knowledge” (Locke [1690], Chap. 17, § 19-22), S. Collections (3). Person-centered arguments are, from this point of view, irrelevant. The same might be said of those that play only on the guiles of natural language and the nuances of interpersonal relationship.

(ii) From the perspective of their linguistic functioning, metonymic arguments based on a relationship of contiguity, can be distinguished from the metaphoric arguments based on a relationship of similarity. This distinction mirrors the opposition between the arguments “establishing the structure of reality” (analogy type) and those “based on the structure of reality’ (causal type) (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] p. 261; 350). S. Metonymy — Synecdoche; Metaphor; Collections (4).

(iii) From the point of view of their productivity. The productivity of an argument scheme depends on the number of actual arguments (enthymemes) derived therefrom. Intuitively, some topics are very productive. One might think for example of those based on the twin argument schemes by categorization^@ and definition; or arguments based on causal or analogical relations, or from the contraries, etc. Others, including the argument from sacrifice^@ are less productive. Other argument schemes are apparently, no longer in use, such as the argumentative exploitation of syzygies.

(iv) From the point of view of their legitimating power. A good example of organizing topical forms according to their strength is given by the hierarchy of legal and theological arguments in the Arab-Muslim culture and religion, such as proposed by Khallaf ([1942]). He distinguishes between ten sources, ordered according to their degree of legitimacy. The most legitimate forms are those based on the Quran and the Tradition. Those that have the weakest degree of legitimacy are, on the one hand, “the laws of monotheistic peoples”, and, on the other hand, perhaps quite surprisingly given the situation in 2017, “the opinions of the Prophet’s companions”, in that order. In other words, the argument put forward at the time of the origin of Islam is granted the smallest possible weight in the hierarchy of arguments. Such was the situation in 1942; it has undergone significant change with the rise of Salafism.

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Three forms of argumentation use the notion of circumstance:

— The fallacy of omission of the relevant circumstances, a criticism addressed to an argumentation.
— The argumentation by the circumstances.
— In the expression “circumstantial ad hominem”, the circumstances alluded to are the characteristics of the person implicated in an ad hominem argument.

1. Fallacy of omission of relevant circumstances

The fallacy of omission of circumstances is sometimes referred to by the Latin label secundum quid fallacy, which abbreviates the phrase a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, “from a restricted affirmation to an absolute affirmation”.

Aristotle classifies the fallacy of omission of relevant circumstances as a kind of fallacy “independent of language” (Soph. 4; 165b20; S. Fallacy (2), occurring when an expression is used “absolutely or in a certain respect” (Soph. 5; 166b35):

“If < what is not is the object of an opinion >, then < what is not is >” (ibid.; our emphasis and parenthesis).

“What is not is the object of an opinion” is a semantically complete, syntactically integrated utterance, a meaningful unique and complete speech act [1]. All its components are necessary and interdependent; none can be subtracted without altering what the speaker said and meant, and he has only said one thing.
It is not possible to extract from this complete utterance any arbitrarily chosen segment (here, « the object of an opinion”) as long as it makes some sense, and attribute the resulting segment (here, “what is not is”) to the speaker of the former statement.
Such considerations are crucial when it comes to determining what is an elementary well-formed linguistic formula.

Other examples: the specified expression “A is (Place, Time)”, “A is here now” can be reshaped into the corresponding, non-qualified, one “A is (Place)”, “A is here”. Vice versa, the non-specified construction “Peter crossed the street” cannot be specified into “Peter crossed the street yesterday” (which can be non fallaciously reduced to “Peter crossed the street”).
This kind of de-contextualization of a qualified statement may result in irony:

S1:    — The weather is fine! (said in the morning, when the weather is fine).
S2:    — Ah hah! And you said that the weather is fine! (said in the evening, while it is raining).

This fallacy passes over relevant contextual data, treating as an absolute assertion what has been asserted with reservation, in a particular context, with precise reference and intention. This radicalization of assertions and positions makes them very easy to refute.

To be relevant in a methodologically equipped context, the refutation must relate exactly to the expression as used, and take into account all the reservations specifically mentioned. The fallacy is particularly vicious when it pretends that the speaker had fully said and assumed something he or she has only said, in the flux of a dispute, as a concession to the opponent.

Prime Minister: — Our country cannot take in all the misery of the world (S1) but it must take its share (S2).
Opponent : — As Mr. Prime Minister said, we cannot welcome all the misery of the world.

In Goffman’s words, in statement S1 the Prime Minister speaks as an Animator, quoting an unknown Principal, whom he opposes; whereas he speaks as the Principal of S2, taking full responsibility for the content and actions, intentions and consequences of what S2 means, S. Roles.
The opponent forces him to speak as Principal of S1. While the Prime Minister advocates receiving refugees, the opponent, who advocates closing the frontiers, makes an ally of the Prime minister who actually rejected his or her position.

2. Argumentation by the circumstances

Argumentation by the circumstances establishes indirectly the existence of a fact, exploiting peripheral, unnecessary indices of an action that have no real probative value, but nevertheless point to a fact:

Question: — Is he corrupt?
Accuser: — Certainly. He needed money; we have seen him receiving thick envelopes; and yesterday, he bought a brand new car.

In classical terms, the argumentation by circumstances can help to solve a conjectural issue, S. Stasis, such as “did he commit this crime?” (Cicero, Top., XI, 50; p. 82). To answer, one “[looks] for the circumstances that preceded the fact, that accompanied it, that followed it” (Cicero, ibid; XI, 51, p. 83), interpreting “an appointment […] the shadow of a body […] pallor… and other indications of trouble and remorse” (id., XI, 53, p. 83). This is part of the investigatory technique:

“He went out murmuring…: this is to argue from what precedes the action; we saw him stealing behind a bush…: that’s what accompanies it. […] a malicious joy, which he endeavored to keep concealed, appeared on his face, mixed with fright: which is what follows.”
Bossuet [1677], p. 140, S. Collections (III)

These observed circumstances are probable natural signs.
Argumentation by the circumstances is a powerful instrument in the arts of suspicion and construction of a culprit.

3. Terminological delicacies

On §53 of the Topics Cicero deals with arguments drawn from “consequences, antecedents, contradictory things [ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus]” (Top., XI, 53: 83).
This paragraph deals with logical antecedence and consequence, involving semantically “necessary” links (id.), referring to questions of a priori and a posteriori reasoning, definition, rules of implication and to the non-contradiction principle.

Bossuet speaks, in connection with the argument by circumstances, of places “derived from what precedes, from what accompanies and what follows [the action], ab antecedentibus, ab adjunctis, a consequentibus” ([1677], p.140). Here, the links of the preceding and following events with the central event are no longer semantical or logical but purely chronological (the change of preposition – ex antecedentibus for the logical consequence and the necessary link vs. ab antecedentibus for temporal anteriority has nothing to do with this distinction).

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[1] For example, Empedocles argues that « from nothingness nothing can absolutely come into existence and what is cannot perish. »

Cause to effect argumentation is based on the existence of a cause-effect relation. The actual occurrence of the cause is materialized by the necessary occurrence of the effect.

The argumentation is oriented towards the future. Argument:

There is a state of affairs c. This state of affairs c falls into the category of facts C.
Cause- Effect Rule: There is a known causal law linking state of affairs C to state of affairs E.
Conclusion: C will / must have an effect e, of type E.

The causal deduction allows prediction:

This bridge is made of metal.
When heated, this metal expands by a certain coefficient.
In summer the bridge will expand by such and such amount.

This causal argument can be supplemented by a pragmatic argument.

Such dilatation can have dangerous consequences: Expansion can twist metal.

Which must be prevented:

It is therefore necessary to provide sufficient space for the bridge deck to expand.

1. Causal argumentation

Cause-to-effect or effect to cause arguments presupposes the existence of a causal link, while causal argumentation establishes the existence of a causal link.

Causal argumentation occurs when a causal link is at issue.

For example, we notice that, on the one hand, (1) that the use of pesticides is intensifying, and (2) that bees are disappearing. Is there a causal relationship between these two facts, are the following statements true?

The use of pesticides causes the disappearance of bees.
Pesticides are used and bees disappear (causal reading).

There may be disagreement about this kind of conclusion, even if there is agreement on the facts under consideration:

We use pesticides and the bees disappear, that’s true. But…

The causal investigation starts with a salient fact, as “bees disappear”, “the climate seems to be changing”, and the cause of this is problematic. Generally, several facts can be evoked as possible causes, and possible explanations of the phenomenon. This creates a stasis of causality, expressed via the confrontation of these two hypotheses, for example in the case of climate change, taken as a fact:

S1:    — the increase in solar activity causes the change of climate.
S2:    — the increasing emission of greenhouse gases causes climate change.

These explanatory causes integrate themselves within broader theories on the climatic equilibrium of the terrestrial globe. Broad conceptions of the physical and social world are in confrontation through such local causal affirmations.

Affirmation of causal relationships are therefore based on elaboration of crucial experiments and the retrieval of key observations. Causes are determined according to the methodology relevant to the given domain.

Ordinary causal experimentation also involves observation and experience. So for example, if I suffer a mild allergy reaction, I must consider what the possible allergens might be which have caused it. I might observe that yesterday I went to the swimming pool and ate strawberries. There are two possible allergenic, strawberries or chemical products used in the pool. I might conduct the following checks, eating strawberries without going swimming, and going swimming without eating strawberries. If I am unlucky, I’ll have to investigate further and perhaps see a specialist, who will proceed in much the same way. If I am lucky, however, I’ll suffer a (controlled) mild allergic reaction in one case and not in the other, and will be able to identify the allergen. As the allergic reaction is undesirable, I pragmatically reason, in view of the negative consequence, I change my behavior, and so eliminate the cause.

2. Refutation of causal assertions

The correct establishment of causal relationships is a fundamental requirement, both in science and in ordinary life. The priority given to the correct determination of causal relations is the basis of Aristotelian thought. The “false cause” fallacy is committed when a causal relation is asserted between two phenomena that in fact have no causal relation between them. This fallacy is sometimes designated by its Latin name non-causa pro causa, “‘non-cause’ taken for a cause”, S. Fallacious (2).

“Smoking causes cancer”: strictly speaking, the positive existence of such a relationship is difficult to establish. It can only be considered as a remainder, persisting when all other possibilities have been discarded. Causal imputation might be revised. If we are to confirm that a link of the causal type does exist between two facts, it is necessary to answer a set of standard objections which oppose the existence of a causal relation.

2.1 The alleged effect does not exist

The causal assertion “the use of pesticides is the cause of the disappearance of the bees” is refuted by showing that although the bees have disappeared from a certain area, there are still as many bees as before if a larger, more general area is considered. The bees have not disappeared, they have simply migrated.

The facts must be confirmed, before looking for and discussing their causes. This methodological rule is well illustrated by the famous case of the golden tooth, described by Fontenelle.

Let us be well assured of the matter of fact, before we trouble our selves with inquiring into the cause. It is true, that this method is too slow for the greatest part of mankind, who run naturally to the cause, and pass over the truth of the matter of fact; but for my part, I will not be so ridiculous as to find out a cause for what is not.
This kind of misfortune happened so pleasantly, at the end of the last age, to some learned Germans, that I cannot forbear speaking of it. “In the year 1593, there was a report that the teeth of a child of Silesia of seven years old dropped out, and that one of gold came in the place of one of his great teeth. Horstius, a profesor of physic in the university of Helmstad, wrote in the year 1595, the history of this tooth, and pretended that it was partly natural and partly miraculous, and that it was sent from God to this child, to comfort the Christians who were then afflicted by the Turks.” Now fancy to your self what a consolation this was, and what this tooth could signify, either to the Christians or the Turks. In the same year, (that this tooth of gold might not want for historians) one Rullandus wrote the history of it: two years after, Ingolsteterus, another learned man, wrote against the opinion of Rullandus concerning this golden tooth; and Rullandus presently makes a fine learned reply. Libavius, another great man, collected all that had been said of this tooth, to which he added his own opinion. After all, there wanted nothing to so many famous works, but the truth of its being a tooth of gold. When a Goldsmith had examined it, he found that it was only a leaf of gold laid on the tooth with a great deal of art. Thus they first compiled books, and then they consulted the goldsmith.
Nothing is more natural than to do the same thing in all other cases. And I am not so much convinced of our ignorance, by things that are, and of which the reasons are unknown, as by those which are not, and for which we yet find out reasons. That is to say, as we want those principles that lead us to the truth, so we have others means that not only do we not have the principles that lead to truth, but we have others which are exceeding well with that which is false.
Bernard Le Bouyer of Fontenelle, The History of the Oracles [1686][1],

2.2 The effect exists independently of the alleged cause

The determining cause has a consistent impact. If C is the cause of E, we cannot have C without E. If a metal is heated, it necessarily expands. It follows that a causal statement can be rejected by showing that the effect persists when the cause is absent. To refer again to the example above, if it can be shown that bees also disappear from areas where pesticides are not used, pesticides cannot be considered to blame for the fall in bees’ number.

2.3 There is no causality but concomitance

In that case, A both regularly accompanies and precedes B without being the cause of B. The cock sings regularly before the break of day, but it is not the cause of the sunrise. Taking an antibiotic might be accompanied by a feeling of exhaustion, but the cause of this exhaustion is not the antibiotic but the infection that it fights. The general principle to check whether a causal relation exists is to suppress the agent which is the suspected cause; if the so-called effect is still there, there is no causal link between the two facts. If the cock is eliminated, for example, the sun still rises; if we do not take antibiotics, we will still be exhausted and perhaps even more.

The use of pesticides is concomitant with the disappearance of bees; but in areas where pesticides cease to be used, bees’ numbers continue to fall at the same rate. The cause is to be sought elsewhere: perhaps climate change is to blame?

Such erroneous causal imputation are well identified in the ancient theory of fallacies, which denotes them by two Latin expressions:

— Fallacy of the antibiotic: cum hoc, ergo propter hoc:

“with A, therefore because of A”: A accompanies B, so A is cause of B.

— Fallacy of the cock: post hoc, ergo propter hoc:

“after A, therefore because of A”: B appears after A, so A is cause of B.

2.4 Another cause may have the same effect

One can be tired because one has been physically exhausted, because one has an infection, or because one is depressed.

2.5 Not one, but several causes: complex causality

It may be necessary for several causes to exist in conjunction in order that they produce some effect. This is the case of economic crises, or lung cancer.

The determination of causes establishes the responsibility of the human agents who have set the causal machinery in motion. If the causality is complex, it is possible for the defendants to argue that they are responsible only for a causal factor, which would not alone have given rise to the relevant problem. Upon being arrested, a person dies. The autopsy shows that this person was suffering from a weak heart:

Lawyer:    — If the police had treated him gently, he would not have died. The police are responsible.
Police:      — If he had not been sick before, he would not have died. The police are not responsible.

In cases of heavy pollution, the authorities apologize to people suffering from respiratory diseases: “people without such respiratory issues have no problem”.

2.6 The effect feeds the cause

Feedback is a sort of causal circle: atomic fusion raises the temperature and the rise of temperature accelerates fusion. In the social field, this kind of mechanism is invoked to reject a particular measure, arguing that it will not alleviate the issue in question, but rather aggravate it:

L1:      — To fight recession, public services must be strengthened / reduced.
L2:      — But the strengthening / reduction of public services will reinforce the recession.

One can always refute a measure by asserting that it will have certain unwanted consequences which will outweigh any potential advantage, S. Pragmatic argument. In the example given above, the refutation is radical, the perverse effect being not a side effect, as yet unnoticed by the author of the proposition, but exactly the reverse of the intended effect. This is a case of pure and simple inversion of causality (see infra), which is frequent in polemical discourse.

2.7 Self-fulfilling prophecies

In the case of self-fulfilling prophecies, the announcement of an event is the cause of the event:

S1_1:     — In truth, I tell you: there will be a food shortage!
So people run into the shops and there is a food shortage.
S1_2:     — You see, I told you so!
S2:        — If you hadn’t have caused the people to panic, there wouldn’t have been a shortage.

Self-fulfilling prophecies are close to manipulation:

We are certainly going to war, so we must rearm and warn the population. … Now we are the strongest, and our people are behind us. We can wage war.

2.8 Conversion of cause and effect

The reversal of cause and effect is a form of refutation common in ordinary argument. Two facts A and B vary concomitantly. To account for this concomitance, some assert that there is a causal link from A to B, others claim a link from B to A. The protagonists defend the converse propositions, “A is the cause of B” and “B is the cause of A”. Do we cry because we are sad? Or are we sad because we cry? Does aggression provoke fear? Or does fear result in aggression?

L1:        — I am afraid of dogs, they can attack and bite!
L2:        — No, they attack because they see that you’re scared.

L1:        — OK, I’m aggressive, that’s because they persecute me!
L2:        — No, they persecute you because you’re aggressive.

In the first case, the affair originates with the dog and the supposed bully, in the second case with the self-claimed victim. It is said that single people are more likely to commit suicide than people with a partner. We might therefore ask whether single people have such problems because they are single, or whether they are single because they have such problems? This form of refutation by permutation of the cause and effect is simple and radical. It is worth noting, however, that it is not always possible to apply this process, as seen above, in the case of bees and pesticides.

This causal shift is particularly popular in ordinary causal argumentation. This play on permutation of terms illustrates the pervasiveness of language-based argumentation schemes. It is easier and more exciting to argue that politics determines morality or that morality determines politics, than to argue that there is no link, or very complex ones, between morality and politics, S. Converse.

2.9 Causality, subjectivity, responsibilities

The causal chain might be badly cut: the expression of causality as “A is the cause of B” is a potentially misleading simplification. Every cause is itself caused, except God, who is said to be his own cause and cause of all that ensues. The phenomenon designated as the cause can itself be constructed as the effect of a deeper cause, and its effects as new causes of new effects. We are therefore not dealing with a link between two terms, but with a real causal chain of potentially infinite length.

Consider the deadly events which took place in Sheffield on Sunday, April 16, 1988. They were extensively reported and commented on in the French press. On the following day, the front page of L’Équipe (a sports newspaper) read as follows:

The Horror!
Eighty-four people were killed on Saturday in Sheffield stadium, where the Liverpool-Nottingham FA Cup semi-final took place.

Typically, this kind of event causes anxiety which in turn stimulates the search for causal explanations. Readers will ask themselves “Why? How can such things be possible?” The same day, the headlines in Le Figaro newspaper (news and opinions) were:

Football: Why so many dead?
Four explanations for the drama:

• • The madness of supporters • Police negligence
  • The age of the stadium • Inadequate relief

The answers provided in the newspaper refer to a broad causality for the first question, and to a narrow causality for the others. The same day, the newspaper Libération (news and opinions) asserts a broad causality:

94 dead in Sheffield stadium
Deadly stadium
Crushed to death by the throng of supporters, victims who had come to see the Liverpool-Nottingham Forest football match made a dramatic tribute to the most popular sport in Thatcher’s Britain.

Still the same day, L’Humanité newspaper (news and opinions) combines local causes and so-called deeper causes:

After the drama of Sheffield, Liverpool in mourning
The Last Stage of Horror

90 dead and at least 170 wounded, such is the appalling toll of the Hillsborough catastrophe. The vast majority of victims are children and young people from working class backgrounds who had come to support their teams. The age of the stadiums and their segregational character, and the hold that money has on the world of football are now in the dock. The destruction of industry and the resulting disorganization of leisure activities all have their share of responsibility in the transformation of sports into high-risk activities.

Examination of the causal chain mobilizes specialists in each of the areas of responsibility mentioned. Police officers and judges investigate narrow causalities, whilst sociologists, economists, politicians and historians discuss long-term causalities and responsibilities. In short, what is the cause? The fragility of the victims’ rib cage, the poor quality of care to victims, the tardy response of the emergency services, the incompetence of the police services, the poor standard of the stadium, the financial greed of the organizers, the supporters’ behavior, unemployment, social exclusion, the capitalist system…? To assign a cause is to assign responsibility and apportion blame and perhaps even bring shame upon the relevant parties. This case shows that causality functions as a discursive object, S. Cause — Effect.

Moreover, the causal chains intermingle and combine into a “fabric of causes”. Argumentation is based on this fabric, as “causal threads” are picked up and cut at a given point. This point determines the nature of the chosen cause attached to the salient problematic event considered as an “effect”. The selection of a cause, correlatively, determines the responsible agent, person or institution, to blame or to praise. All the process depends on the interests and aims of the arguing party. The speaker fully projects his own subjectivity on the causal chain he or she has selected, and on the cause he or she has isolated. It would therefore be quite illusory to consider that ordinary arguments based on causal links are ipso facto more rigorous and less subjective than arguments based, for example, on analogy.

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[1] Bernard Le Bouyer of Fontenelle, The History of the Oracles. Glasgow: R. Urie, 1753. P. 14-15.

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1. The causal relationship and its expression

The notion of cause is central in daily argument as well as in scientific argument. It is considered a primitive, intuitively clear notion. This means that ordinary language defines cause only through notions which are equally complex.

Let us consider some possible ways to refer to and think about causal links and processes:

— The cause explains, accounts for its effect; it gives the why, the reason of things. The effect is understood when its cause is known.
— The cause of something is its principle; origin, basis, foundation, grounds; its occasion. The cause is a motor, which triggers, starts a series of effects.
— Humans act as cause; they are agent, maker; author, creator, inspirer, instigator, promoter, producer…; their aims, purposes, intentions, motives and motivations… are considered as causes. Their incitements, inducements instigations, are second-level causes.
— Metaphorically, the cause is thought of as a spark, a ferment, a germ; a root, a seed; a source, a spring. Their cause is the mother of things as they are.

Beyond the specific verbs corresponding to the preceding nouns, different kinds of causal relations are associated with very general verbs such as bring (about), to give (rise to), to make, procure, lift…

Like the logical relation of implication, the causal relation can be associated with passages articulated by conjunctions or adverbs:

Since, because …; as soon as …; so … ; when; if … then …

All these terms and constructions might point to some kind of causal relation, and can therefore be considered as causal indicators of a sort, being kept in mind that they can also express other functional relations.

Like analogy relationships, causal relations can dispense with causal indicators. A spontaneous “causal impulse” always suggests a causal relation behind a purely temporal succession, or concomitance (see infra).

Practically, it would be difficult, and is not necessary, to identify and reconstruct all of the multi-level, potential causal relations in a text. Relevant and indisputable causal argumentative causal relations are explicit, in the foreground of the discussion, articulated and thematized in the argumentative lines developed by the participants in the discussion.

2. Time, causal, logical series

Let us consider the causal, logical and temporal series. In the physical world, the cause precedes its consequence (this is not, however, always straightforward). In the logical world the antecedent is to the left of the logical connective ‘→’ and the consequent is to its right; in the world at large, events simply follow one another.

Causal series	cause	effect, consequence
Logical series	antecedent	consequent, consequence
Time series	prior, previous, before	posterior, later, after

The time series includes three terms:

before… / during… / after…
prior, anterior, previous… / simultaneous… / posterior, later, subsequent…

The word consequence is thus used to designate the effect, linked to its physical cause, or the consequent, linked to its logical antecedent. In general, logical relations develop the consequences of hypotheses or postulates. If the length of the side of the square is doubled, its surface is multiplied by four: this result is a consequence, linked to a cause which is a mathematical reason.

Mind your words, you speak of the birth of the gods, so you suggest that at one time, the gods did not exist?

This is not a causal, but a semantic consequence, based on the linguistic meaning of the word “birth”.

3. Argumentations appealing to causes, mobiles…
and effects, consequences…

The terminology of argumentation involving a causal relation might be confusing. We will distinguish between, on the one hand, argumentation establishing a causal relationship, and, on the other, argumentation exploiting a previously established causal relationship.

(i) The cause — effect argumentation establishes a causal relationship between two facts and eliminates “false causes”.

(ii) Several kinds of arguments exploit a pre-established causal relationship. In this second case, we will distinguish between:

— Cause to effect argumentation, going forward from the cause to the effect. A fact-argument considered to be a cause, is claimed to have such effect.

— Effect to cause argumentation, goes in the opposite direction, from the effect to cause. A fact-argument to which a status of effect is attributed, is claimed to have such cause.

— Pragmatic argumentation develops first from cause to effect, before returning to the cause. In order to make a decision about a practical measure (assimilated to a cause), one develops its possible positive or negative effects, before arguing back to the cause.

— Argumentations based on motives align the cause-effect relation with the relation from a motive to do something to the corresponding action.

— A priori and a posteriori arguments, propter quid and quia, exploits causal and logical links.

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The term categorization refers to the various cognitive and practical operations through which an individual is integrated into a category and designated by the name attached to that category:

— What is this?   Identification process
— This is a X      Name of the object

The name can be taken from the current lexicon or from a scientifically controlled taxonomy or theory. Categorization as a cognitive and empirical operation cannot be dissociated from nomination, a linguistic operation.
The classical example illustrating Toulmin’s layout of argument is an example of an administrative categorization: the individual Harry is categorized as a British citizen on the basis of the criterion, “— to be born in Bermuda”.

Categorization is the first step to implement an argumentation by definition, “he is a British citizen, so …” S. Argument from definition. In law, categorization corresponds to the legal qualification of an act (is it a crime or an accident?); it determines the law applicable to the case, S. Stasis.

1. Categorization tests: distinctive features and global analogy

An individual is given a name and integrated in a category mainly on the basis of a set of distinctive features or out of a global analogy with an outstanding member of the category.

The categorization by distinctive features is based upon a definition. A definition of a noun is a set of heterogeneous features that can be used to test an individual for the corresponding category. If a significant number of these distinctive features fit with the description of the individual, then this individual belongs to this category, and can be given the corresponding name.
If the categorization-nomination is based on unsystematic, anecdotal features the category is inconsistent: “the bird is gray, the sky is gray, the bird is a cloud, the cloud is a bird” S. Intra-categorical analogy.

The categorization by analogy is based on a common global form (Gestalt) shared by the individual under consideration and a prototypical member of the category: this mushroom looks like a Scotch bonnet, it is a Scotch Bonnet. The prototypical species is the species with which the community is best acquainted with.

The concrete task of nomination–categorization combines the two sets of tools, distinctive features and analogy. The distinctive features can be drawn from the stereotype rather than from any kind of definition; all the features found on the stereotype tend to be considered as essential for the definition of the category, S. Imitation.

Binary and gradual categorization — The categorization made on the basis of essential, distinctive features entails that category predicates are binary: an individual is a member of a category or is not.
If membership within a category is determined simply by stacking any sufficient number of features, category predicates are gradual; the richer the combination of features, the stronger the link with the category. Similarly, a bird which looks more like the prototypical bird than another is “more” a bird than the other one. Category membership becomes gradual, and its top members cannot be transcended; this can be the meaning of the juvenile expression “more X than him, you die”, “cooler than him, you die” in other words, one comes out of the category upwards.

Categorization mistake? — In Alice in Wonderland, the pigeon wrongly categorizes Alice as a serpent:

‘Serpent!’ screamed the pigeon.
‘I’m not a serpent’, said Alice indignantly. ‘Let me alone!’ […]
‘A likely story indeed!’ said the Pigeon in a tone of the deepest contempt. ‘I’ve seen a good many little girls in my time, but never one with such a neck as that! No, no! You’re a serpent; and there is no use denying it. I suppose you’ll be telling me next that you never tasted an egg!’
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland. [1865] [1].

The pigeon wrongly categorizes Alice as a serpent on the basis of the long neck she is developing in this episode. For the pigeon, this characteristic evokes a snake, so that the pigeon fears for its eggs; and in addition, Alice eats eggs, a feature perhaps inessential for the categorization of beings, but which reinforces the pigeon’s conclusion.
From an essentialist view, the pigeon miscategorizes Alice; “having a long neck” is not a specific difference nor a characteristic proper of snakes; giraffes, herons, swans… are also animals with long necks. Actually, the pigeon classifies Alice from a functional point of view. From the pigeon’s perspective, a long neck is a natural sign of danger and it is wise to apply a precautionary principle, that is to shout “snake!” as people shout “wolf!” when perceiving a strange creature lurking behind the house.

2. Technical categorization

The categorization-nomination can be expressed via a simple judgment about an individual “X is a bastard, it shows immediately”; most designations are not the result of a careful examination of the relevant criteria, but if in doubt, the availability of such criteria proves essential. The mushroom picker who has doubts about the nature of the mushroom he has just picked must engage in a careful process of categorization; the same goes for the municipal employee seeking to determine the rights of an individual applying for social security benefits. First of all, they must refer to the criteria enumerated in the relevant reference books: the encyclopedia of mushrooms in the first case; the decrees and dispositions defining the terms and conditions of attribution of social security benefits in the other. A well-conducted process of categorization will lead to reasoned conclusions, such as:

Y is / is not a marasmius oreades, i.e., a Scotch bonnet.
X is / is not a single parent in the administrative sense of the expression.

The investigating parties will then take the relevant action: keeping the mushroom for eating or throwing it away; accepting or denying the application for social security benefits.

Social Categorization — A parent is defined as “a parent or a person who bears the financial burden of one or more children”. “To be single” is defined as: “to be widowed, divorced, separated or unmarried not cohabiting”. The meaning of parent is finally extended to include “pregnant” and “people having the legal responsibility of a child”.

Natural Categorization — Wikipedia describes the Scotch Bonnet as follows:

Marasmius oreades, the Scotch bonnet, is also known as the fairy ring mushroom or fairy ring champignon. The latter name tends to cause some confusion, as many other mushrooms grow in fairy rings (such as the edible Agaricus campestris, the poisonous Chlorophyllum molybdyte, and many others).
Distribution and habitat — Marasmius oreades grows extensively throughout North America and Europe in the summer and autumn (fall) (June – November in the UK), or year-round in warmer climates. It loves grassy areas such as lawns, meadows, and even dunes in coastal areas.
Description — It grows gregariously in troops, arcs, or rings (type II, which causes the grass to grow and become greener). The cap is 1-5 cm across; bell-shaped with a somewhat inrolled margin at first, becoming broadly convex with an even or uplifted margin, but usually retaining a slight central bump — an « umbo »; dry; smooth; pale tan or buff, occasionally white, or reddish tan; usually changing color markedly as it dries out; the margin sometimes faintly lined.
The bare, pallid stem grows up to about 7cm by 5mm in diameter.
The gills are attached to the stem or free from it, fairly distant (rather a distinctive character), and white or pale tan, dropping a white spore-print. The spores, themselves, are 7-10 x 4-6 µ; smooth; elliptical; inamyloid. Cystidia absent. Pileipellis without broom cells.
This mushroom can be mistaken for the toxic Clitocybe rivulosa which lacks an umbo, is white to grey in color, and has closely spaced decurrent gills.
Wikipedia, Marasmius oreades

If the harvested object thing complies with this description, then it is a Scotch Bonnet. Categorization is achieved on the basis of a set of quite different procedures: observing whether the key elements of a definition by description apply to the individual; looking carefully at the picture showing a prototypical Scotch Bonnet; testing the object for its “elasticity under finger pressure”. Some features of the definition can be checked immediately, for example, by looking at the surroundings:

grassy area —grows gregariously in troops, arcs, or rings (ibid.);

or at the mushroom itself:

a slight central bump: an ‘umbo’ (ibid.);

or practicing a small experimentation:

usually changing color markedly as it dries out (ibid.)

These are positive criteria, that, if met, justify the claim “this is a M. oreades”.

Of special importance for the task of categorizing and giving names, are the distinctive criteria; the umbo criteria proves essential, and, for some other species, vital:

This mushroom can be mistaken for the toxic Clitocybe rivulosa which lacks an umbo, is white to grey in color, and has closely spaced decurrent gills (id.)

In contrast the name-derived criteria “fairy ring mushroom” seems to be a necessary, not sufficient criteria, very risky since it is shared by both edible and toxic species. These are key criteria in the case of categorization issues (cf. infra, §3).

Notably, other parts of the definition may remain puzzling for many: “inamyloid. Cystidia absent. Pileipellis without broom cells”. Categorization is commonly achieved on the basis of a selection of criteria. Once categorization has been performed in view of a reasonable set of elements, it is possible to allocate to the object under examination all of the features mentioned in the definition. It is in this way that categorization connected with definition becomes a powerful argumentative machine, argumentation by definition:

it is a Scotch Bonnet, SO “inamyloid, etc.

or, more realistically perhaps:

“Many mushroom connoisseurs are fond of M. oreades” SO, let’s cook it at once!

Over time and with growing experience, this knowledge, manipulations and, most importantly, reasoning will be incorporated in perception, and the mushroom picker will immediately see and recognize Marasmius oreades as such: “look, Scotch Bonnets!”.

 

3. Categorization Issues

The fact that categorization is an argumentation-based process is clearly illustrated by borderline cases, in which the individual or situation under consideration meets some, but not all of the criteria defining the given category.

Let us consider the above-mentioned case of social security benefits, provided by the state to help a single parent to raise a child. The municipal employee receives the following application:

I am currently separated from my husband, who has moved out of the conjugal home, leaving with another woman. We will be taking steps to divorce, but in the meantime, I am living alone with my daughter.

This woman is not divorced, but is apparently engaged in court proceedings, or at least plans to file for divorce. Does she therefore qualify for immediate financial support?

A stasis or conflict of categorization occurs when discourse and counter-discourse are based on conflicting categorizations of the same event, action, or person:

S1_1      — he is a poor guy
S2         — no, he’s a real bastard
S1_2      — no, he is a poor guy, we should pity him

S1_1      — Syldavia is now a great democracy!
S2_1      — how can you talk about democracy in a country that does not respect the rights of minorities?
S1_2      — there are tons of democracies that do not respect the rights of minorities.

Such antagonistic categorizations occur frequently in conversations.
— In dialogue (1), the antagonistic categorizations of the same individual as a poor guy vs. a bastard, are just stated and repeated.

— In dialogue (2), S2_1 rejects the categorization of Syldavia as a democracy, arguing that protecting the right of the minorities is a necessary feature to qualify for being a democracy. S1_2 maintains and backs up his or her appreciation, arguing that democratic regimes, as they are, often fail to respect minority rights. In a very common opposition, S1 categorizes Syldavia on an essentialist criterion, S2 on an empirical criterion, which opens a perfect argumentative situation.

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[1] Quoted after Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, BookVirtual digital edition. P. 71; 72-73. https://www.adobe.com/be_en/active-use/pdf/Alice_in_Wonderland.pdf (11-08-2017).

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1. Definition

Case-by-case argumentation is a technique of inquiry developing in several stages, from questions like “What happened, what can happen?”:

— First, make an inventory of possible cases.
— Second, consider each of these cases.
— Third, sum up the cases considered and see if examination leads to the elimination of all possible cases but one.
— Fourth, conclude that the last remaining case should be chosen or is real and true.

S1       — All this money, either comes from a legacy or is your labor, or has been stolen. If it comes from your labor income or from a legacy, it’ll be easy for you to prove it by showing us the relevant documents. No documents of that kind available? So you stole it.

This argument illustrates the classical law of negation of a disjunction, S. Connectives:

“P or Q or R” is true; but P is false and Q is false; so necessarily, R is true.

Definitions can be given on a case-by-case basis. A crime, such as impiety, might be defined as a lack of respect for either the gods, their priests or their shrines. To accuse someone of impiety (or to exonerate oneself from that crime) one must show that one of the three defining conditions has been disrespected (or not) (after Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23, 1399a5; RR p. 367).

2. Argument by division

Argument by division is illustrated by the following example:

The tyre exploded because it was worn out, because there were nails on the road, or because of a manufacturing defect. Now, the tyre had just been bought and no nails were found in it. So there was bad workmanship. (Perelman, 1977, p. 65)

This shows that the label “argumentation by division” is homonymic: it can refer either to the argumentation by composition or division, or to the case-by-case argument.

3. Refutation of the case-by-case argument

A case-by-case argument is perfectly conclusive if all cases have been considered; it can be rejected on the same case-by-case basis by showing that the enumeration of cases is incomplete:

S2 (as a reply to S1, supra): — No Sir, I just won the lottery, here is the winning ticket!

S3 (as a reply to Perelman, supra) — Well, Sir, here are some other possibilities. The tire might have exploded because it was badly inflated, because there was a pothole on the road, because it hit the curb, because it has been overheated (if the driver happens to have just used a torch to unscrew a wheel bolt), because the brake was glued, because it had been brought into contact with an electrical source, because the car was too loaded or was running too fast… My conclusion is that the investigation must go on.

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Lat. ad quietem arg.; quies, “rest; in politics, peaceful period; neutrality”.

Calm is the emotional and cognitive state of a person having no reason for concern, in particular, having no urgent issue to address.
Serious argumentative situations are inherently tense. The involved participants themselves may wish to wish to get out of it as soon as possible, in order to restore their former, real or imagined tranquility. But it would be best not to have to debate: the burden of proof is the price paid by the proponent for disturbing the tranquility of the group. 

1. Calm and emotionality

The Aristotelian list of socio-rhetorical emotions opposes calm to anger, S. Emotion. In fact, calm may be opposed to any strong positive or negative emotion. Strong emotions are characterized by a marked variation of arousal. Specific actions, speech and arguments might be used to reduce such excitation and re-instill a quieter mood, that is to calm down overexcited people, be they a group of enthusiasts enraged by the prospect of a war, or children throwing a tantrum.

2. Appeal to tranquility

In the political sphere, the ad quietem maneuver has been identified and labelled ad quietem by Bentham (1824; S. Political Arguments). It is defined as an attempt to postpone the discussion of a proposal in the hope that the issue will never be addressed.
Discourses amplifying the following topics are central to this move:

This issue is not so important, already settled, we have other priorities, we’ll discuss that later, you are the only one to see that as a problem…
Leave us alone with these things!

A meta-discussion about the relevance and timing of the discussion is substituted for the discussion itself. Bentham regards this maneuver as fallacious, and classifies it in the category of “fallacies of delay”, directed against freedom of proposition and political innovation.

The appeal to tranquility values calm as a peaceful conservative social state, which may side with apathy, inertia and laziness. Dissatisfied proponents, ready to argue for innovations and changes, speaking possibly in the best common interest, are framed as troublemakers, instilling adrenaline, excitation, anger and anxiety within the group.

Tranquility may be invoked as an argument for not participating in political and social life:

Voting concerns only men, since women — fortunately for their tranquility — do not have political rights.
Clarisse Juranville, [Handbook of Moral Education and Civic Instruction], [1911].[1]

The following interventions are taken from a debate on immigration and French nationality, a quite topical issue at that time. At the very beginning of the discussion A, a female student,  first alludes to the handouts that were distributed to students, then, she  gives a carefully worded and slightly oriented description of the two parties and of their positions. Finally, on the basis of a perfect “leave us in peace” argumentation, she takes an implicit but clear stand in favor of the party holding that “the government currently has other priorities that are more important and that it [is] not necessary to go back to this point”:

 Prof:       then you say nothing stay mute/ you learned nothing from all that, nothing struck you/ — you what are the points/ — so let’s start listing them\ you can give them/ yes/
A:             already two points of view actually, finally
Prof:        there are two points of view you have seen that there was yes/
A:             two parties that oppose well those who want to— as the petition of all the screen actors and filmmakers etcetera who want that: im- well the nationality code be unlimited\ and that all the— undocumented people be regularized\ therefore hmm without any limit
Prof:        hm hm hm hm (1)
A:            and the second point of view is those who say that for there to be a right of the people there must be:: a right of state\ therefore precisely there must be limits and that:: and also these people are those who say that the government currently has other priorities that are more important and that it was not necessary to go back to that point\
Prof:        OK (1)

(1) ratifies the previous turn, without taking a stand.
Corpus On Immigration and French Nationality, Student Workshop.[2]

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[1] Quoted after Clarisse Juranville, Manuel d’éducation morale et d’instruction civique civique [Manual of moral education and civic instruction], Paris: Vve P. Larousse.
Quoted after the 5^e ed., 1^re part Éducation morale [Moral Education]; chap. Le vote [The Vote]; § Les femmes et la politique [Women and Politics]. No Date. No pag.

[2] Corpus Débats sur l’immigration — Débat étudiants [Debates on immigration — Students]. CLAPI data base, http://clapi.univ-lyon2.fr/V3_Feuilleter.php? Num_corpus = 35] (07-30-2013).

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• • Lat. onus probandi; Lat. onus “charge, burden”; probandi, from probare “to make believable, to make accept, to prove”.

The burden of proof plays a fundamental role in argument. It is a conservative principle, like the principle of inertia in physics: “I keep doing business as usual unless I have a good reason to change”. Mill reports an anecdote that vividly illustrates the heaviness of the burden of proof imposed by a conservative society upon social innovators, S. Calm.

The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.([1859]. p. 88)

In court, the burden of proof is expressed by the presumption of innocence “a person is presumed innocent until proved guilty”; that is, the accusation must provide positive evidence of the accused’s guilt. The stabilization of the burden of proof is an institutional decision, organizing the situation; the last word is left to the defendant.

In informal social debates, there is no clear preliminary agreement about who supports the burden of proof, and the proponent can try to shift it onto the adversary. ​​It becomes a stake of the debate.

The doxa can be defined according to the same principle: an endoxon, that is a fragment of the doxa, is best defined not as a “probable” belief, but as a belief which is not subject to the burden of proof, and is, accordingly, considered to be “normal” by the given group. The individual challenging an accepted proposition bear the burden of proof, and has to provide good reasons. This is why Descartes, willing to reject all his pre-established beliefs, must back this radical doubt by the hypothesis of the Evil Genius (Descartes [1641], First Meditation). S. Rules.

When it comes to current trends and fashions, the burden of proof is reversed: “it is new, it has just come out!” is a direct argument for buying the product in question. Good reasons are instead needed for not following fashion, not adopting new theories, and not voting for a new candidate.

Burden of proof and Initiative

Hamblin has redefined the burden of proof in a language game as attributed to the player taking the initiative, that is, making the first move. This definition can be transposed to highly argumentative multi-speaker interactions, where the first turn is generally allocated to the person supporting the proposal to be discussed. In a debate on the legalization of drugs, the facilitator addresses the first question to a supporter, not to an opponent of legalization.

The burden of proof relates to a question and a proposal. If the opponent makes a counter-proposal, he will bear the corresponding burden of proof.

The burden of proof may vary with the group involved, and where the debate takes place. If the doxa of the group is that no prohibition should apply to drug consumption, then, in this group, the supporter of the prohibition will have to justify his stance.

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Arguments based on the beliefs and character of the audience are opposed to those based on the substance of the issue.

In classical rhetorical argumentation, the orator must not only know the case and the law, but also the judge, that is the people he or she intends to address and convince and the opponent he or she is going to face and refute. Before engaging in the quest for arguments, he or she must gather information about the ethos of the audience and of the opponent; that is about their beliefs, habits and general character, including their previous discourses and positions. The orator exploits this information either positively to confirm his or her position, or negatively to reject the opponent’s position:

— The ex datis argument positively exploits the natural ethos of the audience to infer a positive conclusion, S. Ex datis.
— The ad hominem argument exploits the information about the opponent’s discourses and beliefs in a negative way, by exhibiting their inconsistencies, S. Ad hominem.