• • Lat. onus probandi; Lat. onus “charge, burden”; probandi, from probare “to make believable, to make accept, to prove”.

The burden of proof plays a fundamental role in argument. It is a conservative principle, like the principle of inertia in physics: “I keep doing business as usual unless I have a good reason to change”. Mill reports an anecdote that vividly illustrates the heaviness of the burden of proof imposed by a conservative society upon social innovators, S. Calm.

The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.([1859]. p. 88)

In court, the burden of proof is expressed by the presumption of innocence “a person is presumed innocent until proved guilty”; that is, the accusation must provide positive evidence of the accused’s guilt. The stabilization of the burden of proof is an institutional decision, organizing the situation; the last word is left to the defendant.

In informal social debates, there is no clear preliminary agreement about who supports the burden of proof, and the proponent can try to shift it onto the adversary. ​​It becomes a stake of the debate.

The doxa can be defined according to the same principle: an endoxon, that is a fragment of the doxa, is best defined not as a “probable” belief, but as a belief which is not subject to the burden of proof, and is, accordingly, considered to be “normal” by the given group. The individual challenging an accepted proposition bear the burden of proof, and has to provide good reasons. This is why Descartes, willing to reject all his pre-established beliefs, must back this radical doubt by the hypothesis of the Evil Genius (Descartes [1641], First Meditation). S. Rules.

When it comes to current trends and fashions, the burden of proof is reversed: “it is new, it has just come out!” is a direct argument for buying the product in question. Good reasons are instead needed for not following fashion, not adopting new theories, and not voting for a new candidate.

Burden of proof and Initiative

Hamblin has redefined the burden of proof in a language game as attributed to the player taking the initiative, that is, making the first move. This definition can be transposed to highly argumentative multi-speaker interactions, where the first turn is generally allocated to the person supporting the proposal to be discussed. In a debate on the legalization of drugs, the facilitator addresses the first question to a supporter, not to an opponent of legalization.

The burden of proof relates to a question and a proposal. If the opponent makes a counter-proposal, he will bear the corresponding burden of proof.

The burden of proof may vary with the group involved, and where the debate takes place. If the doxa of the group is that no prohibition should apply to drug consumption, then, in this group, the supporter of the prohibition will have to justify his stance.

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Arguments based on the beliefs and character of the audience are opposed to those based on the substance of the issue.

In classical rhetorical argumentation, the orator must not only know the case and the law, but also the judge, that is the people he or she intends to address and convince and the opponent he or she is going to face and refute. Before engaging in the quest for arguments, he or she must gather information about the ethos of the audience and of the opponent; that is about their beliefs, habits and general character, including their previous discourses and positions. The orator exploits this information either positively to confirm his or her position, or negatively to reject the opponent’s position:

— The ex datis argument positively exploits the natural ethos of the audience to infer a positive conclusion, S. Ex datis.
— The ad hominem argument exploits the information about the opponent’s discourses and beliefs in a negative way, by exhibiting their inconsistencies, S. Ad hominem.

A statement can be self-justified: S. Self-Argued Claim. This self-defense is made possible by the multi-layered semantic structure of language, and in particular by the fact that words have an orientation, which may be well grounded on implicit arguments, S. Words as arguments. Just as it can be self-justified, a statement can be self-defeated. A statement is self-defeated when it expresses a logical or material impossibility, or when it involves a pragmatic contradiction between what is said and the act of saying it.

This phenomenon is also called autophagy. Perelman defines autophagy as a contradiction arising from the fact that “the assertion of a rule or a principle is incompatible with the conditions or with the consequences of its assertion or application. Such arguments can be called autophagy. Retaliation is the argument that attacks the rule by highlighting the autophagy” (Perelman 1977, p. 72-73).

The assertion is incompatible with the fact asserted, “the very act implies what the words denies” (id. p. 73). Perhaps the best-known case of autophagy is that of the Cretan Epimenides affirming that “all the Cretans are liars”:

There are no more cannibals, we have eaten the last one.

S1 — All statements can be questioned.
S2 — I question this statement.

Retaliation is a kind of refutation reconstructing a claim as pragmatically self-defeating on the basis of its very content, and in virtue of its own principles. In philosophy, this strategy, known as the epitrope, is applied by Socrates to refute Protagoras’ thesis according to which:

Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they 
are, and of the things which are not, that they are not. (Plato, Theaethetus, 152a; CW, p. 169)

This doctrine exhibits that “most exquisite feature” that if true, it is false:

Socrates: — […] Protagoras admits, I presume, that the contrary opinion about his own opinion (namely, that it is false) must be true, seeing he agrees that all men judge what is.
Theodorus: — Undoubtedly.
Socrates: — And in conceding the truth of the opinion of those who think 
him wrong, he is really admitting the falsity of his own opinion?
Theodorus: — Yes, inevitably.
 (Id., 171a-b; OC, p. 190)

This refutation is based on the principle of non-contradiction; to maintain consistency, a Skeptic will have to doubt this principle.

S. Ad hominem; Ex datis.

 

1. Auctoritas, authority, authoritarian, authoritative

1.1 Lat. Auctoritas

The word authority, and hence elements of the problematic of authority, originates in Latin and Roman laws and custom. According to Benveniste, the words auctor, “author”, auctoritas, “authority” are linked to the primary meaning of the verb augere, “to bring out, to promote” ([1969], no pag.):

In its oldest uses, augeo (1) denotes not the increase in something which already exists, but the act of producing from within itself; a creative act which causes something to arise from a nutrient medium and which is the privilege of the gods or the great natural forces, but not of men (ibid.).
(1) Augeo is the first person singular of the present indicative of augere (CP)

The speech delivered with auctoritas is creative:

The primary sense of augeo is discovered in auctoritas with the help of the basic term auctor. Every word pronounced with authority determines a change in the world; it creates something. This mysterious quality is what augeo expresses, the power which causes plants to grow and brings a law into existence. That one is the auctor who promotes, who alone is endowed with the quality […]. Obscure and potent values reside in this auctoritas, this gift which is reserved to a handful of people who can cause something to come into being and can literally bring into existence (ibid.).

This has nothing to do with what we call now an “argument from authority” supporting a belief about a given reality. Ellul describes the institutional exercise of the auctoritas as follows:

The auctoritas is the quality of the auctor. It gives its support, its approval to the act done by another person. At first it was probably an act of sacred law: an individual makes the legal act, and another validates this act by an intervention which manifests the agreement of the gods. (Ellul [1961], p. 248-249)

The auctoritas is held by the father, the priest, the judge; its use is foundational for family life, as well as for religious and legal life:

The auctoritas appears as the authority of a person who serves as a basis for a legal act. This act has value and efficiency only by the auctoritas. […] The pater [“father”] gives his auctoritas to the marriage of his son. In religious life, the auctoritas of the priest delimits the domain of the sacred, and draws the boundaries of the profane. In juridical life, the auctoritas delimits the domain of what is legitimate, separating it from the illegitimate (ibid).

1.2 Authority, authoritarian, authoritative

The author-authority relation is now broken, an author may have not so much authority, and the person having authority is not necessarily an author.
Authoritarian and authoritarianism develop along a lexical line which stigmatizes authority.
In contrast, authoritative as “possessing recognized or evident authority” (MW, Authority) refers to a positively oriented lexical line associated with authority.

2. Authority as a social issue

The concept of authority is redefined and discussed in all the fields of the human sciences, in relation to submission and in opposition to freedom or freedoms. Major studies on authority, power and totalitarianism marked the last century: in psychology, particularly since the resounding experiences of Stanley Milgram on “Obedience to Authority” (1974); in philosophy, with the study of the “The Authoritarian Personality” of Theodor Adorno (1950); in history with Hannah Arendt’s “The Origin of Totalitarianism” (1951); in sociology with Max Weber (1922), whose distinctions between traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal authority are now a part of common knowledge.

In our society, basic authority is expressed through various explicit standards regulations and norms, enforced by law, backed by the police and the legal institutions, in relation with the current political authorities.
Organizations have to define a mode of authority that they exercise within their field of competence, and to which their members must subscribe.
Like the definition and exercise of authority, resistance to illegitimate authority is a never-ending enterprise.

3. Authority and Argumentation Studies

3.1 Position

Along with the issue of authority, the study of discourse engages in a multidisciplinary reflection on the epistemic level (non-truth conditional conditions of acceptability of statement); on social influence (management of the powers of discourse); on interpersonal relationships (interactional manifestations and effects of the relative positions of authority of the participants).
In the specific field of argumentative rhetoric, the notion of authority is considered in relation to speech: In which identifiable ways, from implicit evocation to explicit invocation, can authority invest a statement? What is an appeal to authority? What are the types of critical responses to authoritarian or authoritative speeches?

To the extent that it refers to reason and free inquiry, argumentation is antithetical to authority and violence, even if they avail themselves of legal and even moral legitimacy. Argumentative speech, however, operates on a knife-edge. As a critical discourse, it denounces the discourse of authority; as strong affirmative discourse, it impacts upon the others’ minds and aspires, in the name of rationality, to change the representations of the audience. Argumentation has to find a way to be authoritative, without being authoritarian.
Claiming to be the instrument of reason, argumentation studies develop towards reflection on how this argumentative reason interacts with legitimate social authority, a fundamental element of social life, S. Agreement; Role; Persuasion; Evaluation. The ideal of rational persuasion and consensus served by argumentation is invoked, but, on the other hand, the decision rests with the legal power that be, and that the best argument may or may not be reflected in the voter’s decision.

3.2 Forms of argumentation appealing to authority

— Basically, the argument from authority explicitly quotes a hetero-attributed authority. It is sometimes specified according to the nature of the source holding the authority: consensus, ad antiquitatem, ad numerum… (see infra).
— Authority, or lack of authority, may be self-attributed, incarnated and manifested in the speaker’s speech and attitudes, S. Ethos; Modesty.
— The authority of the testimony is supported by the character and reputation of the witness, and is thus connected with ethos. The criticism of the testimony is to be compared with that of the expertise.
— The authority of the precedent rests upon an earlier judgment (in all the meanings of the word judgment). The cause may also have been decided in the fable or parable; S. Example; Exemplum.
— Dialectic problematizes discourses supported by various kinds of social authority, S. Doxa.

The following paragraphs develop different forms and argumentative uses of authority.

4. The speaker’s inherent authority

4.1 Performative auctoritas

he speaker holds a unique form of authority, the auctoritas linked to the performativity of different classes of statements. According to Austin [1962], the performative utterance produces the reality that it states: by saying, “I promise”, I promise. The speaker is the auctor of the reality created, her promise.

4.2 Taking their word for it

If a speaker says, “hello!”, even if his friendliness is actually feigned, the default belief is that this is true friendly behavior. Ordinarily, no argument is needed to make somebody believe something, it must simply be stated; as a general rule, the speaker’s words are be taken at face value; what she says is believed and acted upon without hesitation. When somebody is asked “What time is it?”, the answer is accepted, no need to check the respondent’s watch.
Assertions about inner states, “I feel in good shape today”, are, by default, accepted without question, as are assertions made by individuals with special access to the facts under discussion (witnesses). If having authority means having power to successfully transmit one’s representations to the listeners, this is the most common form of linguistic authority, based on the preference for agreement.

This basic linguistic authority combines with other kinds of social authorities, which are attributed to the speaker according to the various social identities and roles he or she plays. These identities and roles cumulate in the shown authority of the authoritative speaker, precisely as defined by the theory of ethos.

Nonetheless, the preference for agreement is not automatic; recipients routinely disagree, and if not, they may be to blame.

5. Argument of legal authority

Authority, in the most common sense of the term, is defined by its claim to compliance and obedience; orders are obeyed by virtue of their source, without being systematically backed by a lengthy justification.

Context: L holds the power and means of coercion in domain D
L tells O to do F (F is in the area of D)
O does F.

The ideal of authoritarian authority is to exert a direct, causal influence on the behavior of others. If the tyrant’s subjects are not submissive to his good reasons or charisma, she can still opt for a hard punishment or a sweet reward.
Radical authority demands that the person who receives the order obey “like a corpse” (perinde ac cadaver), according to the metaphor Ignatius of Loyola uses to illustrate the perfection of the virtue of obedience. For the person who is not a member of the organization, to obey in this way is to reduce oneself to the state of an instrument by renouncing free examination and free will. For a member of the organization, it is simply to trust the goal-related rationality of the institution as such.

Conversely, orders are invoked as a sufficient justification for action: “I only obeyed the orders”. Such an appeal to authority is diametrically opposed to the philosophy of argumentation, which universalizes the imperative of justification and individual responsibilities. It can be challenged by appealing to the international conventions on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention.

Everyday democratic authority is the authority of legal and regulatory norms, backed by the monopoly of legal violence, enforced by the powers that be, and implemented by the persons legally in charge. In such a context, the basic expression of a valid legal and democratic argument from authority can be schematized as follows:

Context: There is a system of norms N. One of these norms empowers a judge to enforce this system and gives her the means of coercion necessary for its application.
Person P has done action A, and somebody complains.
The judge assesses, in a procedure conforming to the requirements of N, whether or not A constitutes a breach of a norm.
If it does, the judge sentences P to F, considering that R (justification of the decision).
Willingly or not, P complies with F.

Court sentences are about “making do”, not “making believe”, that is, convincing the convict. The recipients of the judge’s good reasons are much more the judge’s colleagues, or P‘s counsel, than P herself. P may be convinced of the legitimacy of the punishment by the good reasons given by the judge, but this psychological condition is not necessary. P must only comply with the judge’s decision, willingly or not. One cannot ask everyone to share the theory of redeeming punishment, and to gladly submit to a condemnation, even a democratic one.
Authority cannot force someone to believe something. But, as belief is manifest in words and behaviors, “make do” may be indistinguishable from “make believe”: “kneel down, pray, and you will believe.”

6. Classical argument of authority

6.1 Shown authority and quoted authority

Critical studies of argumentation draw a distinction within ethotic authority, rejecting as fallacious its seductive charismatic component (shown authority), to discuss only its expert component (quoted authority) S. Ethos.
In the case of ethotic authority, the speaker is the source of authority. Authority is « self-authorized » or self-founded. What is said is believed or obeyed because such and such a person says so.
In the case of the classical argument from authority, the speaker legitimizes her argument by quoting a preexisting, external authoritative, source: authority is hetero-founded. The technical study of this hetero-founded authority lies within the more general framework of discourse repetition, reformulation, reinterpretation, S. Resumption of speech.

6.1 Rhetorical argument of authority and the authorities stores

Authority is at the foundation of topos No. 11 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

Another line of argument is founded upon some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject, or on one like it, or contrary to it. Such a proof is most effective if everyone has always decided thus; but if not everyone, then at any rate, most people; or if all, or most, wise or good men have thus decided, or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or people whose decision they cannot gainsay because they have complete control over them, or those whom it is not seemly to gainsay, as the gods, or one’s father, or one’s teachers.
(Rhet., II, 23, 1398b15-30, RR, p. 365)

The “decisions” to be made can be intellectual or judicial. On this basis, later rhetoricians list the authorities likely to be called upon to strengthen the position of a party. In the judicial field, the Rhetoric to Herennius proposes ten “formulae” [loci comunes, “common places”, S. Topos) “to amplify an accusation”:

The first commonplace is taken from authority, when we call to mind of what great concern the matter under discussion has been to the immortal gods, to our ancestors, or kings, states, barbarous nations, sages, the Senate; and again, especially how sanction has been provided in these matters by laws. (Ad Her., II, 48)

These authorities are distinct from the judicial precedent, and can support any form of speech. Quintilian, for the same judicial situation, considers as authoritative,

whatever can be adduced as expressing the opinions of nations or people, or of wise men, eminent political characters, or illustrious poets. 37. Nor will common sayings, established by popular belief, be without their use in this way (IO, V, 11, 36-37).

This authorities store will be extensively used, with some adjustments; Gods should read God:

— Authority of Books, tradition, ancestors (ad antiquitatem); the argument of Progress is opposed to this form of authority.
— The famous verses, proverbs, fables, parables…
— The Chinese, the Americans…
— Authority of the media, professionals, scientists, professors…
— Truths from the mouths of children, the rich, the poor…
— Authority of large numbers, prestige of the majority consensus, of a particular group…

These forms of authority are cumulative: the scientific authority of the Master is sometimes mitigated by the charismatic authority of the Guru.

All these varieties of authority can be quoted; some can be incarnated by the speaker as a Chinese, an expert, a poor, a member of a distinguished community.

6.2 Invoked authority: the classical argument from authority

The classical argument of authority exploits an authority taken from the authority store. It is based on a quotation, and can be schematized as follows (see Hamblin 1970: 224 et seq.):

S:   — A is an authority, A says that P; therefore, P is true and indisputable.

Or, put simply, “A says that P”, when the context clearly establishes that A is an authority, and that S itself defends P, or a position cooriented with P.
The prototypical example in this category is that of Pythagoras quoted by his disciples, “he said it himself” (“ipse dixit”). Pythagoras has of course nothing to do with the matter; it is the speaker who quotes him as an authority.

Authority can justify ways of doing, beliefs, or combine both:

S:     — That’s how they hold their fork and knife in New York.
S:     — The Master said that pity is fallacious
S:     — I never give money to homeless people, I read in a book that’s just encouraging laziness.

6.3 Evoked authority

When analyzing discourse backed by an external authority one must consider the fact that the quotation is not always direct and open. The speaker can also proceed by allusion referring indirectly to a discourse, considered as authoritative because dominant, prestigious or associated with an expert. By subtly using the expressions “discursive formation”, “ideological state apparatuses”; “great other” … I suggest my knowledge and complicity respectively with the thinking of Michel Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, etc.

Quoting an authority in support of a proposition has ethotical repercussions. When the Greek messenger Orestes says to Pyrrhus, “All the Greeks speak to you by my voice” [1], he does more than quoting the Greeks, he incarnates the authority he quotes. Self-quotation does not grant much authority to what is said, quoting a prestigious authority however does improve the personal authority of the speaker. The Master’s voice comes from the speaker’s mouth, the speaker identifies with Him, reframes the exchange accordingly, and hopes that the audience will follow.

The philosophy of argumentation invokes an ideal of exposure to refutation, according to which it is perfectly legitimate to argue by authority, if the argument is explicit, if one knows exactly who said what and when. This rational requirement of making explicit is opposed to the burying of authority into the depths of discourse in order to shield it against a possible refutation.

7. Expert authority

From a logical-scientific point of view, a discourse is sound if it collects and articulates true propositions, in order to deduce a new true proposition, according to procedures accepted in the relevant community. In argumentation, the acceptance of a statement or a global vision is based on authority if it is not based upon a review of the good reasons supporting it, or upon a direct examination of the statement’s conformity with things themselves, but relies on the source and channel through which the information was communicated.
The argument from authority substitutes peripheral, indirect evidence for direct evidence or examination, which is considered inaccessible, too costly, or too tiring. Such daily practice is justified by a principle of economy, division of labor, or simply because someone else was more qualified, or in a better position to tell how events have gone. It works quite well and rationally, as a default argument, which can be edited when more information becomes available. Seen from this perspective, authority subtracts nothing and nobody from dispute, it simply shifts the burden of proof to the person who challenges it, S. Dialectic.

The argument of authority is therefore a form of argumentation when it exposes the authority which it claims. One could oppose the authoritarian support of a statement, as backed by the socio-discursive position of the speaker, to the argument of authority, hetero-founded, whose source is clearly exposed. In other words, when invoked to open the debate, the argument of authority is neither authoritarian nor fallacious, but it is if it claims to close the discussion, S. Modesty.

The counter-discourse method provides a principle of evaluation and criticism of arguments from authority. Referring to the structure of the argument of authority, discourses against authorities are directed as follows.

7.1 Against the quotation itself

S: — A says that Q

The rebuttal challenges the quote as such or the relevance of the quotation to the present discussion. This move preserves the status of A as an authority.

— A did not say Q; Q does not conform to the letter of what A actually said.
— Q is quoted out of context.
— Q is a misquote of A; it contains elements of reformulation and mischievous
                    reorientation.
— As meant by A, Q is not relevant to the present issue (Q is misinterpreted)

7.2 Against the authority quoted

— A has changed her mind, as testified by her more recent statements.

— A has no direct evidence, so A is not a real authority on point Q.

— There is no consensus among experts; “A⁺, a greater expert, rejects Q”.

— By application of the ad hominem argument to the source A: Q is incompatible, contradictory, with other assertions (or prescriptions) of A.

— A has spoken outside of his area of ​​expertise; she is not an expert in the precise field referred to by Q-type claims.

— A is not an expert, his or her views are outdated;

— A is mistaken, and has often been mistaken in the past.

— A is biased, manipulated, paid to say what she says.

— A can be dismissed by a personal attack (ad personam): “A is not an expert but a jester”.

7.3 Argumentations establishing expert authority

One can distinguish between two distinct strategies dealing with authority: arguments establishing an authority as such, and arguments exploiting an established authority. This opposition has a general value, S. Causality, Definition, Analogy. Discourses (7.1) against authority attacks the use made of authority, whereas discourse (7.2) attacks the authority itself.
It follows that discourses (7.2) against authority mirrors a discourse defining a legitimate expert:

A speaks in his sphere of competence, and is aware of the state of the matter; A‘s system is coherent; A has direct evidence, serious experts agree with what A says; the previous anticipations made by A are proven correct.

7.3 Against the person who submits to authority

The interaction framework shifts the focus from the statement of authority itself to the relationship of authority. Criticism is now aimed at the pusillanimity of the interlocutor.

7.4 Counter-argumentation ad rem

Finally, the opponent can argue that direct arguments can be opposed to Q, that is argument dealing with the matter at hand, and drawn not from authority but from scientific reason, or from historical knowledge, considered as superior to lazy appeals to authority.

8. Refutative uses of authority

8.1 Refutative uses of positive authority

The preceding paragraphs address authority inasmuch as it serves as support for an affirmation. Such an authoritative assertion  can be used to rebut a claim:

S1:      — P!
S2:      — X says the opposite, and she knows what she is talking about!

If X and S1 share the same affiliation, the refutation combines authority and ad hominem.
Positive authority can also be used to destroy not the content of what is said, but the claim to authority and therefore the competence of the person holding the discourse:

S1:     — P!
S2:      — That’s exactly what Perelman says!
           — We’ve known that since Aristotle!

Thought is an inner dialogue? We’ve known that since Plato! [2]

8.2 Negative authority: “Reductio ad Hitlerum”

Negative authority is used to rebut a claim in the following case:

S1:     — P!
S2:      — H says exactly the same thing!

H is a person, a party rejected by the speech community to which S2 belongs, or by the third parties arbitrating the discussion, or possibly S1; H is an anti-authority, an anti-model, S. Imitation.
In the case of a positive authority, the proponent connects the statement with an authority. Here, the connection of the disputed statement with the negative authority is made by the opponent.

Hitler is the paragon of the negative authorities, whose words cannot be repeated. The reductio ad Hitlerum puts an end to any argument.

Last year, you may recall, a number of financial-industry barons went wild over very mild criticism from President Obama. They denounced Mr. Obama as being almost a socialist for endorsing the so-called Volker rule, which would simply prohibit banks backed by federal guarantees from engaging in risky speculation. And as for their reaction to proposals to close a loophole that lets some of them pay remarkably low taxes — well, Stephen Schwarzman, chairman of the Blackstone Group, compared it to Hitler’s invasion of Poland.
Paul Krugman, “Panic of the Plutocrats”, 2011.[2]

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[1] Racine, Andromache, 1667. I, 2. Quoted after: http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/French/AndromacheActI.htm#anchor_Toc169494154 (11-08-2017)

[2] SOCRATES: Very good. Now by ‘thinking’ do you mean the same as I do?
THEAETETUS: What do you mean by it?
SOCRATES: A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its judgment. So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?
THEAETETUS: I agree with that.

Plato, Theaetetus, 189e-190d. Translated by M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat. In Plato, Complete Works. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by John M. Cooper; Associate Editor D. S. Hutchinson. Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997.

[2] www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/opinion/panic-of-the-plutocrats.html? _r = 1&ref=global-home (11-08-2017)

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Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss the effects of argumentation on the basis of an opposition between to persuade and to convince, the former being a local achievement involving a particular audience, while the latter is a global achievement involving the universal audience. The functional definition of argumentation provided at the opening of the Treatise, however, does not use these concepts but speaks of “adherence of minds” and “assent”. In this passage, argumentation is seen as an activity aiming “to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence” to “theses” that are “presented for its assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 4).

The concept of assent refers to Newman’s Grammar of Assent (1870).

The Stoic theory of knowledge defines assent as a voluntary act of the soul which occurs when the soul receives a true impression; this process implies a pre-established harmony between the will and the mind. “The soul wants truth”, and truth is index sui, its own mark. The mark of the true impression is the assent granted to it. The skeptics reject this harmony between true representation and assent; truth is not capable of self-certification, that is, one can give its assent to false representations.

The suspension or abstention of assent, is the basis of the skeptical method to achieve tranquility (ataraxia):

The Skeptic Way is called […] aporetic either, as some say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a loss as to whether to assent or dissent. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, I, iii)

Assent may be granted or refused by an act of will:

I think it a very great exploit to resist one’s perceptions, to withstand one’s vague opinions, to check one’s propensity to give assent to propositions; […] Carneades achieved a Herculean labor when, as it had been a savage and formidable monster, he extracted assent, that is to say, vague opinion and rashness from our minds. (Cicero, Ac. II, 34; Trans. Yonge, p. 74)

Skepticism characterizes the argumentative situation as a standoff between two equal (isosthenic) and opposed discursive forces, which imposes a suspension of assent, S. Force; Stasis.

Common language considers assent to be an action. Assent can be given or suspended, in the same way that one can give or suspend an agreement or an authorization. From a rhetorical point of view, the problematic of assent makes the concept of persuasion more complex, by granting some activity to the recipient. Whilst people are passively persuaded, they actively grant their assent. This maintains a balance between the speaker and the audience, in that the speaker’s effort to persuade his or her audience corresponds the audience’s capacity to grant or to refuse his or her assent. Withheld assent plays a role in all varieties of rational exchanges, as it brings about a state of doubt which characterizes the third party position, S. Roles.

The assent granted in regard to a proposition is characterized by varying degrees, as one moves from opinion to belief and knowledge:

— The lowest degree corresponds to opinion, defined as a belief accompanied by the awareness that there are other equally valid opinions.
— The intermediate degree is that of belief. There are other beliefs, considered not false, but less valid than one’s own belief.
— The strongest degree is that of conviction. The convinced party considers that the proposition to which he or she adheres is true and that opposing arguments are fallacious, perverse or insane.

According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, persuading produces belief, while convincing produces a generalized belief, defining social, legitimized knowledge.

The long history of argumentation studies cuts across the history of rhetoric, dialectic and logic. Argumentation studies appeared as autonomous field only after the Second World War; it is nevertheless possible to note inflections during this short history.

1. The long history: dialectics, logic, rhetoric

Greek and Latin Antiquity ­— From the perspective of classical disciplines, argumentation studies are related to logic, “art of thinking correctly”; to rhetoric, “art of speaking well and addressing a group”; and to dialectics, “art of interacting well, articulating one’s intervention and thought with those of others”. This triad is the basis of the system in which argumentation was conceptualized, from the time of Aristotle until the late nineteenth century. Argumentation is seen as a theory of convincing reasoning in ordinary language. The central issues are argument scheme theory, and validity and soundness theory, depending on the quality of the premises and the reliability of the principles used to derive conclusions from these premises. S. Dialectic; Logic; Rhetoric.

Modern Times — Walter Ong has commented upon the decline of dialectical practices (1958) since the Renaissance, the reduction of rhetoric to figures of speech and considerations of literary style, and the critique and rejection of the Aristotelian logic as an exclusive or essential instrument of scientific thought. New scientific methods based on observation and experimentation, making increasing use mathematics, are looked for.

Late nineteenth, early twentieth century — At the end of the nineteenth century rhetorical argument is delegitimized as a source of knowledge. Logic is formalized and becomes a branch of mathematics. The tradition of argumentation studies remains active in law and theology.

2. A symptom: the titles

In French, until the publication of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation, the books entitled Argumentation were pamphlets containing arguments about specific topics, not theoretical books about argumentation in general, as shown by their complete titles:

1857 – Discussion About Etherization Considered from the Standpoint of Medical responsibility — Argumentation. By Marie Guillaume Alphonse Devergie.
1860 – Arguments on Administrative Law of the Municipal Administration. By Adolphe Chauveau.
1882 – The Issue of Water Before the Medical Society of Lyon. Argumentation in Response to Mr. Ferrand. By Mr Chassagny. P.-M. Perrellon.
1922 – Argumentation of the Polish Proposal About the Border in the Industrial Section of High-Silesia.

The substance and field of the argument is specified by an additional subtitle: argumentation on, about … The title Argumentation corresponds to modern titles such as “An Essay on —” or “Thesis”; it refers to a textual genre. Thus, it seems that the emergence of the genre “[Theoretical work on] Argumentation” came with the disappearance of the genre « Argumentation [on —]« .

In English – Toulmin’s book “The Uses of Argument” (1958) comes apparently in a traditional line of books titled “Argument”. Some of these books offer “an argumentation” in support of a position, such as the following:

Yale C., Some Rules for the Investigation of Religious Truth; and Some Specimens of Argumentation in its Support, 1826.

Others are textbooks for composition and debate teaching:

Brewer E. C., A Guide to English Composition: And the Writings of Celebrated An- cient and Modern Authors, to Teach the Art of Argumentation and the Development of Thought, 1852
Foster, W. T., Argumentation and Debating, 1917.
Baird A. C., Argumentation, Discussion and Debate, 1950.
Lever R., The Arte of Reason, Rightly Termed Witcraft; Teaching a Perfect Way to Argue and Dispute, 1573.

The best known may be:

Whately R., Elements of Rhetoric Comprising an Analysis of the Laws of Moral Evidence and of Persuasion, with Rules for Argumentative Composition and Elocution, 1828.

In the first half of the twentieth century, many such books are published, where didactic purposes mingle with more theoretical considerations. But the work of Toulmin does not fit at all in this tradition, linked to the practices of the Speech Communication Departments or of the English Departments in the United States. No book of that kind is listed in his bibliography, and he quotes no work coming from the field of rhetoric.

Actually, Toulmin and Perelman both break with a modern tradition and establish a new foundation in the treatment of the concept of argument.

3. 1958 and after: Constitution of the field of argumentation studies

3.1 A key date, 1958 

Chaïm Perelman, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, Traité de l’Argumentation. La Nouvelle Rhétorique = 1969, The New Rhetoric — A Treatise on Argumentation.
Stephen E. Toulmin, 1958, The Uses of Argument.

These two titles are the best known in an impressive constellation of works that all help define, positively or negatively, the new field of argumentation studies.

— On “Public Relations”: a non rhetorical and non argumentative perspective on persuasion:

Vance Packard, 1957, The Hidden Persuaders.

— On the language of propaganda:

Sergei Chakhotine, 1939, Le Viol des foules par la Propagande Politique.
= 1940, The Rape of the Masses – The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda.
Jean-Marie Domenach 1950. La Propagande Politique [Political Propaganda]

— In law:

Theodor Viehweg, 1953, Topik und Jurisprudenz. Ein Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung = 1993, Topics and Law. A Contribution to Basic Research in Law.

— On the rhetorical foundations of literature and Western culture:

Ernst Robert Curtius, 1948, Europäische Litteratur und Lateinisches. Mittelalter.
= 1953, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages.

— An historical and systematic reconstruction of the field of rhetoric

Heinrich Lausberg, 1960, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik.
= 1998, Handbook of Literary Rhetorik. Foundation for Literary Study.

— A history of the adventures of dialectic and rhetoric at the time of the Renaissance

Walter J. Ong, 1958, Ramus. Method and the Decay of Dialogue.

3.2 Extended theories of argumentation

These theories have been developed since the 1970s, mainly in French:

— In a linguistic perspective:

Oswald Ducrot, 1972, Dire et ne pas Dire [To Say and Not To Say] — 1973, La Preuve et le Dire [Proving and Saying] — & al. 1980, Les Mots du Discours [The Words of Discourse] Jean-Claude Anscombre et Oswald Ducrot, 1983, L’Argumentation dans la Langue [Argumentation within Language]

— In a discursive and cognitive perspective:

Jean-Blaise Grize, 1982, De la Logique à l’Argumentation [From Logic to Argumentation]

3.3 The dialectical and critical approaches

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca work is considered to be a revival of rhetorical argumentation, originating in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Along the same line, Hamblin’s foundational work revived argumentation as a dialectical and critical thinking, based on concept of fallacies, and originating in Aristotle’s On Sophistical Refutations:

Charles L. Hamblin, 1970, Fallacies

3.4. The Pragma-Dialectical trend

From the 1980s on, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst have developed the “Pragma-dialectical” approach. They recast the study of argumentation in terms of speech acts, linguistic pragmatics and a new conception of dialectic. They elaborated a powerful system of guidelines for the evaluation of arguments as a system of rules for the rational resolution of differences of opinion, S. Norms; Rules; Evaluation.

Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 1984, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions A Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed Towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion.
Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 1992, Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies.
Frans H. van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst, 2004, A Systematic Theory of Argumentation – The Pragma-Dialectical Approach.

Since 1986, every four years, a reference conference on argumentation is organized in Amsterdam. The series of Proceedings propose an up to date vision of the discipline (van Eemeren & al. (1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010).

3.5 The Informal Logic trend

The “Informal Logic” of Anthony Blair, Ralph Johnson, Douglas Walton and John Woods connects argumentation studies to a logic and to a philosophy which take into account the ordinary dimensions of speech and reasoning. The focus is on the evaluation of the arguments and their educational applications in the development of critical thinking. The concept of argument scheme has been defined so as to integrate their corresponding counter-arguments, and developed on this basis a new approach to argument criticism.

Howard Kahane, 1971, Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric The Use of Reason in Everyday Life.
Ralph H. Johnson & J. Anthony Blair, 1977, Logical Self Defense.
Ralph H. Johnson, 1996, The Rise of Informal Logic.
Anthony Blair & Ralph H. Johnson, 1980, Informal Logic – The First International Symposium.
John Woods & Douglas Walton, 1989, Fallacies. Selected Papers 1972-1982.
Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno, 2008, Argumentation Schemes.
Anthony Blair, 2012, Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation.

3.6 Argumentation and ordinary interactions

The Pragma-Dialectic and the Informal Logic schools of argumentation give special importance to dialog. The first papers integrating the perspective of conversation and interaction analysis are found in:

Robert Cox & Charles A. Willard (eds), 1982, Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research.
Jacques Moeschler (1985). Argumentation et Conversation. [Argumentation and Conversation] Frans H. van Eemeren & al. (eds), 1987, Proceedings of the [ISSA] Conference on Argumentation 1986.

4. Relations with other disciplines

The leading research programs maintain different relationships with the rhetorical, dialectical and logical heritage, as well as with language studies philosophy and education. The table below tries to give an idea of these links.

0: no significant link

+: the number of stars indicates the importance of the link

 

	New Rhetoric	Arg. within Language	Natural Logic	Fallacies (Hamblin)	Pragma- dialectics	Informal Logic
Rhetoric	+++	+	+	0	++	+
Dialectic	+	0	0	+++	+++	+++
Classical Logic	0	0	+++	+++	++	+++
Grammar, Linguistics	0	+++	++	0	++	+
Philosophy	+++	+	+	++	+	+++
Teaching, Education	++	0	0	0	+	+++

5. Dialogues between main trend theories

The arrows represent commonalities, solidarities or affiliations between different schools

6. Argumentation studies, argumentation scholars:
How to name the field and its specialists?

The talk about of the “revival of the field of argumentation” in the fifties should be taken with precaution. Firstly, the expression is ambiguous: the talk is not about the field of argumentative practices; but about the theory of argumentation, the meta-language used to study this practice. Secondly, it is also slightly simplistic: although discontinuous, reflections on argumentation have been underway for more than two millennia, not half a century. The point is that, since the fifties, a learning community has formed around a vast and differentiated corpus of studies taking for object a set of practices directly characterized as argumentative.

How to designate a field of study, its object and its specialists? The situation is clear when each of these distinct realities is designated by a specific term. This is the case for example with the economists, specialists of economics, whose object is the study of economy (production and consumption of goods and services). But the term argumentation refers to both the object of study, as in “everyday argumentation”, and to the study itself, when, especially in the titles of books where “argumentation” shortens “theory of argumentation”.

The spectacular appearance of papers and books entitled “… Argumentation …” hides a deeper reality, the change in the disciplinary status of logic. All ancient books entitled Logic, dealing with the logic of terms, quantifiers, connectors, analyzed and non-analyzed propositions, etc., are actually theories, logic-based treatises on argumentation, as, for example the Port-Royal Logic, or The Art of Thinking ([1662]). Basically, we now use the word argumentation to refer to a field of study or to a theoretical book because, since the mathematization of logic in the late nineteenth century, the title Logic can only be used in the domain of formal logic, and is no longer available as referring to natural language argument. Exceptions are rare. In French, one can think of works such as the Elements of classical logic (François Chenique 1975, vol. I: The art of thinking and judging; t II. The art of reasoning), or especially Jacques Maritain’s Introduction to Logic ([1923]), which is perhaps one of the last books providing under the heading Logic a traditional “art of thinking”, inspired by neo-Thomist philosophy. This logic is, in this respect, the first in the series of “non formal”, “substantial”, “natural” logics… that flourished at the end of the last century; it is a treatise of argumentation as a theory of logical reasoning within natural language.

So we are left with the problem of naming the field by a single unambiguous term. Following the example of polemology, that is war studies, it might be argumentology. Along the same line, the corresponding professionals would be called argumentologists, a figure clearly distinct from that of the arguers. But these words sound jargon-ridden and slightly ridiculous. Anyway, usage will have the last say, and presently nobody seems to feel an urgent need for such words. Argumentology does not appear in the monumental and fundamental Proceedings on the Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation of 1999; one case in 2003, one in 2007; and no occurrence of argumentologist or any derivative name of that kind (van Eemeren & al. (eds.), 1999, 2003, 2007).

The explosion in theoretical questioning of the notion of argumentation at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries (van Eemeren & al. 1996; 2014), and the multiplicity of disciplines interested in the topic encourage the characterization of the domain according to an underlying system of key features, issues and orientations.

1. Key issues about the role of language

The following table proposes a possible organization of the field according to the role of language and the kind of speech situation which is given theoretical prominence. This hypothesis makes it possible to represent the various concepts of argument as a tree structure, where the nodal points correspond to research questions, or crossroad questions, which articulate the field. Such a representation illustrates that what could at first sight seem to be an arbitrary dispersion of options, in fact reflects the necessity of taking the complex range of argumentative situations into account. A vision of argumentation might be characterized as a structured choice between the various options opened by the following questions (other possible points of departure are suggested in §2).

Table : Key features and issues
about the role of language in argumentation

­­­

	as a thought activity (2)	study of reasoning as a pure psycho-cognitive process (2a)
					form of language (7)
		extended (5)
					general form of discourse (8)
				non polyphonic (11)	logic, as an art of thinking (9a)
argumentation (1)			monologue (9)
	as a linguistic cognitive activity (3)			polyphonic (12)	“bene dicendi” rhetoric (10a)
		situated (6)
				without turn-taking (13)	persuasion rhetoric (11a)
			dialogue (10)		dialogue logic (15)
				with turn- taking (14)
					interaction (16)
	as a multimodal activity (4)

 

---

(1) Argumentation

(2) AS A THOUGHT ACTIVITY:
             Study of reasoning as a psycho-cognitive process

 

(3) AS A LINGUISTIC-COGNITIVE ACTIVITY

(5) Extended                                              

(7)  Form of language:       “ARGUMENTATION WITHIN LANGUAGE” 

(8) General form of discourse:       “NATURAL LOGIC”

(6) Situated

(9) monologue 

non polyphonic:       LOGIC AS AN ART OF THINKING   

polyphonic:       « BENE DICENDI” RHETORIC

 

(10) dialogue

without  turn-taking:       RHETORIC OF PERSUASION

 with turn-taking:       DIALOGUE LOGIC
                                          INTERACTION                      

---

(2) vs. (3) vs. (4): The cognitive, linguistic and multimodal dimensions of argument

Various general questions might be taken as points of departure, and each question would produce a different mapping of the field. This map is born of the general question: is argumentation basically a language activity or a cognitive activity — or both?

If argumentation were defined as a pure activity of thought, expressed in a perfectly transparent language, argumentation studies would correspond to a psychology of reasoning without language.

But, in the same way as everyday argumentation, mathematical thinking and scientific reasoning require a language. Language-based approaches to argumentation deal with the cognitive component within the linguistic component. Such approaches are compatible with various positions on the question of thinking and reasoning. Classical logic, Natural Logic, Informal Logic and cog-nitive approaches stress the articulation of thought and language in the argumentative activity.

Argumentation is unanimously considered to be a discursive practice. The consideration of still and moving images raises questions about how argumentative meanings are able to invest nonverbal semiotic supports. Research on argumentation in working situations also demands that we take the signifying intention steering both the action and the argument into account. In both cases, it is necessary to reconsider what exactly constitutes a well-built corpus within the field of argumentation.

 

(5) vs. (6) — Argumentation as a linguistic-cognitive activity: Extended or situated?

Should argumentation, as a linguistic-based cognitive process, be considered a local or a generalized phenomenon?

 

(7) vs. (8) — Extended argumentation: Saussurian langue or discourse?

Two different theories have extended the concept of argumentation to all linguistic activities, the theory of Argumentation within Language (Anscombre, Ducrot 1983) and the theory of argumentation as a Natural Logic (Grize 1982).

The former generalizes the concept of argumentation at the level of language (of Saussurian langue), whereas the latter enacts the same generalization at the level of speech (parole).

(7) Argumentation, as a condition on well-formed linguistic chain {E1, E2}:
S. Orientation

(8) Argumentation as a schematization of the situation

 

(9) vs. (10) — Situated argumentation: Monologue or dialogue?

If argumentation is limited to some characteristic forms of discourse, then in which kind of discourse is it best exemplified, in monological discourse, or in dialogue?

 

(11) vs. (12) — Monologue: Logic or rhetoric?

(11) Logic

(12) Bene dicendi rhetoric, S. Rhetoric

 

(13) vs. (14) — Dialogue: With or without turn-taking?

According to the externalization principle (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, p. 10), dialogic theories consider either that dialogue is the basic form of argumentative activity, or that it is in the form of a dialogue that argumentative mechanisms of argument, can be most clearly seen.

Within this set of dialogic approaches, there are distinctions. Has the dialogue an exchange structure or not? Does the dialogue admit turns of speech? Do all the participants have equal possibility of taking the floor in the same conditions?

(13) Argumentation, a dialog without exchange structure: The rhetorical address

The rhetorical address is a special kind of dialogue, having a polyphonic structure; the voices of the others, especially the voice of the opponent, are re-built into the discourse of the speaker who holds the floor. The audience will give its answer only later and indirectly, as a judgment on the case or a decision on the policy.

(15) vs. (16) — A turn-taking dialogue: Dialogue logic or natural interaction?

In the case of a dialog in which there is a possibility of exchange, one of the two following poles will provide the appropriate baseline, 1) a logical approach to formal dialogues, or 2) an empirical approach to natural interactions.

(15) Argumentation, a formalized critical dialogue

Since the 1970s the Informal Logic and the Pragma-Dialectic theories have re-orientated argumentation studies by giving the priority to the study of argumentation as a kind of dialogue.

Dialectical critical theories of argumentation strengthen the constraints on the dialogue either by means of a system of rules designed to embody a rational standard, as in Pragma-Dialectic, or by means of a system of critical questions, as in Informal Logic. S. Norms.

 (16) Argumentation, a kind of ordinary interaction

Proto-argumentative activity is triggered by a lack of ratification by the addressee. Depending on the reaction of the interaction partners, conversational disorder might pass quickly, being absorbed into the flow of the on-going task they are engaged in. Otherwise, the interaction might develop into a fully-fledged argumentative situation. In all cases, the argumentative situation is basically ruled by interactional principles.

This vision is compatible with the ancient theory of “argumentative questions” (or stasis, or point to adjudicate).

For each of these points, the question is not which to adopt and which to exorcise, but to clearly articulate the contrast between the approaches they define.

2. Other points of departure

The above table develops from the question of language. Other questions might give rise to alternative maps of the field.

2.1 Kind of rationality?

Truth and rationality can be considered:

• As an attribute of a well-thought monological discourse, best exemplified in logic, as an art of thinking;
• As the consensus of the properly defined universal audience, within the prospect of a rhetoric of persuasion;
• As a social production, the result of a well organized critical dialog to reach the best possible true and rational answer in the course of a dialectical process;
• A a progressive construct, through a closer contact with scientific results, thought and method.

In complete opposition to these guidelines, generalized theories of argumentation maintain an agnostic perspective on rationality, and question the very possibility of reaching it through ordinary discourse.

2.2 Form or function?

Is argumentation (first, better) defined by its function or by its form? This question opposes two theoretical families, one focusing on persuasion, and the other focusing on the structural description and formal representation of argumentative episodes. These two starting points themselves give rise to symmetrical questioning: how to deal with functional aspects in the latter case? What are the structural criteria that ensure the descriptive adequacy of the in the former case?

2.3 Argumentativity, a binary or gradual concept?

For extended theories of argumentation, language (Ducrot) or discourse (Grize) are basically argumentative, S. Orientation; Schematization.

In the case of restricted theories of argumentation, however, some discursive genres (deliberative, epideictic, judicial) or, more broadly, certain kinds of discursive sequences are argumentative and opposed to other non-argumentative genres or other types of sequences. These definitions tend to consider that argumentativity is a binary concept: a sequence is or is not argumentative.

In reference to the language exchanged between partners defending contrasting positions, the argumentativity of a situation is not an all or nothing concept; various forms and degrees of argumentativity can be distinguished.

— A given linguistic situation begins to become argumentative when opposition emerges between two lines of speech, quite possibly without reference to each other, as in an argumentative diptych. This is most probably the basic argumentative structure, each partner repeats and restates his position. S. Disagreement. We can thus go beyond the opposition between narrative, descriptive or argumentative sequences. When a description or a narration is developed in support of an answer to an argumentative question, this narration or description should be considered as fully argumentative and evaluated as such.

— Communication is fully argumentative when the difference is problematized as an argumentative question, with the participants taking roles as proponent, opponent, or third party, S. Roles.

2.4 Central objects?

The various approaches to argumentation are characterized by the nature of their internal assumptions and external assumptions. The former correspond to the organization of the concepts postulated in the system, and the latter, to the kinds of objects taken into consideration. Both types of hypotheses are bound.

The extremities of the branches in any of the preceding “decision trees” represent a pole articulating theoretical views with specific “preferred” objects. To satisfy the requirement of descriptive adequacy each theory must combine its central objects with what it posits as peripheral objects. Decisions as to what is to be considered as central and as peripheral (derived or secondary) data, fall within the domain of external assumptions. Such choices are never self-evident and require justification. So, for example, the decision to give priority to dialogue or to take as reference monologal syllogistic discourse, correspond to two distinct external assumptions regarding the structure of the argumentation field, and clearly put to the fore quite different kinds of data.

This does not imply that second level (often annoying) facts and data are excluded, rather that all phenomena cannot be put on the same level; data must be ordered, and prioritized. In practice, the problem is to determine how the results established on the basis of central facts can be expanded to peripheral data.

Some major types of coupling of internal and external assumptions:

— Rhetorical argumentation, and planned monological speech.
— Dialectical argumentation, and conventionalized dialogues.
— Argumentation as orientation, and pairs of statements.
— Argumentation as schematization, and texts, etc.

---

Argumentation analysis has been intensely and specifically investigated since the post-second world war period (references infra).

The bi-millennial framework of logic as an “art of thinking” in natural language has been taken up and reworked in the new intellectual framework of the post-Fregean mathematical logic as a Substantial Logic, an Informal Logic, or a Natural Logic.

A new vision of argumentation as discourse orientation has been developed in the semantic theory of Argumentation within Language.

Ancient rhetoric has been reshaped into a New Rhetoric. Dialectics has been revisited in relation to pragmatics and speech acts theories, and expanded into a powerful critical instrument within the Pragma-dialectic framework.

The prospects of rhetoric and dialectic are now ubiquitous in contemporary studies and teaching programs on argumentation. The links between rhetoric, text linguistics and discourse analysis have been recognized and rearticulated.

The spectacular results obtained in interaction analysis have opened the immense field of everyday conversational interactions as a specific investigation domain, where argument as “dispute” intertwines with argument as “good reason”.

The different theories of argumentation developed in the late twentieth century are based on different visions and definitions of their objects, methods and goals. Given this diversity, and the apparent and real discrepancies between definitions, there is a real temptation of synthesis, that is, to look for a definition which, while not trivial, will restore order, unity, simplicity and consensus.
Experience shows, however, that many new definitions meant to supplant older ones, merely add to the existing lists, thereby further aggravating the problem that they were intended to solve.

Another solution could be to start with things as they are, that is, to admit that the field of argumentation studies does not develop in the hypothetical-deductive style, starting from an overwhelming “master definition” and deriving its consequences, but rather in a more empirical, data driven, manner.
In practice, this suggests that one can very well start with a corpus of definitions of the concept of argumentation in order to identify the points of consensus and divergence, while emphasizing the points of view that have proven to be the most fertile

1. Rhetorical argumentation, an instrument of persuasion

Socrates considers and rejects rhetoric as an enterprise in social persuasion through speech. He shares this definition with his opponents, in particular with Gorgias:

Gorgias — I’m referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councilors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any political gathering that might take place. (Plato, Gorgias, 452e; p. 798)

Socrates — Well, then isn’t the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the souls by means of speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions, but also in private? (Plato, Phaedrus, 261a ; CW, p. 537)

This defines the common use of the word rhetoric in ancient Greece, what people call rhetoric.
Now what rhetoric is, in its substance — or lack of substance — is another story:

By my reasoning, oratory is an image of a part of politics. (Plato, Gorgias, 463d; CW, p. 807)

Politics is defined as the craft of addressing “the soul » (ibid, 464b, p. 808), and rhetoric is disposed of as an unsubstantial “image”, an eidolon, a counterfeit of politics. Socrates unreservedly condemns rhetorical discourse aimed at persuasion, as a lie, an illusion, a manipulating enterprise, antagonistic to truth-seeking philosophical discourse.
This unqualified and irrevocable condemnation of rhetoric as a fake is at the root of the popular negative meaning of the word, and this obviously includes argumentative rhetoric as well. The criticism of rhetoric is part of the field of rhetoric, and the same applies to the field of argument.

Aristotle positions rhetoric not as a counterfeit but as “the counterpart of dialectic” (Rhet, I, 1, 1354a1; RR p. 95) and defines it as an empirical techne, a craft, oriented towards the study of specific cases:

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion (Rhet, I, 2, 1355b25; RR, p. 105).

Cicero follows this functional definition:

Cicero Junior: — What is an argument?
Cicero Father — A plausible device [probabile] to obtain belief.
Cicero, Part., II, 5; p. 315

Crassus — As becomes a man well born and liberally educated, I learned those trite and common precepts of teachers in general; first, that it is the business of an orator to speak in a manner adapted to persuade. (Cicero, De Or., I, XXXI; p. 40)

Likewise, the “New Rhetoric” of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca focuses on persuasion:

The object of the study of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent. ([1958], p. 4; italics in the original)

By focusing on “discursive techniques” and on “the mind’s adherence”, this definition re-builds argumentation studies on the same basis as those of the Aristotelian argumentative rhetoric, persuasive speech. It re-connects contemporary understanding of argumentation with the experience gained throughout two millennia.

Thesis, mind, presented, assent, discursive techniques: this definition articulates the core concepts of what could be called “the argumentation movement” as a vision of man and discourse in modern democratic societies.

— The claims are theses. This is a philosophical term; the issues covered by argumentative interventions are complex and high level, “the most rational” (id., p. 7). The Treatise keeps its distances from everyday argument and minds: it does not address the ignoramus, and more: “there are beings with whom any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable…” (id., p. 15).

— These theses are presented to and not imposed on the audience.

— Moreover, they are presented to the audience’s mind, that is to say to men and women endowed with a choice and decision-making capacity; and living under social conditions that allow them to fully exercise this capacity.
This action upon minds can be opposed to the manipulation of souls and bodies: souls with their capacities of emotion and sensibility / sensitivity to romantic or mystical appeals; bodies which can be forced to march or vibrate in unison under a musical mantra or image.

— The assent results from an explicit judgment of a free and conscious mind. Assent can be given or withdrawn. Expressing one’s assent is opposed to producing a response under the causal pressure of a stimulus.

— Finally, argumentation is a discursive technique, that is, a form of speech in which speakers can practice and improve.

— The Treatise does not deal with fallacies, but the evaluation of argument is a key issue of the book. The sound criticism and evaluation of arguments is not a matter for the orator, but for the partner audiences, particular and universal.

2. Argumentation as a way to deal with stasic situations

The Rhetoric to Herennius by an unknown author of the first century BC (formerly attributed to Cicero) articulates argumentative rhetoric with the key concept of stasis. In court, the contradiction brought by one party to another party determines the “point to adjudicate” and produces a stasis, which defines an argumentative situation:

The Point to adjudicate is established from the accusation and the denial, as follows: Accusation: ‘You killed Ajax.’ Denial: ‘I did not.’ The point to adjudicate: Did he kill him?
(To Her., I, 17; p 53)

Argumentation can be thus defined in general as an institutional instrument developed institutionally to deal with and settle stasic situations. S. Argumentative Question.

3. Argumentation as “substantial logic” and default reasoning

According to Toulmin’s “layout of argument”, the argumentative passage is defined by its structure.

— A speaker puts forwards a Claim, based on Data oriented by general rules or principles, the Backing, and the Warrant, defining the monologal assertive component of argumentation.

— The Claim is defeasible under certain Rebuttal conditions, expressed by a Modal affecting the Claim. This reservation component refers to a dialogic and critical approach of argumentation.

The combination of an assertive and a refutative components into an “argumentative cell”, both linguistic and cognitive, defines reasonable-rational discourse.

This Toulminian complex layout is often reduced to the main parts of its assertive component “Data, Claim”,

Slavery was abolished, why not prostitution? I do believe in the progress of civilization.
When snakes come out, it’s going to rain. We know that from experience.

Toulmin makes no reference to rhetoric. But as Bird has pointed out (1961), with his warrant and backing, Toulmin has “re-discovered” the more than two-thousand-year-old concept of topic, fundamental to the rhetorical theory of argument.
This approach is entirely compatible with a class of classical definitions of rhetorical argument, such as the following,

Cicero Senior — I take it that what you desire to hear about is ratiocination, which is the process of developing the arguments. […]
Cicero Junior — Clearly that is exactly what I require.
Cicero Senior — Well then, ratiocination, as I said just now, is the process of developing the argument; but this process is achieved when you have assumed indubitable or probable premises from which to draw a conclusion that appears in itself either doubtful or less probable.
Cicero, Part., XIII, 46; p. 345-347; my italics

How to make the doubtful a little less doubtful? Like Toulmin, Cicero sees argumentation (“ratiocination”) as a technique to reduce uncertainty.

4. Argumentation as saying and schematizing

According to Jean-Blaise Grize,

As I understand it, argumentation considers the interlocutor not as an object to manipulate but as an alter ego with whom a vision has to be shared. To work on him means to try to change the various representations attributed to him, by highlighting certain aspects of things, hiding others, proposing him new perspectives, and all this with the help of an appropriate schematization. (Grize 1990, p. 40)

Arguing consists in schematizing, or framing the situation for the interlocutor.
Such a generalization extends the concept of argumentation over the whole act of saying something to somebody:

Arguing amounts to putting forward some assertions that we choose to compose in a discourse. Conversely, asserting (saying) amounts to arguing, simply because we choose to say and put forward some meanings rather than others. (Vignaux 1981, p. 91)

This vision of saying as essentially a rhetorical argumentative activity has deep roots in the rhetorical tradition.

It may be compared with what Quintilian presents as the essence of rhetorical argumentation:

The art of speaking well. (IO, II, 15, 37)

This famous formula is often quoted in Latin, rhetoric is the “ars bene dicendi”; the definition is complemented by the definition of the orator as “a good man speaking well”.
Argumentative rhetoric becomes the legislative technique of persuasive speech, guaranteed by the quality of the speaker, S. Ethos.
This vision of rhetoric constitutes the backbone of the classical humanities

Compared with Grize — who, to my knowledge, never quotes Quintilian, no more than Toulmin referred to the classical science of topoi — the only difference is that Quintilian stresses the educative dimension of rhetoric, whereas Grize simply analyzes argumentation as found in natural discourse.

This line of thought generalizes rhetoric to all forms of controlled expression, thus founding a Rhetorik der Sprache (Kallmeyer 1996), a “rhetoric of speech”.

5. Argumentation as orientation

Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of Argumentation within Language is based on the fact that, in natural language, the argument as a statement is linguistically linked to the conclusion, defined as the following statement:

A speaker argues when he presents a statement S1 (or a set of statements) as intended to make acceptable a new one (or a set of new ones), S2. Our thesis is that there are linguistic constraints governing this presentation. For a statement S1 to be given as an argument supporting a statement S2, it is not sufficient that S1 gives reason to admit S2. The linguistic structure of S1 must also meet certain conditions to be able to constitute, in a speech, an argument for S2. (Anscombre & Ducrot 1983, p. 8)

This approach results in a redefinition of the concept of topos, as a semantic link between two predicates, S. Topos in Semantics.

By re-defining the argumentative constraint as an inter-statements linguistic constraint, Anscombre and Ducrot generalize the concept of argumentation as a property of the linguistic system (langue and not parole “speech”, as defined by de Saussure).

S. Orientation; Argumentative scale.

6. Argumentation between monologue and dialogue

Argument seems to be a mode of discourse which is neither purely monologic nor dialogic. (Schiffrin 1987, p. 17)
[I have defined argument as] a discourse through which speakers support disputable positions. (Id., p. 18)

Schiffrin’s work is not primarily devoted to argument. This succinct definition, however, perfectly express the mixed character of the argumentative activity.

7. Argumentation, a discourse submitted to a rational judge

Argumentation is a verbal and social activity, aiming to strengthen or weaken the acceptability of a controversial point of view from a listener or reader, advancing a constellation of proposals to justify (or disprove) that view before a rational judge. (van Eemeren & al. 1996, p. 5)

This definition summarizes the rhetorical and dialectical positions. It re-defines the position of the third party, the judge, not as an empirical, institutional figure, arguing on the basis of the legal corpus of law and jurisprudence shaped by history and sociology, but instead as a normative rational figure, arguing on the basis of a set of independently defined rational principles, S. Norms; Evaluation and Evaluators.

8. Guidelines adopted in this dictionary

(i) An argumentative situation is defined in the Ad Herennium style: a complex dialogic situation opened by an argumentative question.

(ii) An argumentative question is a question to which the arguers (the debaters) give argued answers, possibly both sensible and reasonable, but incompatible, organized in pro- and a contra-discourse.

(iii) These answers express the conclusions (points of view) of the arguers about the issue. The elements of pro- and counter-discourse which support these conclusions have the status of argument for their respective conclusions.

(iv) Argumentative situations come in a variety of degrees and types of argumentativity, according to the kinds of relationship established between the pro- and counter- discourses and to the interactional and institutional parameters framing the exchanges.

Points (i) to (iv) define the external argumentative relevance, as the relevance of a conclusion for a question.

(v) An argumentation, in the monologic sense is defined as the “argumentative cell”, as represented in Toulmin’s layout.
In the broad sense, the word argumentation covers all the verbal and semiotic activities produced in an argumentative situation.

(vi) An argument is an implicit or explicit combination of statements supporting a conclusion.

(vii) The internal argumentative relevance, as the relevance of an argument for a claim is defined in relation to an argument scheme.

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1. Argument

The word argument is used in different domains, in grammar, logic, literature, and argumentation, with quite different meanings.

— In logic and mathematics, the arguments of a function f are the empty places x, y, z… characterizing the function; the independent entities (variables) organized by the function.

— By analogy, in grammar, the verb plus its subject and object(s) can be considered the counterpart of a function. To give for example, corresponds to a predicate governing three arguments “x gives y to z”; to love to a two-argument predicate, “x loves y”. By substituting adequate phrases (i.e., respecting the semantic relationship characterizing the verb) for each of these variables, we form a proposition^@: “Adam gives Eve an apple”, S. Proposition.

— In literature, the central argument of a play or a novel corresponds to the plan, the summary, or the guiding principle of the plot. With this meaning, the word argument is morphologically and semantically isolated; argument as “summary” bears no relation to conclusion, nor to to argue, argumentation.

2. Argument and argumentation

The words argument and proof are used to translate the Greek word pistis and the Latin word argumentum.

2.1 Argument ~ argumentation

By synecdoche, argument often means argumentation: “let the best argument prevail!”

2.2 Premise, data, argument

— In logic, the premises of the syllogism lead to a conclusion. The premises are propositions expressing true or false judgments. The conclusion is a proposition which is different from the premises and which is derived exclusively from their combination, without the surreptitious introduction of implicit background information into the reasoning, S. Syllogism. A premise is not an argument but a constituent of an argument; the argument is constructed by combining the two premises.

— In argumentation, the conclusion is derived from an item of information combined with an inferential topic. The situation is the same in Toulmin’s layout of argument, where the data becomes an argument when combined with an often implicit system warrant / backing. The word argument is routinely used to refer to the data element as the head of such combinations.

— In analytical and immediate inferences, the conclusion is derived directly from a single statement, which is an argument in itself. The conclusion is derived from the form or the semantic contents of the statement argument, S. Proposition.

Argument and conclusion are correlative terms. The “argument — conclusion” relationship is expressed, more or less accurately by expressions such as those listed below. If necessary, “is” may be replaced by “is presented as such by the speaker” (as in line 1, etc.).

The argument	The conclusion
— is a consensual statement, or presented as such by the arguer)	— is a dissensual, challenged, disputed statement
— is more likely than the conclusion	— is less likely than the argument
— is the cognitive starting point in deliberative argumentation — is the end point in justificatory argumentation	— is the end point of deliberative argumentation — is the starting point in justificatory argumentation
— expresses a reason	— is in search of a reason
— does not carry the burden of proof	— carries the burden of proof
— is oriented towards the conclusion	— is a projection of the argument
— (in a functional perspective) determines legitimizes the conclusion	— (—) determined, legitimized by the argument
— (in a dialogical perspective) accompanies the answer given to the argumentative question	— (—) is the proper answer to the argumentative question

2.3 Argument: true, probable, plausible, accepted, conceded…

A statement is considered (or presented) as a certain truth and may function as an argument on very different bases.

— The argument conveys a well-known fact, an intellectual self-evidence, S. Self-Evidence.

the heat of the wax dilates the pores and pulling up is thus less painful (Linguee)

— The partners have explicitly agreed on the statement, for example as part of a (quasi-) dialectical agreement:

We agree that now Syldavia cannot leave the Eurozone, so we can place further requirements upon them.

— The speaker has chosen his argument from those considered to be true by the audience, even if he or she has personal doubts about its validity, S. Ex datis:

You think that Syldavia will never leave the Eurozone, so…

— A simple fact: the statement is challenged neither by the opponent nor by the audience.

The audience’s acceptance of stable statements that may serve to support the conclusion, is always precarious. The opponent’s belief in the truth of a given statement is even less stable. The choice of what will be considered a valid argument is thus a strategic choice which will change in view of the circumstances, S. Strategy.

Challenging the argument — If the argument is disputed, it must itself be legitimized. As part of this operation, the argument takes the status of a claim put forward by the proponent and supported by a series of arguments. These new arguments serve as sub-arguments supporting the overarching claim, S. Linked argument; Epicheirema. If no agreement can be reached on any statement, things can, theoretically, go back indefinitely and the debate may continue without end. The risks associated with such “deep disagreement” should not be considered to invalidate argumentation as a useful social tool to deal with social incompatibilities, as far as third parties play their role in well-regulated settings.

3. Claim, thesis, conclusion, point of view, standpoint

In argumentation, the conclusion is also called the claim, or point of view. A philosophical conclusion is often called a thesis, S. Dialectic. The set of conclusions drawn from complex data at the end of an abduction process can be a full-blown theory, S. Abduction.

3.1 Point of view, viewpoint, standpoint

In the socio-political domain, a point of view is an “opinion”, possibly justified by arguments. The pragma-dialectical program is aimed at reducing, resolving, or eliminating differences of opinions. The corresponding expressions “resolving… differences of conclusions, claims, thesis…” are not in use.
An argument as a point of view, an opinion, a perspective… conveyed in just one sentence is a very special case. Points of views and opinions are generally expressed in complex discourses, supported by equally complex argumentative sub-discourses. The expression point of view can be used to refer to a whole speech, including the point of view and the good reasons supporting it.
In ordinary language, the concept of point of view organizes the perceptual reference system of the speaker:

On the other side of the hedge, was a gardener.
On the other side of the hedge, we saw a road.

In one case, the speaker is outside the garden, in the other in the garden. The concept of point of view used in argumentation is strongly metaphorical. It frames the argumentative situation according to the visual metaphor of a spectator within a landscape, which would be the reality, inaccessible as such, if not represented on a map.
The spectator’s vision provides a slice of reality restructured according to the laws of perspective. The reality referred to by the point of view is only so with regard to a, by definition, unstable focus. In this sense, a point of view is either questionable as it functions as blinkers; or valuable, because it protects one from the objectivist illusion produced by consensus, and from the paranoia of absolute knowledge.

An affirmation corresponds to a point of view if it is brought back to one subjective source, while absolute truth, or vision, is independent of any source, or has a universal, absolute source.
The point of view is an inescapable starting point. Points of view are comparable and assessable. We cannot be without perspective-point of view, yet we are able to define a better point of view; change our point of view, and multiply our points of view. In order to eliminate differences in points of view, one would have to eliminate subjectivity, or the plurality of voices, and de-contextualize the discourse. Scientific discourses do that routinely, but, as far as argumentative discourse seeks to deal with human affairs, involving (legitimate) interests, values, and their affective correlates, argumentation analysis cannot align itself with scientific language without changing the nature of its objects and objectives. The radical elimination of points of view would require the resurrection of the absolute rational Hegelian subject, or of the objective and omniscient narrator of nineteenth century novels.

3.2 Conclusion

The opening section of a discourse is its introduction, its closing section its conclusion. The argumentative conclusion is distinct from the material conclusion ending an intervention. The argumentative conclusion can be stated, or repeated, in any part of speech, at the beginning or at the end, or both.

The argumentative conclusion is defined in correlation with the argument (see Table above). In an argumentative monological text, the conclusion is the assertion according to which the discourse is organized; towards which it converges; in which its orientation materializes; the intention which gives the discourse its meaning, and the ultimate core of the text obtained by condensing it.

The conclusion is more or less detachable from the arguments supporting it. Once we have reached the conclusion that “probably, Harry is a British citizen”, we can, by default, act on the basis of this belief. But, as far as the modal probably expresses clear reservations on the whole inferential process, the claim will remain revisable if conditions change. The “fire and forget” principle[1] does not work well in argumentation. The conclusion is never fully detachable from the speech used in its construction.

A statement S becomes a claim in the following dialogical configuration

(1) — S is put forward by a speaker (as something essential for him, or merely anecdotal)
(2) — S is not ratified by the addressee: not preferred second turn
(3) — S is re-asserted, possibly reformulated by the speaker
(4) — S is explicitly rejected by the dialogue partner (re-statement not ratified: disagreement ratified)
(5) — Emergence of pro- and contra-arguments.

At stage (3), the disagreement emerges. At stage (4) the disagreement is ratified as such, a stasis is formed, and S is now a Claim put forward by the first speaker. At stage (5), the stasis begins to develop

Stage (1) is not a dialectical “opening stage”. The speaker does not necessarily intend to open a dispute. Non-ratification can occur at any time in an interaction, and may concern any foreground or background statement, S. Denying; Disagreement. In other words, being a claim is not a property of a statement, but is attached to the treatment of a statement in an interactive configuration.

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[1] “(Of a missile) able to guide itself to its target once fired.” (EOD, fire-and-forget) (11-08-2017)

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1. The English words

1.1 To Argue ­

The verb to argue has two different accepted meanings which will be referred to, respectively, as to argue₁ and to argue₂:

— To argue₁: “to put forth reasons for or against; debate”
— To argue₂: “to engage in a quarrel; dispute: We need to stop arguing and engage in constructive dialogue (tfd, Argue).

The morphological, syntactic, and semantic differences between these meanings are crucial and clear.

Morphology

The word argumentation derives from to argue₁ via argument₁; it refers only to a speech in which a conclusion is supported by good reasons.

Syntax

— To argue_1 is followed by a that clause: “A argues that P”; P is the claim.
— To argue_2 is followed by a double indirect complementation, “A argues with B about Q”. Q is neither A‘s nor B‘s claim, but refers to the issue of the dispute.

Semantics

— To argue_₁ means “to give reasons” (MW, Argue), and refers to a semiotic activity (verbal and co-verbal).

— To argue_₂ means “to have a disagreement a quarrel, a dispute” (ibid.), and refers to the broad field of interactions ranging from a lively discussion to outright pugilism, as shown in the following passage, in which the detective Ned Beaumont questions an informant, Sloss:

Ned Beaumont nodded. ‘Just what did you see?’
‘We saw Paul and the kid standing there under the trees arguing’
‘You could see that as you rode past?’
Sloss nodded vigorously again.
‘It was a dark spot’, Ned Beaumont reminded him. ‘I don’t see how you could’ve made out their faces riding past like that, unless you slowed up or stopped.’
‘No, we didn’t, but I’d know Paul anywhere,’ Sloss insisted.
‘Maybe, but how’d you know it was the kid with him?’
‘It was. Sure it was. We could see enough of him to know that’
‘And you could see they were arguing? What do you mean by that? Fighting?’
‘No, but standing like they were having an argument. You know how you can tell when people are arguing sometimes by the way they stand’
Ned Beaumont smiled mirthlessly. ‘Yes, if one of them’s standing on the other’s face.’ His smile vanished.
Dashiell Hammett, The Glass Key, [1931][1].

1.2 Argument ­

The noun an argument inherits the two meanings of to argue; an argument₁ is a “good reason”, an argument₂ is a “dispute”, possibly containing argument₁. Grimshaw’s book, Conflict talk. Sociolinguistic investigations of arguments in Conversation (1990), exclusively deals with arguments₂ “dispute”, not at all with arguments_1, “good reasons”.

A third, specific, meaning adds to these two inherited meaning, argument₃, as “the abstract, the theme, the subject matter” (of a literary work, etc.).

“Argument is War” — Lakoff and Johnson have proposed the famous equivalence “argument is war”:

Let us start with the concept argument and the conceptual metaphor argument is war. This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions:

Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument. […]

“We can actually win or lose arguments” (1980, p. 4)

Lakoff and Johnson refer to the “concept argument”. If the preceding conclusion is correct, there is not just one but two concepts of argument. To argue₂ and argument₂ may be associated with a kind of war; but what about argument₁ and to argue₁?

If interlinguistic comparisons can tell something about words used as concepts, note that, in French, the first series of metaphors easily translates word-for-word; but the expression “we can actually win or lose arguments”, does not. The words to argue, argument, and argumentation have clearly recognizable counterparts in French or Spanish, or in the Romance languages at large:

French argumenter, argument, argumentation
Spanish argumentar, argumento, argumentación

This graphic illustration of the proximity of these words certainly favors the internationalization of the concept. Yet there are deep differences between their respective meanings, which can be roughly represented as follows:

English

dispute

good reason

topic

 

French

good reason

topic

 

Spanish

good reason

topic

The French word argument and the Spanish word argumento never refer to a dispute. The field of argumentation studies develops from the shared meaning of argument₁, “good reason”.

This shows that the meaning of to argue₂, argument₂ in a language is independent of the concept referred to by the family to argue₁, argument₁, argumentation.

1.3 Argumentative

According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the adjective argumentative shares the two meanings of its morphological base, argument: “controversial” and “disputatious” (MW, Argumentative). The Merriam-Webster Learner’s Dictionary, however, is more categorical (MWLD, Argumentative):

Argumentative: tending to argue; having or showing a tendency to disagree or argue with other people in an angry way: quarrelsome.

an argumentative person
he became more argumentative during the debate.
an argumentative essay.

In this dictionary, argumentative will be attached by default to the family “argumentation”, thus a semantically derived of argument₁ “good reason”, unless contextually clear or otherwise specified. An argumentative essay will be taken as “an essay developing an argumentation”; if referring to “a polemical essay”, its quarrelsome character will be explicitly mentioned.

2. Differential orientations:
the French words arguer, argutie

In French, from a morphologic point of view, the verb arguer is the basic verb from which all the argu- words derive:

arguer   → un argument      → argumenter       → une argumentation, etc
an argument”     “to argue”          “an argumentation”, etc.

But arguer_F must be set apart; to argue matches argumenter_F, nor arguer_F. There is a semantic discontinuity between arguer_F and argumenter_F. When S1 says:

S:   — Pierre argumente en faveur de P, “Peter argues that P”

S recognizes that Peter does give arguments. When he or she says:

S:   — Pierre argue que… “Peter argues_F that…”

S just quotes the argumentative discourse of Peter without taking a position on the validity of the arguments he offers, and even suggesting that they might be fallacious. In a democratic or republican newspaper the construction:

the extreme right argues_F that…

introduces an argumentation considered as weak or invalid. That is, the verbs arguer_F and argumenter_F have opposing orientations. The former values discourse as argumentative, whereas the latter suggests that it posits only pseudo-arguments.

Quibble may translate in French as argutie_F, a word derived from arguer_F:

These people are the manipulated agents of subversion, performing instructions and rehashing quibbles [“répétant des arguties”].

Arguer_F and argutie_F are only used occasionally. Arguer_F might be replaced by argument_F between quotation marks. So a pro-wind farm group quotes the arguments of its opponents, the anti-wind farm group, as follows:

Let’s look at some of the ‘arguments’ put forward by anti-wind farms
(Complete example, S. Convergent argumentation)

The concept of arguments, and argumentation studies, benefit from the strong positive orientation that the words argument and argumentation have in ordinary language. The case is the same for the word and the concept of dialogue, S. Interaction, Dialogue, Polyphony.

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[1] Quoted after Dashiell Hammett, The Four Great Novels. Picador, 1982. P. 725-726.