The concept of object of discourse (Fr. “objet de discours”; also translated as discursive object or discourse object) was introduced by Jean-Blaise Grize, in relation to the schematization process. An object of discourse is basically a thing, a situation, as characterized by its plasticity, that is to say, permanently re-designed throughout the discourse or the interaction.

1. Cluster of a word

At the language level, the cluster of an object [“faisceau d’objet”] is investigated on the basis of the word designating that object. It is defined as:

[The] set of aspects normally attached to the object. Its elements are of three kinds: properties, relations and patterns of action. So the cluster of “rose” brings together properties like ‘to be red’ […], relationships like […] ‘to be more beautiful than’, patterns of action like ‘to fade’.” (Grize 1990, p. 78-79)

The cluster attracted by an object is defined at the notional level and does not coincide either with linguistic categories such as those used in semantic analysis (id., p. 79), with lexicographical elements used in dictionaries, with elements psychologically associated with the object, or with ontological features claiming to grasp the being of the object, S. Categorization. The cluster of a word results from an aggregation of discourses using this word (id., p. 78), S. Orientation; Words as Arguments; Inference; Polyphony. This concept can be compared with the stereotypes associated with a word, or, better, to the set of its favorite linguistic collocations, as established in corpus linguistics.

2. Cluster of an object of discourse

At the discourse level, the elements which make up the cluster attached to a specific object of discourse are not known a priori, but are empirically constructed, on the basis of the examination of the actual discourse under analysis. A specific object of discourse is developed via the progressive aggregation of the contextual properties attributed to it, the beings it is associated with, the events in which it participates, etc.

The study of objects of discourse focuses on their plasticity, as they are progressively produced and transformed in discourse: their mode of introduction, the evolution of the contexts to which they are attached. It overlaps with the grammatical study of designation paradigms (Mortureux 1993); a designation paradigm is the set of words and expressions constituting the anaphoric chain related to an evolving object of discourse. It is part of the study of textual cohesion and coherence, and overlaps essential observations of the rhetoric on the displacements of meaning.

Objects of discourse may be opposed to “logical objects”. Classical logic references stable objects; according to the principle of identity every occurrence of the sign (signifier) “a” is strictly equivalent to another one. As a consequence, any variation in the scope of the reference of “a” introduced in the development of discourse are considered fallacious. S. Fallacy; Ambiguity.

3. Objects of discourse in argumentative situations

A discourse may concern a large number of objects, and to study the development of each one might turn out to be unworkable; boundaries must be set. As far as argumentation studies are concerned, they must focus on the most relevant objects, that is on conflicting objects, and primarily on those mentioned in the formulation of the argumentative question. Just as peaceful, undisputed, affirmations are considered to be true, undisputed objects are considered to be real and stable in their reference.
Conflicting objects are associated with conflicting claims. The observation of their discursive development, and the correlative establishment of their contrastive characterization is a simple and practical method used to expose their argumentative relevance.

The following data is taken from a discussion between students, and concerns the conditions a person must fulfill to obtain French citizenship; the key question “who? who can obtain French citizenship?” immediately structures the debate. The two antagonistic positions taken by the participants are clearly mirrored by the two systems of designations they use to construct this “who?”.

— All the students agree that there is an unproblematic group, who should have an automatic right to French citizenship, that being, “the persecuted”.

— One group of students supports the claim that “the process of obtaining citizenship should be facilitated”. Immigrants are constructed as people having a right to French citizenship; this group is further specified as:

workforce; people who came to work in periods of prosperity
people we asked to come;
people we welcomed;
people who have been there for a very long time
their relatives
their children     – born in France – born in another country

— Another group of students support the claim that “the process of obtaining citizenship should be toughened”. In this set of co-oriented discourses, immigrants are constructed as people having no right to French citizenship, and these individuals are referred to as:

undocumented immigrants
people with problems; having or creating problems
illegal immigrants;
immigrants by “practicality” (economic migrants)
“anyone”, (that is indiscriminate foreign people asking for citizenship).

In reality, one can certainly observe that among the people applying for French citizenship there are certainly both undocumented people and people who came to France many years ago in order to work. Despite this, each group of students schematizes immigrants (as a group) as either one or the other.

For another example of diverging constructions of causality as an object of discourse, S. Cause — Effect.

This method shows how a specific light is cast on an object of discourse, how it is “spotlighted” (Grize), or given a discursive “presence”, in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s terminology ([1958], 115-120).

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1. In logic

In logic, the non-contradiction principle prohibits the affirmation of contradictory propositions. In other words:

— The conjunction “P and not-P” expresses a contradiction, and, as such, is a self-destructing statement, which is necessarily false.
— The disjunction “P or not-P” is necessarily true.

One of the two propositions P and not-P must be true, both cannot be true simultaneously. The same thing cannot be and not be. This principle is considered by classical logic as a law of thought, and as an axiom by contemporary logicians. A logical system respecting the principle of non-contradiction does not contain any antinomies; it is said to be consistent.

Negation — Using the truth-table method, the negation operator is defined as follows:

P	¬ P
T	F
F	T

This table expresses the principle of the excluded middle. It reads:

line 1: “when P is true, then not-P is false”
line 2: “when P is false, then not-P is true”

2. In natural language

The application of the non-contradiction principle to everyday language is complex, because it presupposes that P is plainly true or false, not far from true or practically false, not true or not according to the circumstances.

Many argumentative forms appeal to the non-contradiction principle, albeit under different names: S. Ad Hominem; Dialectic; Contradiction; Consistency

The non-contradiction principle applies not only to logical, argumentative discourse, but also to any kind of discourse; inconsistent narrations or descriptions for example, are rejected as such.

According to the basic Aristotelian dialectical rule, any discourse resulting in a contradiction is irrational and must be abandoned. Hegelian dialectic sees in the ongoing treatment of contradictions the motor of History. The cynical politician can lay claim to Hegel to hide his opportunism:

Stalin’s speech on the five-year plan serves as an ardent apology for contradiction as a “vital value” and an “instrument of struggle”. One of Lenin’s great strengths was his ability never to feel a prisoner of what he had preached as true the day before […] Mussolini’s famous word “Let us beware of the mortal trap of coherence” could be signed by all those who intend to pursue a work within currents they cannot foresee.
Julien Benda, [The Betrayal of the Intellectuals], [1927][1]

The affirmation of a paradox as an oxymoron makes it possible to withstand the contradiction: “O wound without scar!”. Such paradoxical assertion is not seen as absurd or fallacious and eliminated as such, but triggers a quest to identify the deeper, symbolic meaning of the words wound and scar used in this context.

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[1] Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs, [1927]. Excerpt from the Preface to the 1946 edition. Paris: Grasset, 1975, p. 78-79.

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A natural sign is a perceptual datum, an actual material fact or item, materially linked, necessarily or ambiguously, to another fact or item or state of things not perceptually accessible.

A natural sign is typically an indisputable fact, “as certainties, we have, in the first place, what is perceived by the senses, as what we see, what we hear, as signs [signa] or indications” (Quintilian, V, 10, 12).

A natural sign is quite different from a linguistic sign, for which the link between signifier and signified is social and arbitrary. It is not a global analogon of the thing it “represents”, as in the case of analogical thinking. Nor is it a symbolic representation of the associated phenomenon.

The natural sign is just a part of the phenomenon through which the observer can access the whole phenomenon. The link between the present natural sign and its absent counterpart can be:

The very first manifestation of a phenomenon: a red setting sun / rainy weather tomorrow
A remnant of something disappeared: the leftover / the meal
A part of a whole: a hair / a person
An effect to its cause: being tired / having worked

1. Natural signs, clues and traces

Clue is an accurate synonym of material sign, since to look for clues, one must necessarily have to deal with some “intricate procedure or maze of difficulties”, or be seeking “to find something, understand something, or solve a mystery or puzzle” (MW, Clue). These description fit well with exploratory argumentative situations. Generally speaking, an argument is indeed a clue to a conclusion; etymologically, a clue is ‘a ball of thread’; hence, one used to guide a person out of a labyrinth” (OD, Clue). Clues are typically looked for “in the detection of a crime”; “police officers are still searching for clues” (ibid.). Yet clue is also used to refer to a “piece of information” given to someone; and this is not a natural sign in the sense discussed in this entry.

Traces, such as fingerprints (necessary sign), or tire marks (probable sign), are a special kind of natural signs, but, insofar traces are leftovers, “a mark […] left by something that has passed”, not all material signs are traces; smoke is not a trace of fire, whereas ashes are.

Index, indication, indicator can also be used with the meaning of “natural sign”.

2. Reasoning on probable and necessary signs

The relation of the natural sign to its counterpart is inferential in nature:

Anything that when it is, another thing is, or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being.
(Aristotle, P. A., II, 27; my italics for the sign and underlining for the counterpart).

In the Aristotelian system, enthymemes are developed from natural signs and probabilities (P. A., II, 27); S. Enthymeme; Probable.

These inferences are exploited in concrete argumentations such as:

I can see smoke, the house is on fire
Peter’s face is flushed, he must have a fever

The quality of the argumentation depends on the nature of the link it exploits. If the sign is necessary, the argumentation is conclusive; if it is probable, the possible claim is slightly more probable that it would be in the absence of the argument; probable signs reduce uncertainty, S. Abduction.

Probable signs are distinct from human and social probabilities.

— A necessary sign (tekmerion) is associated with a material being or state of affairs. It corresponds to a material, empirical necessity (not a logical necessity):

A scar, an ancient wound
Callous hands, being a manual worker
Smoke, fire
Footprints on the sand, humans on the island

Such signs thus have the force of proof, the associated syllogism is valid, as in the following propter quid argument, S. A priori

Law (major): A woman who has milk has given birth (if M, then B)
Sign (minor): This woman has milk.
Conclusion: This woman has given birth.

— Probable (contingent) signs (semeion) may correspond to several associated realities. Contingent signs are ambiguous, whereas necessary signs are unambiguous

tiredness is a possible sign of having worked
being flushed is a possible symptom of having a fever

Typically, peripheral indicators are non-necessary signs: “he has a guilty look so he feels guilty, so he is guilty”, S. Circumstances. The associated syllogism is not valid:

Law:                Women who have given birth are pale.
Sign:               This woman is pale.
Conclusion:    This woman has given birth.

A necessary condition is taken for sufficient: one might simply have a naturally pale complexion, or one might be pale because one is ill. The probable sign brings only one piece of evidence (judicial); it can support a suspicion, it is not a proof.

The human body is an inexhaustible source of natural signs; white hair and flexibility of the skin are natural signs indicative of age and the global physical condition of the person. In medicine, co-occurring non-necessary signs are grouped in a syndrome, that is to say “a group of signs and symptoms that occur together and characterize a particular abnormality or condition.” (MW, Syndrome). For example, the Samter’s syndrome

Samter’s Triad or Aspirin Sensitive Asthma, is a chronic medical condition that consists of asthma, recurrent sinus disease with nasal polyps, and a sensitivity to aspirin and other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs).[1]

This grouping of signs is the basis of conclusive medical reasoning: if a patient suffers from asthma and is sensitive to aspirin, then he would very probably also has a problem with nasal polyps. He should be checked for this third condition.
When grouped, a series of separately non-conclusive signs might constitute a body of conclusive evidence. An area of ​​the body may be red, because it has been rubbed; hot, because of incipient sunburn; painful or swollen because of an accidental blow. But if it is at once red, painful, hot and swollen, then, we can say that it is inflamed, S. Convergent argumentation.

To guess the intentions of the enemy, the soldier observes their acts and movements and then reasons from a cluster of converging signs:

The writer Roland Dorgelès had “the singular privilege of baptizing a war”, as “the Phony War”, which refers to the strangely calm situation on the front between September 3rd 1939, the date of the declaration of war, and May 10th 1940, the date of the invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France by Nazi Germany. His book, The Phony War, brings together a series of reports on the front during this period. In April 1940 he was in Alsace, at an observation post.

Seen from above, it looks as though the enemy lines are dominated as if from a balcony. […] The sergeant who never loses sight of them, now knows their habits, knows where they come from and where they go.
‘There, he points out, they are digging a sap. Look at the stirred earth… This gray house has certainly been consolidated… look at the embrasures… And those tiles over there? Their workers at this moment are mainly occupied there. This morning I counted sixty of them, returning from the building site, with lamps: so they must be digging underground.’
From dawn to darkness, our watchmen remain leaning over the telescope.
Roland Dorgelès, [The Phony War], 1957[2]

The whole art of Sherlock Holmes resides in the observation, interpretation and combination of clues, S. Deduction. The clue is a trace of the action from which a modus operandi can be inferred. If the window panes have been shattered into pieces, and these are found lying inside the drawers which have been torn from the cupboards and thrown onto the room, then we can be sure that the room was first ransacked and the windows were then fractured to give the false impression that the window had been broken to enable entry into the room. So, they entered the room through the door; so they had a key. Who has the keys?

Certain individuals exploit and investigate clues is a professional capacity. Sign-based arguments are field-dependent. On the basis of a clue, the detective knows how to reconstruct the scenario of a crime; the historian knows how to judge the authenticity of a document; the archeologist knows how to reconstruct the city map, the paleontologist knows how to determine the age of the skeleton (Ginzburg 1999). The informed reasoning of these professionals should be considered to be exemplary of practice-oriented argumentation studies.

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[1] https://aerd.partners.org (08-31-2017)
[2] Roland Dorgelès, La Drôle de Guerre 1939-1940. Paris: Albin Michel, 1957, p. 9; p. 194.

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The individual’s will, intentions, desires, motives, reasons… may be interpreted as causes for action, considered to be effects or consequences of such an “inner” causation. Conversely, actions are evaluated and interpreted according to their motives and reasons are seen as their causes. The consistency requirement imposes this causal structure on human motivation, S. Consistency.

1. Argumentation from the existence of reasons for action

Two basic Aristotelian topics transpose the law of causality in human conduct, with reasons and motives substituted for causes. When the cause exists, then the effect follows. That is to say that when one party has a motive or a reason to do something, as soon as he or she has the opportunity, he or she will do it. In the wording of the topic n° 20 of the Rhetoric:

To consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding the action in question. (Rhet., II, 23, 20; RR, p. 373)

The basic topos is:

You wished it, so you strived for it!
Who wants the end wants the means.

This topos is also implemented by the pathetic argument. Here, it supports a charge:

You had a motive, you talked about it, the opportunity came up, and you did it!

Or a defense:

L1:     — You did it!
L2:      — I had no reason to do it, I even had reasons not to do it.

Likewise, in topic n°24, cause means “reason to do”:

Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist. […] For example, Leodamas […] (id., II, 23, 24; F. p. 319).

2. Arguments on the “real reasons”

The following argument schemes substitute a covert motivation for a public good reason, as a true cause can be substituted for a false one, S. Interpretation:

— Topic n° 15 substitutes a covert, underhanded, interested motive for a noble, publicly claimed reason. It is used to charge or to refute the opponent.

— Topic n° 23 rejects the malevolent interpretation given for an act by giving an acceptable, respectable reason for the alleged guilty motive. It is used to clear somebody from a charge.

— Topic n° 19 changes the benevolent interpretation given to an act for a malevolent one.

2.1 Publicly displayed good reasons and real private ugly intentions

According to topic n° 15 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

The things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly, their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness, but in their heart they prefer their own advantage. {…] This is the most effective of the forms of argument that contradict common opinion. (Rhet. II, 23, 15; RR, p. 369)

The argument highlights a (possible) private, hidden, poor motive for refuting the public, honorable, good reason given as justification for an action:

S1:   — Supporting this Charity, I fight for a noble cause!
S2:    — You fight especially for your own advertising.

S1:    — We wage war to restore democracy and human rights in Syldavia
S2:    — You wage war to seize their oil.

In the second dialogue, S1 justifies war, S2 does not oppose war, he or she can simply introduce a realpolitik argument, which could be openly put forward in another situation.

2.2 A commendable motive substituted for a guilty one

This argument corresponds to topic n° 23, “useful for men who have been really or seemingly slandered”:

To show why the facts are not as supposed; pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given. (Rhet., II, 23, 23; RR p. 375)

embodied in the enthymeme:

She hugs him because he’s her son, not because he is her lover.

Topic n° 23 is quite the reverse of topic n° 19; it helps to exculpate by substituting an honorable motive for the offending one:

I struck him to save him from drowning, not to hurt him.

The action is reinterpreted according to a re-evaluating strategy: “you must congratulate me and not blame me.” S. sStasis (e); Interpretation; Orientation.

2.3 The poisoned chalice

The wording of topic n° 19, is rather puzzling, “some possible motive for an event or state of things is the real one”; it matches the enthymemes:

A gift was given in order to cause pain by its withdrawal.

Gods give to many great prosperity, / Not out of good will towards them, but to make / Their ruin more conspicuous. (Rhet., II, 23, 19; XX p. 371)

The topic operates a dramatic negative reinterpretation of an act which was assessed positively.

She seduced not by love but by hatred / greed / to make him suffer by leaving him later

This is the principle of the “Dinner Game”, “they invited me not as a friend, but to make fun of me”. This technique for narrowing the cognitive and affective discrepancy, particularly effective for destroying a sense of gratitude, S. Emotion.

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Latin “argumentum ad verecundiam” lat. verecundia “modesty, humility”

1. The ad verecundiam argument

The argument of modesty is invoked by someone who bows before the speech and the good reasons offered by a person he considers to be superior to him- or herself. It typically refers to an act of submission to ethos. The ad verecundiam argument is the interactional correlative of an appeal to authority, not an appeal to authority. Note that, in the following key passage, Locke refers to ad verecundiam as coming from a fear of breaching “modesty”.

The first [fallacious argument] is to allege the opinion of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam. (Locke [1690], p. 410).

This argument is deemed fallacious:

It argues not another man’s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. [1690], p. 411).

In a similar way, topic n°11 of the Rhetoric argues “from a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter”. Such a precedent-setting judgment must have been produced by an authority, one of “those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict” (Aristotle, Rhet., II, 23, 12; F. 309), that is to say, “it would be disgraceful to contradict him” (ibid.; my italics), be he a father, a god, an instructor or a wise man. Politeness is argumentatively oriented in favor of the submission to the status quo.

2. Authority or pusillanimity?
Ad verecundiam, or misplaced modesty

Locke stages an interaction, where one partner “allege[s]” an authoritative opinion. It appears from the description that the characteristics conferring authority to an opinion have either a social (“parts, learning, eminency, power … dignity”) or an intellectual source (“learning, … approved author… learned doctor… approved writer”), S. Ethos. Such sources do indeed have a legitimizing power, S. Dialectic. Note that religious authorities are not mentioned.

It must be emphasized that Locke does not censor the expression of or the reference to authoritative opinions in a first round of speech, but blames the acritical acceptation of such an authority, that is the lack of a second round of speech in which what has previously been said is criticized and alternative views are expressed. The condemnation ad verecundiam is a protest against the censure of this second round by an internal impulse of modesty, the feeling of one’s own insufficiency (however legitimate it can be). This censorship is a preventive reaction to a threat that could come from a third round claiming to silence the objection addressed to the authority. This third turn itself does not deal with the substance of the objection made to the second (by an argument ad judicium, S. Matter. It merely substitutes in the discussion of the critical opinion, a negative evaluation of the person who supports it, an ad personam attack invoking “a breach of modesty, too much pride, insolence, impudence”, that is, an intimidation maneuver, S. Personal Attack; Respect. The problem is therefore not located in the authoritative first round, but in the inhibitive foreboding of an aggressive third round. As expressed by the label “argument ad verecundiam”, the fallacy is committed by the interlocutor, the overly humble individual who expresses no objection for fear of creating a scene. This is not primarily a fallacy of authority but of cowardice or spinelessness. The verecundia is the (false sense of) shame that prevents one saying what one thinks out loud.

4. Justified modesty

When it comes to authority itself, the problem is twofold. In the first turn, participant S1_1 has “alleged” an authoritative opinion, which may be a fairly sensible move. Suppose that S2 can overcome his or her ad verecundiam inhibition, and quite freely voices his or her opinion, in a second turn. Then, if in a third turn S1_2 bars S2_1’s remarks in the name of authority, whilst also criticizing his opponent for his or her boldness and pride then S1 argues from authority, which certainly is a fallacious move. Some situations are nonetheless embarrassing. If S1 quotes Einstein in his (Einstein) field of competence, S1 having a good background in physics and S2 none, then a humble lay speaker S2 would be wise to ask for more explanation before voicing his or her doubts. If not, S1_2 would legitimately give in to an authoritative exasperation.

3. A fallacy in dialogue

The problem of authority is thus reframed as that of authoritarian interaction, that is to say a dialogue where an authority is quoted in the first speech turn, and alleged in the third turn to silence the objections, considering that the quoted authority gives the quoter the power to close the discussion. This use of authority is a direct contrast to the use made of it in a dialectical game. The problem does not lie so much in the quoting of authority as in the possibility of contradicting authority. Modesty, respect, concern not to cause the other to lose face, rules of politeness, preference for agreement are all intellectual inhibitors. All these constraints define a typically anti-dialectical situation, S. Dialectic.

Authority is accepted as fact, the problem lies in the possibility of calling this authority into question. Authority is deceptive only if it claims to escape from dialogue, to silence and not to answer its counter-discourse. The conclusion is that what is fallacious or not fallacious is the dialogue itself. It is impossible to say whether a statement such as “The Master said it!” is misleading or not; it all depends on the statement’s position in the dialogue. If it is an opening statement, it is not fallacious. If it is a closing statement, intending to silence the critic, it is.

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Lat. argument ad temperentiam, Lat. temperentia, “moderation, measure, restraint”

1. Argument to moderation and radicalism

In politics, moderation is opposed to radicalism or extremism, as reformism is to revolution. The argument from moderation is developed in discourses which prioritize the necessity of sticking to practicality, to compromise, of holding inclusive positions, changing things little by little, etc. The appeal to radicalism is developed in discourses which foreground the urgency of the decision, the necessity of a new start, of avoiding deadlocks in discussions, the will to be true to one’s principles framed as antinomies, “freedom or death”.

Two contrasted ethos and emotional states are associated respectively with moderation and radicalism: conservative vs. progressive; open to dialogue and compromising vs. uncompromising; realist vs. idealist; calm / exaltation; etc.

2. Middle ground argument

The middle ground argument justifies a measure by showing that it does not satisfy any of the opposing parties. The speaker takes the position of the responsible third party, S. Roles.

Both the far right and the far left attack my policy; it clearly shows that it is a good policy.
Keep away from extremes.

Christianity has reestablished in architecture, as in other arts, true proportions. Our temples, bigger than those of Athens, and smaller than those of Memphis, have that proper balance, in which beauty and taste par excellence prevail.
Chateaubriand, [The Genius of Christianity], 1802[1]

The intermediate position is valued: reason and virtue “stand in the middle” (Lat. in medio stat virtus):

Neither rash nor coward, just courageous.

The arguer who opts to take the middle-ground will be stigmatized as a person who is indecisive, or who does not want to examine the arguments of the parties in detail, “let’s stop the discussion, meet in the middle; split the difference”. The case of Solomon’s judgment shows that there are stakes that cannot be so easily split up.

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[1] Quoted after François René de Châteaubriand, Le Génie du christianisme. Part 3, Book 1, Chap. 6. Tours: Mame, 1877, p. 194-195.

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Traditionally, two main domains are distinguished within the field of rhetoric, one deals with tropes and figures, and the other deals with argument schemes. A semantic and ornamental rhetoric is opposed to a cognitive and functional rhetoric. This approximate opposition can be misleading.

1. Tropes

A trope is defined as an operation “through which a word is given a meaning which is not precisely the proper meaning of that word” (Dumarsais [1730], p. 69). This definition may be paralleled by that of an argument as an operation “through which a statement (the conclusion) is given a belief value which is not precisely the proper belief value of that statement”.

The linguistic mechanisms involved in the tropic referential shift bear a significant resemblance to those involved in argument. In both cases, this is a transfer problem. In the case of a trope, the meaning of a word is transferred to another. In the case of an argument, the belief value of a statement is transferred to another, and the rules of transfer are similar.

Metaphor^@, irony^@, metonymy and synecdoche considered to be the four “master tropes” (Burke, 1945), are all relevant to the study of argumentation, although in fairly different ways.

2. Metonymy

2.1 Metonymy as a trope

Consider the classical example of metonymy, “the pen is mightier than the sword”. A pen is “an instrument for writing or drawing with ink…” (MW, Sword), and a sword is “a weapon with a long metal blade and a hilt with a hand guard…” (OD, Sword.). In the quoted proverb, pen and sword are used metonymically to mean respectively “word, thought and discourse, verbal communication…” and “physical violence, military force…”. The global meaning being that “strength will not prevail over reasoned discourse”.

Generally speaking, the metonymy semantic scheme can be described as follows.

— There is a word {S / C1}, its signifier is S and its content C1: pen/“instrument for writing”.
— The signifier S is used metonymically to designate content C0: pen/“discourse”.
— This transfer of meaning operates under a condition: it needs a backing, expressed in a transition law such as “C0 is in some relation of contiguity with C1”. Here, “the pen is the instrument used to produce discourse”

The subtypes of metonymy schemes are classified according to the kind of contiguity connection between the contents of C0 and C1, for example:

— Effect for cause, “Death is in the Meadow”.
— Instrument for agent, “She is the pen of the President”.
— Agent (or “cause”) for the work produced: “A new Shakespeare just came out”.
— Instrument for object produced, “The pen is mightier…”.
— Name of the place where the object is made for the object itself, etc. “I feel like having a Cognac”.
— Relevant ongoing planned action for a participant: “Sir, your rendezvous just left”.

2.2 Metonymic transfer and argumentative transfer

Figures and arguments require the same kind of backing. This can be suggested by the following examples.

The effect for cause metonymy: “Death is in the Meadow”[1] meaning that phytosanitary products (also called crop protection products) (Ph) used in agriculture can cause death (D). The word (signifier) designating the effect (D) now designates (refers to) the cause (Ph).

— In the effect-to-cause argument, the (truth-)value predicated upon the effect is transferred back to the cause, or to a series of causes:

Metals expand when heated

This metal expanded (is an established fact) SO it has been heated (is an established fact)

The tire exploded, so [either C1, or C2, or…] (id.); S. Case-by-Case

Effect-to-cause argument transfers the predicate “— is an established fact” from the effect to the cause.

The word death refers to death; in the case of metonymy, its referential domain is extended so as to include the cause of death, “death refers to phytosanitary products”. In our standard vision of reference, a word refers to an object; actually it refers centrally to an object, and to the objects contextually connected to it; that is, the word (signifier) actually refers to any element belonging to the cluster of that objects, S. Object of discourse. Ordinary language clearly expresses this fact:

(1) He has a temperature so he has an infection.
(2) Give him antibiotics, it will reduce the fever.

The antibiotic in fact acts upon the infection, and fever in (2) should thus be considered to be an effect-for-cause metonymic designation of the infection. On the other hand, fever is a natural sign of an infection: “he has a fever that means he has an infection”: this is precisely what the metonymic analysis says.

A metonymy designating a work by the name of its author corresponds to an argumentation transferring to a work a judgment about its author: “The author of this book supported the former dictator”. The mechanisms of this metonymic transfer from the person to his or her acts and products have been studied from the argumentative point of view in Perelman (1952), S. Person.

3. Synecdoche

As shown by example of the rendezvous above (§1), metonymic naming can operate upon any pair of strongly connected objects, this connection being accidental (local), or essential. Synecdoche operates upon constituents of a whole. The word “metonymy” is sometimes used to refer to both metonymy and synecdoche.

3.1 “Part – whole” and “whole – part” relations

A roof is a component of a house; in “looking for a roof”, roof means “house”, houses being considered prototypical lodgings.

Part – whole arguments transfer to a whole the predicate attached to the part. These are backed by the same kind of connection, S. Composition and division.

The roof is in poor condition, so the house must not be well maintained.

3.2 Genus for species and species for genus

A synecdoche of a genus for a species uses the name of the genus to refer to one of its species; the name of the genus replaces that of the species: “the animal” for “the lion”. This use is most common in textual co-referring:

We saw a lion. The poor animal was gaunt and sick.

Backed by the same relation, the argumentation by the genus attaches to the species the predicates of the genus, S. Taxonomy and category; Categorization:

This is a lion, therefore it is an animal, and therefore, it is mortal.

4. The tree and its fruits

The following argument was advanced in defense of Paul Touvier, leader of the pro-Nazi Militia in Lyon, France, during the German Nazi Occupation. Sentenced to death after the war, he escaped and remained in hiding for 25 years. The following excerpt is taken from a letter to the then President of the French Republic by the Rev. Blaise Arminjon, S. J., on December 5, 1970, in support of Paul Touvier’s petition for clemency:

How are we to believe that he [Touvier] is a “criminal”, or a “bad Frenchman”, when his conduct for twenty-five years, and the education he has given his children, has been so admirable? A tree is known by its fruits.[2]

A Toulmin style analysis can be applied to this passage, the warrant being provided by the biblical topos, “a tree is known by its fruits”:

For a good tree does not bear bad fruit, nor does a bad tree bear good fruit.
Luke 6:43-45, New King James Version.

But this transition law also authorizes a metonymy-based interpretation. To speak of “the [admirable] conduct of Touvier for twenty-five years” is a way of referring to Touvier metonymically. To say that this conduct is “admirable” is to say metonymically that Touvier is admirable. Similarly, a positive evaluation of the act, “the education that Touvier gave his children is admirable” also spreads metonymically to the agent, Touvier, who is necessarily equally admirable. The same phenomenon can be equally expressed in the language of tropes or in the language of argument, both of which implement the same kind of rationality.

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[1] La Mort est dans le pré, youtube.com/watch?v=nAMARhJoFaQ
[2] Quoted in René Rémond & al., Paul Touvier and the Church, Paris, Fayard, 1992, p. 164.

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From a rhetorical point of view, metaphor is valued as a cryptic analogy, the clarification of which is entrusted to the audience. The key difference between metaphor and analogy is that, while analogy keeps the two domains it relates separate and distinct, metaphor tends to conflate them.

According to Aristotle, metaphor is the most efficient persuasive instrument of ordinary discourse. From the perspective of an anti-rhetorical theory of argumentation, metaphor is abundantly misleading. But metaphor is also a powerful cognitive tool for building representations, and better understanding complex situations. Metaphor applies the language of a model, i.e. the Resource domain (the metaphorical term) to an actual situation, the Problematic domain to which belongs the (sometimes missing) metaphorized term, S. Structural Analogy.

1. Metaphor put on trial

If metaphor is defined as a figure, and figures are defined as ornaments, then metaphor is misleading in all its dimensions, S. Fallacy; Ornamental fallacy. The metaphorical statement is false: “The voter is a calf” said Charles de Gaulle; but the voter (proper term) is not a calf (metaphorical term) the voter is a human being. Metaphor systematically commits a category mistake. One can also accuse metaphor of creating ambiguity, because it introduces a parasitic level of signification, the figurative meaning, running parallel to the proper, standard meaning.

Metaphor pops up, creating a surprise and introducing an emotion (ad passiones fallacy); it entertains the audience (ad populum fallacy), thus sacrificing docere to placere. It turns the reasonable arguer into an actor (ad ludicrum fallacy). Metaphor is therefore the discursive distractor par excellence, putting the audience on a false trail, and confusing the honest literal individual in his or her pursuit for truth. S. Relevance; Red Herring; Resumption of discourse.

Therefore, metaphor is, and should be, banished from serious argumentative discourse, as it is from scientific language; it can be helpful only when re-formulated as a comparison (Ortony 1979, p. 191). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that metaphor is active and welcome to stimulate creativity and facilitate science transmission and popularization.

2. Metaphor, the ultimate weapon of persuasion?

Persuasion, pistis, is produced in three ways “(1) by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, (2) by giving them the right impression of the speaker’s character, or (3) by proving the truth of the statements made” (Aristotle, Rhet., 1403b10; RR p. 397), in the latter case, persuasion emerging “from the facts themselves” (ibid).

Ideally, the issue should be discussed on the basis of facts and proofs: “we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore should matter except the proof of those facts” (ibid 1404a1; RR p. 399). But normal people are not perfect, and “owing to the defects of our hearers”, and of our “political institutions”, “the arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance” in public discourse and education — but not in geometry: “nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry” (1404a1-10, RR. p. 399).

So, refined language is the most effective tool of persuasion. Persuasion by emotion (pathos) and image (ethos) is produced, orally, by the “oratorical action”; in writing, by the stylistic arrangement of facts, “because speeches of the written or literary kind owe more to their diction than to their thought” (1404a15; p. 401). Metaphor is the supreme tool of written discourse “both in poetry and in prose”; it “gives style clearness, charm and distinction as nothing else can” (1405a1-10; RR, p. 405). The conclusion is clear: metaphor is the ultimate weapon of persuasion, defined as the art of “[hiding one’s] purpose successfully” (1404b20; RR, p. 403), and charming the audience, S. Logos, Ethos, Pathos.

Contemporary approaches to metaphor unanimously consider that metaphor derives this power from the intrinsic element of surprise, resulting from the perception of an anomaly in the discourse, a rupture, an inconsistency, an incongruity, a contradiction of logic, in short, a discursive coup, to the audience’s delight. Pleasure cannot be rebutted, and metaphor is thus considered to be quasi inaccessible to refutation — in reality, it is: cf. infra, §4

3. Metaphor and interpretative cooperation

Using a metaphor, the speaker openly seeks the interpretative cooperation of the audience; creating cooperation, metaphor strengthens the importance of prior agreements. Note that the same functional explanation is given for the derivation of enthymemes from underlying syllogisms. In both cases, the argumentative (i.e. effective, persuasive) function of the enthymematic or metaphoric condensation is the activation of the partner, S. Enthymeme §5.

This analysis assumes that the non-argumentative metaphorical language, or the non-elliptic syllogism would be transparent, or less complex than the metaphorical language, and that their direct interpretation would not require the same degree of cooperation from the audience, which is not self-evident.

4. Metaphor as analogy

Metaphor finds smart solutions to the riddle of metaphor:

Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person; and the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too, understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.
(Davidson 1978, p. 29)

In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud defines dream-work as the process by which the latent content of a dream is covered by its manifest content, by displacement, distortion, condensation and symbolism. The metaphor “metaphor / dream work” is difficult to reject, even if it commits the fallacy of trying to go ad obscurum per obscurius, that is, it attempts to illuminate the dark (metaphor) by the darker (the dream work).

The metaphor is a model, (Black 1962), and an imperialist model, urging one to identify the metaphorized reality within the metaphorical world:

L1 — we should do something with the economy…
L2 — with the “economy-casino” you mean\
L1 — oh yes, all these addicted traders should be banned from the market!

Reconstructed analogy “as addicted players are banned from casinos”

Saying that “the voter is a calf” is to mean that “the voter is hesitant, weak and can be manipulated like a calf”, calves being here the stereotypical animal combining these characteristics. The metaphor opens new perspectives, and legitimates a new set of inferences about voters: if they are categorized as calves, one can make them adopt behaviors directly contrary to their interests, e.g. to lead them to a more or less metaphorical slaughterhouse.

Metaphor draws its argumentative strength from an analogy pushed to identification. Structural analogy explicitly brings together two domains, respecting their specificities; the domains are confronted, not assimilated. Metaphor renders the comparison implicit, negates the metaphorized domain, assimilated to the metaphorical one. This is why the reconstruction of the analogy underlying the metaphorical expression betrays metaphor: it splits apart what metaphor has joined together. Peter is a lion: the language referring to lions is substituted for the language referring to humans; we are not far from the hyper-unitary coherent Renaissance world where everything is mirrored in everything,, S. Analogical thinking.

5. Jumping from analogy to identity?

Analogy can be defined as a partial identity. The question of possible profound identity, underlying immediately discernible differences plays an essential role here:

Snowdrifts are like corrugated iron.
Snowdrifts are like dunes.

The syntactic structures of these two statements are identical, both propose the image of “waves” to the interlocutor, and a key common semantic feature, /waving/. But the second comparison is deeper; it opens the way to a theory. It introduces an analogy of proportion:

snow : snowdrift :: sand : dune

It suggests that the analogy can be explained by the action of wind on, respectively, the snow particles and sand grains. It puts the hearer on the way to the construction of a physical-mathematical model covering the two phenomena (with due respect paid to the differences between the two kinds of particles, grains of sand and snowflakes, and their respective laws of agglomeration). From two apparently distinct phenomena (one can know what a dune is without knowing what a snowdrift is, and vice-versa), we end up with the problem of a unifying abstract representation: can the same physical model account for the two phenomena?

Establishing an analogy may be considered to be the first step toward the affirmation of an in-depth identity. Such a shift, from explanatory analogy to identity is at the center of a class of arguments about analogy, which fit perfectly into the framework of a vision of metaphor, not only as a model but also as the genuine essence of the metaphorized phenomenon.

6. Mole rats “societies”, human society: metaphor or identity?

The following texts and information are taken from S. Braude & E. Lacey, “A revolutionary monarchy: the society of mole rats”[1]. Mole rats are mammals, precisely hairless rats, living in “groups” or “communities” (the difference is relevant); they exhibit behaviors evoking those observed among social insects, like ants or bees. But this behavior has never been observed in mammals. Hairless mole rats are thus the first mammals with this kind of “social behavior”.

But, when speaking of “social behavior” or “community”, do we use a simple analogical-metaphorical lexicon, a pedagogical or explanatory metaphor? Or are we engaged in a process of describing these newly identified animal behaviors in terms of the existing structures of human societies? Do we suggests, as in the case of the dunes and snowdrifts, that both phenomena may well have the same foundations, biological in this case? Does the organization of human societies obey the same biological laws as apply to mole rat “societies”? Are we on the way towards a socio-biological theory of human societies? Have we moved surreptitiously from metaphorical language to identification?

This is a strategy of “slippery metaphor”. This strategy is so successful, that it reverses the relationship Target / Resource. Being closer to nature, mole rats, formerly the Target, now become a model for the study of human society, formerly the Resource.

In order to reject this assimilation, the opponent lists the terms coming from the field Resource, the human social lexicon:

The phrase “division of labor” is used four times; the word “task” also appears four times; the term “responsible” also appears four times, and “they take care of” once; the terms “cooperation” and “subordinate” are used once each. The expression “sexual status” is used three times to refer to the reproductive state of the animals. (G. Lepape, [Investigation], 1992)

In their reply to this criticism, the authors of the article set limits to the identification of the two areas:

G. Lepape also contends that our language introduces unfair comparisons which attribute common behavioral traits to mole rats and social insects. This assertion surprises us, especially when he writes, “the similarities [between hairless mole rats and social insects] are treated as true homologies”. Our article is clear on that point: we believe that the behavior of hairless mole rats and eusocial[2] insects have striking similarities. However, we do not see how the language used to describe these similarities can suggest that a common origin of these animals would constitute the evolutionary basis of these similarities.
Braude & Lacey, id..

The danger here is that we might be tempted to forget that we are dealing with analogy, which is “never more compelling than when it is abolished and ceases to be perceived as an analogy. Becoming invisible, it merges with the order of things.” (Gadoffre 1980, p. 6)

7. Against metaphors

Politicians [are] catering to a public that doesn’t understand the rationale for deficit spending, that tends to think of the government budget via analogies with family finances.
When John Boehner, the Republican leader, opposed US stimulus plans on the grounds that “American families are tightening their belt, but they don’t see the government tightening its belt”, economists cringed at the stupidity. But within a few months the very same line was showing up in Barack Obama’s speeches […]. Similarly, the Labour party […]
(The Guardian 04-29-2015)[3]

The “stupidity” is that of inference “families are tightening their belts, SO the state must tighten its belt”. We can reconstruct the warranting principle of this argument as a metaphor:

A state, a nation, a country is a family.

One could also think of a kind of composition:

The state is made up of families, families are tightening their belts, the state must tighten its belt.

However, the metaphor “state, family” has deep roots; it is based on the etymology of the word economy, from the Greek oikonomia, “home management”; it is found in the praise of the leader as “father of the nation”, “founding father”, etc.

Krugman considers that politicians are “catering” (“providing what the public wants, desires or what amuses them”; after d.c, cater) to a public “that doesn’t understand”; so politicians must use metaphors, and metaphors, at least this metaphor – is stupid — this is indeed exactly what Aristotle said, cf. supra.

Happy metaphors do serve to charm the audience, but the fact that there are also unhappy metaphors must be fully acknowledged. Where they are used, the interlocutors are not only not “charmed”, showing no pleasure, but they also “cringe at the stupidity”, that is, “show on their face and bodies their feeling of disgust and embarrassment” (after MW, Cringe). This is exactly how metaphor can be rebutted as metaphors.

Then, in a second step, the accounts can be settled with the substantial contents, that is the de-metaphorized claim “in times of economic crisis, the state must turn to austerity”. Krugman conducts this substantive rebuttal in the semi-technical language of economics, combining a priori refutation (theoretically ill-grounded), falsification (forecasts contradicted by facts) and pragmatic refutation (policies inspired by this theory have failed). But a second metaphor remains; if words such as restriction and austerity, have a clearly negative orientation, the expression “to tighten one’s belt”, associated with successful diet, weight loss, slimness, has strong visual, irrefutable positive connotations, inaccessible to refutation.

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[1] Braude, S. & Lacey E. (1989). Une monarchie révolutionnaire: la société des rats-taupes. La Recherche [Investigation], a journal of general scientific information] July-August 1989. Comments from G. Le Pape, and reply of the authors in the same journal, Oct. 1992.

[2] “Living in a cooperative group in which usually one female and several males are reproductively active and the nonbreeding individuals care for the young or protect and provide for the group eusocial termites, ants, and naked mole rats” (MW, Eusocial)

[3] www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion (15-08-16)

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The argument to the matter address the relevant facts and the central issue under discussion, that is the substance of the controversy, the merits of the case, the heart of the matter under discussion.

Discussion of the matter is avoided, for example, when somebody accused of corruption and embezzlement of public money answers to the charge by a counter accusation of misogyny, using a classical argument substituting a private and potentially shameful ulterior motive for a public and honorable good reason.
In that sense, an argument to the matter is a quite different thing from an argument drawn from the subject matter of the law.

Like the ad judicium and ad rem arguments, arguments addressing the matter under discussion are not argument schemes, that is, forms of reasoning leading to a conclusion, such as the argument by analogy or by opposites. Any argument scheme may or may not be used to discuss the substance or form of a debate.

The three labels ad rem, ad judicium and to the matter could be taken absolutely, in the Lockian style, as referring to arguments producing knowledge based on natural objects by scientific method, see ad judicium.
On the global opposition ad judicium – to the matter – ad rem  / to the letter, S. Ad judicium.

1. Argument to the matter and validity

To say that an argument is to the matter means that it is relevant to the debate, and that it constitutes a substantial contribution to the discussion.
From the immanent evaluative perspective of the third parties, such arguments are the only ones whose strength and value are worthy of discussion and should be registered or mentioned in the argument map of the discussion.

This does not mean however that they are automatically validated. A party can invoke a precedent, for example, which is clearly a legitimate and substantial move, when dealing with the matter. The precedent can, however, be criticized and rejected, by an argument showing that the so-called precedent are not similar enough to the actual facts. This argument although on the matter is finally declared irrelevant to the issue under discussion Nonetheless, it can be registered as an interesting objection.

2. Form and substance (matter) of the discussion

Arguments dealing with the substance of the discussion are complementary to arguments about its form of the discussion,  which relate to the conditions in which the discussion is taking place. They have to do with the framework, procedure and rules according to which the issue is dealt with. For example, participants may object that they could not get in time the needed documents; or that the quorum was not reached.

3. Logos-based arguments and arguments to the matter

Misleading associations could lead one to think that the arguments related to the logos are “logical” and therefore objective, dealing with objects, and, as a consequence, with the matter and substance of things. As such, logos-derived arguments would be opposed to ethotic and pathemic arguments, the latter being  subjective and arbitrary.

In everyday argumentation, as well as logo-ic arguments, ethotic and pathemic arguments exploit the logos, understood as language and discourse. In an argumentative situation, however, it is the question which determines what the object, the matter and substance, of the debate is.
Arguments referring to persons, their values and emotions are substantial (ad rem and ad judicium) to the extent that they are relevant to the question. Recalling the previous convictions of a person is not irrelevant in all contexts. The description of the state of emotional shock in which the victim was found, for example, might be relevant in court. The problem is distinguishing between the aspects of a personality which are relevant to the discussion, and those which are not. This process is particularly complicated when the persons involved are parties in the argument process.

4. Indirect arguments, peripheral arguments,
arguments to the matter

Indirect argument such as an argument from the absurd, or from ignorance, and they can be to the matter or not.

The same is true for peripheral arguments, exploiting indices accidentally associated with action. A peripheral argument on the person, for example, is to the matter if relevant to the discussion: a witness saw him near the scene of the crime; or not really so: a witness says the suspect is a good friend of his, S. Circumstances.

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[1] http://carm.org/dictionary-argumentum-ad-judicium (20-09-13).

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1. Many questions as a dialectical fallacy

Dialectical games use an ortho-language (S. Logics for Dialogue), that is to say a language game derived from ordinary language and interaction supplemented by a system of conventional rules. The problem about the so-called fallacy of “many questions” originates first in two specific rule of the dialectical game, as exposed in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutation (RS), S. Fallacies . In ordinary language, one single interrogative sentence may contain many questions and many answers, a property derived from the fact that sentences have several layers of meaning. Logical dialectical game prohibits the exploitation of this linguistic resource, and requires the use not of ordinarily phrased sentences, but of propositions, a proposition being defined as “a single statement about a single thing” (Aristotle, RS, 169a6; Tricot, p. 30). Secondly, logical dialectical game authorizes only yes/no answers.

The linguistic phenomenon of loaded questions (also known as many or multiple questions) is examined by Aristotle in the context of a dialectical exchange, where they are considered a fallacious discursive maneuver, S. Fallacies. It consists in “the making of two questions into one” (id. 167b35; p. 22).

Consider a set composed of bad things and good things (id., §5). The misleading question is: “is the set good or bad?”. The answer “good” will be rejected by alleging a bad thing, and the answer “bad” by alleging a good thing. (ibid.). The correct answers are yes for the first component and no for the second one; but the smart sophist will refute the yes by alleging the second component, and vice-versa.
The case of the half white and half black picture might be more convincing. The sophistical dialectical question is: “is it (=the picture) black (resp. white)?”. As there are only two authorized answers “yes” or “no”, they will be refuted respectively by focusing on the white (resp. black) part of the picture (id., §5).

Ordinary speakers would simply give the sensible non-dialectal answer, “this part is white and the other black”.
One can imagine that the question “is anger a good thing?” exhibits that kind of problem. The answer yes is refuted by any negative aspects of anger such as violence or lack of self-control, whilst the no is undermined by any case of “righteous anger”.

The fallacy of many questions is thus a clear example of fallacy defined as a breach of dialectical rules, S. Fallacies (2). The issue of many questions arises as a by-product of the rules of the dialectical game, and there is no need to import it as such in the analysis of ordinary argumentation. Rhetorical argumentation has no problem with confusing questions; they are answered with a conceptual dissociation or a distinguo.

2. Presupposition

Natural language questions might concern statements containing presuppositions that are, or are not, considered acceptable by their recipient:

S1: — You should think about the reasons for the failure of your policy.
S2: — But my policy has not failed!

S2 rejects the presupposition of S1 “your policy has failed”.
The imposition of a presupposed judgment is contrary to the logical principle that a statement expresses a single judgment (if it contains several judgments, each must be asserted separately). Consequently it contradicts the dialectical rule requiring that each proposition be explicitly accepted or rejected by the respondent. S1 could therefore ask S2 the question “why P?” only if S1 and S2 previously agree on the existence of P. From a Perelmanian perspective, the question of presuppositions should be settled within the framework of prior agreements, S. Conditions for discussion.

The problem is that, in ordinary language, all statements are more or less “loaded” not only by their orientation, but also by their implicit contents of various kinds, some of them inferred from oriented words. In reality, it is always possible to extract litigious presupposed or infer propositional contents from a statement and to subsequently hold the interlocutor liable for it. Let us consider a discussion between a banker and a recriminating customer trying to get a better interest rate:

S1_1:   — I went to the bank just across the street from my house, and they immediately offered me a loan at a lower rate than the one you proposed to me!
S2:      — It’s because they wanted to have you as a customer.
S1_2:   — Because you do not want to keep me as a customer?

S1_2 extracts from or infers from S2’s intervention an implicit content that S2 certainly rejects, but nevertheless shows the banker that a different explanation is needed. This move can be considered to be a special straw man maneuver (de Saussure 2015).

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