1. Word and Domains

The transitive verb to manipulate, “No manipulates N1” functions within two structures:

Manipulate₁: N1 refers to an object (non-human, inanimate) (container manipulation) or body parts (spinal manipulation).

Manipulate₂: N1 designates a person as a synthesis of representations and capable of self-determination. Manipulating₂ is exploitative; manipulating people is using them as objects or instruments.

To manipulate is the head of a rich and homogeneous derivational family: manipulation, manipulator, (non-)manipulatory, (non-)manipulative, outmanipulate, “to outdo or surpass in manipulating”, (MW, Outmanipulate).

Manipulation₂ can influence all domains of human activity.

— Political, ideological and religious fields.
— Everyday psychology: a manipulator, manipulative behavior.
— Military domain: White propaganda comes from domestic source and targets domestic public opinion; it may be misleading. Black propaganda has a concealed origin and purpose. It appears to come from a well-meaning and harmless source, although it comes from an evil or enemy source.
— Commercial action and marketing techniques are used to encourage or manipulate people to buy this rather than that or nothing, using different techniques to “bait and hook” the customer, S. Gradualism.

In these different fields, manipulative influence may cross, combine or contradict argumentative persuasion.

2. Doing together: from collaboration to manipulation

Manipulation is a resource that may be activated in any situation where a person M pursues a goal φ. To achieve this goal, M requires a contribution to be made by another person, N.

2.1 Overt purpose negotiation

(i) M considers that φ is in the interest of N, and N agrees

N has a positive representation of φ; φ is considered important, pleasant, in the individual’s interest; N pursues φ spontaneously, for independent reasons. So, M needs N and N needs M; M and N co-operate to achieve φ.

If N’s commitment is less immediate, M will take a more open approach and will seek to persuade N to associate with him or her in order to realize φ. N knows that M intends to make him or her do φ, and they will discuss this with one another.

(ii) Doing φ is not really in the best interest of N

N doesn’t care about φ. He or she will not spontaneously collaborate with M in order to achieve φ. M may then act on the will or on the mental representations of N.

(a) Action on the will to do

In this situation, M may undertake to persuade N to do φ. M threatens N (ad baculum), tries to blackmail or bribe N (ad crumenam), to move N to pity (ad misericordiam), to charm or seduce N (ad amicitiam), S. Threat; Emotion.

N still has a rather negative view of φ. But M’s arguments, if they are arguments at all, have transformed N’s willingness to act, and he or she will ultimately agree to act in favor of φ even if he or she does not like it. N does φ reluctantly, as a favor to M. The question arises as to whether N has been manipulated.

(b) Action on representations of the action to be taken

M may reframe φ so that it seems to be pleasant or favorable, in N‘s in best interests. As in case (i), N agrees to do φ because it seems beneficial.

In case (a), N will do a job that he or she knows to be dangerous, because it is well paid. In case (b), N will do a job, hazardous or not, which he or she does not consider to be dangerous. M can combine the two strategies: “you can do this for me, it’s not so dangerous”. These two situations are not necessarily manipulative. M has openly presented the goalφto N; N was persuaded to do φ for arguably good reasons; the work may not actually be all that dangerous, and it is well paid.

M behaves manipulatively only if he or she knows that the work is dangerous, but knowingly misrepresents it, concealing the danger to N. Lying is the basis of manipulation.

(iii) Doing φ is against the interests and values ​​of N

Now, φ is clearly contrary to the interests of N. In normal circumstances, N would automatically oppose M in his or her attitude toφ. Nevertheless, it is still possible for M:

— To persuade N to willfully do something contrary to his interests or values. In an extreme case, for example, N might be persuaded to commit suicide or sacrifice him or herself, even if he or she does not wish to die, in the name of a higher interest or value, “God, the Party, the Nation, asks you to…”; “You must sacrifice your children to make our cause prevail”.

— To persuade N that the action to which he or she is urged is good, and in his or her best interest. M urges N to sacrifice him or herself for example, even if N is not eager to die, “you will go to le se”. The discourse and arguments through which M persuades N to consent to φ are manipulative because they do not respect a hierarchy of values that is considered natural. On the basis of highly questionable arguments, N was induced to do something to which no person would reasonably commit. This is a case of brainwashing.

2.2 Covert purpose negotiation

In the cases described above, N is more or less aware of what he or she is committing to doing. Deep manipulation, however, is characterized by M’s hiding his or her actual intentions or the true nature of the goal φ, which in reality is unacceptable to N. M will use a secondary goal, as a decoy (φ_d):

(i) φ_d is positive for N: N is led to believe that it is in his or her interests to do φ_d
(ii) φ_d leads fatally to φ
(iii) N ignores (2)
(iv) N achieves the decoy goal; M pockets the bet.

There is not necessarily a verbal exchange, or even contact between M and N during this process. N suffers any damage, and may or may not understand that he or she has been manipulated. N may lose the game without even knowing he or she was playing a game. One example might be that of a salesman. A large encyclopedia, for example, is sold to consumers who, although delighted by its purchase, hardly know how to read, have no use for this type of book, and, in any case, cannot afford to pay the bill. The salesman has achieved the feat of framing the sales interaction,φ, as an ordinary, friendly conversation, φ_decoy.

3. “Pious lies”

Manipulation achieved via a pious lie is what we see in action when, for example, we put sweeteners in cod-liver oil administered to children; or what Calvin attributes to monks who wish to bring people to their salvation by any means, because the end justifies the means. The following excerpt is about the multiplication of the relics of the true cross:

Now, what other conclusion can be drawn from these considerations but that all these were inventions for deceiving silly folks? Some monks and priests, who call them pious frauds, i.e., honest deceits for exciting the devotion of the people, have even confessed this.
John Calvin, A Treatise on Relics, [1543][1]

The concept and practice of “patriotic fraud” in elections might be seen as a modern day version of the practices that Calvin attributes to medieval monks.

4. Manipulation and power practices

The status accorded to manipulation is based on ideas of power and action. Should power be exercised by reason and valid argument, or, in a Machiavellian perspective, does it necessarily require the use of force and lies?

I must confess that what is called the cultured circles of Western Europe and America are incapable of understanding the actual balance of power. These people must be considered deaf-mutes.
To tell the truth is petty bourgeois prejudice, while lying is often justified by the objectives. (Lenin, quoted in V. Volkoff, [Disinformation, A Weapon of War], 1986[2]

Discussing the vital necessity of keeping the place and time of the Normandy landing a secret, Churchill said:

“In war-time”, I said, “truth is so precious it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies”. (Discussion of Operation Overlord with Stalin at the Teheran Conference, Nov. 30, 1943[3])

The answer to the previous question may be that:

[The] truth is incontrovertible. Panic may resent it, ignorance may deride it, malice may distort it, but there it is.
Winston Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons, May 17, 1916[4]

5. Argumentation and manipulation

5.1 Argumentation and propaganda

The study of discursive schematizations is the study of the processes through which the speaker arranges a synthetic, coherent, stable meaning. This constructed meaning is neither a manipulation₂, nor reality itself, nor an illusion of reality, but simply a significant view taken of reality, S. Schematization. To communicate, the speaker must necessarily manipulates₁ the discursive material, but this process is not necessarily intended to manipulate₂ the interlocutor. Manipulation₂ presupposes deliberate falsehood. Considering that all speech is necessarily manipulative would amount to an undue dramatization of the process of signification.

A very tenuous thread separates the study of argumentation as defined by the Treatise on argumentation and that of political propaganda, as defined by Domenach. For Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, “the object of the study of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent.” ([1958]/1969, p. 4; italics in the original). Domenach defines the object of propaganda as “to create, transform or confirm opinions” by means of multi-semiotic processes (image, music, demonstration and crowds) (Domenach 1950, p. 8). This difference may be that between ratio-propaganda and senso-propaganda as defined by Tchakhotine (1939, p. 152). The former is effective “by persuasion, by reasoning”, and the second by “suggestion” (ibid.), that is, by manipulation₂.

5.2 Manipulation and lying

Lies and concealed intentions crucially oppose argumentation to manipulation; a lie being understood as an active lie, asserting a known falsehood, and a passive lie, as failing to tell the whole truth, or relevant parts of it. Manipulative discourse is based on lies, which may be presented as “alternative facts”. Disorienting hints, false cues and misleading prospects are put forward as truths. Even some true information may be mixed with fake information to make it believable.
The denunciation of manipulative discourse is a denunciation of lies; but there is no formal mark of errors and lies; exposing lies necessitates a substantial knowledge of the issue. For this reason, as Hamblin says, “[the logician] is not a judge or court of appeal: and there is no such judge or court” (1970, p. 244); but, as a responsible citizen, he or she must denounce manipulation in favor of a better-informed picture of reality, S. Evaluation.

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[1] John Calvin, A Treatise on Relics. Trans. and introd. by Valerian Krasinski. 2^nd ed. Edimburg: Johnstone, Hunter & Co, 1870. Quoted after http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32136/32136-pdf.pdf (08-17-2017)
[2] Vladimir Volkoff, La désinformation, arme de guerre. Lausanne: L’Âge d’Homme, 1986, p. 35.
[3] In The Second World War, Volume V: Closing the Ring (1952), Chapter 21 (Teheran: The Crux), p. 338.
[4] Quoted after https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill

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In order to build a correct representation of the world, knowledge-oriented theories of argumentation focus on phenomenon concerning the objects of debate (categorizations; physical surroundings of the facts; probable and necessary signs; causal and analogical networks, etc.), and the representational function of language (well-built definitions, univocity, etc.). The construction and strategic management of people and their emotions is essential in the overall orientation of rhetorical discourse towards persuasion and action: its goals are to make people think, feel and act. The accomplished action is the only criterion of successful persuasion, which would be unduly reduced to creating or strengthening the mind’s adherence to a thesis, S. . The rhetorical judge is not persuaded if he does not pronounce in favor of the party who convinced him.
The connections between convictions and actions are far from clear, S. Motives and Reasons. It is said that a MP once replied to someone who tried to convince him to alter his opinion, “you can certainly change my opinion, but you will not change my vote”; this quip highlights the crucial difference between the determiners of representation and those of action.

The rhetorical technique provides three instruments of persuasion (pistis) respectively drawn from the logos, the ethos and the pathos. These instruments, sometimes called “proofs”, are used by the speaker not only to make believe, but also to guide the will and determine the action.

Of the modes of persuasion offered by the spoken word there are three kinds: the first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience in a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. (Rhet., I, 2, 1356a1; RR, p. 105).

All three forms are discourse dependent; logo-ic evidence is purely discursive, while ethotic and pathemic evidence is discursive and para-discursive. The parallel, “ethos, pathos, logos” tends to assimilate these three kinds of evidence, which leads to define rhetorical evidence as any sign, verbal or non-verbal, capable of inducing a belief.

Cicero and the later rhetorical catechisms assign three goals to the speaker engaged in a persuasion process. S/he must prove (probare), please (conciliare), and move (movere) (De Or., II, XXVII, p. 114).
— First teach, that is, inform, narrate and argue, via the logos. . That is to say that the speech must inform, narrate and argue. This teaching thus takes an intellectual approach in achieving persuasion, that of evidence and deduction.
— Yet information and argumentation may be weakened by the boredom and incomprehension of the audience. The listener must therefore be given peripheral indications, and this is the function of ethos (“maybe you don’t quite understand, anyway you can trust me”).
— But logos and ethos do not have the power to trigger the “acting out”, hence the recourse to pathos. It is not enough to see the good, it is still necessary to want it; the almost physical emotional stimuli produced by the orator, that is the pathos, are supposedly the final determinants of the will and action.

Evidence based on logos is considered to be logical”, objective, at least the only one of the three to serve as proof in the proper sense of the term. Firstly, it meets, at least partially, the propositional condition for reasoning (to be expressed in an identifiable statement, evaluable independently from the conclusion is supports), so it is open to refutation. In contrast, pathemic and ethotic evidences, by nature subjective, are expressed indirectly, through the subtlest channels, and are therefore hardly accessible to verbal refutation.

Classical texts insist on the practical superiority of the subjective proofs, ethos and pathos, over objective ones. Aristotle poses the primacy of the ethos: “[the speaker’s] character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion” (Rhet., I, 2, 1356a10; RR, p. 106), and warns against the overly effective use of the pathos. Cicero and Quintilian quasi assimilate ethos to pathos, in order to affirm the practical supremacy of emotions.

In the second half of the twentieth century, different systems of logic were constructed to give a formal representation of argumentative dialogue.

— In addition to his historical presentation, discussion and critique of the “standard treatment of fallacies” Charles L. Hamblin proposed a “formal dialectic” (1970)
— Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz developed a dialogical logic (Lorenzen, Lorenz, 1978).
— Else Barth and Jan L. Martens constructed a formal dialectic for the analysis of argument (Barth, Martens, 1977).
— Jaakko Hinttika studied the semantic of questions, and the logic of information-seeking dialogs (1981).
— Taking Hamblin’s work as a starting point, Douglas Walton and John Woods developed a logical approach to fallacies (Woods, Walton 1989) and to argumentative dialogues (Walton 1989).

The dialogical logic (Dialogische Logik) of Lorenzen and the school of Erlangen was developed as a contribution to formal logic. This model extended to apply to the definition of rational dialogue, is a precursor of the pragma-dialectic approach to argument.

1. Logical dialogue game

The logical contribution consists in a method of no longer defining logical connectives by the traditional method of truth tables, but by means of permissible or prohibited moves in a “dialogical game”. Consider, for example, the connector “&”, “and”. It can be defined by the truth table method. In dialogical games, “&” is defined by the following moves:

(a) First round:

Proponent: P & Q
Opponent: Attacks P
Proponent: Defends P

If the proponent defends P successfully, he wins round (a). If his or her defense fails, the game is over, and the proponent has lost the game. In the language of truth tables, this corresponds to the truth-table line “if P is false, then the conjunction ‘P & Q’ is false”. In other words, the line “if P is false, then the conjunction ‘P & Q’ is false” is excluded.

If the proponent won round (a), in relation to P, the game continues.

(b) Second round, the opponent attacks Q.

Proponent: P & Q
Opponent: Attacks Q
Proponent: Defends Q

If the proponent defends Q successfully, he wins round (b), and, as round (a) has already been won, the game is won for the proponent. If his or her defense fails, the game is over, the proponent lost the game, and the opponent won it.

In the language of truth-tables, this translates as “P & Q” is true: the proponent won; and “P & Q” is false: the opponent won.

2. Dialogue logic rules and Pragma-Dialectical rules

Dialogical logic uses three kinds of rules (van Eemeren & al. 1996, p. 258)

— Starting rule: the proponent starts by asserting a thesis.
— General rules on legal and illegal moves in dialogue (see above).
— Closing rule, or winning rule, determining who has won the game.

Similar rules apply in Pragma-Dialectic:

— The starting rule corresponds to “Rule 1. Freedom — “The parties must not interfere with the free expression or questioning of points of view” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans 2002, 182-183).
— The closing rule, or the winning rule corresponds to “Rule 9. Closing — ­If a point of view has not been conclusively defended, the advancing party must withdraw it. If a point of view has been conclusively defended, the other party must withdraw the doubts it has expressed with respect to that point of view” (ibid.).

The other rules are intended to ensure the smooth running of an argumentative dialogue in ordinary language aimed at eliminating differences of opinion.

3. A contribution to the theory of rationality

In a work entitled Logical Propaedeutic: Pre-School of Reasonable Discourse ([1967] / 1984), Kamlah and Lorenzen aim to provide “the building blocks and rules for all rational discourse” (quoted in van Eemeren & al 1996, p. 248). Their basic assumption is that, “in order to prevent them from speaking at cross purposes in interminable monologues, the interlocutors’ linguistic usage in a discussion or conversation must comply with certain norms and rules. Only when they share a number of fixed postulates with respect to linguistic usage can they conduct a meaningful discussion” (van Eemeren & al. 1996, p. 253). The goal of the enterprise is therefore the construction of an “ortholanguage” (Lorenzen & Schwemmer, 1975, p. 24; quoted in id., p. 253), defining the rational dialogical behavior capable of resolving inter-individual contradictions.

There is obviously a great difference between this approach and the interactional approaches to speech in interaction that began to develop at the same time.

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1. Traditional logic

1.1 The Aristotelian framework

Aristotle does not use the word “logic” in his logical and ontological writings gathered in the Prior and Posterior Analytics. In his own words, he deals with “demonstrative analytical behavior (reasoning, discourse)”, which corresponds “to the current meaning of the term logic.” (Kotarbinski [1964], p. 5; Woods 2014). The Posterior Analytics defines scientific knowledge:

We attain knowledge through demonstration […] I call demonstration a scientific syllogism. (Post. An., I, 2; Owen, p. 247)

It follows that “it is necessary that demonstrative science should be from things true, first, immediate, more known than, prior to, and the causes of the conclusion” (ibid).

In a note added to this passage, Tricot points out that “syllogism is the genre (“producer of science”) common to demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms; scientific is the specific difference separating demonstration from dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms” (In Aristotle, SA, I, 2, 15-25; Note 3 p. 8). The scientific syllogism produces categorical knowledge, the dialectical syllogism produces probable, that is criticized, knowledge where no categorical knowledge is available, and the rhetorical syllogism produces persuasive representations. The position of persuasion in the rhetoric of Aristotle should be understood within this framework.

Traditional logical theory is based on an analysis of propositions as subject-predicate constructions, on a definition of the relations between the four forms of a general proposition and of a theory of syllogism.

1.2 Neo-Thomist logic

In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas took up the Aristotelian definition of logic and defined it in relation to the reflexivity of the act of reasoning, that is “its ability to reflect upon itself”:

An art is needed to direct the act of reasoning, so that by it a man when performing the act of reasoning might proceed in an orderly and easy manner and without error. And this art is logic, i.e. the science of reason. (Com. Post. An., “Foreword”)

This definition is taken up by the Neo-Thomist tradition, especially by Maritain, who defines logic as:

The art WHICH DIRECT THE VERY ACT OF REASON.
(Maritain 1923, p. 1; capitals in the text)

This definition is taken up by Chenique in his Elements of Classical Logic (1975).

The following definition stresses the normative value of “formal logic” defined as

A science that determines the correct (or valid) forms of reasoning.”
(Dopp 1967, p. 11, italics in the original).

1.3 Logic and inference

In mathematics, logic is defined as :

The discipline that deals with correct inference. (Vax 1982, Logic)

Logic is concerned with the principles of valid inference. (Kneale and Kneale, [1962], p. 1)

S. Inference. Logic is the study of the valid forms of deduction:

Logic has the important function of saying what follows from what. (Kleene, 1967, Chap. 1, §1)

1.4 Logic is a science

Logic, like any science has as its business the pursuit of truth. (Quine, 1959, p. xi)

The Stoics first defined logic not in the manner of Aristotle as an organon, an instrument (in the service of the sciences), but as a science.

1.5 Classical logic

Classical logic (or traditional logic, according to Prior 1967) is by nature a formal logic: it is one of the revolutionary merits of Aristotle to have introduced a systematic use of variables. Classical logic covers a set of theses and techniques synthesizing proposals of Aristotelian, Stoic or Medieval origin. It consists in two parts:

— The logic of analyzed propositions or predicate calculus, and the theory of the syllogism.

—The logic of unanalyzed propositions or propositional calculus, which deals with the construction, using logical connectives, of complex propositions on the basis of simple or complex propositions, and with the determination of valid formulas (logical laws, tautologies).

Classical logic is based on a set of principles, considered to be laws of thought and rational discourse:

— Non-contradiction, “non-(P and non-P)”; a proposition cannot be true and false.

— Excluded middle (excluded third), “either (P or non-P)”; a proposition must be true or false.

— Identity “a = a”, and its practical consequences, such as the principle of indiscernibility and intersubstitutability of the identicals, and the unicity and stability of meaning of the logical symbols in the same universe of discourse (same reasoning).

Contemporary logics no longer regard these principles as laws of thought, but as possible axioms, among others.

The contemporary era saw the multiplication of “unconventional” logical formalisms, sometimes inspired by certain phenomena of ordinary language not taken into account by classical logic, such as time or modality.

2. Logic: An art of thinking, a branch of mathematics

2.1 The three operations of the mind

From Aristotle to the end of the nineteenth century, classical logic was considered the art of thinking correctly, that is, of combining propositions in such a way as to convey the truth of the premises to the conclusion, in a universe of shared and stable symbols and meanings. Logic provides the theory of rational discourse and of scientific argumentation by defining and determining the valid reasoning schemes.

The theory of the three operations of the mind comes from Maritain (1937, §2-3). For a long time, such an approach was abandoned by logicians, who were legitimately motivated by the fantastic potential of expansion and discoveries offered by mathematical models. Nonetheless, it certainly has its place in relation to ordinary thinking, anchored in ordinary language. It indeed illuminates the necessity to take into account the progressive and multi-dimensional construction of an argument, articulating words and concepts into judgments, and propositions into arguing and reasoning. Such a model is quite compatible with the idea of schematization as defined in Grize’s Natural Logic.

(i) Argumentation as a mental process

As a mental process, argumentation is defined as the third “operation of the mind”, apprehension, judgment and reasoning.

— Apprehension: the mind grasps a concept, “man”, then delimits it scope: “some men”, “all the men”.

— Judgment: the mind constructs a proposition, affirming or denying something about this delimited concept: “some men are wise”. This judgment is categorical, it is true or false and nothing else.

— Reasoning: the mind concatenates the judgments without any loss of truth, so as to develop new truths on the basis of known truths.

(ii) Argumentation as a discursive process

In the discursive process, argumentation is defined as the third of the three basic linguistic operations: naming the concept; predicating something of this concept in a statement; and arguing.

— Naming: Speaking of something clearly delimited. The concept is anchored in language by a term according its quantity, S. Proposition.

— Predicating: Saying something about this delimited concept, that is constructing a proposition (a linguistic statement) by imposing a predicate on this term.

— Arguing: Composing the statements orderly into the premises of a discourse so as to produce a new proposition, the conclusion, developed exclusively from the premises which are already known. Argumentation on the discursive level thus corresponds to reasoning on the cognitive level.

In Aristotelian logic, the rules of correct reasoning are given by the theory of syllogism, which distinguishes between valid syllogisms and paralogisms (vicious reasoning, fallacies, sophisms).

2.2 Logic as the art of reasoning and the emergence of scientific method

In modern times, this view of logic as a theory of discursive reasoning and the assimilation of discursive reasoning with scientific reasoning has been destabilized by the emergence of natural sciences and experimental reasoning, based on observation, measurement, prediction and experimentation, all regulated by mathematical calculation. In contemporary times, this evolution has been complemented by the integration of logic into mathematics. The rules of scientific method include and exceed logic.

From the point of view of argumentation, this evolution began in the Renaissance, and can be traced back to Ramus (Ong 1958), for whom judgment, logic and method must be considered as stand-alone operations we would call epistemic or cognitive, independent from rhetoric and language. The mutation appears clearly if one compares the Port-Royal Logic, in its full title: Logic, or, the art of Thinking: Containing, Besides Common Rules, Several New Observations Appropriate for Forming Judgment of Arnauld and Nicole ([1662]) to Condillac’s Treatise on the Art of Reasoning ([1796]). In the latter work, the language of the “art of reasoning” is not syllogistically organized natural language, but geometry. Rhetorical argument is never considered, as shown by the case of analogy, which is reduced to mathematical proportion.

2.3 Mathematization of logic

Logic is by its nature formal, it is interested not in the content (in substance, in the particular objects) of reasoning, but in the form. In contemporary times it has been axiomatized and mathematized. The publication of Frege’s Begriffschrift, “Concept Writing” in 1879 set the point from which logic cannot be seen as an “art of thinking”, but as an “art of calculating”, that is, as a branch of mathematics. At the beginning of the twentieth century, classical logic was overwhelmed by the “twilight of self-evidences” (Blanché 1970, p. 70):

We move from Logic to logics that can be built at will. And this plurality of logics withdraws its privileges to classical logic, which is now merely one system among others, like them a simple formal architecture whose validity depends only on its internal coherence. (Id., p. 71-72)

To become an axiomatic exercise, logic had to renounce its reflexive and critical function over common thought and discourse. It could no longer provide the model of rationally argued discourse or dialectical exchange. Logic is now the mathematical discipline, which was questioned, in the 1950s and 1970s, by the Natural, Non-formal and Substantial logics. Classical logic can indeed also be appended to this list.

2.4 Neo-Thomism: Resistance to the formalization trend

In 1879, the year when Frege published the Begriffschrift, Pope Leo XIII established Thomas Aquinas and his interpretation of Aristotelianism as a quasi-official philosophy of the Catholic Church in the Aeterni Patris Encyclical. This decision was certainly unfortunate, insofar as it promoted an outdated vision of logic. Nonetheless, it has brought about a powerful trend of research and teaching on classical logic as a method of thought and as an analytic frame for natural language cognition. Substantial developments relating to classical logic constructions and interesting considerations on arguments schemes and sophisms can be found in textbooks for the Neo-Thomist philosophical curriculum at a higher level.

Under various agendas, Maritain’s Logic (1923), Tricot (1928), Chenique (1975) reflect this continuing interest in classical logic. This trend may be compared and contrasted with the so-called revivals of rhetoric that developed from the fifties onward.

3. Pragmatic logic and argumentative calculations

In a quite different tradition, that of the philosophy or ordinary language, Toulmin was the first to suggest that the formalization movement in logic required an accompaniment and counterpart able to address “logical practices”, ([1958], p. 6), mobilizing “substantial” and “field-dependent” argument (id., p. 125; p. 15). He sought a logic which would be a “generalized jurisprudence” (id., p. 7), whose primary purpose would be “justificatory” (id., p. 6).

The logico-pragmatic movement including non-formal, substantial, natural, and generally dialogue logics, distances itself from axiomatized formalisms to take into account the ecological conditions of argumentation. People argue in natural language, and in a given context; classical logic does not meet the second condition, but does meet the first, at least for the restricted aspects of language it can deal with.

Unlike other theories of argumentation, and perhaps in opposition to the utter rejection of logic by the New Rhetoric, Informal Logic and Natural Logic have retained the word logic in their name, perhaps to stress the fact that, beyond their specific difference they do belong to a common genre, S. Argumentation Studies; Demonstration; Proof.

These pragmatic logics must combine with ordinary language and subjectivity. Classical logic has its roots in a severely regimented ordinary language, whilst the speaker of natural language is a virtuoso of contextualization, implicitness and polysemy. These characteristics are constitutive of the efficiency, dynamism and adaptability of natural language in ordinary life circumstances and the possibilities of strategic management of the worlds of action and interaction. Nevertheless, these observations do not imply any rejection of logic: the practice of ordinary discourse necessitates logical competences, just as it necessitates some arithmetical capacities: “It takes about two hours to reach the refuge, night will falls in about one hour, we will arrive at the refuge in the dark; that is risky”; “some mushrooms are edible, not all: you can’t cook any mushroom like that, that is risky”.

4. Entries concerning classical logic

— Predicate Logic: S. Proposition; Syllogism

— Propositional Logic: S. Connectives

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Linked (or coordinate) argumentation is defined in relation with two different issues, as:

(i) An argumentation whose conclusion is based on several statements combining to produce an argument (whose conclusion is supported by a set of interrelated premises). The issue is about the link between statements, the sum of which constitutes a single argument; the notion of link being then constitutive of that of argument.
(ii) An argumentation whose arguments are sufficient for the conclusion only if they are taken jointly. The issue is about the mode of combining arguments so as to produce a conclusive conclusion. The notion of link is then constitutive of that of conclusive argumentation.

S. Convergence, Linked, Serial

1. Statements combined so as to build an argument

A linked argumentation is defined as an argumentation based on linked premises. A premise (major, minor, S. Syllogism) is defined in relation to a conclusion:

Logic. a proposition supporting or helping to support a conclusion (Dic., Premise)

The expression “linked premises” can therefore sound pleonastic. In reality, propositions or statements are linked so as to function as premises supporting a conclusion.
Syllogistic reasoning has a linked structure: “all members of this Society are more than 30 years old”, is an argument in favor of “Peter is more than 30 years old” only when combined with the proposition “Peter is a member of this Society”.
Representation:

Similarly, according to Toulmin’s representation the assertive component has a linked structure. The “data” statement becomes an argument only insofar as it combines with “warranting” and “backing” statements. S. Layout.
Representation:

2. Convergent and linked argumentation

The concepts of link and convergence do not describe same-level phenomena: several arguments converge to (point to) the same conclusion, whilst several statements are linked in order to build an argument for a given conclusion.
Convergent arguments are made of two or more co-oriented arguments, each of them having, by definition a linked structure, as shown in the preceding paragraph. The complete schema of convergent argumentation therefore looks as follows:

2.1 Arguments linked to produce a conclusive conclusion

The linking effect also affects convergent argumentation, the strength of which is not just in the addition of the individual strength of the added arguments. For example, an argument from necessary signs can combine necessary indices into a necessary and sufficient bundle. Likewise, case-by-case arguments, when exhaustive, benefit from a binding effect, giving to the whole greater strength than would be achieved by the mere addition of each of the parts. S. Signs; Case-by-case.

2.2 Convergent or linked argumentation?

The technique used to answer this question is a) consider a conclusion supported by a set of statements, b) consider a particular statement, c) look what happens if it is false or suppressed (Bassham 2003):

— If what remains is still an argumentation, we are dealing with a convergent argumentation:

Peter is clever and personable, he will be a great negotiator
Peter is clever, he will be a great negotiator
Peter is personable, he will be a great negotiator

All these argumentations are admissible; “Peter is clever” and “Peter is personable” are two convergent, co-oriented arguments giving rise to the same conclusion “ Peter will be a great negotiator”.

— If what remains is not an argumentation, we are dealing with a linked argumentation:

(1) It rained and the temperature is below 0°C, there should be black ice on the road.
(2) It rained, there should be black ice on the road (wrong)
(3) The temperature is below 0°C, there should be black ice on the road (wrong, unless one adds the premise “low temperatures generally goes with wet roads”).

Discourse (1) is an explicit, valid and sound argumentation. Discourses (2) and (3) are still argumentations, but they are not valid and sound as they are. To make them sound, missing premises, corresponding precisely to the suppressed statements, must be added.

The usefulness and practicability of the convergent / linked distinction is challenged (Goddu, 2007). Walton considers that its merit lies in its ability to capture the different conditions of the refutation for the two constructions. To refute a linked argumentation, one must simply show that one of the premises is false or inadmissible; to refute the conclusion of a convergent argumentation, each converging argument must be tested separately (Walton on 1996, p. 175). The arguer can grant one of the arguments in the case of convergent argumentation, but cannot give up a premise in the case of linked argumentation.

Basically, one must decide whether one or more good reasons are involved in the argumentation, that is to say, one must structure the verbal flow by proposing coherent semantic blocks supporting the conclusion.

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In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin presents a general description of the structure of argumentative passages, “the layout of argument” (1958, Chap. III, p. 94-145). This very influential representation is also known as “Toulmin Schema”, “Toulmin Model of Argument” or “Toulmin Argument Pattern” (TAP).

1. The structure of the prototypical argumentative dialogue and monologue

1.1 Argumentation as a polyphonic monologue

The following passage is an elementary argumentative cell, putting together the basic components of argumentative discourse according to Toulmin:

— Harry was born in Bermuda, so, presumably, Harry is a British subject
— Since a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject,
on account of the following statutes and other legal provisions ‘…’
— Unless both his parents were aliens / he has become a naturalized American/…(id., p. 103)

The layout of argument combines two major components:

— A central, affirmative component.
— A negative component, staging a challenging voice, that details the “circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside.” (Id., p. 101)

1.2 Argumentation as dialogue

This discourse can be re-played as a prototypical argumentative dialogue, starting from a question, asked by some investigating third party, and developing under the pressure exerted by a challenger.

(i) An Issue

Question:  — What is the nationality of Harry?

 

(ii) A Claim — The arguer answers that:

Arguer: — “Harry is a British subject” (ibid., p. 99).

Making this assertion, the arguer “[is thereby committed] to the claim which any assertion necessarily involves”. As a Claim (C), it can be “challenged”:

Challenger: — “What have you got to go on?” (ibid. p. 98)

 

(iii) Data — In defense, the arguer “must be able to establish [the Claim] — that is, make it good and show that it was justifiable. How is this to be done?” (Id., p. 97): “we shall normally have some facts to which we can point in its support” (ibid.). Here, the arguer gives a fact, or Data (D) to justify the answer:

Arguer: — Harry was born in Bermuda.

Toulmin’s layout is clearly built on a dissensus background. A Claim is “a demand for something rightfully or allegedly due” (WCD, Claim): a claim is put forward in the context of a contestation “to lay claim to, to assert one’s right or title to” (Ibid.).

Data are “things known or assumed; facts or figures from which conclusions can be inferred” (WCD, Data). The quest for data is led with some claim in mind, S. Justification.
Data and Claim are correlative words: Claims require Data, and Data is sought for and selected in function of Claims; they are explicitly connected through a Warrant.

 

(iv) Warrant — The challenger can still consider that the answer is not fully satisfactory, and “[require]” the speaker to indicate “the bearing on [his/her] conclusion of the data already produced” (id., p. 98):

Challenger: — “How do you get there?” (Ibid.)

The arguer is now required to give a Warrant (W), that is “some rule, principle or inference license” (Ibid.):

Arguer: — “A man born in Bermuda will be a British subject” (id., p. 99).

Now the inquisitive challenger may be “dubious” “whether the warrant is acceptable at all” (id., p. 103):

Challenger: — “You presume that a man born in Bermuda can be taken to be a British subject; […] why do you think that?” (Ibid.).

A warrant is an “authorization or sanction, as by a superior or the law” (WCD, Warrant): the “argument — conclusion” gap is sutured by some authority. It can also be “a justification or reasonable grounds for some act, course, statement or belief” (ibid.). In that case, the warrant would correspond itself to a good reason added to the data; it is generally a law orienting the fact as a data for this claim.
Another warrant would give a different orientation to the same data. For example, the warrant “In Bermuda from late May to October, the climate can be uncomfortably hot and with especially high humidity” would orient the same fact toward the claim “Harry certainly knows how to behave under a humid subtropical climate”.

 

(v) Backing — The arguer is now required to give a Backing (B), making the Warrant acceptable

Arguer: — I say that “on account of the following statutes and other legal provisions: …” (id., p. 105).

 

 (vi) Qualifier – Rebuttal — For the preceding moves, the challenger asked for formal clarifications; now, he or she turns to substantial objections, such as:

Challenger: — But “special facts may make this case an exception to the rule, or one in which the law can be applied only subject to certain qualifications” (id., p. 101).

Finally the arguer acknowledges these reservations. His or her Claim is a “presumption”, only “presumably” true, not “necessarily” so. This must be clearly expressed by a Qualifier (Q), “indicating the exceptional conditions which might be capable of defeating or rebutting the warranted conclusion (R)”:

Arguer: — My claim (C) is probably true, insofar we don’t know if “both his parents were aliens [or] he has become a naturalized American” (id. p. 102-103).

The Rebuttal articulates the conditions that, if met, would cancel the reasoning. In integrating the challenger’s contributions into his or her reasoning, the speaker introduces co-operation in a situation of inquiry.

The Qualifier should not be considered as the expression of a vague mental restriction, just in case things do not turn out as expected. It is the trace of substantial Rebuttals, not just any face-saving softener or mitigator; these terms would not express the link with the substantial rebutting counter-discourse.

2. Representation

Toulmin articulates these six basic elements in the following diagram

 

 

The chain “Data — Warrant — Backing — Claim” represents the positive component of the model.
The combination “Qualifier + Rebuttal” represents the negative, or default^@ component of the model.

3. Corollaries

3.1. A legal syllogism

Toulmin speaks of his approach to argument as “generalized jurisprudence” ([1958], p. 7). The instance of reasoning illustrating the layout of argumentation corresponds to a legal syllogism, where a law is applied to a fact.

Positive component
Law: Any motorist crossing the yellow line is an infraction and will be fined
Recorded fact: X has crossed the yellow line
Conclusion: This is a violation of the Law and will be accordingly fined

Default Component
Unless X was driving a fireman’s car, an ambulance… on a mission; was participating in a formal parade…; road works were in progress…

The positive component articulates a premise with a general subject (a law), a premise with a concrete subject (or singular proposition, the argument) in order to deduce a proposition with a concrete subject (the conclusion). It corresponds to a categorization^@ process, including an individual into a class, and therefore authorizing the attribution to the individual of the properties and stereotypes characterizing the class. Toulmin’s basic example draws attention to the importance of categorization and intracategorial deduction in ordinary argumentative activity. Nonetheless, the warrants are not restricted to categorizing principled. Actually, a Warrant is an instantiation of an argument scheme^@.

3.2 The “rediscovery of the topoi”

 The Warrant corresponds to the traditional argumentative notion of topos (Bird 1961), or argument scheme^@. A topos is a general statement “warranting” the acceptability of the argument and capable of generating an infinity of particular arguments or enthymemes having the same form.

Ehninger and Brockriede have shown how the concept of warrant could cover the main forms of argument schemes, for example “authoritative arguments” ([1960], p. 293):

— (D) Klaus Knorr states “Soviet leaders calculate that a minor build-up of nuclear power in the NATO countries of Western Europe will add only marginally to the danger of American striking power.
— therefore (C) Soviet leaders calculate that a minor build-up of nuclear power in the NATO countries of Western Europe will add only marginally (to the danger of American striking power).
— Since (W) what Knorr says about the power of nuclear weapons is reliable
— Because (B) Knorr is a professor at Princeton’s Center of International Studies / is unbiased / has made reliable statements on similar matters in the past / etc.
Unless (R) Other authorities more qualified than Knorr say otherwise / special circumstances negate or reduce Knorr’s usual reliability as a witness.

Accordingly, the specific objections and counter-discourses attached to a given argument scheme will come under the Qualifier – Rebuttal subsystem.

3.3 Open foundations

Let us suppose that Harris was born not in Bermuda but in the Falkland Islands (English name) also called Islas Malvinas (Argentine name). Then, the Backing mentioning the statutes on British nationality, would possibly be supplemented by an evocation of the right of occupation, conquest and the right of the strongest, considering the complex history of the islands.

Basing the Warrant on a Backing opens a potential regression to infinity, the guarantee needing itself to be guaranteed. The same regression could be observed on the argument, which may also be challenged.

3.4 Scientific calculation and the erasing of the rebuttal component

Toulmin’s layout is a favorite among scientists interested in argument. The following example, which is less often quoted than the preceding one, corresponds to the expression of a scientific prediction based on a calculation involving laws derived from experience and observation (1958, p. 184):

The general premise is replaced by a calculus based on physical laws. The disappearance of counter-discourse (Modal + Rebuttal) characterizes the transition to mathematical calculus based upon stabilized scientific content

Laughter and seriousness are the manifestations of two antagonistic psychic states. Laughter is a manifestation of a positive emotion, such as joy. Laughter is the opposite of tears and grief, which are manifestations of negative emotions, and also the opposite of seriousness, denoting calm, S. Pathos.

Laughter is a major instrument of discourse disorientation and destruction, S. Orientation; Irony. Laughter and entertainment are classed along with rhetoric, whilst seriousness and austerity are associated with argumentation. In a debate, laughter and seriousness correspond to two antagonistic positioning strategies: if the opponent jokes and laughs, let your answer be stern and to the matter; to an austere technical discourse, answer with a smile and make a pun everybody can understand.

Hamblin mentions three standard ad fallacies of entertainment, which occur in two different discursive and interactional organizations (Hamblin 1970, p 41).

1. The arguer as an entertainer

Ad ludicrum, Lat. ludicrum, “game; show”, which Hamblin translates as “dramatics”.
Ad captandum vulgus, Lat. vulgus, “the populace”; captare, “to seek to seize”.

Rational criticism rejects discursive histrionics, which spare no form of public speech, even conference communications. An address is transformed into a performance. Such shows were put on first by the ancient sophists as staged in Plato’s Euthydemus, S. Sophism. The arguer becomes an actor, “playing to the gallery” or “to the crowd”, referring to an actor whose demagogic play appeals to easy popular tastes, S. Ad populum.

2. The arguer makes fun of the opponent

Ad ridiculum, Lat. ridiculum “ridiculous”

This latter kind of talk is quite distinct from the former. Hamblin uses the labels “appeal to ridicule” and “appeal to mockery” (ibid.). Strictly speaking, this is a kind of refutation by the absurd, whereby the advanced proposition is rejected by indicating that it has unacceptable, counter-intuitive, amoral and laughable consequences, S. Absurd. The ridiculous is not necessarily comic, and laughter may be sarcastic rather than joyful.

Hedge’s seventh rule explicitly excludes laughing about the opponent, “any attempt to […] lessen the force of his reasoning, by wit, caviling, or ridicule, is a violation of the rules of honorable controversy” (1838, p. 162); S. Rules. This is a special case of the prohibition to substitute discourse destruction to argument refutation, S. Destruction.

Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s book, The Comic of Discourse (1974), is devoted to the comic exploitation of argumentative mechanisms as jokes.

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A co-orientation condition does not suffice to characterize a well articulated convergent argumentation; co-oriented arguments must be consistent. This is the thrust of Freud’s point in The Interpretation of Dreams [1900], in which he uses kettle argumentation as an analogue in order to interpret the content of his dream about “the injection made to Irma”. Both his dream and the following argument are incoherent defense systems putting forward good but incompatible justifications:

I noticed, it is true, that these explanations of Irma’s pains (which agreed in exculpating me) were not entirely consistent with one another, and indeed that they were mutually exclusive. The whole plea — for the dream was nothing else — reminded one vividly of the defense put forward by the man who was charged by one of his neighbors with having given him back a borrowed kettle in a damaged condition. The defendant asserted first, that he had given it back undamaged; secondly, that the kettle had a hole in it when he borrowed it; and thirdly, that he had never borrowed a kettle from his neighbor at all. So much the better: if only a single one of these three lines of defense were to be accepted as valid, the man would have to be acquitted. (Freud [1900], p. 143-144)

The neighbor collates all the possible defensive replicas, as laid down by stasis theory. More justifications could be added, “I am not the one who holed the kettle”; “it’s really a tiny hole”, “very easy to fix” etc.

People justify an answer already given to an argumentative question, while they deliberate on an open argumentative question, when they do not know its answer, either individually (Third parties, S. Role), or when the group has not yet reached a decision.
Deliberation takes place in a situation of doubt about what to do, while justification bears on a decision which has already been taken. The starting point determines the difference between justification and deliberation.

— Deliberation intervenes in contexts of discovery. It develops from argument to conclusion. A decision is to be taken, and I deliberate to construct it through an inner or collaborative deliberation; the arguments condition the conclusion. The argumentation:

Question: Should I resign?
[Deliberation: I weigh up the pros and cons] The answer states the conclusion: I resign.

— In contexts of justification, the discourse proceeds from conclusion to argument. I resigned, this is a practical reality:

Question: Why did you resign? Justify your decision!
Justification: I was sick and didn’t get along with my boss.

A decision has been taken, and, when required to account for it, I explain why I took this decision or made this choice, I recall all the good reasons I had to do so, and, if necessary, I invent new ones. Now, the conclusion determines the arguments.
Deliberation leads to a conclusion introduced by so, therefore; justification enumerate good reasons introduced by since.

The mechanisms of argumentation are valid for justification and deliberation. I deliberate, I reach a conclusion and make my decision. When I am asked to justify this decision, the same arguments, which were deliberative, become justificatory, and explain the decision taken, S. Explanation.

	Deliberative
Argumentation
	Justificatory

In the case of deliberation, there is real uncertainty about the conclusion, which is constructed in the course of a cognitive and interactional argumentative process. In the case of justification, the conclusion is already there. Justification tends to erase doubt and counter-discourse, whilst stimulating deliberation.
Private arguments put forward during an inner deliberation may have nothing to do with the arguments put forward publicly as a justification for the same conclusion, S. Motives and Reasons.
Situations of pure deliberation and pure justification are border cases in which I do not know what I will conclude or do (full deliberation), and I’m sure I did well (full justification). The same arguer may oscillate between justification and deliberation, for example if, during the justification, he or she questions the decision already taken, or is about to change his or her mind.
If we postulate that any argument that presents itself as deliberative is in fact oriented by a decision which has been taken unconsciously, then anything and everything is in fact justification. Yet the institutional organization of debates reintroduces deliberation. A debate may well be deliberative when each of the parties comes with firmly entrenched and duly justified positions and conclusions. The shock of justifications produces deliberation.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the rule of justice as a fundamental argumentative principle, “all beings of the same category must be treated in the same way”. The rule is illustrated by some categories that have historically regulated the distribution of benefits, “to each according to his merit; to each according to his birth; to each according to his needs” (Perelman [1963], p. 26).

The rule founds claims such as “equal pay for equal work”. It involves distinct operations.

(i) A categorization — First, individuals are categorized as members of a general category, “to be born”; “to have needs”; “to have merit” (admitting that one can deserve a punishment and that to demerit is to have a negative merit); “to be an employee, having worked such and such hours and produced such and such assessable products”.
General rights and duties can be defined with recourse this first level, “all born human beings have the same right to life”. The following practice refers to a strict a pari argument, referring to thieves as a non-hierarchized category, “a thief is a thief”.

General Baclay was also quite a character, but a funny woman, very just in her own way. She shot in the same way women and men, all thieves, whether they had stolen a needle or an ox. A thief is a thief and all were shot. It was fair.
Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah is not obliged. 2000.[1]

(ii) An equality relation — Secondly, there is an equality relation defined as “equality of birth; of needs; of merits; of work”. This relation determines a hierarchy between workers, “P has worked as much as Q or R…; more than A or B…; less than X or Y…”.
Such equipped categories can be represented on oriented scales. The position of an individual upon this scale can be debated, “has X more/less merit than Y?”.
The metric is easy to define in cases of work, when determined by the weight of the fruit picked from the trees for example. Things become more complicated when it comes to scientific production, or when it comes to needs and merits. In any cases, the criteria for prioritizing one individual over another one must be set.

(iii) An allocation scale — Another quite different scoring method must be established in order to define the parallel scales of punishments and rewards (what wages for that level of work?), and the two scales must be coupled.

These two independent rankings ((ii) and (iii)) make the rule of justice more complex than an a pari argument. Gross a pari holds that “work must pay”:

if P works, P has a right to be paid for this work (except if P is a voluntary worker serving a non-profit organization),

while the rule of justice connects two graduated scales.

In addition, it is supposed that the rule of justice is to be applied to all members of the group in a linear order, but actual rules include thresholds. Regarding a tax level, the rule “to each according to his or her income” applies only beyond a certain threshold, and contains tax brackets and smoothing principles.

Other categories may be considered, showing that the rule of justice can also serve in support of injustices:

To each according to his or her gender
To each according to his or her color of skin

The rule of justice excludes arbitrariness, but not injustice. According to the principle “who favors disfavors”, the rule of justice, necessarily creates innumerable injustices. If the benefits are distributed according to merit, they are not distributed according to birth or according to need.
The rule of justice is said to be “just” because it excludes the arbitrariness of the principle “to everyone according to my convenience”; and because the category and the hierarchy have been defined by disregarding the cases to be judged, “the decision is just because the rule existed before your case.” This “justice” is formally just because it allows the application of a legal syllogism.

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[1] Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah n’est pas obligé. Paris: Le Seuil, p. 111