People justify an answer already given to an argumentative question, while they deliberate on an open argumentative question, when they do not know its answer, either individually (Third parties, S. Role), or when the group has not yet reached a decision.
Deliberation takes place in a situation of doubt about what to do, while justification bears on a decision which has already been taken. The starting point determines the difference between justification and deliberation.

— Deliberation intervenes in contexts of discovery. It develops from argument to conclusion. A decision is to be taken, and I deliberate to construct it through an inner or collaborative deliberation; the arguments condition the conclusion. The argumentation:

Question: Should I resign?
[Deliberation: I weigh up the pros and cons] The answer states the conclusion: I resign.

— In contexts of justification, the discourse proceeds from conclusion to argument. I resigned, this is a practical reality:

Question: Why did you resign? Justify your decision!
Justification: I was sick and didn’t get along with my boss.

A decision has been taken, and, when required to account for it, I explain why I took this decision or made this choice, I recall all the good reasons I had to do so, and, if necessary, I invent new ones. Now, the conclusion determines the arguments.
Deliberation leads to a conclusion introduced by so, therefore; justification enumerate good reasons introduced by since.

The mechanisms of argumentation are valid for justification and deliberation. I deliberate, I reach a conclusion and make my decision. When I am asked to justify this decision, the same arguments, which were deliberative, become justificatory, and explain the decision taken, S. Explanation.

	Deliberative
Argumentation
	Justificatory

In the case of deliberation, there is real uncertainty about the conclusion, which is constructed in the course of a cognitive and interactional argumentative process. In the case of justification, the conclusion is already there. Justification tends to erase doubt and counter-discourse, whilst stimulating deliberation.
Private arguments put forward during an inner deliberation may have nothing to do with the arguments put forward publicly as a justification for the same conclusion, S. Motives and Reasons.
Situations of pure deliberation and pure justification are border cases in which I do not know what I will conclude or do (full deliberation), and I’m sure I did well (full justification). The same arguer may oscillate between justification and deliberation, for example if, during the justification, he or she questions the decision already taken, or is about to change his or her mind.
If we postulate that any argument that presents itself as deliberative is in fact oriented by a decision which has been taken unconsciously, then anything and everything is in fact justification. Yet the institutional organization of debates reintroduces deliberation. A debate may well be deliberative when each of the parties comes with firmly entrenched and duly justified positions and conclusions. The shock of justifications produces deliberation.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the rule of justice as a fundamental argumentative principle, “all beings of the same category must be treated in the same way”. The rule is illustrated by some categories that have historically regulated the distribution of benefits, “to each according to his merit; to each according to his birth; to each according to his needs” (Perelman [1963], p. 26).

The rule founds claims such as “equal pay for equal work”. It involves distinct operations.

(i) A categorization — First, individuals are categorized as members of a general category, “to be born”; “to have needs”; “to have merit” (admitting that one can deserve a punishment and that to demerit is to have a negative merit); “to be an employee, having worked such and such hours and produced such and such assessable products”.
General rights and duties can be defined with recourse this first level, “all born human beings have the same right to life”. The following practice refers to a strict a pari argument, referring to thieves as a non-hierarchized category, “a thief is a thief”.

General Baclay was also quite a character, but a funny woman, very just in her own way. She shot in the same way women and men, all thieves, whether they had stolen a needle or an ox. A thief is a thief and all were shot. It was fair.
Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah is not obliged. 2000.[1]

(ii) An equality relation — Secondly, there is an equality relation defined as “equality of birth; of needs; of merits; of work”. This relation determines a hierarchy between workers, “P has worked as much as Q or R…; more than A or B…; less than X or Y…”.
Such equipped categories can be represented on oriented scales. The position of an individual upon this scale can be debated, “has X more/less merit than Y?”.
The metric is easy to define in cases of work, when determined by the weight of the fruit picked from the trees for example. Things become more complicated when it comes to scientific production, or when it comes to needs and merits. In any cases, the criteria for prioritizing one individual over another one must be set.

(iii) An allocation scale — Another quite different scoring method must be established in order to define the parallel scales of punishments and rewards (what wages for that level of work?), and the two scales must be coupled.

These two independent rankings ((ii) and (iii)) make the rule of justice more complex than an a pari argument. Gross a pari holds that “work must pay”:

if P works, P has a right to be paid for this work (except if P is a voluntary worker serving a non-profit organization),

while the rule of justice connects two graduated scales.

In addition, it is supposed that the rule of justice is to be applied to all members of the group in a linear order, but actual rules include thresholds. Regarding a tax level, the rule “to each according to his or her income” applies only beyond a certain threshold, and contains tax brackets and smoothing principles.

Other categories may be considered, showing that the rule of justice can also serve in support of injustices:

To each according to his or her gender
To each according to his or her color of skin

The rule of justice excludes arbitrariness, but not injustice. According to the principle “who favors disfavors”, the rule of justice, necessarily creates innumerable injustices. If the benefits are distributed according to merit, they are not distributed according to birth or according to need.
The rule of justice is said to be “just” because it excludes the arbitrariness of the principle “to everyone according to my convenience”; and because the category and the hierarchy have been defined by disregarding the cases to be judged, “the decision is just because the rule existed before your case.” This “justice” is formally just because it allows the application of a legal syllogism.

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[1] Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah n’est pas obligé. Paris: Le Seuil, p. 111

Juridical arguments are argument schemes considered by law professionals as the most important and typical in their field, and presented as the basis of “juridical logic” (Perelman, 1979). Such arguments are important for the general theory of argumentation insofar as they illustrate the explicit and controlled implementation, in the field of law, of general principles currently met in ordinary argumentation. They are presented here from this perspective.
Cicero’ Topica is perhaps the first essay to bring together a list of legal inferential principles, which are historically significant in all the classical fields of argumentation study. S. Interpretation 2; Collection 2.

These juridical arguments rule the interpretation of legal texts and their application to concrete cases. They allow the application of a text to a case, possibly by extending its meaning and legal force. Given a fact “f” submitted to legal evaluation on the basis of a code (legal, religious…), it most often happens that the judge can attach “f” to a category M mentioned in the code in order to apply to “f” the legal provisions concerning m.s, the members of the category M. It may also be the case, however, that the code does not contain a category which is immediately relevant to the case at hand. This may occur, for example, if there are equally good reasons to categorize “f” as an M or as an X. This situation corresponds to a stasis of categorization. Such stasis might evolve into a stasis of definition, where the code must be interpreted in order that it also applies to “f”. In such cases, the judge does not simply apply the law, but produces the law.

The process of interpretation is not limited to the juridical domain. Generally speaking, it starts from a proposition P, which is to be interpreted. In the interpretation process, P takes the status of argument, accepted because it belongs to a stock of statements, a Code, a Regulation, a Sacred Text… itself accepted by the community of interpreters or believers. A proposition Q is then derived from P. Q has the status of a conclusion, which corresponds to an interpretation of P. The juridical argument schemes are the basic tools that rule such derivations in the domain of law. The limit of interpretation is fixed by the principle “what is clear must not be interpreted”. This principle enshrines the existence of a literal meaning, based on grammatical data. If, in order to vote in a Syldavian presidential election, a citizen must be 18 and a Syldavian national, nobody meeting only one of the two criteria will be admitted to vote. There is nothing to interpret.

1. Three collections of juridical argument schemes

Specialists in legal arguments offer lists of argument schemes that are particularly important in law. The lists provided by Kalinowski and Tarello are frequently included in the general framework of argumentation studies (Perelman 1979, Feteris 1999, Vannier 2001). We have added the list provided by lawoutlines.com[1] (no author’s name). These three lists make extensive use of Latin terminology.

— Kalinowski (1965) lists 11 argument schemes:

• • • A pari
    • A contrario sensu, or a contrario
    • A fortiori ratione, or a fortiori
    • A maiori ad minus, or from the biggest to the smallest
    • A generali sensu, or argument of the generality of the law
    • A ratione legi stricta
    • Pro subjecta materia, or consistency argument
    • From preparatory work
    • A simili, or argument by analogy
    • Ab auctoritate, or argument from authority
    • A rubrica, or argument from the title

— Tarello (1974 ; quoted in Perelman 1979, p. 55) lists 13 argument schemes:

• • • A contrario
    • A simili, or argument by analogy
    • A fortiori
    • A completudine
    • A coherentia
    • Psychological a.
    • Historical a.
    • Apagogical a.
    • Teleological a.
    • Economical a.
    • Ab exemplo a.
    • Systemic a.
    • Naturalist a.

— Lawoutlines considers 10 argument schemes:

• • • By analogy or argument a pari
    • Of greater justification or argument a fortiori
    • By contrast or argument a contrario
    • Of absurdity or ab absurdum
    • From generality or a generali sensu
    • From superfluity or ab inutilitate
    • From context or in pari materia
    • From subject matter or pro subjecta materia
    • From title or a rubrica
    • From genre or ejusdem generis

2. How many argument schemes?

34 argument schemes are specified.

— Four argument schemes are included in the three lists; arguments:

• • A contrario ; a contrario sensu ; by contrast or a contrario, S. Opposites.
  • A fortiori ratione, a fortiori ; of greater justification or a fortiori, S. A fortiori.
  • A pari argument is considered separately, or as equivalent to the argument by analogy (“by analogy or a pari”).
  • A simili argument is assimilated to analogical argument, S. Analogy; A pari.

— Three argument schemes are common to two lists; arguments:

• • A generali sensu, generalizing argument ; or argument from generality.
  • Pro subjecta materia ; from subject matter.
  • A rubrica ; from title.
  • Apagogical ; from the absurd.

— Fifteen (or twelve) are specific to one of the three lists; arguments:

• • From preparatory work, historical, psychological, teleological, S. Legislator’s Intention.
  • From context or in pari materia, S. Consistency
  • Ratione legi stricta, S. Strict Meaning
  • Ab auctoritate, S. Authority ; Precedent
  • A completudine, S. Completeness
  • A coherentia, S. Non-contradiction ; Consistency
  • Economical, S. Superfluity
  • Ab exemplo, S. Precedent ; Example
  • Systemic
  • Naturalist, S. Weight of circumstances
  • From superfluity or ab inutilitate, S. Superfluity
  • From the same genus, or ejusdem generis.

We thus obtain 22 different legal topics, which may be reduced to 19 if we admit that, under various labels, the argument from preparatory work, the historical, psychological and teleological arguments refer to what Perelman globally terms the “legislator’s intent” (1979, p. 55).

3. Groupings

These 22 legal topics can be divided into sub-groups as follows.

(i) General arguments, not specific to law, operative in any controlled argumentative situation:

• • From consistency (a coherentia)
  • A pari, a simili, analogy
  • From genus
  • A contrario
  • A fortiori

  • Fom the absurd
  • From precedent
  • From authority.

In law, these last two forms of argument are based on, and reinforce, the historical continuity of legal practice.

(ii) Arguments legitimizing interpretations based on the conditions of production of the law. Arguments based on:

• • Preparatory work
  • History (of the law)
  • The legislator’s intention, teleological argument
  • Psychological argument.

(iii) Arguments appealing to the systemic character of the code of laws to legitimate an interpretation. Arguments based on

• • Systemic considerations
  • Coherence (a coherentia, in pari materia)
  • Comprehensiveness
  • Necessity (all the articles of the code are necessary)
  • The title of a section of the code, a rubrica.

These argument schemes aassume that the text to be interpreted is “perfect”, in the sense that it contains neither contradiction nor redundancy. All content is necessary; the text ​​ contains nothing superfluous, or redundant. All elements hang together; they have meaning only by their relation within the structure. This insistence on the systemic character of the legal code could lead to a mechanical view of the law and its application. Ultimately, all the properties of a formal system are attributed to the code.

The establishment of precise definitions of these forms of argumentation within the field of law, their illustration with examples, the determination of the conditions for their application, and the problems connected with their construction and use, fall within the jurisdiction of lawyers.

4. Prescriptive scope of the topics

This set of arguments legitimizes the interpretation of the law in view of application to specific cases. When used in the imperative form, this set of arguments becomes a guide for the drafting of laws. For example, as the argument from superfluity (economic argument, or argument from uselessness) assumes that the laws are not redundant; the legislator will endeavor to avoid any redundancy in the drafting of the law, and the same for the other interpretative principles.

5. Generalization to other fields,

S. Interpretation

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[1] Legal tradition-Trahan.doc. P. 21-22.
www.lsulawlist.com/lsulawoutlines/index. php?folder=/TRADITIONS (09-20-2013)

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Irony can be considered a pivotal strategy, positioned somewhere between discourse destruction and refutation. Irony ridicules a speech that pretends to be dominant or hegemonic, by implicitly referring to some contextually available irrefutable rebutting evidence.

1. Irony as refutation

Ironic development originates from a hegemonic D₀ discourse. A hegemonic discourse is a discourse which prevails within a group, which has the power to direct or legitimize the actions of the group, and which opposes the discourse of a minority.

In a situation Sit_1, the participant S1, the future target of the irony, claims that D₀, with which S2, the future ironist, disagrees. S2 submits to D₀, although he or she is not convinced of the validity of the argument.

S1_1 (future Target)   — What about taking a shortcut to reach the summit?
S2_1 (future ironist)   — Hmm … It seems that there might be icy zones…
S1_2                             — No problem, I know the place, it’s easy going! (= D₀)
S2_2                             — Oh well then…

Later, in situation Sit_2, when the group finds itself on a rather slippery slope, the ironist takes up S1’s discourse, as the circumstances make this discourse indefensible:

S2_Ironic  — No problem, I know the place, it’s easy going!

This last statement sounds strange:

— In the present circumstances, the statement is absurd.
— If the original discussion has been forgotten, it is interpreted as a humorous euphemism or antiphrasis.
— If it is still present in the memory of the participants, then the statement is entirely ironic: S2_Ironic repeats S1_2, whereas the circumstances show that the statement is obviously, and tragically, false. The mechanism is rather similar to an ad hominem argument, what the adversary says is opposed to what he or she does, and this is clear to all parties involved. The facts being self-evident, S1 is now shown to be wrong and is seen to have misled the company. Irony combines malice and humor, S. Dismissal.

Ironic destruction and scientific refutation can be opposed as follows:

Scientific Refutation	Ironic Discourse Destruction
S1 says ‘D0’	S1 says ‘D0’ in situation Sit_1
The opponent S2 quotes D0, and explicitly attributes D0 to S1	The ironist, S2, says ‘D’ in situation Sit_2: — D resumes, echoes D0 — D = D0 is not explicitly referred to its occurrence in Sit_1, but the link is easy to make; either everybody recalls, or S2 gives a cue to recall (for ex. S2 mimics S1’s voice)
The opponent refutes D0 with explicit and concluding arguments	Contextual evidence drawn from Sit_2, destroys D = D0. This evidence is so obvious that (S2 thinks that) it does not need explanation.

2. Countering the ironic move

Ducrot uses the following example, consisting of a statement and a description of its context:

I told you yesterday that Peter would come to see me today, and you didn’t believe me. Peter being physically present today, I can tell you in an ironic way ‘You see, Peter did not come to see me’. (Ducrot 1984, p. 211).

Some times ago, in S°, the speaker and his or her partner “You” had a debate about whether or not Peter will be coming. The speaker, the (future) ironist lost this debate. Now, the evidence of Peter’s presence “you see” is given as a conclusive argument, as concrete proof, supposed to silence You, proving You wrong. But the game is not necessarily over. Irony is mainly studied on the basis of the isolated ironic statements, whereas it is a sequential phenomenon with two kinds of developments, depending on the target reaction. If he or she stays mute and embarrassed, the ironist wins the game; if he or she retorts, then the game continues. Here, You can reply that he or she can certainly see that Peter is actually there, but that does not prove that Peter came to see the interlocutor:

— No, Peter did not come to see you. He actually came to see your sister.

This refutation or reversal of irony applies the scheme of substitution of a motives.

3. Irony can dispense with markers

In Zürich, Switzerland, in the years 1979-1980, a youth protest movement made quite an impression on the city’s people.

There are two television shows which caused extreme shock in German-speaking Switzerland. The first, a popular show, was disturbed by members of the “Movement”, who put a stop to it. The second, later referred to as “Müller’s Show”[1], showed two militants dressed as members of the bourgeoisie from Zurich, and seriously voicing the opinion that the “Movement” should be repressed with the utmost severity, the autonomous center should be closed etc. The sensationalist media and some individuals orchestrated a campaign of defamation after the shock of this second show. Let us note in passing that the term müllern entered the vocabulary of the movement […]. The creation of paradoxical situations was one specialty of the “movement”.
Gérald Béroud, [Work Values and Youth Movement], 1982[2]

The ironic discourse D consists in the strict repetition, with a straight face, of the primary discourse D₀, as held by the opponents; D and D₀ coincide perfectly. The ironized discourse D₀ is the typical bourgeois argumentative discourse, taken with its contents, its modes of expression, its dress codes, gestures, body postures, modes of arguing following the bourgeois norms of maintaining a calm and courteous atmosphere, ritually invoking some counter-discourse in the role of the “honorable opponent” while ignoring the real existing strong, deep disagreement as well as power and strength relations. The entire practice of the argued, contradictory, quasi-Popperian mode of discussion is ironized and negated by Müller’s sarcastic behavior.

Irony is a borderline case of an argument based on self-evidence. It becomes dramatically prominent in situations where argumentation is vain or impossible. The following remarks were written in Czechoslovakia, a country which at that time, was under the dictatorial rule of a communist regime:

In intellectual circles, the attitude towards official propaganda often results in the same contempt that one feels for the drunkard’s drunkenness or the graphomaniac’s lucubration. As intellectuals particularly appreciate the subtleties of a certain absurd humor, they may read the Rude Pravo editorial or the political discourse printed there for pleasure. But it is very rare to meet someone who takes this seriously.
Petr Fidelius, [Lies Must be Taken Seriously], 1984[3]

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[1] Name of the two delegates of the movement, Hans and Anna Müller.

[2] Gérald Béroud, “Valeur travail et mouvement de jeunes”, Revue Internationale d’Action Communautaire 8/48, 1982, note 62, p. 28. Television program (in German) available at: [http://www.srf.ch/player/video?id=05f18417-ec5b-4b94-a4bf-293312e56afe] (09-20-2013).

[3] Petr Fidelius, Prendre le mensonge au sérieux. Esprit, 91-92, 1984, p. 16. The Rude Pravo was the newspaper of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, during the Communist period.

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1. The arts of understanding

Hermeneutics, exegesis and interpretation are the arts involved in the understanding of complex texts such as the Bible, the Criminal Code, the Koran, the Iliad, the Communist Manifesto, the Talmud, the Upanishads, etc. (Boeckh [1886], p. 133 ; Gadamer [1967], p. 277 ; p. 280). Texts require an exegesis because they are written in forgotten languages, or are historically distant, or hermetic. The community considers that vital things depend on what such texts precisely say and mean. This meaning is not immediately accessible to the contemporary reader. It must be established and preserved to be transmitted as well as possible.

Hermeneutics is a philosophical approach to interpretation, defined as an effort to share a form of life, a search for empathy with the text, its author, the language and culture in which it was produced. The hermeneutical understanding is thus opposed to the physical explanation sought in the natural sciences, where “to explain” has the meaning of “subsuming under a physical law”.

Psychoanalysis and linguistics have shown that ordinary acts and words also may require interpretation.

The theoretical language of interpretation is complicated by the morphology of the lexicon, as is always the case when a theory develops within ordinary language. What difference should be made between hermeneutics, exegesis and interpretation?
Their three respective lexical series include a term designating the agent exegete, hermeneutist, interpreter; two of them include a noun referring to the process and result, interpretation, exegesis, which, as hermeneutics, can also refer to the field of investigation. Only one series includes a verb, namely to interpret: This verb will therefore be used for the three series, imposing its meaning upon the whole lexical field.

In the philological and historical sense, exegesis is a critical activity whose object is typically a text belonging to a cultural or religious tradition taken in its material conditions of production and original practices, linguistic conditions (grammar, lexicon), rhetorical conditions (genre), historical and institutional context, genesis of the work in its links with the life and milieu of the author. Philological exegesis establishes the text, reveals its meaning(s), contributing thus to resolving conflicting interpretations or articulating different levels of interpretation. It stabilizes the “literal meaning”, that is the core meaning of the text, and thus lays down the material to be interpreted. In a broad sense, exegesis encompasses interpretation; both endeavor to overcome the distance carved by history, between the text and its readers.
The purpose of philological exegesis is to express the meaning of the text; it tries to create the conditions for a certain projection of the reader into the past. Interpretative exegesis (or interpretation, hermeneutics) seeks to reformulate this meaning to make it accessible to a contemporary reader; it actualizes the meaning of the text. This is where the link between hermeneutics and the rhetoric of religious preaching lies.
Exegesis aims at understanding the meaning as expressed by the text; interpretation and commentary push the meaning of the text beyond the text itself. Contrary to philological exegesis, interpretation can be allegorical. The philological interpretation is exoteric, whilst hermeneutics can be esoteric.

2. Rhetoric and hermeneutics

The hermeneutic task is to make intelligible to one person the thought of another via its discursive expression. In this sense, rhetoric as the “art of persuading” is the counterpart of hermeneutics as the “art of understanding”; their directions of fit are complementary.
Rhetoric adopts the perspective of a speaker/writer striving to persuade an addressee, the listener/reader. In contrast, hermeneutics adopts the perspective of a reader/listener striving to understand a speaker/writer addressing him or her through a text.
Rhetoric is related to live speech, taking into account the listener’s beliefs, trying to minimize his or her efforts; hermeneutics is linked to distant speech, to reading; the reader having to adapt to the meaning of the text.

Taken together, hermeneutics and rhetoric establish a dual cultural communicative competence, to understand and to be understood. The rejection of rhetoric in the name of pure intellectual demand results in the transfer of the burden of understanding to the reader, and so requires hermeneutics.

3. Interpretation and argumentation

The interpretative process applies to any discourse component, from words to whole texts, in order to derive their meaning, and this meaning is necessarily (expressed in) another discourse. The interpretive relationship thus binds two discourses, the link between the interpreting and interpreted utterance being made according to transition rules that are not different from the general argumentation schemes.

In the case of argumentation, the argument might be any statement expressing a true or accepted vision of reality. In the case of interpretation, the data, the argument statement, is the utterance to be interpreted, in view of the precise form it has in the text. Once this statement is available, the linguistic mechanisms are the same. If we consider the argument-conclusion relation in its greatest generality, we shall say that the conclusion is what the speaker has in view when the argument is stated, the conclusion being the meaning of the argument. The argumentative relation is therefore no different from the interpretative relation. When the listener/reader has grasped the conclusion of the text, he or she has achieved an authentic understanding of this text. This amounts to considering that meaning is always lacking within the statement, and the statement will be allocated a meaning only in relation to a later statement. Meaning is thus construed within an endless process, S. Orientation.

Just as with argumentation, interpretation is valid insofar as it is based on principles that correspond to a transition law accepted by the interpretative community concerned, the community of jurists or theologians for example:

The rabbis saw the Pentateuch as a unified, divinely communicated text, consistent in all its parts. It was consequently possible to uncover deeper meanings and to provide for a fuller application of its laws by adopting certain principles of interpretation (middot; “measures,” “norms”).
Jacobs & Derovan, 2007, p. 25

The same principles apply to the Muslim legal-religious interpretation (Khallaf [1942]), or to legal interpretation. The argumentative forms used in law are the same as those which govern the interpretation of all texts to which, for whatever reason, a systematic character is attributed. This is because they are considered as the best expression of the legal-rational views of the time, because they flow from a divine source or from an individual genius, S. Juridical Arguments.

This postulate of strong, even perfect coherence is fundamental for the structuralist interpretations of texts, as for the interpretation of legal texts or religious texts, as mentioned in the preceding quotation. It may conflict with the genetic argument constructing the meaning of a text by derivations justified by “preparatory works”, such as the manuscripts, or the intentions of the writer, as they can be grasped through his or her correspondence, for example. Arguments from genetic evidence are one aspect of the philological interpretive work on the text. They may be regarded with suspicion by true believers, for genetic arguments suppose that a non-divine origin, at least partly human, can be attributed to the text.

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The concept of interpretation refers to:

— The general process of understanding complex text, S. Interpretation, Exegesis, Hermeneutics.
— In rhetorical argumentation, the word interpretation can refer to:

1. 1. A special kind of stasis.
   2. A figure of repetition.
   3. An argument scheme, S. Motives ant Reasons

1. Stasis of interpretation

In stasis theory, the stasis of interpretation corresponds to a special case of contradiction between the parties, the “legal question”. In court, or, more broadly, whenever a debate is based on a written text, and especially a normative rule, a “question of interpretation” arises when the two parties base their conclusions on different readings of the text. One party, for example, may base their argument on the letter of the law, whilst the others will argue from its spirit.

2. A figure of repetition

As a figure of discourse, interpretation consists in duplicating a first term in the form of an immediately following second term, quasi-synonymous and more easily understood than the first. In the sequence “Term₁, Term₂”, T₂ interprets T₁, i.e., explains; clarifies the meaning of T₁. T₂ can be a common language equivalent of a technical term T₁:

We found marasmius oreades, I mean, Scotch Bonnets.

The interpretation applied to a word or an entire expression may maintain its argumentative orientation:

The President announced an expenditure control policy, a “sober state” policy.

Phrased by an opponent, the interpretation can reverse the argumentative orientation of T₁:

The President announced an expenditure control policy, that is, a policy of austerity.

This change is marked by the introduction of a reformulation connective (one might say an interpretive connective): in other words, i.e., that is to say, which means that…

3. Refutation by interpretation

The Treatise on Argumentation classifies the interpretatio as a “figure of choice”, and offers an example borrowed from Marcus Annaeus Seneca, (known as the Seneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician). Seneca the Elder is the author of the Controversies, a collection of more or less imaginary judicial cases, treated by different rhetors of his time (1st century), in a kind of speech contest.

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s example is taken from the first case of the collection ([1958] p. 233), where the question proposed to a score of expert orators is an ingenious story of a son who fed his uncle despite his father’s ban. The wheel of fortune having turned, it is now the father who is in difficulty, and the son has now fed his father in spite of his uncle’s prohibition. The unhappy son is thus driven out for the same reason, first by the father, then by the uncle. In the following passage, the author reports the words of the lawyers addressing the father on the son’s behalf, first Fuscus Arellius, then Cestius:

Arellius Fuscus, in concluding, suggested, as a question: ‘I thought that, in spite of your prohibition, you wanted your brother to be fed: you had this air in pronouncing your defense, or at least I believed.’ Cestius was bolder: he did not just say ‘I thought you wanted it’, he said, ‘You wanted it and you still want it today’, and by means of this figure, he pointed to all the motives which forced [the father to want it so] [and concluded:] ‘Why do you drive me away? Doubtless you are indignant at the fact that I took your part’.
Seneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician (54 BC – 39 AD),
[Controversies and suasories], (written at the end of his life).[1]

The interventions of the two lawyers are co-oriented. Fuscus Arellius argues that the father may have given his order reluctantly. Cestius then goes farther, and attributes to the father an intention contrary to his words, “you wanted it and you still want it today”. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca see here an “argumentative figure or a stylistic figure depending on the effect it has on the audience” ([1958], p. 172), S. Figure. Actually, the counsel’s words are clearly argumentative. Firstly, they introduce a typical stasic situation, a question about the qualification of the act under examination, “you wanted me to disobey you. So, don’t punish me, rather congratulate me in having accomplished your secret wish!” S. Stasis. Second, it implements the private vs. public scheme, substituting the private, sincere, will, to the publicly affirmed will, made under social pressure, S. Motives.

4. Refutation by interpretation vs. performative analysis

The discussion of this example involves the analysis of the order as a performative act. Interpretation is an instrument of refutation and defense that, interestingly, opposes a charge based on a performative analysis of such a speech act. Austin illustrates his discovery of performativity with an example borrowed from the Hippolytus of Euripides (I, 612). According to Austin, an order, is valid as soon as it is uttered, regardless of what the speaker is actually thinking:

Surely the words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and so as to be taken ‘seriously’? […]. But we are apt to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance. The classic expression of this idea is to be found in the Hippolytus (1. 612), where Hippolytus says, “my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not”. Thus “I promise to…” obliges me — puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle.
It is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immorality. (Austin, 1962, p. 9-10)

As the son and the father in Seneca’s example, Hippolytus and the nurse, are engaged in highly argumentative interactions. In such situations, semantics, pragmatics, and morality can all be discussed and argued. The son acknowledges the facts (he fed his uncle) and pleads not guilty to the charge of disobedience, maintaining that the verbal order, what the father said, did not expressed the true will of the father. This is exemplary of the case of opposition described by Austin, which exists between what language actually does and what goes on in the mind of the speaker. It should be noted first that Austin’s binary distinction knows only the verbal aspects of language, and excludes all paraverbal (mimic) modalization of the order.

There remains the question of the validity of the father’s prohibition. For the father and for Austin, the prohibition is valid because the father uttered the relevant formula, and the son is guilty of the double Austinian sin, analytical fallacy and moral perversity. Yet the analysis offered by the Austinian father is rather questionable; what the father really said is problematic and must be subject to an interpretation which will takes into account the pragmatic environment of the speech act utterance. The situation is analogous to that of ironic utterances, S. Irony. The addressee hears something contextually incongruous, said by someone who usually talks seriously, and this forces him to engage in interpretation of this puzzling utterance. Similarly, the father uttered a prohibition which contradicts the natural (doxic) law of brotherly love, which the son esteems inconsistent with his father’s true character; the son is obliged to interpret the incongruity — maybe the verbal utterance of the father was accompanied by a paralinguistic sign, which pointed to another intention? He thus infers that the order was not given in the true, natural voice of the father but in his social voice, as argued by Fuscus Arelius. As a consequence, the son feeds his uncle. To decide that this latter interpretation is “the right one” is to side with the son and oppose the father; to decide that the Austinian interpretation is the correct one is to take the side of the father and oppose the son. In either case, to take a stand for an analysis is to side with a party or another.

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[1] Translated after the French edition used by Perelman, Sénèque le Rhéteur, Controverses et Suasoires. Trans. by H. Bornecque. T. 1. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1932, p. 23-24. https://archive.org/details/ControversesEtSuasoiresTraditionNouvelleTexteRevueParM.HenriBornecque

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Rhetorical approaches to argumentation focus on monological data; dialectical approaches, focus on conventionalized dialogues; interactional approaches to apply to everyday argumentation, when needed, the concepts and methods of verbal interaction analysis. Argumentation is necessarily two-sided, developing both as a monological and as an interactional activity, and it would be pointless to oppose these two kinds of argumentative activities. Argumentative questions can be relevantly discussed under a variety of speech formats, from the philosophical treatise to the internet forum and dinner conversation, S. Argumentation (I).

1. Interaction, dialogue, argumentative dialogue

Ordinary exchanges, dialogues and conversations are two special kinds of verbal interactions. Verbal interactions are characterized by the use of oral language, the physical presence of face-to-face interlocutors, and a key feature, the organized, continuous chain of alternate turns of speaking.

Dialogue is practiced first among humans, and, by extension, between humans and machines. This is not necessarily the case for interaction: particles interact, they do not engage in dialogue. Human interactions are both verbal and non-verbal. One can reject a dialogue, but one cannot reject interaction. Social organizations necessarily interact; they can open dialogues in view of promoting their respective interests or solving their disputes.

Dialogue is chiefly verbal with some nonverbal aspects, and this implies a kind of egalitarian situation. The concept of interaction takes the inequalities of the participants’ social statuses and their specific participations in the ongoing common task into account. It focuses on the coordination between language and other forms of action (collaborative or competitive) carried out by the participants, in complex material environments, including manipulation of objects. Language at work is interactional, not dialogical or conversational; conversations at work exclude work.

The interactive perspective paved the way for the study of argumentation in the work place or its role in the acquisition and development of scientific knowledge in labwork activities, where argumentative sequences are produced as regulatory episodes, in coordination with the manipulation of objects.

Dialogue has an “about-ness”, which makes it quite distinct from ordinary conversation, which tends to jump from topic to topic. In ordinary usage, the word dialogue has a quasi-prescriptive positive orientation: dialogue is good, we need dialogue. The philosophies of dialogue have a marked humanistic color. Personalities open to dialogue are opposed to the fundamentalists, closed to dialogue. When two parties enter into dialogue they commit to negotiating; breaking the dialogue may give way to violence. In this sense, as can be seen from the title of Tannen’s book, The argument culture: Moving from debate to dialogue (1998), debate, as a potentially acrimonious and vindictive argument_2 quasi-deprived of argumentation, can be contrasted with reasoned dialogue. We see a progress in the transition from the first to the second.

The formal approaches of argumentation as a dialogue game first appeared in the second half of the twentieth century, as a development of the Aristotelian dialectical rules. S. Dialectic; Logics of dialogue.

2. Dialogism and polyphony

The concepts of dialogism, polyphony and intertextuality make it possible to apply the interaction-based vision of argumentation to monological argumentative discourses and written texts more generally. Monological discourse is defined as a possibly long and complex, spoken or written, one-speaker discourse.

Socrates defines thinking, in its very essence, as a dialogue,

a talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. (Theaetetus, 189e) [1]

This definition can be exploited to characterize thought as an argumentative process (in natural language).

2.1 Dialogism

In rhetoric, dialogism is a figure of speech featuring the direct reproduction of a dialogue as a passage in a literary or a philosophical composition.
Mikhail Bakhtin introduced the concept of dialogism, or polyphony, to refer to a specific fictional arrangement. In a nineteenth century classical perspective, the fictional characters are in some way, if not the puppets of the narrator at least supervised by him or her; all of their acts and speeches are framed according to their contribution to the intrigue. In a dialogic disposition, the narrator is less dominant; the characters tend to develop autonomous discourses and are relatively free of the duty to contribute to the intrigue.

2.2 Polyphony

In music, a polyphony “consists of two or more simultaneous lines of independent melody, as opposed to a musical texture with just one voice, monophony” (Wikipedia, Polyphony)
In relation with the Bakhtinian concepts of dialogism and polyphony, the word polyphony can be used metaphorically to designate a set of phenomena corresponding globally to the monological staging of a dialogue situation, in the mouth of a single physical speaker (Ducrot, 1988), called the animator of speech, in Goffman’s vocabulary.

The theory of polyphony conceptualizes monological discourse as a polyphonic space, articulating a series of clearly identified voices, each one singing its tune, that is voicing a specific viewpoint. These voices are not attributed to identified persons, as they are in direct quotations.

The polyphonic approach to connectives and negation have proved particularly fruitful; for example, “Peter will not attend the meeting” stages two voices, the first voicing the positive “Peter will attend the meeting”, and a second one rejecting the first: “No!”; and the speaker identifies with the second voice, which is, in Goffman’s words, the Principal, assuming responsibility for the talk. S. Connective; Denying.

It is particularly worth noting that one specific Animator can develop a two-sided discourse, staging two voices, articulating arguments and counter-arguments, as in a regular argumentative two-person interaction. The argumentative dialogue is then internalized, in an inner confrontation free from the constraints associated with face-to face interaction. This is the case when, as in the theater, a character engages in a monologal deliberation. The polyphonic speaker speaks in a voice, then in another, opposed to the first, to finally reject one side of the argument and accept the other, therefore identifying with that voice.

According to Ducrot, the polyphonic speaker acts as a theater director, staging the voices, and choosing to identify with one of them, S. Role; Persuasion. This concept of identification is central to the theory of Argumentation within Language. First, the speaker sets out a range of enunciators, the sources of the points of view evoked in the utterance. In a second stage, he identifies himself or herself with one of these enunciators, this identification being marked in the grammatical structure. For example, denying implies the staging of two voices, and identification of the speaker to the denying voice (cf. supra); the same for the “P, but Q” coordination. It must be emphasized that this concept of identification is totally foreign to the psychological concept of identification that is discussed in connection with the issue of persuasion.

Polyphony is not restricted to developed monologues. A conversational turn, necessarily dialogical, can also be polyphonic, as shown by the use of negation. The possible discrepancies between the interlocutor as such (as a real person) and the interlocutor as framed by the speaker can be seen in a polyphonic perspective, S. Resumption of speech.

The two adjectives, dialogic and dialogical, both refer to dialogue. It could prove interesting to use one of these words, perhaps dialogic to cover the polyphonic and intertextual aspects of discourse on the one hand, and dialogical to cover the interaction related phenomena (including their dialogic aspects) on the other. Either way, full-blown argumentation articulates two disputing voices, it is a dialogical activity.

2.3 Intertextuality

In line with the classical monolithic vision of the speaker, rhetoric considers that the arguer is the source of the speech that he or she masters and pilots at will. According to the concept of intertextuality, speech and discourse have their own permanent reality and dynamics, preexisting to their voicing by some individual. Speakers are, as it were, second to their speech. Intertextuality decreases the role of the speaker, who is considered only as an instance of coordination and reformulation of discourses already elaborated and concretized elsewhere. The speaker is not the intellectual source of what is said, but merely the conscious or unconscious vocalizer of pre-existing contents. The discourse is not produced by the speaker, but the speaker by the discourse. This vision of the arguer as a machine to repeat and reformulate inherited arguments and points of views is particularly humbling when compared with the classical image of a creative, “inventive” orator.

In the case of argumentation, these relations of intertextuality are specifically taken into account through the notion of argumentative script, S. Script.

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[1] Plato, Theaetetus (189-190). In Plato, Complete Works. Translated by M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by John M. Cooper – Associate editor, D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett. 1997.

SOCRATES:  Now by ‘thinking’ do you mean the same as I do? THEAETETUS: What do you mean by it?
SOCRATES: A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its judgment. So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?
THEAETETUS: I agree with that.

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In law, the argument of the legislator’s intention (or teleological argument) is based not on the strict literal meaning of the law as actually expressed, but on the intention of the legislator, that is the social and historical context of the legislative act, the kind of problems the legislator wanted to address, and the solution he or she wanted to achieve. This form of argumentation is recognized as relevant, S. Juridical Logic; Strict Meaning.

1. Historical argument, genetic argument, psychological argument

The intention of the legislator can be established by an historical, or genetic argument, using the data provided by the history of the law. This history is known by the preparatory works, the “whereas” section of the law, the parliamentary debates having led to the drafting of this law, and so on. When relying on the previous state of legislation, the historical argument assumes that the legislator is conservative and that the new texts must be interpreted in the context of the legal tradition (presumption of continuity of law).

The intention of the legislator can also be sought in reference to the spirit of the law: one will then speak of a psychological argument (Tarello, quoted in Perelman 1979, 58).

2. General principles of interpretation

The scope of this class of arguments extends beyond the legal field. They can be used in relation with any written standards, when the institution recognizes the validity of an argument based not on the letter of the text but on the intention of the author. For example, in the philosophical or literary field, the interpretation of a text can appeal to the author’s intention, which is itself based on preparatory work and historical data (notes, manuscripts, declarations of the author), or on psychological data (the spirit of the work and the author’s mind at the time, as understood by the interpreter).

Such arguments are considered fallacious in structuralist literary analysis, which advocates an immanent approach of literary texts, S. Fallacy (I).

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The concept of inference is a primitive, that is, it can be defined on the basis of concepts of an equal complexity, or by an example of inference taken from a special field, logic: an inference is “the derivation of a proposition (conclusion) from a set of other propositions (the premises)” (Brody 1967, p. 66-67). Inference is used to establish a new truth on the basis of truths already known or accepted.

There are two kinds of inference, inference strictly speaking and immediate inference.

— In immediate inference, the conclusion is derived from a single proposition, S. Proposition.
— Strictly speaking, inference is based upon several propositions, its premises. Traditional logic distinguishes between deductive inference (deduction) and inductive inference (induction). In Aristotle’s vision of rhetoric, the enthymeme is the argumentative counterpart of deductive inference and the example is the counterpart of inductive inference, S. Enthymeme; Example.

1. Analogy, deduction, induction and conduction

Analogical inference is accepted only as a heuristic instrument, it has no probative value, S. Analogy.

Deduction and induction are traditionally opposed on two bases.
— The particular / general orientation. Deduction and induction are considered to be two complementary processes, induction going from the general to the most general:

This Syldavian is red-haired, so all Syldavians are red-haired.

Whereas, the deduction would go from the most general to the least general:

Men are mortal, so Socrates is mortal.

But syllogistic deduction can be generalizing:

All horses are mammals, all mammals are vertebrates, therefore all horses are vertebrates.

— The degree of certainty. The valid conclusion of a syllogistic deduction from true premises is apodictic, i.e., necessarily true, while induction only concludes in a probable way.

 

— Conduction is considered by Wellman (1971) as a specific kind of inference on a par with deduction and induction.

2. Immediate inference and analytic statements

An analytic statement is a statement deemed true “by definition”, i.e., in virtue of its meaning. Good definitions are analytically true “a single person is an adult unmarried person”. While logical immediate inference proceeds from quantifiers or “empty words”, immediate analytical inference operates upon the meaning of the “full words” of the basic utterance:

He is single, so he is not married.

In arguments such as, “this is our duty, so we must do it”, the proposition introduced by so, “we must do it” is contained in the argument “it is our duty”; by definition a duty is something people must do. The conclusion, if a conclusion at all, is immediate.
More broadly, an analytic inference is an inference where the conclusion is some way embedded in the argument; the conclusion only develops the semantic contents of the argument. If I’m advised that my colleague recently “quitted smoking” I can analytically infer that he or she smoked in the past, S. Presupposition.

Consider the example:

You talk about the birth of the Gods; this implies that at one time the Gods did not exist. This is just as impious as talking about the death of Gods, for which your colleague was recently sentenced to death.

Birth is defined as the “beginning of life”. The conclusion does not directly follow from the definition of the word; an additional step is needed to make explicit the meaning of “beginning”, chosen so as to imply equivalence between the times after death with the times before birth. For this reason, the conclusion does not seem so obvious as in the preceding cases.

3. Pragmatic inference

The concept of pragmatic inference is used to account for the interpretation of utterances in discourse. In the dialogue:

S1    — Whom did you meet at the party?
S2    — Paul, Peter and Mary

From S2’s answer, S1 will infer that S2 encountered no other person they both know. This inference is based on a transition law, the maxim of quantity, or completeness: “when you are asked something, give the best information you have, both quantitatively and qualitatively”. If S2 met Bruno at the party, a person well-known to S1, then S2 can be said to have lied to S1 by omission, S. Cooperation.

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Induction is one of the three classical modes of inference. Induction goes from the particular to the general; it generalizes to all cases findings and information gathered from a limited number of cases.

I draw a marble from the bag; then a second marble, … then still another marble…
The bag is still not empty; nonetheless, I conclude that this is a bag of marbles.

To conclude with certainty, all the remaining items would have to be examined, but it would take a long time. A trade-off must be found between 1) the margins of uncertainty I can tolerate and 2) the amount of time that would be needed to check the entire bag. I decide to save time I check some items and conclude, “this is a bag of marbles”.
Induction rests on similarity between the individuals, possibly based just on one feature, deemed relevant by the arguer.

An induction based on just one case is an example.

1. Forms of induction

Complete induction — Induction is said to be complete and its conclusion positive (valid, certain), if one proceeds by an exhaustive inspection of each individual. Such a process is possible only if one has access to all the members of the set.

Induction from a representative subset to the set — A proposition found true in a carefully selected sample can be tentatively extended to the whole:

40 per cent of a representative sample of voters polled declared their intention to vote for candidate Joni. So Joni will get 40 per cent of the vote on Election Day.

Depending on whether or not the sample is truly representative, whether or not people have given fanciful answers, the conclusion varies from almost certain to vaguely probable.

Induction from an essential characteristic — The generalization from an accidental property of a specimen to all other specimen is hazardous, but when based on an essential property, the conclusion is positive, S. Example:

This is a normal Syldavian passport.
This passport mentions the religious affiliation of the holder.
So all Syldavian passports mention religious affiliation.

2. Refutation of induction

A conclusion obtained by induction is refuted by showing that it proceeds from a hasty generalization, based on the examination of an insufficient number of cases. To that end, one exhibits members of the collection that do not possess the property.

3. Induction in mathematics: recursive reasoning

In mathematics, recursive reasoning is a form of induction which leads to positive conclusions (Vax 1982, [Mathematical induction or recursive reasoning]). It is operative in domains such as arithmetic, where a relation of succession can be defined. First, it must be shown that the property holds for 1; then, that if it holds for an individual “i”, it also holds for its successor “i + 1”. The conclusion is that all the members of the set possess the tested property.

4. Induction as a positive method in literary history

An inductive argument consists of establishing a general law or tendency and applying this to a large number of examples. This process is typical of the positivist science of literature and ideas.

§ 2 Diffusion of Irreligion in the Nobility and the Clergy
Diffusion of irreligion is considerable in the high nobility. General testimonies abound, ‘Atheism’, says Lamothe-Langon, ‘was universally spread in what was called high society; to believe in God was becoming ridiculous, and we were careful to guard ourselves’. The Memoirs of Ségur, those of Vaublanc, those of the Marquise de la Tour du Pin confirm what Lamothe-Langon writes. At Madame d’Hénin’s, the Princess de Poix, the Duchesse de Biron, the Princess de Bouillon, and in the ranks of officers, people are, if not atheist, at least deist. Most members of the salons were “philosophers”, and adopted the spirit of the philosophers, and the great philosophers are their most beautiful ornament. This may be seen not only in the salon of the philosophers themselves, at d’Holbach’s, Mme Helvetius’s, Mme Necker’s, Fanny de Beauharnais’s (where we see Mably, Mercier, Cloots, Boissy d’Anglas), but also among the great nobility. At the Duchesse d’Enville’s, one meets Turgot, Adam Smith, Arthur Young, Diderot, Condorcet; at the Count de Castellane’s, D’Alembert, Condorcet, and Raynal. In the salons of the Duchesse de Choiseul, the Maréchale de Luxembourg, the Duchesse de Grammont, Madame de Montesson, the Comtesse de Tessé, the Comtesse de Ségur (her mother), Ségur meets or hears Rousseau, Helvétius, Duclos, Voltaire, Diderot, Marmontel, Raynal, Mably. The Hôtel de la Rochefoucauld is the meeting place of the more or less skeptical and liberal great lords, Choiseul, Rohan, Maurepas, Beauvau, Castries, Chauvelin, Chabot, who meet with Turgot, d’Alembert, Barthélémy, Condorcet, Caraccioli, Guibert. There are many others who might be mentioned here: the salons of the Duchesse d’Aiguillon, who was ‘very infatuated with modern philosophy, that is to say, with materialism and atheism’, Madame de Beauvau, the Duke of Levis, Madame de Vernage, the Comte de Choiseul-Gouffier, the Vicomte de Noailles, the Duke de Nivernais, the Prince de Conti, etc.
Daniel Mornet, [The Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution], 1933[1]

The claim to be justified asserts that, “the diffusion of irreligion is considerable in the high nobility”. It is supported by an explicit testimony, accompanied by three others, which are merely evoked. This is followed by an affirmation of the same order, “most members of the salons are “philosophers” and philosophers are their most beautiful ornament”, supported by twenty-eight names of philosophers. The reasoning is irresistible, but the reading can be boring.

The strength of the asserted principle depends on the number of cases considered. Their small number gives some reasons for skepticism:

It hasn’t been sufficiently appreciated how insignificant is the number of these historical examples upon which are asserted the “laws” claiming to be valid for all the past and future evolution of the humanity. [Vico] claims that history is a succession of alternations between a period of progress and a period of regression; he gives two examples. [Saint-Simon] that it is a succession of oscillations between an organic epoch and a critical epoch; he gives two examples. A third, [Marx], that it is a series of economic regimes, each of which eliminates its predecessor by violence; he gives one single example!
Julien Benda, The Treachery of the Clerks, [1927].[2] Our emphasis.

It should be noted that Benda’s own claim that, “the number of these historical examples upon which is asserted a “law” claiming to be valid for all the past and future evolution of humanity is insignificant”, is itself backed by three examples.

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[1] Daniel Mornet (1933). Les origines intellectuelles de la Révolution Française, 1715-1787. Paris: Armand Colin, p. 270-271.
[2] Quoted after Julien Benda, La Trahison des clercs. Paris: Grasset, 1975, p. 224-225.

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